(10:36:46 AM) bradass87: living such an opaque life, has forced me never to take transparency, openness, and honesty for granted
(11:49:02 AM) bradass87: im in the desert, with a bunch of hyper-masculine trigger happy ignorant rednecks as neighbors… and the only safe place i seem to have is this satellite internet connection
(11:49:51 AM) bradass87: and i already got myself into minor trouble, revealing my uncertainty over my gender identity… which is causing me to lose this job… and putting me in an awkward limbo
(1:13:10 PM) bradass87: i just… dont wish to be a part of it… at least not now… im not ready… i wouldn’t mind going to prison for the rest of my life, or being executed so much, if it wasn’t for the possibility of having pictures of me… plastered all over the world press… as boy…
(1:14:11 PM) bradass87: i’ve totally lost my mind… i make no sense… the CPU is not made for this motherboard…
(1:14:42 PM) bradass87: s/as boy/as a boy
(02:03:27 PM) bradass87: received a “Company Grade Article 15″ — a formality (they only reduced me in grade, and aren’t making me do “extra duty”) since they needed to punish me in some way
(02:03:36 PM) bradass87: PFC
(02:04:59 PM) bradass87: i punched a colleague in the face during an argument… (something I NEVER DO…!?) its whats sparked this whole saga
(02:06:24 PM) email@example.com: did they have it oming?
(02:06:33 PM) bradass87: yes
(02:06:44 PM) bradass87: as a result, i was referred (forced) to behavioral health… to evaluate me… as a result, my commander had access to all of my mental health files… ergo how they found out about my cross-dressing history, discomfort with my role in society, and the environment i’ve placed myself in
(02:07:03 PM) bradass87: it was a minor incident… but it brought attention to me
firstname.lastname@example.org: I put on my robe and wizard hat.
(01:44:33 PM) bradass87: DADT isnt really enforced
(01:44:56 PM) bradass87: top interrogator here has a civil union in NJ
(01:45:18 PM) bradass87: i punched a dyke in the phace…
(01:45:22 PM) email@example.com: lol
(01:45:43 PM) bradass87: half the S2 shop was at least bi
(01:45:57 PM) firstname.lastname@example.org: you know this personal-like? ; )
(01:46:05 PM) bradass87: it was all female
(01:46:10 PM) email@example.com: ah
(01:46:46 PM) bradass87: i got sick of these dykes and their drama… it was worse than “The L Word”…
(01:47:12 PM) bradass87: i even created a “chart”
(01:47:42 PM) firstname.lastname@example.org: physical or virtual?
(01:48:07 PM) bradass87: we never got a replacement CI expert
(01:48:39 PM) bradass87: virtual… on SIPR =P(01:49:20 PM) email@example.com: shouldn’t be a challenge for you to exfiltrate a copy ;>
(01:51:07 PM) bradass87: that was probably a primary facilitator… CI officer was an open position, taken up by a lesbian interrogator who was more worried about the drama than the exfiltration of classified information
"Listen up, new battalion SOP (standing operating procedure) from now on: Anytime your convoy gets hit by an IED, I want 360 degree rotational fire. You kill every [expletive] in the street!"
We weren't trained extensively to recognize an unlawful order, or how to report one. But many of us could not believe what we had just been told to do. Those of us who knew it was morally wrong struggled to figure out a way to avoid shooting innocent civilians, while also dodging repercussions from the non-commissioned officers who enforced the policy. In such situations, we determined to fire our weapons, but into rooftops or abandoned vehicles, giving the impression that we were following procedure.
I was part of the unit that was responsible for this atrocity. In the video, I can be seen attempting to carry wounded children to safety in the aftermath.
The video released by WikiLeaks belongs in the public record. Covering up this incident is a matter deserving of criminal inquiry. Whoever revealed it is an American hero in my book.
Nuance is simply entirely lost on some people -- especially the "everything the Government does is bad" crowd (sounds familiar, hm, I should remember to bring biscuits to your little Tea Party).
Huh. On the one hand, I am glad Manning leaked these documents. I am glad these documents are now public. But at the same time, I am not opposed to Manning being executed or imprisoned for life should he be found guilty.
So all foreign policy is bad then?
Now, whoever leaked the Pentagon Papers WOULD be subject to criminal prosecution, had they been uncovered. But journalists also protect their sources for this very reason. -- chimaera
What did we get from the release of cables, the specific contents of which were unknown to both Manning and Assange, the contents which had to be given to certain journalists to do the work of providing context and summaries? I mean, aside from creating diplomatic messes and weakening diplomatic ties, and launching an annoying media circus? Nothing. They never should've been released. They're done more harm than good.
I forgot his name. I knew Ellsberg's name wasn't a secret. "whoever" was poor word choice, but thanks for the insult.
Now, whoever leaked the Pentagon Papers WOULD be subject to criminal prosecution, had they been uncovered. But journalists also protect their sources for this very reason.
The difference is, allow me to reiterate, Ellsberg had made no oath to protect the information he disseminated. Manning had in fact undertaken that very charge.
if there's a word or phrase in here that's poorly chosen, I trust you to find it and obliterate my point thereby.
I'm not talking about the general oath all servicemen take. You realize that in order to get a security clearance you have to sign documents (which are under oath, as misrepresentations carry perjury penalties)
No. I really couldn't think of is name and put in "whoever" -- I made no attempt to state that nobody else knew his name.
subject to criminal prosecution, had they been uncovered. But journalists also protect their sources for this very reason.
Pre 9-11 terrorism was rare; now we dump fuel on fires.
I'd almost go as far as to call Al Qaida a "first world problem". ;)
The US government claims that Al Qaeda is in shambles and there are 10-20 leaders left of any note and that Al Qaeda has essentially lost its ability to mount a large scale operation at this time. While we must watch for resurgence and there is always a chance of an attack by another group, your comment is incorrect.
As a further example in defense of current US military spending I note
that India has a much lower defense budget and would appear to be subject to additional terrorist risk.
Therefore we can conclude that the status quo is beneficial to the majority of citizens.
(02:31:02 PM) bradass87: i think the thing that got me the most… that made me rethink the world more than anything
(02:35:46 PM) bradass87: was watching 15 detainees taken by the Iraqi Federal Police… for printing “anti-Iraqi literature”… the iraqi federal police wouldn’t cooperate with US forces, so i was instructed to investigate the matter, find out who the “bad guys” were, and how significant this was for the FPs… it turned out, they had printed a scholarly critique against PM Maliki… i had an interpreter read it for me… and when i found out that it was a benign political critique titled “Where did the money go?” and following the corruption trail within the PM’s cabinet… i immediately took that information and *ran* to the officer to explain what was going on… he didn’t want to hear any of it… he told me to shut up and explain how we could assist the FPs in finding *MORE* detainees…
The US simply has no business killing random people in foreign countries who have never offered us any harm. This would be evil even if it were profiting the citizens of the USA - the fact that, by any objective measure, the last decade and more of foreign wars has been a big loss for Americans makes it evil and stupid.
Why this thread has turned into this discussion, I'm not sure
(a) Citizens are equal before the law, without discrimination because of sex, blood, language, social origin, or religion. (b) Equal opportunities are guaranteed to all citizens, according to the law.
Iraqi Constitution, 1970
Education: Rapidly growing enrollment in tuition-free public schools. Six years of primary (elementary), three years of intermediate secondary, and three years of intermediate preparatory education. Six major universities, forty-four teacher training schools and institutes, and three colleges and technical institutes, all government owned and operated. Dramatic increases since 1977 in numbers of students in technical fields (300 percent rise) and numbers of female primary students (45 percent rise). Literacy variously estimated at about 40 percent by foreign observers and 70 percent by government. Academic year 1985-86: number of students in primary schools 2,812,516; secondary schools (general) 1,031,560; vocational schools 120,090; teacher training schools and institutions 34,187; universities, colleges, and technical institutes 53,037.
It appears, then, that, however important sectarian affiliation may have been in the past, in the latter 1980s nationalism was the basic determiner of loyalty. In the case of Iraq's Shias, it should be noted that they are Arabs, not Persians, and that they have been the traditional enemies of the Persians for centuries. The Iraqi government has skillfully exploited this age-old enmity in its propaganda, publicizing the war as part of the ancient struggle between the Arab and Persian empires. For example, Baathist publicists regularly call the war a modern day "Qadisiyah." Qadisiyah was the battle in A.D.637 in which the Arabs defeated the pagan hosts of Persia, enabling Islam to spread to the East.
The real tension in Iraq in the latter 1980s was between the majority of the population, Sunnis as well as Shias, for whom religious belief and practice were significant values, and the secular Baathists, rather than between Sunnis and Shias. Although the Shias had been underrepresented in government posts in the period of the monarchy, they made substantial progress in the educational, business, and legal fields. Their advancement in other areas, such as the opposition parties, was such that in the years from 1952 to 1963, before the Baath Party came to power, Shias held the majority of party leadership posts. Observers believed that in the late 1980s Shias were represented at all levels of the party roughly in proportion to government estimates of their numbers in the population. For example, of the eight top Iraqi leaders who in early 1988 sat with Husayn on the Revolutionary Command Council--Iraq's highest governing body-- three were Arab Shias (of whom one had served as Minister of Interior), three were Arab Sunnis, one was an Arab Christian, and one a Kurd. On the Regional Command Council--the ruling body of the party--Shias actually predominated (see The Baath Party , ch. 4). During the war, a number of highly competent Shia officers have been promoted to corps commanders. The general who turned back the initial Iranian invasions of Iraq in 1982 was a Shia.
The Shias continued to make good progress in the economic field as well during the 1980s. Although the government does not publish statistics that give breakdowns by religious affiliation, qualified observers noted that many Shias migrated from rural areas, particularly in the south, to the cities, so that not only Basra but other cities including Baghdad acquired a Shia majority. Many of these Shias prospered in business and the professions as well as in industry and the service sector. Even those living in the poorer areas of the cities were generally better off than they had been in the countryside. In the rural areas as well, the educational level of Shias came to approximate that of their Sunni counterparts.
In summary, prior to the war the Baath had taken steps toward integrating the Shias. The war placed inordinate demands on the regime for manpower, demands that could only be met by levying the Shia community--and this strengthened the regime's resolve to further the integration process. In early 1988, it seemed likely that when the war ends, the Shias would emerge as full citizens-- assuming that the Baath survives the conflict.
Nestled in a back corner of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport is a sprawling walled compound run by the Central Intelligence Agency. Set on the coast of the Indian Ocean, the facility looks like a small gated community, with more than a dozen buildings behind large protective walls and secured by guard towers at each of its four corners. Adjacent to the compound are eight large metal hangars, and the CIA has its own aircraft at the airport. The site, which airport officials and Somali intelligence sources say was completed four months ago, is guarded by Somali soldiers, but the Americans control access. At the facility, the CIA runs a counterterrorism training program for Somali intelligence agents and operatives aimed at building an indigenous strike force capable of snatch operations and targeted “combat” operations against members of Al Shabab, an Islamic militant group with close ties to Al Qaeda.
As part of its expanding counterterrorism program in Somalia, the CIA also uses a secret prison buried in the basement of Somalia’s National Security Agency (NSA) headquarters, where prisoners suspected of being Shabab members or of having links to the group are held. Some of the prisoners have been snatched off the streets of Kenya and rendered by plane to Mogadishu. While the underground prison is officially run by the Somali NSA, US intelligence personnel pay the salaries of intelligence agents and also directly interrogate prisoners.
As the criticism grew, there is no sign that anyone in the U.S. administration, and only a tiny handful within Congress, actually took it to heart— actually questioned the sanity and legality of reducing an entire civilization to a preindustrial state, of bankrupting an entire nation for the purpose of containing one tyrannical man. As the criticism grew and the suffering continued on a massive scale, the U.S. administration stubbornly saw itself as alone in its moral leadership, never grasping the significance or thoroughness of its isolation and marginality. It seems that the United States simply could not see its policies the way the rest of the world did: not just Arab nations, or France or Russia, but nearly everyone— the General Assembly, NGOs, UNMOVIC, the UN’s human rights rapporteur, every UN humanitarian agency, and nearly every member of the Security Council.
U.S. officials did not act with the deliberate cruelty that is envisioned by international human rights law. It was not a hatred of Iraqis that led U.S. officials to act as they did; it was the decision that the Iraqis would bear the cost of the United States’ intractable political dilemma. This particular catastrophe did not require actual hatred; it required only the capacity of U.S. officials to believe their own rationales, however implausible they might have been, and that there be no venue in which to challenge their reasoning as casuistic and disingenuous. Madeline Albright’s memorable gaffe in response to the question “500,000 children— is it worth it?”— which she regretted for years— was always and only a public relations error. It made no difference that she and other State Department officials, from that point on, vigorously insisted that they cared deeply about Iraqi children. The more accurate answer, regardless of the public rhetoric, was: of course it was worth it. Blocking glue, water pipes, water tankers, thermos flasks, ambulance radios, irrigation equipment— all of this was worth it because the negligible imaginary possibility that these could be turned to nefarious purposes always outweighed the collapse of the Iraqi health system, Iraq’s frantic efforts to increase agricultural production, the disappearance of Iraq’s middle class, the hundreds of thousands of tons of untreated sewage that went daily into Iraq’s rivers.
Excerpt from Joy Gordon's "Invisible War"
As the criticism grew and the suffering continued on a massive scale, the U.S. administration stubbornly saw itself as alone in its moral leadership, never grasping the significance or thoroughness of its isolation and marginality. It seems that the United States simply could not see its policies the way the rest of the world did: not just Arab nations, or France or Russia, but nearly everyone— the General Assembly, NGOs, UNMOVIC, the UN’s human rights rapporteur, every UN humanitarian agency, and nearly every member of the Security Council.
...Blocking glue, water pipes, water tankers, thermos flasks, ambulance radios, irrigation equipment— all of this was worth it because the negligible imaginary possibility that these could be turned to nefarious purposes always outweighed the collapse of the Iraqi health system, Iraq’s frantic efforts to increase agricultural production, the disappearance of Iraq’s middle class, the hundreds of thousands of tons of untreated sewage that went daily into Iraq’s rivers.
SECRETARY POWELL: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister and good evening ladies and gentlemen. I am very pleased to be back in Egypt and to have had the opportunity to meet and consult with President Mubarak and with the Foreign Minister. I've known President Mubarak for many, many years and it is good to renew the friendship. He is looked on as a wise leader not only by his people, but by people throughout the region and throughout the world...
We will always try to consult with our friends in the region so that they are not surprised and do everything we can to explain the purpose of our responses. We had a good discussion, the Foreign Minister and I and the President and I, had a good discussion about the nature of the sanctions -- the fact that the sanctions exist -- not for the purpose of hurting the Iraqi people, but for the purpose of keeping in check Saddam Hussein's ambitions toward developing weapons of mass destruction. We should constantly be reviewing our policies, constantly be looking at those sanctions to make sure that they are directed toward that purpose. That purpose is every bit as important now as it was ten years ago when we began it. And frankly they have worked. He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors. So in effect, our policies have strengthened the security of the neighbors of Iraq, and these are policies that we are going to keep in place, but we are always willing to review them to make sure that they are being carried out in a way that does not affect the Iraqi people but does affect the Iraqi regime's ambitions and the ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and we had a good conversation on this issue.
adjectif masculin singulier
en dehors du territoire national
The United States exported support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war over $500 million worth of dual use exports to Iraq that were approved by the Commerce department. Among them were advanced computers, some of which were used in Iraq's nuclear program. The non-profit American Type Culture Collection and the Centers for Disease Control sold or sent biological samples of anthrax, West Nile virus and botulism to Iraq up until 1989, which Iraq claimed it needed for medical research. A number of these materials were used for Iraq's biological weapons research program, while others were used for vaccine development. For example, the Iraqi military settled on the American Type Culture Collection strain 14578 as the exclusive anthrax strain for use as a biological weapon, according to Charles Duelfer. ( wiki )
TO: The Secretary
FROM: PM - Jonathan T Howe
SUBJECT: Iraq Use of Chemical Weapons
We have recently received additional information confirming Iraqi use of chemical weapons. We also know that Iraq has acquired a CW [chemical weapons] production capability, primarily from Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary. In keeping with our policy of seeking to halt CW use whenever it occurs, we are considering the most effective means to halt Iraqi CW use including, as a first step, a direct approach to Iraq. This would be consistent with the way we handled the initial CW use information from Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, i.e., private demarches to the Lao, Vietnamese, and Soviets.
As you are aware, presently Iraq is at a disadvantage in its war of attrition with Iran. After a recent SIG meeting on the war, a discussion paper was sent to the White House for an NSC meeting (possibly Wednesday or Thursday this week), a section of which outlines a number of measures we might take to assist Iraq. At our suggestion, the issue of Iraqi CW use will be added to the agenda for this meeting.
If the NSC decides measures are to be undertaken to assist Iraq, our best present chance of influencing cessation of CW use may be in the context of informing Iraq of these measures. It is important, however, that we approach Iraq very soon in order to maintain the credibility of U.S. policy on CW, as well as to reduce or halt what now appears to be Iraq's almost daily use of CW.
I understand that there were legal constraints on EXIM financing for sales to Iraq arising from Iraq's links to international terrorists. Recently, the President of Iraq announced the termination of all assistance to the principal terrorist group of concern, among others. Iraq then expelled this group and its leader. The terrorist issue, therefore, should no longer be an impediment to EXIM financing for U.S. sales to Iraq...
[blah blah there will be money, they will boost oil exports]...
From the political standpoint, EXIM financing would show U.S. interest in the Iraqi economy in a practical, neutral context. It could provide some incentive for Iraq to comply with our urgings that it show restraint in the war. This evidence of our interest in increasing commercial relations also will bring political benefits, as well as balance-of-trade and employment benefits to our economy.
I, Howard Teicher, hereby state that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the facts presented herein are true, correct and complete. I further state that to the best of my knowledge and belief, nothing stated in this Declaration constitutes classified information.
1. My name is Howard Teicher. From 1977 to 1987, I served in the United States government as a member of the national security bureaucracy. From early 1982 to 1987, I served as a Staff Member to the United States National Security Council.
2. While a Staff Member to the National Security Council, I was responsible for the Middle East and for Political-Military Affairs. During my five year tenure on the National security Council, I had regular contact with both CIA Director William Casey and Deputy Director Robert Gates.
3. In the Spring of 1982, Iraq teetered on the brink of losing its war with Iran. In May and June, 1982, the Iranians discovered a gap in the Iraqi defenses along the Iran-Iraq border between Baghdad to the north and Basra to the south. Iran positioned a massive invasion force directly across from the gap in the Iraqi defenses. An Iranian breakthrough at the spot would have cutoff Baghdad from Basra and would have resulted in Iraq's defeat.
4. United States Intelligence, including satellite imagery, had detected both the gap in the Iraqi defenses and the Iranian massing of troops across from the gap. At the time, the United States was officially neutral in the Iran-Iraq conflict.
5. President Reagan was forced to choose between (a) maintaining strict neutrality and allowing Iran to defeat Iraq, or (b) intervening and providing assistance to Iraq.
6. In June, 1982, President Reagan decided that the United States could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran. President Reagan decided that the United States would do whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran. President Reagan formalized this policy by issuing a National Security Decision Directive ("NSDD") to this effect in June, 1982. I have personal knowledge of this NSDD because I co-authored the NSDD with another NSC Staff Member, Geoff Kemp. The NSDD, including even its identifying number, is classified.
7. CIA Director Casey personally spearheaded the effort to ensure that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war. Pursuant to the secred NSDD, the United States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S. military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military weaponry required. The United States also provided strategic operational advice to the Iraqis to better use their assets in combat.
For example, in 1986, President Reagan sent a secret message to Saddam Hussein telling him that Iraq should step up its air war and bombing of Iran. This message was delivered by Vice President Bush who communicated it to Egyptian President Mubarak, who in turn passed the message to Saddam Hussein. Similar strategic operational military advice was passed to Saddam Hussein through various meetings with European and Middle Eastern heads of state. I authored Bush's talking points for the 1986 meeting with Mubarak and personally attended numerous meetings with European and Middle East heads of state where the strategic operational advice was communicated.
8. I personally attended meetings in which CIA Director Casey or CIA Deputy Director Gates noted the need for Iraq to have certain weapons such as cluster bombs and anti-armor penetrators in order to stave off the Iranian attacks. When I joined the NSC staff in early 1982, CIA Director Casey was adamant that cluster bombs were a perfect "force multiplier" that would allow the Iraqis to defend against the "human waves" of Iranian attackers. I recorded those comments in the minutes of National Security Planning Group ("NSPG") meetings in which Casey or Gates participated.
9. The CIA, including both CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq. My notes, memoranda and other documents in my NSC files show or tend to show that the CIA knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, munitions and vehicles to Iraq.
10. The United States was anxious to have other countries supply assistance to Iraq. For example, in 1984, the Israelis concluded that Iran was more dangerous than Iraq to Israel's existence due to the growing Iranian influence and presence in Lebanon. The Israelis approached the United States in a meeting in Jerusalem that I attended with Donald Rumsfeld. Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir asked Rumsfeld if the United States would deliver a secret offer of Israeli assistance to Iraq. The United States agreed. I travelled wtih Rumsfeld to Baghdad and was present at the meeting in which Rumsfeld told Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz about Israel's offer of assistance. Aziz refused even to accept the Israelis' letter to Hussein offering assistance, because Aziz told us that he would be executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so.
11. One of the reasons that the United States refused to license or sell U.S. origin weapons to Iraq was that the supply of non-U.S. origin weapons to Iraq was sufficient to meet Iraq's needs. Under CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, the CIA made sure that non-U.S. manufacturers manufactured and sold to Iraq the weapons needed by Iraq. In certain instances where a key component in a weapon was not readily available, the highest levels of the United States government decided to make the component available, directly or indirectly, to Iraq. I specifically recall that the provision of anti-armor penetrators to Iraq was a case in point. The United States made a policy decision to supply penetrators to Iraq. My notes, memoranda and other documents in my NSC files will contain references to the Iraqis' need for anti-armor penetrators and the decision to provide penetrators to Iraq.
12. Most of the Iraqi's military hardware was of Soviet origin. Regular United States or NATO ammunition and spare parts could not be used in this Soviet weaponry.
13. The United States and the CIA maintained a program known as the 'Bear Spares" program whereby the United States made sure that spare parts and ammunition for Soviet or Soviet-style weaponry were available to countries which sought to reduce their dependence on the Soviets for defense needs. If the "Bear Spares" were manufactured outside the United States, then the United States could arrange for the provision of these weapons to a third country without direct involvement. Israel, for example, had a very large stockpile of Soviet weaponry and ammunition captured during its various wars. At the suggestion of the United States, the Israelis would transfer the spare parts and weapons to third countries or insurgent movements (such as the Afghan rebels and the Contras).
Similarly, Egypt manufactured weapons and spare parts from Soviet designs and porvided these weapons and ammunition to the Iraqis and other countries. Egypt also served as a supplier for the Bear Spares program. The United States approved, assisted and encouraged Egypt's manufacturing capabilities. The United States approved, assisted and encouraged Egypt's sale of weaponry, munitions and vehicles to Iraq.
14. The mere request to a third party to carry out an action did not constitute a "covert action," and, accordingly, required no Presidential Finding or reporting to Congress. The supply of Cardoen cluster bombs, which were fitted for use on Soviet, French and NATO aircraft, was a mere extension fo the United States policy of assisting Iraq through all legal means in order to avoid an Iranian victory.
15. My NSC files are currently held in the President Ronald Reagan Presidential Archives in Simi Valley, California. My files will contain my notes and memoranda from meetings I attended with CIA director Casey or CIA Deputy Director Gates which included discussions of Cardoen's manufacture and sale of cluster bombs to Iraq. My NSC files will also contain cable traffic among various United States agencies, embassies and other parties relating to Cardoen and his sale of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq and other Middle Eastern states.
16. Under CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq. My NSC files will contain documents that show or tend to show the CIA's authorization, approval and assistance of Cardoen's manufacture and sale of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq.
17. My files will contain notes, memoranda and other documents that will show that the highest levels of the United States government, including the NSC Staff and the CIA, were well aware of Cardoen's arrest in 1983 in Miami in a sting operation relating to the smuggling of night vision goggles to Cuba and Libya. My files will also show that the highest levels of the government were aware of the arrest and conviction of two of Cardoen's employees and his company Industrias Cardoen.
18. CIA Director William Casey, aware of Cardoen's arrest and the conviction of his employees and his company, intervened in order to make sure that Cardoen was able to supply cluster bombs to Iraq. Specifically, CIA Director Casey directed the Secretaries of the State and Commerce Departments that the necessary licenses required by Cardoen were not to be denied. My files will contain notes, memoranda and other documents showing or tending to show that CIA Director William Casey's intervention was in order to maintain Cardoen's ability to supply cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my memory and recollection.
Executed on 1/31/95
Recipes that antigovernment militia groups circulate at gun shows might suffice to make the deadly powder, he said.
But William C. Patrick III, a scientist who made germ weapons for the American military and is now a private consultant on biological defense, rated the Daschle anthrax as 7 on a scale of 10.
"It's relatively high grade," Mr. Patrick said, "but not weapons grade."
WASHINGTON –– Iraq's bioweapons program that President Bush wants to eradicate got its start with help from Uncle Sam two decades ago, according to government records getting new scrutiny in light of the discussion of war against Iraq.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention sent samples directly to several Iraqi sites that U.N. weapons inspectors determined were part of Saddam Hussein's biological weapons program, CDC and congressional records from the early 1990s show. Iraq had ordered the samples, claiming it needed them for legitimate medical research.
The CDC and a biological sample company, the American Type Culture Collection, sent strains of all the germs Iraq used to make weapons, including anthrax, the bacteria that make botulinum toxin and the germs that cause gas gangrene, the records show. Iraq also got samples of other deadly pathogens, including the West Nile virus.
The transfers came in the 1980s, when the United States supported Iraq in its war against Iran. They were detailed in a 1994 Senate Banking Committee report and a 1995 follow-up letter from the CDC to the Senate.
The exports were legal at the time and approved under a program administered by the Commerce Department.
"I don't think it would be accurate to say the United States government deliberately provided seed stocks to the Iraqis' biological weapons programs," said Jonathan Tucker, a former U.N. biological weapons inspector.
"But they did deliver samples that Iraq said had a legitimate public health purpose, which I think was naive to believe, even at the time."
The disclosures put the United States in the uncomfortable position of possibly having provided the key ingredients of the weapons America is considering waging war to destroy, said Sen. Robert Byrd, D-W.Va. Byrd entered the documents into the Congressional Record this month.
Byrd asked Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld about the germ transfers at a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. Byrd noted that Rumsfeld met Saddam in 1983, when Rumsfeld was President Reagan's Middle East envoy.
"Are we, in fact, now facing the possibility of reaping what we have sown?" Byrd asked Rumsfeld after reading parts of a Newsweek article on the transfers.
"I have never heard anything like what you've read, I have no knowledge of it whatsoever, and I doubt it," Rumsfeld said. He later said he would ask the Defense Department and other government agencies to search their records for evidence of the transfers.
Invoices included in the documents read like shopping lists for biological weapons programs. One 1986 shipment from the Virginia-based American Type Culture Collection included three strains of anthrax, six strains of the bacteria that make botulinum toxin and three strains of the bacteria that cause gas gangrene. Iraq later admitted to the United Nations that it had made weapons out of all three.
1. SUMMARY. THE DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURAL AVIATION HAS INVITED U.S. CROP SPRAYING AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS TO PROVIDE PROMOTIONAL LITERATURE FOR A JUNE 83 PURCHASE. A PILOT TRAINING PACKAGE IS EXPECTED TO BE INCLUDED. AIRCRAFT SALES ARE EXPECTED TO TRIPLE AS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT EXPANDS THEIR AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM. END SUMMARY...
4. 20 SOVIET DESIGNED, POLISH BUILT, AGING FOUR-MAN CHOPPERS ARE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED FOR CROP SPRAYING, DUSTING, FERTILIZING AND SEEDING... ACCORDING TO THE DIRECTOR, SOME PILOTS WHO HAVE BEEN FLYING FOR OVER 20 YEARS ARE EXPERIENCING CHEST PAINS FROM INHALING INSECTICIDE FUMES. COMATT WAS SHOWN THROUGHOUT CHOPPER BASE AND WITNESS LACK OF VENTILATION WITHIN HELICOPTERS...
5. THE DIRECTORY STATED THAT HE EXPECTED TO GRADUALLY REPLACE ALL 20 POLISH CHOPPERS WITHIN THREE TO FOUR YEARS. AFTER SOME PROBING, THE DIRECTOR AGREED THAT CURRENT INVENTORY WAS BASED UPON AN AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM THAT HAS BEEN DORMANT. WITH NEWLY AWARDED LARGE LAND RECLAMATION PROJECTS, AND ADDITIONAL FUNDING OF AGRICULTURAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAMS (FARMS), AIR FLEET IS EXPECTED TO TRIPLE (60 AIRCRAFT) TO ABSORB THE DEMAND FOR PEST CONTROL. AS ONE PILOT REMARKED, UPCOMING MAJOR JOBS WILL INCLUDE TWO CRAFTS IN OPERATION FOR A PERIOD OF 2 AND ONE HALF MONTHS, COVERING A MINIMUM OF 1200 DONUM.
Since first delivered to civil operators in 1966, over 2,500 Model 500s and MD 500s of various models built by Hughes, MDHC, and their licensees have operated on all continents. In addition to their more common use as executive transports, these helicopters have been employed frequently for law enforcement, training, geological survey, transport of precious metals, oil drilling and other mineral exploration projects... crop spraying (with a market breakthrough being achieved in 1988 when MD 500Es replaced Soviet-built Kamov Ka-26s operated by the Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture), and battle against pests (such as during attempts by the World Health Organization, WHO, to control the African River Blindness in eleven West African nations).
The document shows that the American and French supply houses shipped 17 types of biological agents to Iraq in the 1980's that were used in the weapons programs. Those included anthrax and the bacteria needed to make botulinum toxin, among the most deadly poisons known. It also discloses that Iraq had tried unsuccessfully to obtain biological agents in the late 1980's from other biological supply houses around the world.
--NYT, March 2003
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit data (see Figure 6), Iraq’s GDP stood at roughly $38 billion in 1989, measured in constant 2003 dollars.
Iraq’s indebtedness has been the result primarily of the war with Iran. Iraq traditionally had been free of foreign debt and had accumulated foreign reserves that reached $35 billion by 1980. These reserves were exhausted in the early stages of the war with Iran. It is estimated that from 1980 to 1989 Iraq’s arms purchases alone totaled $54.7 billion. Following the war, Iraq was faced with the dilemma of paying off short-term debts to western creditors estimated between $35 to 45 billion at high interest rates. However, the Regime resisted western attempts through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to reschedule the debt primarily because Baghdad believed it could negotiate more favorable terms dealing with countries bilaterally.
Iraq’s foreign debt was comprised of western credit provided for military assistance, development finance and export guarantees. This assistance has been estimated at $35 billion in principal. The former Soviet Union and Russia also provided loans to Iraq via the Paris Club during the 1980s and 1990s for the development and production of military programs (Figure 10). Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates provided an additional $30 to 40 billion in financing to fight Iran (Figure 11). Although the Gulf States considered the financial support provided to Iraq to be a loan, Iraq believed that the Gulf States were required to provide help to Iraq in its fight to prevent the spread of radical Iranian fundamentalism.
On the direct monetary costs, Iraq spent between US$74-US$91 billion on the conduct of the war and another £41.94 billion on military imports, whereas Iran's costs were US$94-US$112 billion and £11.26 billion respectively. As for the indirect cost due to the loss of income from oil and agricultural produce, it was estimated that the sums were US$561 billion and US$627 billion for Iraq and Iran respectively.
US BIOWEAPONS SUPERSTORE
JUNE 24, 1984
AMERICAN TYPE CULTURE COLLECTION AND THE CDC
APPROVED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR EXPORT
001 CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM*
001 HISTOPLASMA CAPSULATUM*
001 CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS*
001 BRUCELLA MELITENSIS*
001 BACILLUS ANTHRACIS*
TOTAL DUE: $0 (COURTESY OF AMERICAN TAXPAYERS)
THANK YOU FOR SHOPPING WITH US, SADDAM HUSSEIN!
*NOT FOR USE FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT OR ATTACKS
*ESPECIALLY LIKE THE ONES YOU EXECUTED IN THE PAST YEAR
*WE REALLY, REALLY MEAN IT
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