Counterterrorism is most effective when it doesn't make arbitrary assumptions about the terrorists' plans. Stop searching bags on the subways, and spend the money on 1) intelligence and investigation -- stopping the terrorists regardless of what their plans are, and 2) emergency response -- lessening the impact of a terrorist attack, regardless of what the plans are. Countermeasures that defend against particular targets, or assume particular tactics, or cause the terrorists to make insignificant modifications in their plans, or that surveil the entire population looking for the few terrorists, are largely not worth it.
"Humanity for millennia has chosen to live in cities. They serve its needsand ends with this paragraph:
“MAN”, wrote Aristotle in roughly 330BC, “is by nature a city beast.” So, he could have added, are rats."
"Yet if pollution, traffic and the suburban shopping mall cannot kill the city, will teleworking and the net? Will downtowns like Houston’s be abandoned to decay, their office towers unpeopled as the pyramids, leaving suburbia to rule? Futurologists love to tell us so. Let them tell the birds."In my mind, the question before us now, is whether terrorism will be the tune played by fanatical pipers, that finally, added to all the other disincentives of urban life, empties the great cities, or failing that, reduces them to locations where risks must be undertaken to obtain specialized goods or services requiring city infrastructure.
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These searches would not be Terry stops, which require "reasonable suspicion" that a crime is in progress or imminent. In Stauber v. New York, a federal judge prohibited police from conducting blanket searches of protestors' bags at the Republican National Convention, absent a "showing of both a specific threat to public safety and an indication of how blanket searches could reduce that threat." It also appears that searches require "individualized suspicion" and not random stops.
The closest parallel that I can think of to the current NYPD searches on the subway would be sobriety checkpoints on highways, which are covered by a "special law enforcement need for greater flexibility."
Also: persons selected for search are allowed to refuse, but then they won't be allowed entrance into the subway system. (The MTA's rules for the subway say nothing that I can see about reserving the right to refuse service, and they're a governmental entity.) Can a public entity refuse to admit you if you're not breaking any of their rules and hold a valid ticket?
posted by Vidiot at 12:19 PM on July 25, 2005