Retreat and Retrench?
February 22, 2005 5:23 PM Subscribe
Multipolarity: "The tendency toward a multipolar configuration of world politics, in which a number of regional power centers compete for hegemony over their spheres of influence within a framework of international agreements and institutions, is a long term process involving incremental gains and losses for the major players."
The first link is a George Soros foundation, most decidedly against current US international relations policy.
posted by stbalbach at 5:43 PM on February 22, 2005
posted by stbalbach at 5:43 PM on February 22, 2005
Nice links Joey.
Isn't it likely that it will be a hybrid between multi polar and uni polar worlds? Isn't the US likely to become first among equals. No-one else has the geographical position, the economic power, the political unity and the bases in so many countries or the desire or ability to spend 500 Billion dollars on the military every year.
However, despite the awesome power of the US and it's fearsome arsenal, it is currently being taught a lesson by tens of thousands of Iraqis armed with AK-47s and RPGs.
Whether the US can continue to attempt to be the World hegemon is in question. The US's incredible trade deficit and incredible budget deficit may cause the US to lose some of it's comparative strength compared to others. If the US were to suffer some bad times economically due to this over stretch it would be interesting to see if the US population continued to support the huge military budget and ambitious plans of the US government.
But even after, as is likely, a dramatic US reduction in power, the US will still be 'first among equals' in a multi-polar world.
posted by sien at 5:43 PM on February 22, 2005
Isn't it likely that it will be a hybrid between multi polar and uni polar worlds? Isn't the US likely to become first among equals. No-one else has the geographical position, the economic power, the political unity and the bases in so many countries or the desire or ability to spend 500 Billion dollars on the military every year.
However, despite the awesome power of the US and it's fearsome arsenal, it is currently being taught a lesson by tens of thousands of Iraqis armed with AK-47s and RPGs.
Whether the US can continue to attempt to be the World hegemon is in question. The US's incredible trade deficit and incredible budget deficit may cause the US to lose some of it's comparative strength compared to others. If the US were to suffer some bad times economically due to this over stretch it would be interesting to see if the US population continued to support the huge military budget and ambitious plans of the US government.
But even after, as is likely, a dramatic US reduction in power, the US will still be 'first among equals' in a multi-polar world.
posted by sien at 5:43 PM on February 22, 2005
Last year, Foreign Policy Magazine posted an interesting article by Niall Ferguson discussing the alternative to multipolarity: A World Without Power.
posted by aubin at 8:23 PM on February 22, 2005
posted by aubin at 8:23 PM on February 22, 2005
That Ferguson article reeks of scaremongering:
*****
For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad.
The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there?
*****
posted by Gyan at 9:05 PM on February 22, 2005
*****
For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad.
The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there?
*****
posted by Gyan at 9:05 PM on February 22, 2005
Pertinent discussion from earlier; the referenced New Yorker article contains analysis of Bush administration views on the topic, in particular that of Rice; some of the ambitious strategizing seems, today, quaint, as the Iraq venture has proved more destabilizing to certain of these interests than it has to the ostensible targets of the GWOT. There does seem to be a temporary weakening of the unipolar throne; whether it will be lasting remains to be seen, and there's plenty of evidence that the US has excess weight for the throwing.
(For more, see my comment then.)
I think sien has an excellent point, which is that the essential tipping point in our weakening is not going to be a matter of military strength, or even necessarily diplomatic strength, but of economic strength. It's very arguable, of course, that the EU's weaknesses -- absorbing new members, structural unemployment, aging population, foreign policy by committee -- mitigate against expectations for that body, and even China is going to soon run up against certain inevitable limitations such as energy supply, a national banking overdraft, and male overpopulation. I think the EU is fundamentally prepared to deal with these problems; I think China is fundamentally crippled by its institutionalized autocracy, and economic liberalization will not be enough. The US remains well positioned should either of these power centers fumble, although the real question is how we might deal with the anarchy along the fringes (see Cold War, end of).
Meanwhile, though, I remain highly impressed by the progress of states from Brazil, to Nigeria and South Africa, to even Iran, Vietnam and Indonesia. I think it's an oversimplification to see multi-polarity solely in a struggle against the power of the US, as there's plenty of upside in every region for smart players. The US offers much as a partner -- witness the dollarization trend -- and actually tends to prefer promoting these weaker entities precisely because of entrenched antipathy found in the major leagues. I think the worst-case scenario discussed in the Ferguson article -- a world of "apolarity" -- is probably closer to the future than not, but I have a slightly higher confidence in our (global we) ability to manage it better this time around, through interdependence and supranational institutions. The truth is, I suspect that nationalism and sovereignty have seen their day, and while I don't envy the coming death throes, which might be in specific instances quite ugly, I think by mid-century we'll think this all rather quaint.
posted by dhartung at 9:14 PM on February 22, 2005
(For more, see my comment then.)
I think sien has an excellent point, which is that the essential tipping point in our weakening is not going to be a matter of military strength, or even necessarily diplomatic strength, but of economic strength. It's very arguable, of course, that the EU's weaknesses -- absorbing new members, structural unemployment, aging population, foreign policy by committee -- mitigate against expectations for that body, and even China is going to soon run up against certain inevitable limitations such as energy supply, a national banking overdraft, and male overpopulation. I think the EU is fundamentally prepared to deal with these problems; I think China is fundamentally crippled by its institutionalized autocracy, and economic liberalization will not be enough. The US remains well positioned should either of these power centers fumble, although the real question is how we might deal with the anarchy along the fringes (see Cold War, end of).
Meanwhile, though, I remain highly impressed by the progress of states from Brazil, to Nigeria and South Africa, to even Iran, Vietnam and Indonesia. I think it's an oversimplification to see multi-polarity solely in a struggle against the power of the US, as there's plenty of upside in every region for smart players. The US offers much as a partner -- witness the dollarization trend -- and actually tends to prefer promoting these weaker entities precisely because of entrenched antipathy found in the major leagues. I think the worst-case scenario discussed in the Ferguson article -- a world of "apolarity" -- is probably closer to the future than not, but I have a slightly higher confidence in our (global we) ability to manage it better this time around, through interdependence and supranational institutions. The truth is, I suspect that nationalism and sovereignty have seen their day, and while I don't envy the coming death throes, which might be in specific instances quite ugly, I think by mid-century we'll think this all rather quaint.
posted by dhartung at 9:14 PM on February 22, 2005
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posted by Joey Michaels at 5:26 PM on February 22, 2005