The issue is whether § 512(h) applies to an ISP acting only as a conduit for data transferred between two internet users, such as persons sending and receiving e-mail or, as in this case, sharing P2P files. Verizon contends § 512(h) does not authorize the issuance of a subpoena to an ISP that transmits infringing material but does not store any such material on its servers. The RIAA argues § 512(h) on its face authorizes the issuance of a subpoena to an ‘‘[internet] service provider’’ without regard to whether the ISP is acting as a conduit for user-directed communications. We conclude from both the terms of § 512(h) and the overall structure of § 512 that, as Verizon contends, a subpoena may be issued only to an ISP engaged in storing on its servers material that is infringing or the subject of infringing activity.posted by monju_bosatsu at 9:08 AM on December 19, 2003
Finally, the RIAA argues the definition of ‘‘[internet] service provider’’ in § 512(k)(1)(B) makes § 512(h) applicable to an ISP regardless what function it performs with respect to infringing material – transmitting it per § 512(a), caching it per § 512(b), hosting it per § 512(c), or locating it per § 512(d).posted by monju_bosatsu at 9:33 AM on December 19, 2003
This argument borders upon the silly. The details of this argument need not burden the Federal Reporter, for the specific provisions of § 512(h), which we have just rehearsed, make clear that however broadly ‘‘[internet] service provider’’ is defined in § 512(k)(1)(B), a subpoena may issue to an ISP only under the prescribed conditions regarding notification.
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posted by BigPicnic at 8:55 AM on December 19, 2003