The Origins of Cambridge Pragmatism
June 17, 2013 3:56 PM Subscribe
In this video, Cheryl Misak delivers a lecture mostly having to do with the relationship between the accounts of truth given by C.S. Peirce and F.P. Ramsey.
Here is some primary-source background reading:
First, Ramsey's Truth and Probability (pdf) from 1926.
Second, Peirce's Illustrations of the Logic of Science serialized in six essays of Popular Science Monthly in the 1870s:
1. The Fixation of Belief
2. How to Make Our Ideas Clear
3. The Doctrine of Chances
4. The Probability of Induction
5. The Order of Nature
6. Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis
Peirce's essays were reprinted in the 1923 volume, Chance, Love, and Logic, which Misak mentions in her lecture.
And here is some secondary-source background reading and listening:
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an article on Peirce, as well as on Peirce's Logic and Peirce's Theory of Signs.
The SEP does not have an entry for Ramsey yet, so here is the Wikipedia entry, here is an interesting piece on the relationship between Ramsey and Wittgenstein (which is especially worth reading if you have never heard of Ramsey), and here is audio of an interview of philosopher D.H. Mellor about Ramsey.
And in case you need a larger-scale overview, here is the SEP entry on pragmatism.
Here is some primary-source background reading:
First, Ramsey's Truth and Probability (pdf) from 1926.
Second, Peirce's Illustrations of the Logic of Science serialized in six essays of Popular Science Monthly in the 1870s:
1. The Fixation of Belief
2. How to Make Our Ideas Clear
3. The Doctrine of Chances
4. The Probability of Induction
5. The Order of Nature
6. Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis
Peirce's essays were reprinted in the 1923 volume, Chance, Love, and Logic, which Misak mentions in her lecture.
And here is some secondary-source background reading and listening:
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an article on Peirce, as well as on Peirce's Logic and Peirce's Theory of Signs.
The SEP does not have an entry for Ramsey yet, so here is the Wikipedia entry, here is an interesting piece on the relationship between Ramsey and Wittgenstein (which is especially worth reading if you have never heard of Ramsey), and here is audio of an interview of philosopher D.H. Mellor about Ramsey.
And in case you need a larger-scale overview, here is the SEP entry on pragmatism.
Awesome post! Misak rocks, Ramsey is fascinating, and Peirce was a pretty sharp fellow! You've really outdone yourself here, JL.
(I have it on good authority that her work is literally shaking the pragmatist corner of the profession, though mostly because they claim it is deeply, deeply wrong. The SAAP folks are LIVID about the criticisms of Dewey, and to a lesser extent, James.)
posted by anotherpanacea at 4:41 PM on June 17, 2013
(I have it on good authority that her work is literally shaking the pragmatist corner of the profession, though mostly because they claim it is deeply, deeply wrong. The SAAP folks are LIVID about the criticisms of Dewey, and to a lesser extent, James.)
posted by anotherpanacea at 4:41 PM on June 17, 2013
Ok, in fairness, once she starts reading her notes she gets her footing and is much easier to listen to.
I was first introduced to the metaphysical club by Louis Menand.
I have read Pierce, James, Rorty and others, but am not well versed in Ramsey, so again, thanks!
posted by OHenryPacey at 4:43 PM on June 17, 2013
I was first introduced to the metaphysical club by Louis Menand.
I have read Pierce, James, Rorty and others, but am not well versed in Ramsey, so again, thanks!
posted by OHenryPacey at 4:43 PM on June 17, 2013
Great post! This will be fun to explore.
It's criminal how little-known Ramsey is outside of academia. He published foundational papers in three or four different fields and died at 26. That gives him claim to being one of the greatest minds of the last century. If he'd lived longer, and I have no doubt we'd think him a figure like Einstein, Wittgenstein, Chomsky, or Keynes.
posted by painquale at 4:57 PM on June 17, 2013 [2 favorites]
It's criminal how little-known Ramsey is outside of academia. He published foundational papers in three or four different fields and died at 26. That gives him claim to being one of the greatest minds of the last century. If he'd lived longer, and I have no doubt we'd think him a figure like Einstein, Wittgenstein, Chomsky, or Keynes.
posted by painquale at 4:57 PM on June 17, 2013 [2 favorites]
I honestly know next to nothing about Ramsey as a man or his work outside mathematics, but Ramsey's Theorem (and by extension Ramsey Theory) is nearly always on my mind in one way or another as a Graph Theorist. It's amazing what he was capable of in his short life. I'll be looking through these links over the next few days. Thanks, JL.
posted by monkeymadness at 5:02 PM on June 17, 2013
posted by monkeymadness at 5:02 PM on June 17, 2013
I hadn't read about the pragmatic view of truth before, but from browsing through this post and watching that lecture and discussion, I have to say I don't see a well-justified reason to make a distinction been such a discussion of truth and simple epistemology. Pragmatism implies to me a concern with knowledge claims than with whatever it is that we mean by "truth". Truth, while certainly only existing relative to some subject, seems to me to have the same sort of reality as a rock — that is, rocks only exist as rocks because there is someone to put them into such a category, and so with truth. But just as we don't decide whether something is a rock by how useful or justified such a claim is, it seems that a search of what truth is has to ask for something objective, and pragmatism seems to me to be saying, "whatever truth really is, the only way we'll ever identify it is by checking if the things we think are true are useful". (I'm simplifying my language a lot here, as I understood that the Jamesian view of usefulness was rejected by Ramsey; I'm just using "useful" to mean "within the scope of pragmatism".) Of course, maybe that's the whole point — the only understanding of truth we can hope to grasp for is one that is within our epistemological reach. Will have to keep reading.
posted by cthuljew at 10:42 PM on June 17, 2013
posted by cthuljew at 10:42 PM on June 17, 2013
Did Frank Ramsey really make Keynes change his view on probability?
posted by Golden Eternity at 8:58 AM on June 18, 2013
posted by Golden Eternity at 8:58 AM on June 18, 2013
Truth, while certainly only existing relative to some subject, seems to me to have the same sort of reality as a rock — that is, rocks only exist as rocks because there is someone to put them into such a category, and so with truth. But just as we don't decide whether something is a rock by how useful or justified such a claim is, it seems that a search of what truth is has to ask for something objective, and pragmatism seems to me to be saying, "whatever truth really is, the only way we'll ever identify it is by checking if the things we think are true are useful".
Two things. First, James, Dewey, and others will probably dispute the claim that we don't decide whether something is a rock by how useful or justified such a claim is. We want to decide whether this is a rock. What does that decision amount to? Well, it involves deciding whether or not to treat this as a rock: to call it a rock, to ascribe to it rock-like properties, to use it as one would use a rock, etc. But all of those seem to be closely related to the usefulness of those decisions. (The defense is much easier if you go to justification, which has clear epistemic content, not just pragmatic content.)
Second, the accounts of truth offered by Peirce and Ramsey are pretty different from the caricature of pragmatism that takes a proposition to be true whenever it is useful. Peirce starts off with the hypothesis that there are real things independent of what you or I or any finite number of individuals happen to think. He then offers the claim that scientific inquiry indefinitely pursued will disclose any given such real. The basic dispute between Peirce and more metaphysically robust accounts (like the correspondence theory) is that Peirce denies that it is possible to have two different, equally well-supported theories at the ideal end of inquiry. He denies a sort of global under-determination thesis.
One could give at least the following two thoughts in support of a Peircean view. (1) Suppose you had a theory that was well-supported by evidence -- one that has been born out through countless tests -- and suppose that no future test will lead you to abandon the theory, wouldn't you say that such a theory is true? If not, what more do you want from a true theory? (2) Whatever the real is, it has to have the potential to make a difference to experience. Otherwise, what is the point of calling it real? (Compare with the man who says he has a unicorn in his garden. "Where?" you ask. "Oh, I don't know," he says. "It's there somewhere." "How could I be sure?" "Oh, there's no way of testing." The man may insist that the unicorn is real, but we shouldn't believe him.)
Ramsey's view is usually thought to be even weaker than Peirce's (the redundancy view), and a lot of the lecture focuses on disputing the opinion that Ramsey's view of truth was just a redundancy theory.
posted by Jonathan Livengood at 5:01 AM on June 19, 2013 [1 favorite]
Two things. First, James, Dewey, and others will probably dispute the claim that we don't decide whether something is a rock by how useful or justified such a claim is. We want to decide whether this is a rock. What does that decision amount to? Well, it involves deciding whether or not to treat this as a rock: to call it a rock, to ascribe to it rock-like properties, to use it as one would use a rock, etc. But all of those seem to be closely related to the usefulness of those decisions. (The defense is much easier if you go to justification, which has clear epistemic content, not just pragmatic content.)
Second, the accounts of truth offered by Peirce and Ramsey are pretty different from the caricature of pragmatism that takes a proposition to be true whenever it is useful. Peirce starts off with the hypothesis that there are real things independent of what you or I or any finite number of individuals happen to think. He then offers the claim that scientific inquiry indefinitely pursued will disclose any given such real. The basic dispute between Peirce and more metaphysically robust accounts (like the correspondence theory) is that Peirce denies that it is possible to have two different, equally well-supported theories at the ideal end of inquiry. He denies a sort of global under-determination thesis.
One could give at least the following two thoughts in support of a Peircean view. (1) Suppose you had a theory that was well-supported by evidence -- one that has been born out through countless tests -- and suppose that no future test will lead you to abandon the theory, wouldn't you say that such a theory is true? If not, what more do you want from a true theory? (2) Whatever the real is, it has to have the potential to make a difference to experience. Otherwise, what is the point of calling it real? (Compare with the man who says he has a unicorn in his garden. "Where?" you ask. "Oh, I don't know," he says. "It's there somewhere." "How could I be sure?" "Oh, there's no way of testing." The man may insist that the unicorn is real, but we shouldn't believe him.)
Ramsey's view is usually thought to be even weaker than Peirce's (the redundancy view), and a lot of the lecture focuses on disputing the opinion that Ramsey's view of truth was just a redundancy theory.
posted by Jonathan Livengood at 5:01 AM on June 19, 2013 [1 favorite]
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