The future of war is thus: information technology grows no potatoes.
March 15, 2005 8:10 PM   Subscribe

It is more likely than not that most of America’s enemies in the near future will continue to be at least as awkwardly and inconveniently asymmetrical as they have been over the past 15 years. However, it would be grossly imprudent to assume that they will all be led by politicians as incompetent at grand strategy as Saddam Hussein or Slobodan Milosevic. There is probably a General Aideed lurking out there, not to mention a General Giap. A no-less-troubling thought is recognition of the certainty that America’s strategic future will witness enemies initially of the second-rate, and eventually of the first... One may choose to recall the old aphorism that “unless you have fought the Germans, you don’t really know war.” That thought, though one hopes not its precise national example, holds for the future.
How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?  The answer seems to be not that much at all: The truth of the matter is that war is not changing its character, let alone miraculously accomplishing the impossible and changing its nature.
posted by y2karl (8 comments total)
 
How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War? The answer seems to be not that much at all.

Cool. So if that's the case then it looks like I'm gonna be on the winning team for a while yet. Gotta be happy about that.

"Don't kid yourself Jimmy. If a cow had the chance he'd eat you and everyone you cared about!"
posted by uncanny hengeman at 8:41 PM on March 15, 2005


For those interested in what the US military thinks about the changing nature of war, read Gen. Krulak's famous (at least within the armed forces) and prescient essay The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War. This (especially as it is being played out in Iraq), plus the current military efforts towards transformation [warning: PowerPoint], are causing massive shifts in the way the military approaches war.
posted by blahblahblah at 9:22 PM on March 15, 2005


from the link:

The Strategic Potency of a Transforming Military Will Be Disappointing

“The Big Story” about US defense policy of recent years, a story that is certain to run on for a long time to come, is of course the drive to “transform.” The process is unstoppable. It is driven by cultural impulse, by technological opportunity, and by a narrow, but understandable and praiseworthy, determination to perform more efficiently. Whether it is inspired by strategic need is another matter.

American strategic and military culture is incapable of offering much resistance to the seductive promise of a way of war that seeks maximum leverage from the exploitation of information technologies. This is a trend that will continue... Unfortunately, perhaps, war is not only about the ever more precise delivery of stand-off firepower, and—if need be—the swift and decisive maneuver of mechanized ground forces. We can predict that although the transformation push may well succeed and be highly impressive in its military-technical accomplishments, it is likely to miss the most vital marks.

There are a number of reasons for this rather harsh judgment... It is not obvious that the current process of military transformation will prove vitally useful in helping to improve America’s strategic performance. Specifically, the country needs to approach the waging of war as political behavior for political purposes. Sometimes one is moved to the despairing conclusion that Clausewitz wrote in vain, for all the influence he has had on the American way of war.

posted by y2karl at 9:54 PM on March 15, 2005


There are a lot of critics of transformation, and a lot of supporters. Colin Gray may turn out to be right about the fact that transformation may not change the way the military is used to achieve strategic goals, but transformation will likely have a big impact on how the military carries out its mission. Differentiating the use of power from how power is projected is important. If anyone wants the big theory behind transformation, this long e-book [don't worry, HTML] from the National Defense University may prove interesting.
posted by blahblahblah at 10:09 PM on March 15, 2005


I note that people like Krulak and Shinkseki have accurately identified the challenges that the US are currently facing, in Iraq amongst other places.

I think the concern I have is that having identified the issues the lower levels of the US military are not always managing to make "the right decision at the right time".

In summary you have identified the problem, defined the solution, but you don't seem to be implementing it - at least outside of the USMC.

(Actually I have heard good things about the attitude and professionalism of the USMC in Iraq - at least in comparison - anyone else heard anything similar?)
posted by fingerbang at 10:39 PM on March 15, 2005


Defense establishments are apt to develop impressive military solutions to problems that they prefer to solve, rather than those that a cunning or lucky foe might pose.

That is my big take-away from this piece. In light of the Army's Future Combat Systems modernization plan, this statement couldn't be more right.

... the country needs to approach the waging of war as political behavior for political purposes...

Amen.
posted by fixedgear at 2:28 AM on March 16, 2005


Some trends (although far from an exhaustive list) that, in my opinion, make all speculative efforts to imagine the future of armed conflict, such as those cited in this thread, less than reliable guides:

1) Trans-nationalism. In mechanisms as different as the EU, NAFTA, WTO, and even religious fundamentalism, forces for change unrelated to traditional political structures such as nations are becoming important in the lives of individuals, to the point of becoming self-descriptive terms. "I'm a free trader." used to be something I heard at cocktail parties in the late 80's and 90's about as often as "I'm a conservative." or "I'm a Catholic." To the extent that individuals increasingly see themselves as ecologists, humanists, conservatives, liberals, free traders, or whatever other philosophical trend groups that have basis in a greater world's stream of ideas, in place of more traditional patriotic allegiances to nations, they will act within existing nation states and political structures to damp the natural conflict of national competitions that drive war. Increasingly, I think people see their citizenship as a matter of chance at birth, and are more apt to give greater allegiance to ideas of their own choosing.

2) Enfranchisement. In a world where personal voices can readily speak to large audiences, the value of the individual rises. In all nations, personal freedoms multiply with opportunity, and even repressive regimes must take this into account, as we are seeing in china and Lebanon, and have seen in Germany, Russia, and even South Africa. Persuasion and non-violent tactics are simply more efficient, less risky and less costly ways of bringing about change than are military actions.

3) Some nations are far better equipped to disseminate and manage flows of information than are others, and their leaders will continue to enjoy disproportionate influence on the world by non-military means so long as these asymmetries exist and are skillfully exploited. Culture wars are ultimately more transformative than military wars. While personal scale technologies promoting enfranchisement become more important to the direction of change of local and regional regimes, the cost of production and large scale distribution of high-quality media continue to be governed by capital availability and cultural sophistication.

4) Dominant language adoption. Many sub-trends are driving the adoption of a small number of "second languages" as cultural mediators. English and Spanish benefit from the desire of a large populations whose native language is something else, for rapid access to information, as individuals are less willing to wait for translation, or want to understand for themselves the content of sources in these important publishing languages. English is already the official language of aviation, and is rapidly becoming the defacto language of technology, science and banking. If large numbers of people around the world continue to "vote with their mouths," as participants in global markets and conversations, it is bound to shape the future in ways "voting with their feet" or conducting armed conflicts never could.
posted by paulsc at 6:26 AM on March 16, 2005


I think the concern I have is that having identified the issues the lower levels of the US military are not always managing to make "the right decision at the right time".

The junior officer corps (and the enlisted) have distinguished themselves in Iraq. It is the generals who have been a disaster (not sending enough armor, enough up-armored Humvees, et cetera).

See On Ground In Iraq, Capt. Ayers Writes His Own Playbook

and The Crucible
posted by mlis at 2:46 PM on March 16, 2005


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