"How the fuck you able to keep the count right you not able to do the book problem then?"
"Count be wrong, they fuck you up."
Imagine this: Our understanding is that a striped mother cat will always give birth to striped kittens. But we're not sure about this. We're trying to figure out if our assumption is correct. So here we have a striped mother cat, but we'd have to open this closed door if we want to see what its kittens look like. And here we have a brown-coated mother cat, and its kittens are behind this other closed door. And here, third, we have a litter of striped cats, and their mom is behind that third door. And lastly we have this litter of brown-coated cats, and their mom is behind that fourth door. Now, opening doors is hard work! Who wants to do more work than they need to! Think it through, and tell me which doors you'd need to open if you wanted to make sure our initial assumption was correct.
Alternative (By-product) Hypotheses Eliminated
B1. That familiarity can explain the social contract effect.
B2. That social contract content merely activates the rules of inference of the propositional calculus (logic).
B3. That any problem involving payoffs will elicit the detection of logical violations.
B4. That permission schema theory can explain the social contract effect.
B5. That social contract content merely promotes “clear thinking.”
B6. That a content-independent deontic logic can explain social contract reasoning.
B7. That a single mechanism operates on all deontic rules involving subjective utilities.
B8. That relevance theory can explain social contract effects (see also Fiddick et al., 2000).
B9. That rational choice theory can explain social contract effects.
B10. That statistical learning produces the mechanisms that cause social contract
The evidence supports social contract theory: Cheater detection occurs even when the social contract is wildly unfamiliar (Figure 20.3a). For example, the rule, “If a man eats cassava root, then he must have a tattoo on his face,” can be made to fit the social contract template by explaining that the people involved consider eating cassava root to be a benefit (the rule then implies that having a tattoo is the requirement an individual must satisfy to be eligible for that benefit). When given this context, this outlandish, culturally alien rule elicits the same high level of cheater detection as highly familiar social exchange rules. This surprising result has been replicated for many different unfamiliar rules (Cosmides, 1985,
1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; Platt & Griggs, 1993).
As predicted (D3), the mind’s automatically deployed definition of cheating is tied to the perspective you are taking (Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992). For example, consider the following social contract:
 If an employee is to get a pension, then that employee must have worked for the firm for over 10 years.
This rule elicits different answers depending on whether subjects are cued into the role of employer or employee. Those in the employer role look for cheating by employees, investigating cases of P and not-Q (employees with pensions; employees who have worked for fewer than 10 years). Those in the employee role look for cheating by employers, investigating cases of not-P and Q (employees with no pension; employees who have worked more than 10 years). Not-P & Q is correct if the goal is to find out whether the employer is cheating employees. But it is not
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