I am not a philosopher, nor do I claim to be an expert on philosophy. Because of a lifetime of activity in the field of theoretical physics, ranging from particle physics to general relativity to astrophysics, I do claim however to have some expertise in the impact of philosophy on my own field.If philosophy does not progress, but science does, and philosophy has an "impact" on science, how does science still progress? I guess it really is turtles all the way down...
When I was growing up, where I was growing up, there was a critique of religion according to which religion was cruel, and a lie, and a mechanism of enslavement, and something full of loathing and contempt for everything essentially human. Maybe that was true and maybe it wasn’t, but it had to do with important things — it had to do, that is, with history, and with suffering, and with the hope of a better world ...The "it" in the clause after the em-dash in the last sentence refers back to the criticism of religion, not to religion itself. The way I read it, Albert is saying, "We used to pick on religion for being evil, but now it seems that the best we critics can do is to call it dumb." Now, maybe for some of you "dumb" is worse than "evil." I'll say that the observable effects of dumb and evil are often indistinguishable. But somehow, dumb seems more excusable.
Or Turing? Turing...the philosopher?Wikipedia calls him
Alan Mathison Turing, OBE, FRS (play /ˈtjʊərɪŋ/ TEWR-ing; 23 June 1912 – 7 June 1954), was an English mathematician, logician, cryptanalyst, and computer scientist.For a long time he was thought of as someone who only did theoretical work on computers. But that's because all his practical work was classified.
"Also"? Wait, are you genuinely charging Albert with not having read Krauss's book? Reviewing a book in the Times without having read it would be an unrealistically bold thing to do, but just in case you're not convinced, Albert does say, in the thread I linked to above, "I did, for the record, read all of Professor Krauss’ book."Empath's reasoning seems to be "I read the book, and I liked it. David Albert says the book isn't good, therefore, he could not have read it." And accuses him of having only read the dust jacket.
I actually have read it, and it great. And he dismisses all the philosophical questions in the introduction so he can talk about his own perfectly reasonable and defensible definition of 'nothing' in the rest of the book.And what is his definition of nothing, exactly?
The idea that he didn't read the book is completely preposterous. You could argue he didn't understand it properly, but to claim he didn't read it is so absurd -- it isn't like it would have been difficult to do it, the guy probably reads tons of books, he probably got paid for the review... why wouldn't he have read it and why would he lie about doing so? The "evidence" of him having read it is his direct statement that he read it.Albert does say, in the thread I linked to above, "I did, for the record, read all of Professor Krauss’ book."If he did, there is zero evidence of it in the review.
No, my point about him not reading the book is that his review doesn't engage with the substance of the book at all, and merely picks at what could have been gleaned from the dust jacket or he introduction.Well "He hasn't read the book" is a different statement then "The review isn't comprehensive enough".
Richard Feynman goes, “Philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.” In response, some philosophers (e.g. Jonathan Schaffer[1]) have pointed out that it is likely that ornithological knowledge would be of great benefit to birds, were it possible for them to possess it.Or to put it another way "Philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as medical science would be to humans"
And it's not that it isn't comprehensive enough. He doesn't review the book, flat out. He reviews the introduction, decides the topic isn't for him, then dismisses the whole enterprise.Okay, so he writes:
What on earth, then, can Krauss have been thinking? Well, there is, as it happens, an interesting difference between relativistic quantum field theories and every previous serious candidate for a fundamental physical theory of the world. Every previous such theory counted material particles among the concrete, fundamental, eternally persisting elementary physical stuff of the world — and relativistic quantum field theories, interestingly and emphatically and unprecedentedly, do not. According to relativistic quantum field theories, particles are to be understood, rather, as specific arrangements of the fields. Certain arrangements of the fields, for instance, correspond to there being 14 particles in the universe, and certain other arrangements correspond to there being 276 particles, and certain other arrangements correspond to there being an infinite number of particles, and certain other arrangements correspond to there being no particles at all. And those last arrangements are referred to, in the jargon of quantum field theories, for obvious reasons, as “vacuum” states. Krauss seems to be thinking that these vacuum states amount to the relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical version of there not being any physical stuff at all. And he has an argument — or thinks he does — that the laws of relativistic quantum field theories entail that vacuum states are unstable. And that, in a nutshell, is the account he proposes of why there should be something rather than nothing.Is that accurate? I assume there's more to the book then that, but if that's not the central thesis of the book, then what is? And if it is the central thesis, why shouldn't the reviewer talk about it?
But for my taste, Albert hurts the case for philosophers and theologians not only by asserting without evidence that Krauss is wrong but also by (seemingly) throwing his lot in with religion. He concedes that religion may be a cruel lie and mechanism of enslavement, but at least it "had to do with important things — it had to do, that is, with history, and with suffering, and with the hope of a better world". And he ends by taking offense at his own straw man that religion is being insulted and called dumb.He's not "throwing his lot in with Religion" but rather saying "back in my day people had the balls to claim religion was bad" - It sounds like he'd prefer Hitchens style attacks on religion, rather then Krauss's "its' incorrect" or whatever.
LobsterMitten: Albert describes in his review that the proper understanding of the question is, whatever you think the fundamental physical stuff is, why is there that rather than a lack of that? So, as applied to a system in which quantum fields are the basic physical stuff, the question is, why are there quantum fields rather than no quantum fields? Or, how did the first quantum fields come to be?All interesting questions that Albert would perhaps have been better off addressing in a book of his own rather than knocking Krauss for not writing that book for him.
painquale: The question isn't whether there was a state in which nothing existed. Even if quantum fields always have existed and always will exist, things could have been otherwise (and apparently you and Krauss admit this as a possibility). So, why aren't they otherwise?
delmoi : He's not "throwing his lot in with Religion" but rather saying "back in my day people had the balls to claim religion was bad" - It sounds like he'd prefer Hitchens style attacks on religion, rather then Krauss's "its' incorrect" or whatever.Entirely possible. But if true, how and why would that even be a meaningful or relevant criticism of a book that was never trying to be about religion? Krauss spends perhaps 2-3 pages on religion throughout the book, and does so only in the most cursory way to anticipate the unavoidable, common preconceptions readers might have on the origins of the universe in order to redirect them towards his thesis. Apparently even that is enough to mark someone as a heretic who must be buried alive in a wordy avalanche of irrelevant outrage.
Executive summaryposted by Davenhill at 11:03 AM on April 29, 2012
This is going to be kind of long, so here’s the upshot. Very roughly, there are two different kinds of questions lurking around the issue of “Why is there something rather than nothing?”
One question is, within some framework of physical laws that is flexible enough to allow for the possible existence of either “stuff” or “no stuff” (where “stuff” might include space and time itself), why does the actual manifestation of reality seem to feature all this stuff?
The other is, why do we have this particular framework of physical law, or even something called “physical law” at all?
Lawrence (again, roughly) addresses the first question, and David cares about the second, and both sides expend a lot of energy insisting that their question is the “right” one rather than just admitting they are different questions.
Nothing about modern physics explains why we have these laws rather than some totally different laws, although physicists sometimes talk that way — a mistake they might be able to avoid if they took philosophers more seriously.
Then the discussion quickly degrades into name-calling and point-missing, which is unfortunate because these are smart people who agree about 95% of the interesting issues, and the chance for productive engagement diminishes considerably with each installment.
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