Paul Nitze, 1907-2004
October 22, 2004 11:23 AM
Subscribe
A Walk in the Woods.Farewell to the original
Cold War warrior:
Paul Nitze, the college professor's son who went to Hotchkiss and Harvard and worked as investment banker before going to Washington in 1940, where he quickly became one of the
chief architects of American policy towards the Soviet Union. His doctrine of "
strategic stability" became its cornerstone for half a century (Nitze held key government posts in Washington, from the era of Franklin Roosevelt
to Ronald Reagan's, when he was the
White House's
guru on
arms control).
By the end of 1949, Nitze had become director of the State Department's policy planning staff, helping to devise the role of Nato, deciding to press ahead with the manufacture of the H-bomb, and producing
National Security Council document 68, the document
at the heart of the Cold War: in it, Nitze called for a drastic expansion of the U.S. military budget. The paper also expanded containment’s scope beyond the defense of major centers of industrial power to encompass the entire world.
(NSC-68 was a top secret paper, written in April 1950 and declassified in the 70's, called "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security"). More inside.
posted by matteo (7 comments total)
« Older
Bigfoot Field Researchers' Organisation....
| wow..and it can fly a flight s...
Newer »
Interestingly enough,
George Kennan thought that “The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” To that end, he called for countering “Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world” through the “adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.” Such a policy, Kennan predicted, would “promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.”
Even within the Truman administration there was a rift over containment between Kennan and Paul Nitze, Kennan’s successor as director of the Policy Planning Staff. Nitze, who saw the Soviet threat primarily in military terms, interpreted Kennan’s call for “the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force” to mean the use of military power. In contrast, Kennan, who considered the Soviet threat to be primarily political, advocated above all else economic assistance (e.g., the Marshall Plan) and “psychological warfare” (overt propaganda and covert operations) to counter the spread of Soviet influence. In 1950, Nitze’s conception of containment won out over Kennan’s.
___________
Nitze was "our old fox," as one Reaganite described him.
Having thundered about the need for more U.S. nuclear weapons, Nitze then began trading them away. His first bargain was hatched in the famous "walk in the woods," where he and a Soviet negotiator explored a deal for a radical reduction of medium-range missiles. That gambit failed, but arms control gathered force through the '80s, as Nitze had hoped. His trump card was Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" missile defense program, which had been created partly in response to Nitze's warnings about American vulnerability to Soviet attack. Nitze used Star Wars as leverage to help negotiate the breakthrough arms control agreement that Reagan concluded with Mikhail Gorbachev.
____
In 1986, reflecting on the Soviet Union, which was to disintegrate five years later, Mr. Nitze said negotiating with the Soviets was like working with a defective vending machine. "You put your quarter in, but you don't get anything out," he said. "You can shake it. You can talk to it. But you know it won't do any good. It just won't talk back to you."
posted by matteo at 11:27 AM on October 22, 2004