Fukuyama
May 8, 2006 12:11 AM Subscribe
In a new afterword to "The End of History and the Last Man", Fukuyama reflects on how his ideas have survived the tides of criticism and political change.
I also thank you for the link, semni. It was great reading. Having read this, I'd like to address some of Fukuyamas points now.
"Despite a number of Rousseauian dreamers who imagine that they would be happier living in a hunter-gatherer or agrarian society than in, say, contemporary Los Angeles, there are scarcely a handful of people who actually decide to do so."
Not because they don't want to but because its too hard, Francis. Pretty much everyone who works in a 9 to 5 job dreams of leaving it all behind and having a sort of sea change moment. But they don't do it because its too hard to give up the job which guarantees you and your family some measure of economic security and allows you to pay off those loans you aqquired back when you were a struggling student. Whilst I don't neccessarily advocate a Rousseauian hunter gatherer syle way of life, I do firmly believe people would be happier living outside the big cities, free from the economics of the larger world and working and producing only that which they need to survive.
And besides, a Rousseauian way of life vs. life in the big city does not neccessarily pit liberal democracy and its intrinsic values against that of any other form or style of government. Sure, he argues that the desire for a liberal democracy isn't as strong as the desire for "development" (itself a word that can convey a myriad of things in terms of this particular debate) but Fukuyama's central plank of his end of history argument has always been that western liberal democracy is the way forward for everyone everywhere, no matter how much he may try to backpedal on that in this new afterword.
"However, there is a strong correlation between successful economic development and the growth of democratic institutions"
Oh yeah? One word for you there Francis.
China.
And if the modern United States is any indication, the further along your development, the greater the loss of democracy. Diebold, Gitmo, The Patriot Act, NSA Wiretaps, the marginalisation of homosexuals and much, much more are examples of how the US is paying lip service to the ideals of democracy whilst true democracy withers and dies whilst its people, for the most part, look on and do nothing.
Next!
"The final aspect of the modernisation process concerns the area of culture. Everybody wants economic development, and economic development tends to promote democratic political institutions. But at the end of the modernisation process, nobody wants cultural uniformity; in fact, issues of cultural identity come back with a vengeance. Huntington is correct when he says that we will never live in a world in which we have cultural uniformity, the global culture of what he calls "Davos Man". Indeed, we would not want to live in a world in which we have the same universal cultural values based on some kind of globalised Americanism. We live for the particular shared historical traditions, religious values, and other aspects of shared memory that constitutes the common life."
I agree, but this argument isn't new by any stretch of the imagination (though certainly, on the face of it, Fukuyama isn't claiming it to be). This is just a long winded revision of the old rhyme that states how boring the world would be if we were all the same.
"uccessful democracy depends in large measure on the existence of a genuine political community that agrees on certain basic shared values and institutions. Shared cultural values build trust and lubricate, so to speak, the interaction of citizens with one another. Democracy at an international level becomes nearly impossible to imagine given the actual diversity of peoples and cultures involved."
I don't neccessarily agree. What Fukuyama is essentially speaking about here is social capital; the notion that the more people who share in a cultural norm and participate in society (thus adding to that culture) then the stronger the democracy. I see what he is saying; namely that because the cultures of the world are so different in all the various nations of the world so as to prevent liberal democracy from being truly international. I don't believe that this is neccessarily the ultimate barrier to international democracy. I believe such a thing, essentially a world government, could exist, but it would need to be founded upon one unifying force upon which all humans could agree. For example, an international crisis which threatens to wipe out all humanity. If I may take a brief step into the world of science fiction fantasy, were we as a planet to face extinction from some evil alien force, for example, I believe we would unite as a species. Indeed, it would probably appeal to our deep seated id; the part of us which fears the unknown. Whereas now a KKK member would say "at least he's white", in such a fantasy scenario I can plausibly imagine a KKK member saying "Well at least he's human." In short, a unifying event needs to occur; something which threatens us all, for a worldwide social capital to grow. In such a scenario a world government isn't too far fetched.
"The jaundiced view that many Americans have of international institutions like the United Nations reflects in part the slowness and inefficiency of collective action on an international level, among diverse societies seeking collective action based on political consensus."
It's partly that; it also has a lot to do with the United States not paying its dues to the UN. But I digress.
Infact, I digress from this whole god damned argument. Basically Fukuyama isn't offering anything truly new to his original argument. Instead, he seems to be trying to revise his original argument, which seems like a form of intellectual bankruptcy more than anything else. It's interesting watching an arch-conservative try to shy away from such a tag, and trying to sound like he's actually more liberal than liberal. Maybe he's just embarrassed to be associated with the right in the US today. Maybe he's just... ah forget it.
posted by Effigy2000 at 2:43 AM on May 8, 2006
"Despite a number of Rousseauian dreamers who imagine that they would be happier living in a hunter-gatherer or agrarian society than in, say, contemporary Los Angeles, there are scarcely a handful of people who actually decide to do so."
Not because they don't want to but because its too hard, Francis. Pretty much everyone who works in a 9 to 5 job dreams of leaving it all behind and having a sort of sea change moment. But they don't do it because its too hard to give up the job which guarantees you and your family some measure of economic security and allows you to pay off those loans you aqquired back when you were a struggling student. Whilst I don't neccessarily advocate a Rousseauian hunter gatherer syle way of life, I do firmly believe people would be happier living outside the big cities, free from the economics of the larger world and working and producing only that which they need to survive.
And besides, a Rousseauian way of life vs. life in the big city does not neccessarily pit liberal democracy and its intrinsic values against that of any other form or style of government. Sure, he argues that the desire for a liberal democracy isn't as strong as the desire for "development" (itself a word that can convey a myriad of things in terms of this particular debate) but Fukuyama's central plank of his end of history argument has always been that western liberal democracy is the way forward for everyone everywhere, no matter how much he may try to backpedal on that in this new afterword.
"However, there is a strong correlation between successful economic development and the growth of democratic institutions"
Oh yeah? One word for you there Francis.
China.
And if the modern United States is any indication, the further along your development, the greater the loss of democracy. Diebold, Gitmo, The Patriot Act, NSA Wiretaps, the marginalisation of homosexuals and much, much more are examples of how the US is paying lip service to the ideals of democracy whilst true democracy withers and dies whilst its people, for the most part, look on and do nothing.
Next!
"The final aspect of the modernisation process concerns the area of culture. Everybody wants economic development, and economic development tends to promote democratic political institutions. But at the end of the modernisation process, nobody wants cultural uniformity; in fact, issues of cultural identity come back with a vengeance. Huntington is correct when he says that we will never live in a world in which we have cultural uniformity, the global culture of what he calls "Davos Man". Indeed, we would not want to live in a world in which we have the same universal cultural values based on some kind of globalised Americanism. We live for the particular shared historical traditions, religious values, and other aspects of shared memory that constitutes the common life."
I agree, but this argument isn't new by any stretch of the imagination (though certainly, on the face of it, Fukuyama isn't claiming it to be). This is just a long winded revision of the old rhyme that states how boring the world would be if we were all the same.
"uccessful democracy depends in large measure on the existence of a genuine political community that agrees on certain basic shared values and institutions. Shared cultural values build trust and lubricate, so to speak, the interaction of citizens with one another. Democracy at an international level becomes nearly impossible to imagine given the actual diversity of peoples and cultures involved."
I don't neccessarily agree. What Fukuyama is essentially speaking about here is social capital; the notion that the more people who share in a cultural norm and participate in society (thus adding to that culture) then the stronger the democracy. I see what he is saying; namely that because the cultures of the world are so different in all the various nations of the world so as to prevent liberal democracy from being truly international. I don't believe that this is neccessarily the ultimate barrier to international democracy. I believe such a thing, essentially a world government, could exist, but it would need to be founded upon one unifying force upon which all humans could agree. For example, an international crisis which threatens to wipe out all humanity. If I may take a brief step into the world of science fiction fantasy, were we as a planet to face extinction from some evil alien force, for example, I believe we would unite as a species. Indeed, it would probably appeal to our deep seated id; the part of us which fears the unknown. Whereas now a KKK member would say "at least he's white", in such a fantasy scenario I can plausibly imagine a KKK member saying "Well at least he's human." In short, a unifying event needs to occur; something which threatens us all, for a worldwide social capital to grow. In such a scenario a world government isn't too far fetched.
"The jaundiced view that many Americans have of international institutions like the United Nations reflects in part the slowness and inefficiency of collective action on an international level, among diverse societies seeking collective action based on political consensus."
It's partly that; it also has a lot to do with the United States not paying its dues to the UN. But I digress.
Infact, I digress from this whole god damned argument. Basically Fukuyama isn't offering anything truly new to his original argument. Instead, he seems to be trying to revise his original argument, which seems like a form of intellectual bankruptcy more than anything else. It's interesting watching an arch-conservative try to shy away from such a tag, and trying to sound like he's actually more liberal than liberal. Maybe he's just embarrassed to be associated with the right in the US today. Maybe he's just... ah forget it.
posted by Effigy2000 at 2:43 AM on May 8, 2006
A minor, unrelated point: Writing about Fukuyama's new afterward, Talal Asad writes,
posted by ori at 2:48 AM on May 8, 2006
Fukuyama finds that some Muslim countries are making the transition to economic prosperity and political democracy, and so suggests that the culprit is not Islam but "Arab political culture". But consider in this light the electoral victory of Hamas in occupied Palestine in January 2006 – a democratic formation that is being undermined by the European Union and the United States, those models of humanity's liberal democratic future. There are excuses, of course, but they remain excuses.But Fukuyama himself says in the afterward:
As Charles Taylor explains, liberalism cannot be completely even-handed toward different cultures, since it itself reflects certain cultural values and must reject alternative cultural groups that are themselves profoundly illiberal.I think the Hamas charter, which states that "Israel will rise and will remain erect until Islam eliminates it as it had eliminated its predecessors" and "There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad. The initiatives, proposals and International Conferences are but a waste of time, an exercise in futility" fully qualify it as "profoundly illiberal".
posted by ori at 2:48 AM on May 8, 2006
Just did my dissertation on Fukuyama....
Will the gloablization of capitalism create Fukuyama's end of history?
I thought that the increasing importance of capitalism would be the driving force for liberalism. Unfortunately, the fact that the globalisation of capitalism has increased the distance of the wealthy countries from the poor countries is a bit of a problem. China is an obvious case against economic development creating lib. democracy, however, with the introducion of Google, Roling Stone, and the fact there are a hell of a lot of Chinese students studying in universities like mine, I wouldn't rule it out for democratising
The fact that American democracy isn't going too well doesn't really undermine democracy as a whole. There's plenty of other countries it works in.
I think if there was anything that would create a global government it'd be environmentalism. It is something the world as a whole needs to cooperate on. But when Kyoto is ignored by the US that really doesn't help....
posted by RufusW at 3:10 AM on May 8, 2006
Will the gloablization of capitalism create Fukuyama's end of history?
I thought that the increasing importance of capitalism would be the driving force for liberalism. Unfortunately, the fact that the globalisation of capitalism has increased the distance of the wealthy countries from the poor countries is a bit of a problem. China is an obvious case against economic development creating lib. democracy, however, with the introducion of Google, Roling Stone, and the fact there are a hell of a lot of Chinese students studying in universities like mine, I wouldn't rule it out for democratising
The fact that American democracy isn't going too well doesn't really undermine democracy as a whole. There's plenty of other countries it works in.
I think if there was anything that would create a global government it'd be environmentalism. It is something the world as a whole needs to cooperate on. But when Kyoto is ignored by the US that really doesn't help....
posted by RufusW at 3:10 AM on May 8, 2006
The fact that American democracy isn't going too well doesn't really undermine democracy as a whole. There's plenty of other countries it works in.
In a recent editorial, Pat Buchanan, referring to the recent motivated moves by several Latin American governments, observes that:
Contrary to Frank ("The End of History") Fukuyama's famous prediction that liberal democracy had won the struggle for the future of mankind, nationalism, religious fundamentalism, anti-capitalism and even good old-fashioned tribalism seem to be making impressive comebacks.
Comebacks? I'd say they never really went away.
posted by three blind mice at 4:15 AM on May 8, 2006
In a recent editorial, Pat Buchanan, referring to the recent motivated moves by several Latin American governments, observes that:
Contrary to Frank ("The End of History") Fukuyama's famous prediction that liberal democracy had won the struggle for the future of mankind, nationalism, religious fundamentalism, anti-capitalism and even good old-fashioned tribalism seem to be making impressive comebacks.
Comebacks? I'd say they never really went away.
posted by three blind mice at 4:15 AM on May 8, 2006
I'd say they never really went away.
Bingo. Fukuyama's book was idiotic when it appeared, and the passage of time has only revealed its idiocy so glaringly it's impossible to overlook. It has the same ring now as that late-nineteenth-century announcement that science had discovered everything there was to discover and the patent office could close up shop.
posted by languagehat at 5:49 AM on May 8, 2006
Bingo. Fukuyama's book was idiotic when it appeared, and the passage of time has only revealed its idiocy so glaringly it's impossible to overlook. It has the same ring now as that late-nineteenth-century announcement that science had discovered everything there was to discover and the patent office could close up shop.
posted by languagehat at 5:49 AM on May 8, 2006
Some great comments on a great post.
Thanks all.
Nothing much I can add here except to agree that Fukuyama is an idiot.
posted by nofundy at 5:56 AM on May 8, 2006
Thanks all.
Nothing much I can add here except to agree that Fukuyama is an idiot.
posted by nofundy at 5:56 AM on May 8, 2006
At the core of his book was the fact that democracy 'solves' the eternal struggle of mankind for recognition. By giving everyone a vote we learn to live peacfully together. Although the premise that every human wants this is a little basic (and I understand I'm talking from a Western view-point here) I don't think it's wrong to say that maybe it is the best form of political organisation - and therefore liberal democracies are at the end of history (for us at the least). Whether or not other countries can join us (economic, cultural reasons) is debateable - but is there any real opposition at this time?
"nationalism, religious fundamentalism, anti-capitalism and even good old-fashioned tribalism" This really creates opposition to Capitalism and liberal democracy?
And although not many people liked Fukuyama's neo-con stance on Iraq - we should remember the end of history is a peaceful time. Economic interdependence and recognition of other countries stops wars. It is actually an inherently optomistic view on a possibility for the world.
Although Fukuyama's thesis is rather simple, based on old ideas and it does predict the future - I would by no means call him an idiot.
posted by RufusW at 6:12 AM on May 8, 2006
"nationalism, religious fundamentalism, anti-capitalism and even good old-fashioned tribalism" This really creates opposition to Capitalism and liberal democracy?
And although not many people liked Fukuyama's neo-con stance on Iraq - we should remember the end of history is a peaceful time. Economic interdependence and recognition of other countries stops wars. It is actually an inherently optomistic view on a possibility for the world.
Although Fukuyama's thesis is rather simple, based on old ideas and it does predict the future - I would by no means call him an idiot.
posted by RufusW at 6:12 AM on May 8, 2006
Its sort of surprising me that people are pulling out the China card as proof that economic progress does not bring as a result liberal democracy. Being able to choose Pepsi over Coke does not mean that the next day afterward, you suddenly have an urge to choose between Candidate A versus Candidate B in a local election. Its a change in progress.
Anyone following the news can notice how there are things happening in China, in which the CCP is being held responsible, being forced to alter its game plan, or simply, losing its former authoritarian grasp on Chinese society. If you compare Chinese society today to Chinese society through much of its history since 1949, the change is apparent.
Its way too early to claim that economic progress has not resulted in any democratic liberalization. In about fifteen to twenty years, I'm pretty confident that there will be a significant difference in the relationship between the CCP and the Chinese people in relation to today.
posted by Atreides at 6:22 AM on May 8, 2006
Anyone following the news can notice how there are things happening in China, in which the CCP is being held responsible, being forced to alter its game plan, or simply, losing its former authoritarian grasp on Chinese society. If you compare Chinese society today to Chinese society through much of its history since 1949, the change is apparent.
Its way too early to claim that economic progress has not resulted in any democratic liberalization. In about fifteen to twenty years, I'm pretty confident that there will be a significant difference in the relationship between the CCP and the Chinese people in relation to today.
posted by Atreides at 6:22 AM on May 8, 2006
I'm not a big Fukuyama wonk, but I thoroughly enjoyed the dis of his latest book in a recent New Yorker:
Boy, I'm blockquotey today.
posted by illovich at 6:37 AM on May 8, 2006 [1 favorite]
He takes ideas seriously and he tries to see the big picture, and even if you think that he takes ideas too seriously, and that his pictures tend to be too big to help with the practical challenges of political decision-making in the here and now, his views on American policies and their implications deserve thoughtful attention. Such attention might begin, in the case of the present book, with the observation: No duh. It took Fukuyama until February, 2004, to realize that Charles Krauthammer, who has been saying basically the same thing since the end of the Cold War, is the intellectual cheerleader of a politics of American supremacy that appears to recognize no limit to its exercise of power? And that the Bush Administration, to the extent that it has any philosophical self-conception at all, operates on the basis of the crudest form of American exceptionalism? And that neoconservatism, whatever merits it once had as a corrective to liberal wishfulness and the amorality of realpolitik, long ago stiffened into a posture of reflexive moral belligerence about everything from foreign policy to literary criticism?I totally lol'd that one.
Boy, I'm blockquotey today.
posted by illovich at 6:37 AM on May 8, 2006 [1 favorite]
Fukuyama and Robert Wright in an April 21 conversation that is relevant to this thread.
(Embedded Windows Media)
posted by mania at 6:57 AM on May 8, 2006
(Embedded Windows Media)
posted by mania at 6:57 AM on May 8, 2006
What compels people to create such an incredibly succinct theory on a topic as broad as... all of existance? I heard once in a class that "the simplest explanation is typically the correct one." Perhaps it stems from this.
I think the problem in assuming this one-world state lies not in the assertion that all people are different, but in the fact that we are all the same at our core, though not reflective/insightful enough to realize this.
Effigy: China.
Actually, I think that's kind of a weak example. If history has taught us anything, it is that the intentions of our leaders vary greatly, and the resultant policies can be either benign or quite harmful. In the case of China, they seem to set these forward economic policies on proven effective methods of luring industry and capital their way (i.e. capitalism).
Rufus: Impending ecological doom seems further off than MAD. The former would be a great rallying cause, I agree, but the latter has that cinematic quality that everybody can enjoy, I think. If I were to create an analogy, I would say that we are searching around in a dark room for a button that will unite us all, but in the same room lurks a button that will kill us.
Anyway, I think that such a massive undertaking can be looked at for insight, not discarded because it is not an all encompassing prophecy. What I took from this terribly interesting post, however, is that you're all way smarter than me and I'll be reading this tomorrow.
posted by GooseOnTheLoose at 7:20 AM on May 8, 2006
I think the problem in assuming this one-world state lies not in the assertion that all people are different, but in the fact that we are all the same at our core, though not reflective/insightful enough to realize this.
Effigy: China.
Actually, I think that's kind of a weak example. If history has taught us anything, it is that the intentions of our leaders vary greatly, and the resultant policies can be either benign or quite harmful. In the case of China, they seem to set these forward economic policies on proven effective methods of luring industry and capital their way (i.e. capitalism).
Rufus: Impending ecological doom seems further off than MAD. The former would be a great rallying cause, I agree, but the latter has that cinematic quality that everybody can enjoy, I think. If I were to create an analogy, I would say that we are searching around in a dark room for a button that will unite us all, but in the same room lurks a button that will kill us.
Anyway, I think that such a massive undertaking can be looked at for insight, not discarded because it is not an all encompassing prophecy. What I took from this terribly interesting post, however, is that you're all way smarter than me and I'll be reading this tomorrow.
posted by GooseOnTheLoose at 7:20 AM on May 8, 2006
Stopping emisions reduces economic efficiency. If there was a global agreement on this it inherently reduces state sovereignty and places it with the global gov (UN). Hopefully it would create the starting point for more integration. Unfortunatly, global warming affects developing countries more than developed countries. Therefore there's no incentive to do anything... MAD'll never happen, not a chance.
posted by RufusW at 7:56 AM on May 8, 2006
posted by RufusW at 7:56 AM on May 8, 2006
Whether or not other countries can join us (economic, cultural reasons) is debateable - but is there any real opposition at this time?
Yes, there is. The reason I agree with languagehat's "idiot" characterization is because Fukuyama's doing the exact same thing that anthropologists in the "bad old days" did: taking their own, ethnocentric biases, generalizing them completely out of proportion, and coming away with a fatalistic fantasy based on the absurd notion that evolution is linear. Evolution is about adapting to one's environment, and insofar as environments differ, so, too, must the adaptations to them. Liberal democracies simply do not work everywhere.
I'd say it's fair to say that all humans want to be recognized, to one degree or another. Whether or not liberal democracies fulfill that need is another question, of course--look at voter turnout in the United States, the supposed world leader of liberal democracy. Our population does not vote, because we believe it to be meaningless--liberal democracy does not fulfill our need to be recognized. We feel unrecognized, and that is precisely the problem. But more importantly, the desire for recognition is not the only, or even necessarily the most important, human desire. For instance, the desire to feel oneself to be "good" can be just as important, if not moreso. As difficult as it may be for the contemporary Westerner to wrap his brain around the concept, there really are people in the world who are opposed to democracy on the grounds that it offends their notion of the cosmic order--i.e., a person has his place, and keeping in that place is a duty. There are people who take great pride in that, and there are people--and not just the elites who benefit from such an arrangement, either--who hate democracy for up-ending what they believe to be the natural order of the world. I may think that's a bizarre way of thinking, but they do exist. Which speaks to the most fundamental problem with Fukuyama's argument: there are many different, competing ideals which are commonly shared among humans. We order them differently--we have different priorities. Fukuyama comes from a culture where the need for recognition is placed above all else, but other cultures arrange their priorities differently. Do we have any reason to believe that Fukuyama's culture--our culture--has the right set of priorities, and everyone else is wrong and needs to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into the "correct" way to live?
Fukuyama deals with ideas and philosophies: the tip of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, but history is less the story of ideas than of material needs. The barbarians invaded Rome because they wanted, above all, to be Romans. That desire did not stop the "Dark Ages" from forming, nonetheless. It is the lower levels of Maslow's hierarchy that have always driven history, not the top--while individuals may have free will, populations have never moved towards something they wanted, only towards something they needed.
posted by jefgodesky at 8:18 AM on May 8, 2006
Yes, there is. The reason I agree with languagehat's "idiot" characterization is because Fukuyama's doing the exact same thing that anthropologists in the "bad old days" did: taking their own, ethnocentric biases, generalizing them completely out of proportion, and coming away with a fatalistic fantasy based on the absurd notion that evolution is linear. Evolution is about adapting to one's environment, and insofar as environments differ, so, too, must the adaptations to them. Liberal democracies simply do not work everywhere.
I'd say it's fair to say that all humans want to be recognized, to one degree or another. Whether or not liberal democracies fulfill that need is another question, of course--look at voter turnout in the United States, the supposed world leader of liberal democracy. Our population does not vote, because we believe it to be meaningless--liberal democracy does not fulfill our need to be recognized. We feel unrecognized, and that is precisely the problem. But more importantly, the desire for recognition is not the only, or even necessarily the most important, human desire. For instance, the desire to feel oneself to be "good" can be just as important, if not moreso. As difficult as it may be for the contemporary Westerner to wrap his brain around the concept, there really are people in the world who are opposed to democracy on the grounds that it offends their notion of the cosmic order--i.e., a person has his place, and keeping in that place is a duty. There are people who take great pride in that, and there are people--and not just the elites who benefit from such an arrangement, either--who hate democracy for up-ending what they believe to be the natural order of the world. I may think that's a bizarre way of thinking, but they do exist. Which speaks to the most fundamental problem with Fukuyama's argument: there are many different, competing ideals which are commonly shared among humans. We order them differently--we have different priorities. Fukuyama comes from a culture where the need for recognition is placed above all else, but other cultures arrange their priorities differently. Do we have any reason to believe that Fukuyama's culture--our culture--has the right set of priorities, and everyone else is wrong and needs to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into the "correct" way to live?
Fukuyama deals with ideas and philosophies: the tip of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, but history is less the story of ideas than of material needs. The barbarians invaded Rome because they wanted, above all, to be Romans. That desire did not stop the "Dark Ages" from forming, nonetheless. It is the lower levels of Maslow's hierarchy that have always driven history, not the top--while individuals may have free will, populations have never moved towards something they wanted, only towards something they needed.
posted by jefgodesky at 8:18 AM on May 8, 2006
"Whilst I don't neccessarily advocate a Rousseauian hunter gatherer syle way of life, I do firmly believe people would be happier living outside the big cities, free from the economics of the larger world and working and producing only that which they need to survive."
Which is fine for a few people, but when you start talking about supporting everyone, the seduction of the sylvan falls away. Oh, and since I think I probably know more agrarians than you do-- for the most part, their lives suck. That people are happier in subsistance is a fantasy of the urban middle class.
As for Fukuyama, I think that overall he does a pretty good job of addressing a lot of objections and is pretty dead on about a lot of things (most notably, his observations on the Arab Muslim problem regarding democracy is pretty on-target). He's not an idiot, despite attempts to paint him that way. He is continuing in a Hegelian tradition that some people find distressing, but a lot of the arguments he's making here are the same ones that Chantal Mouffe has made regarding the flaws of liberal conceptions of democratic society (though I doubt that they'd necessarily agree about what that means). Though this is often overlooked on the internet, it is possible to disagree with someone without thinking of them as an idiot.
posted by klangklangston at 9:01 AM on May 8, 2006
Which is fine for a few people, but when you start talking about supporting everyone, the seduction of the sylvan falls away. Oh, and since I think I probably know more agrarians than you do-- for the most part, their lives suck. That people are happier in subsistance is a fantasy of the urban middle class.
As for Fukuyama, I think that overall he does a pretty good job of addressing a lot of objections and is pretty dead on about a lot of things (most notably, his observations on the Arab Muslim problem regarding democracy is pretty on-target). He's not an idiot, despite attempts to paint him that way. He is continuing in a Hegelian tradition that some people find distressing, but a lot of the arguments he's making here are the same ones that Chantal Mouffe has made regarding the flaws of liberal conceptions of democratic society (though I doubt that they'd necessarily agree about what that means). Though this is often overlooked on the internet, it is possible to disagree with someone without thinking of them as an idiot.
posted by klangklangston at 9:01 AM on May 8, 2006
it is possible to disagree with someone without thinking of them as an idiot.
The kneejerk hate just makes those who do not like Fukuyama seem like tools, eh klangklangston?
posted by three blind mice at 9:18 AM on May 8, 2006
The kneejerk hate just makes those who do not like Fukuyama seem like tools, eh klangklangston?
posted by three blind mice at 9:18 AM on May 8, 2006
Aww, TBM, I didn't know that you had such and eCrush on me. Here's another hint-- bringing up your toolish behavior in another thread in an attempt at chastisement? Also makes you look like a tool. FYI.
posted by klangklangston at 9:48 AM on May 8, 2006
posted by klangklangston at 9:48 AM on May 8, 2006
Interesting thread. I give Fukuyama credit for being willing to self-correct, something other neocons seems fundamentally incapable of doing as the Hindenburg soars into infamy.
Something about the one-eyed man being king in the realm of the blind or something. But still, interesting read.
posted by bardic at 9:58 AM on May 8, 2006
Something about the one-eyed man being king in the realm of the blind or something. But still, interesting read.
posted by bardic at 9:58 AM on May 8, 2006
jefgodesky
Do we have any reason to believe that Fukuyama's culture--our culture--has the right set of priorities, and everyone else is wrong and needs to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into the "correct" way to live?
Well, yes, we do. Do you support the right of a society to slaughter its ethnic/religious/economic social minorities? To sanction, both officially and unofficially, the subjugation and abuse of women? To practice slavery? I'm pretty sure that you'd agree that there are basic standards of human rights every country must adhere to, and if you're willing to believe that, then you're saying that certain, as you put it, orderings of priorities are better than others. As you say, evolution is about adapting to one's environment, but you fail to see Fukuyama's point. The environment has changed. It's no longer just India, the West, the Arab world, etc. The human environment is now a truly global one, and ideas and practices that may have worked on the ancient regional scales simply do not and cannot work on a global one. Liberal democracy is simply the best way we've found of organizing people and beliefs. It is the best way to allow people to live as they want, in all their differences, while still allowing things to function. You are wrong: now, after the end of Communism as a serious ideological contender to the values of liberal democracy, there really are not any serious challengers to it. There is resistance to it in some places to be sure, but it does seem like there is no ideology we have that survives that can challenge its dominance.
The problems in the Arab world, as some above have noted, are not due to Islam, but to political/economic reasons, which can be solved. There is no real ideological threat coming from there.
People who keep bringing up China as a counter-example are being willfully ignorant and short-sighted. Fukuyama never said that the moment a free market enters a country, it will instantly and irrevocably become a capitalist liberal democracy. It's a slow process, and one we've already seen happening. As Atreides said, as bad as China is today, it's come a long way from the days of Mao. If you have studied Chinese history at all, you'd know that a major motivation behind the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 was a press for Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai's Four Modernizations of the economy and military to be extended to a fifth area: political reform. The violent crackdown by the government was in reaction to this. Indeed, the 1990s saw a reverse of the relatively liberal policies of the 80s precisely for this reason: the government knows that with each step in the direction of economic reform, the basis for its rule grows weaker, since it is founded on revolutionary, Communist principles it no longer adheres to and can hardly use to justify its repressive tactics. Watch the news on China, there are constant rumblings within the political sphere. Nothing major yet, but they point to a future in which the government is going to one day have to come to some sort of reform. The trek to liberalism, however long and slow, seems to already have begun.
And people using the US as a counter-example to the dominance of liberalism are equally wrong. Fukuyama never said once established all democracies would be perfect and unchanging. Like all human endeavors, liberal democracy is an organic process, ever-changing and adapting. There is progress and there are set-backs, but the fundamental values and ideology does not change. Did FDR's packing of the Supreme Court, and his implementation of Keynesian government-guided economic policies, show that liberal democracy was dead in the 30s? There will always be arguments over interpretation and implementation, but the belief in the ideology is there. The US can hardly be said to have abandoned the core values of a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. It's just arguments over what that means, how that government should look, and what that government should do. You're essentially letting the political bickering of today blind you to the overall picture. It's like saying that the concept of a mammal, which includes bearing live young, is useless because the platypus lays eggs.
This leads me to my last point. languagehat and others are wrong when they say that the fact that "nationalism, religious fundamentalism, anti-capitalism and even good old-fashioned tribalism" are still around shows Fukuyama to be wrong. The problem is that they are, as with those pointing at the US as a counter-example, failing to distinguish between attacks within liberal democracy and attacks on liberal democracy. Nationalism, fundamentalism, and tribalism are all problems liberal democracy has to deal with, but they do not threaten the supremacy of the system. The Basques in Spain, the Catholic Irish in the UK, Muslim terrorists, tribal tensions in Africa etc all present unique challenges to their societies, but these are problems that democracy can and has dealt with, to varying degrees, and is still dealing with. Again, democracy is a process, not an end-point. These problems don't shake democracy to its foundations and reveal it as useless. Similarly, anti-capitalist feelings, with the fall of Communism as a serious challenger, have become questions to be dealt with wtihin a liberal democratic framework, not assaults on it. Should the world market follow the more-free market-oriented Washington Consensus? Should it look more like the more-socialist EU model? Should it even have aspects of Japan's industrial state? etc There is plenty of room for all sorts of beliefs about the market, but the fundamental idea of liberal economic policies still hold.
While Fukuyama is not a prophet, and makes mistakes, I don't think his overall premise is wrong, and no one here has made a serious argument as to why it would be.
On Preview:
RufusW, you make some good points, but I would disagree that environmental reform has to inherently harm the economy. Things like developing more fuel-efficient devices would both help the economy and the environment. Just a thought. But you're right that environmental issues require governments to cooperate and cede some of their authority for the sake of the big picture. Trade issues also require this, as we've seen in the WTO. Perhpas there's hope for global cooperation one day, however painful it is to get there, after all...
posted by Sangermaine at 9:59 AM on May 8, 2006
Do we have any reason to believe that Fukuyama's culture--our culture--has the right set of priorities, and everyone else is wrong and needs to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into the "correct" way to live?
Well, yes, we do. Do you support the right of a society to slaughter its ethnic/religious/economic social minorities? To sanction, both officially and unofficially, the subjugation and abuse of women? To practice slavery? I'm pretty sure that you'd agree that there are basic standards of human rights every country must adhere to, and if you're willing to believe that, then you're saying that certain, as you put it, orderings of priorities are better than others. As you say, evolution is about adapting to one's environment, but you fail to see Fukuyama's point. The environment has changed. It's no longer just India, the West, the Arab world, etc. The human environment is now a truly global one, and ideas and practices that may have worked on the ancient regional scales simply do not and cannot work on a global one. Liberal democracy is simply the best way we've found of organizing people and beliefs. It is the best way to allow people to live as they want, in all their differences, while still allowing things to function. You are wrong: now, after the end of Communism as a serious ideological contender to the values of liberal democracy, there really are not any serious challengers to it. There is resistance to it in some places to be sure, but it does seem like there is no ideology we have that survives that can challenge its dominance.
The problems in the Arab world, as some above have noted, are not due to Islam, but to political/economic reasons, which can be solved. There is no real ideological threat coming from there.
People who keep bringing up China as a counter-example are being willfully ignorant and short-sighted. Fukuyama never said that the moment a free market enters a country, it will instantly and irrevocably become a capitalist liberal democracy. It's a slow process, and one we've already seen happening. As Atreides said, as bad as China is today, it's come a long way from the days of Mao. If you have studied Chinese history at all, you'd know that a major motivation behind the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 was a press for Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai's Four Modernizations of the economy and military to be extended to a fifth area: political reform. The violent crackdown by the government was in reaction to this. Indeed, the 1990s saw a reverse of the relatively liberal policies of the 80s precisely for this reason: the government knows that with each step in the direction of economic reform, the basis for its rule grows weaker, since it is founded on revolutionary, Communist principles it no longer adheres to and can hardly use to justify its repressive tactics. Watch the news on China, there are constant rumblings within the political sphere. Nothing major yet, but they point to a future in which the government is going to one day have to come to some sort of reform. The trek to liberalism, however long and slow, seems to already have begun.
And people using the US as a counter-example to the dominance of liberalism are equally wrong. Fukuyama never said once established all democracies would be perfect and unchanging. Like all human endeavors, liberal democracy is an organic process, ever-changing and adapting. There is progress and there are set-backs, but the fundamental values and ideology does not change. Did FDR's packing of the Supreme Court, and his implementation of Keynesian government-guided economic policies, show that liberal democracy was dead in the 30s? There will always be arguments over interpretation and implementation, but the belief in the ideology is there. The US can hardly be said to have abandoned the core values of a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. It's just arguments over what that means, how that government should look, and what that government should do. You're essentially letting the political bickering of today blind you to the overall picture. It's like saying that the concept of a mammal, which includes bearing live young, is useless because the platypus lays eggs.
This leads me to my last point. languagehat and others are wrong when they say that the fact that "nationalism, religious fundamentalism, anti-capitalism and even good old-fashioned tribalism" are still around shows Fukuyama to be wrong. The problem is that they are, as with those pointing at the US as a counter-example, failing to distinguish between attacks within liberal democracy and attacks on liberal democracy. Nationalism, fundamentalism, and tribalism are all problems liberal democracy has to deal with, but they do not threaten the supremacy of the system. The Basques in Spain, the Catholic Irish in the UK, Muslim terrorists, tribal tensions in Africa etc all present unique challenges to their societies, but these are problems that democracy can and has dealt with, to varying degrees, and is still dealing with. Again, democracy is a process, not an end-point. These problems don't shake democracy to its foundations and reveal it as useless. Similarly, anti-capitalist feelings, with the fall of Communism as a serious challenger, have become questions to be dealt with wtihin a liberal democratic framework, not assaults on it. Should the world market follow the more-free market-oriented Washington Consensus? Should it look more like the more-socialist EU model? Should it even have aspects of Japan's industrial state? etc There is plenty of room for all sorts of beliefs about the market, but the fundamental idea of liberal economic policies still hold.
While Fukuyama is not a prophet, and makes mistakes, I don't think his overall premise is wrong, and no one here has made a serious argument as to why it would be.
On Preview:
RufusW, you make some good points, but I would disagree that environmental reform has to inherently harm the economy. Things like developing more fuel-efficient devices would both help the economy and the environment. Just a thought. But you're right that environmental issues require governments to cooperate and cede some of their authority for the sake of the big picture. Trade issues also require this, as we've seen in the WTO. Perhpas there's hope for global cooperation one day, however painful it is to get there, after all...
posted by Sangermaine at 9:59 AM on May 8, 2006
Britain had feudalism and I'm pretty sure people thought they "had a place and keeping in that place is a duty". Then we got democracy. Sure there are cultures that are against liberal democracy, but do you think in an ever-globalizing, scientific, atheist world, people will keep hold of the belief they don't deserve to be treated the same as everyone else? I'm not too sure...
I think voter turn-out in the US is more to do with the fact that they are recognized. There's nothing else to fight for, it's fine, we can say what we want, we can go out and earn whatever what we want... do I really need to use my vote unless I really care about health policies for the over-50s (or whatever)?
I hope that human alturism is an important part of our genetic make-up (us making ourselves feel 'good'). But unfortunatley I'd have to disagree with the fact it's more important than self-preservation, or in fact, being better than the person next to you.
Neo-con foreign policy is not inherently linked to Fukuyama's thesis. It is a possible by-product. We do not have to drag them kicking and screaming, it is natual progression.
I don't know Maslow. But if people are drawn towards things they need then surely economic development is key - it's defintely possible to argue economic liberalism has been proven as the best way to create wealth. It then open up the date over whether economic liberalism creates political liberalism.
posted by RufusW at 10:07 AM on May 8, 2006
I think voter turn-out in the US is more to do with the fact that they are recognized. There's nothing else to fight for, it's fine, we can say what we want, we can go out and earn whatever what we want... do I really need to use my vote unless I really care about health policies for the over-50s (or whatever)?
I hope that human alturism is an important part of our genetic make-up (us making ourselves feel 'good'). But unfortunatley I'd have to disagree with the fact it's more important than self-preservation, or in fact, being better than the person next to you.
Neo-con foreign policy is not inherently linked to Fukuyama's thesis. It is a possible by-product. We do not have to drag them kicking and screaming, it is natual progression.
I don't know Maslow. But if people are drawn towards things they need then surely economic development is key - it's defintely possible to argue economic liberalism has been proven as the best way to create wealth. It then open up the date over whether economic liberalism creates political liberalism.
posted by RufusW at 10:07 AM on May 8, 2006
Well, yes, we do. Do you support the right of a society to slaughter its ethnic/religious/economic social minorities? To sanction, both officially and unofficially, the subjugation and abuse of women? To practice slavery? I'm pretty sure that you'd agree that there are basic standards of human rights every country must adhere to, and if you're willing to believe that, then you're saying that certain, as you put it, orderings of priorities are better than others.
You assume too much--I don't know if there are basic standards of universal human rights or not. But as far as subjugation, slaughter, and slavery, those crimes have never been committed by any other culture on anything like the same scale--in terms of number of victims, or span of time--as they have by those cultures that gave us liberal democracies. It was Western civilization that gave us the African slave trade and the Holocaust, and though we see those activities more often performed by other cultures now, it's important to point out that it's very much the legacy of colonialism. Those are all consequences of contact between their cultures, and our much-beloved liberal democracies. All of which reminds me of a particular quote attributed to Jesus in the gospels: "Why do you see the speck that is in your brother's eye, but don't consider the beam that is in your own eye? Or how will you tell your brother,'Let me remove the speck from your eye;' and behold, the beam is in your own eye? You hypocrite! First remove the beam out of your own eye, and then you can see clearly to remove the speck out of your brother's eye."
The environment has changed. It's no longer just India, the West, the Arab world, etc. The human environment is now a truly global one, and ideas and practices that may have worked on the ancient regional scales simply do not and cannot work on a global one.
And that is where Fukuyama earns the title of "idiot." klangklangston says Fukuyama's not an idiot because he continues the Hegelian tradition--and yet, it's precisely that, that makes him an idiot! Hegelian historical fatalism was one of the worst ideas, from its very conception, to ever be thoroughly disreputed: and it has. Anthropologists still shy away from ethnology nearly a century later, because of the Hegelian influence that led to such absurd pronouncements in the 1700s and 1800s about this or that being the ultimate end-point of history. Every generation has declared itself as such, and yet, history always moves on in spite of them.
But most importantly, Fukuyama glosses over the very real differences that remain. Globalization is a passing mirage, an ephemeral dream permitted only by the enormous energy glut afforded by peak oil production. Whatever you may think of the various infrastructure problems we face, it must be admitted that we cannot long continue as we have. Globalization is a "one-size-fits-all" solution to all the world's problems, and that means that it will always be a foolish way to do things. If you happen to be awash in cheap energy, you may be able to afford doing something so foolish, as we have, but that doesn't make it any less foolish. We will need to come to terms with that. In the end, homogeneity is, was, and ever shall be a momentary thing. It is maladapted to the reality of a universe that always pushes towards diversity, and is thus always a self-eliminating strategy.
Fukuyama is probably correct that liberal democracy is well-adapted to the current moment. Where he earns the title of idiot is the supreme lack of imagination present in his assumption that this is the way things will continue to be, or that this is anything like a stable configuration. It is, in fact, highly unstable: a cursory examination of history should be enough to reveal that. Bioregional realities differ; cultural adaptations to those bioregional realities differ; personal accomodation to those cultural adaptations differ. With enough energy, you can ignore that, but ultimately, it's the most efficient strategies that will always win out.
Liberal democracy is simply the best way we've found of organizing people and beliefs.
Many, many people disagree with that. I certainly do. The problem I see with liberal democracy is the same problem I see with Communism: scale. Humans evolved in small groups. Liberal democracies try to mimic the feeling of involvement, self-empowerment and ultimately, as Fukuyama notes, "recognition," that a million years of evolution has conditioned us to expect, but it's a pale mimicry at best. Again, I would point to U.S. voter turnout as evidence.
Instead, I think the best way we've found of organizing people and beliefs is the first one we ever tried, the one we co-evolved with: the hunter-gatherer band. Now, whether or not that is practical is another matter entirely, but it's my own thinking that all large-scale societies are essentially dehumanizing, even liberal democracies with all their attempts to abrogate that inescapable facet of living in a large population. Ultimately, one way or another, I think we will be forced to scale back down to a human scale, where that "best way" becomes viable again, and pretensions to a "global" culture are rightfully relegated to the dust bin of bad ideas conjured up by madmen and idiots. All that's really left up to us is whether we'll make that transition peacefully or catastrophically.
But as to the question of whether liberal democracies are the "best way," there is simply nothing to support such a conjecture but for our own smug, ethnocentric sense of self-importance.
Britain had feudalism and I'm pretty sure people thought they "had a place and keeping in that place is a duty". Then we got democracy.
Quite true--and at the time, a lot of British peasants thought they had a duty to remain in their place. Others thought otherwise. Points were tipped, cultures changed. Cultures change all the time: that's what Fukuyama ignores. Because we live in a global society now, he assumes we always will, forevermore. Because liberal democracies are well adapted to the current situation, he assumes that this will never change. But it's so true it's become cliche to point out that change is the only constant.
I think voter turn-out in the US is more to do with the fact that they are recognized. There's nothing else to fight for, it's fine, we can say what we want, we can go out and earn whatever what we want... do I really need to use my vote unless I really care about health policies for the over-50s (or whatever)?
Perhaps, but when you actually ask the people who aren't voting, the most common response is that they do not feel their vote matters. They feel unrecognized. Perhaps they're lying, or perhaps you know how they feel better than they do, but when asked for their reasons, that is the most common answer given.
I don't know Maslow.
Maslow's hierarchy of needs, Wikipedia.
...it's defintely possible to argue economic liberalism has been proven as the best way to create wealth.
I think we're seeing the beginnings of a certain failure of the materialist dream. We're seeing more things like voluntary simplicity, slow food, etc.--as Jeff Vail pointed out in "Vernacular Zen":
You assume too much--I don't know if there are basic standards of universal human rights or not. But as far as subjugation, slaughter, and slavery, those crimes have never been committed by any other culture on anything like the same scale--in terms of number of victims, or span of time--as they have by those cultures that gave us liberal democracies. It was Western civilization that gave us the African slave trade and the Holocaust, and though we see those activities more often performed by other cultures now, it's important to point out that it's very much the legacy of colonialism. Those are all consequences of contact between their cultures, and our much-beloved liberal democracies. All of which reminds me of a particular quote attributed to Jesus in the gospels: "Why do you see the speck that is in your brother's eye, but don't consider the beam that is in your own eye? Or how will you tell your brother,'Let me remove the speck from your eye;' and behold, the beam is in your own eye? You hypocrite! First remove the beam out of your own eye, and then you can see clearly to remove the speck out of your brother's eye."
The environment has changed. It's no longer just India, the West, the Arab world, etc. The human environment is now a truly global one, and ideas and practices that may have worked on the ancient regional scales simply do not and cannot work on a global one.
And that is where Fukuyama earns the title of "idiot." klangklangston says Fukuyama's not an idiot because he continues the Hegelian tradition--and yet, it's precisely that, that makes him an idiot! Hegelian historical fatalism was one of the worst ideas, from its very conception, to ever be thoroughly disreputed: and it has. Anthropologists still shy away from ethnology nearly a century later, because of the Hegelian influence that led to such absurd pronouncements in the 1700s and 1800s about this or that being the ultimate end-point of history. Every generation has declared itself as such, and yet, history always moves on in spite of them.
But most importantly, Fukuyama glosses over the very real differences that remain. Globalization is a passing mirage, an ephemeral dream permitted only by the enormous energy glut afforded by peak oil production. Whatever you may think of the various infrastructure problems we face, it must be admitted that we cannot long continue as we have. Globalization is a "one-size-fits-all" solution to all the world's problems, and that means that it will always be a foolish way to do things. If you happen to be awash in cheap energy, you may be able to afford doing something so foolish, as we have, but that doesn't make it any less foolish. We will need to come to terms with that. In the end, homogeneity is, was, and ever shall be a momentary thing. It is maladapted to the reality of a universe that always pushes towards diversity, and is thus always a self-eliminating strategy.
Fukuyama is probably correct that liberal democracy is well-adapted to the current moment. Where he earns the title of idiot is the supreme lack of imagination present in his assumption that this is the way things will continue to be, or that this is anything like a stable configuration. It is, in fact, highly unstable: a cursory examination of history should be enough to reveal that. Bioregional realities differ; cultural adaptations to those bioregional realities differ; personal accomodation to those cultural adaptations differ. With enough energy, you can ignore that, but ultimately, it's the most efficient strategies that will always win out.
Liberal democracy is simply the best way we've found of organizing people and beliefs.
Many, many people disagree with that. I certainly do. The problem I see with liberal democracy is the same problem I see with Communism: scale. Humans evolved in small groups. Liberal democracies try to mimic the feeling of involvement, self-empowerment and ultimately, as Fukuyama notes, "recognition," that a million years of evolution has conditioned us to expect, but it's a pale mimicry at best. Again, I would point to U.S. voter turnout as evidence.
Instead, I think the best way we've found of organizing people and beliefs is the first one we ever tried, the one we co-evolved with: the hunter-gatherer band. Now, whether or not that is practical is another matter entirely, but it's my own thinking that all large-scale societies are essentially dehumanizing, even liberal democracies with all their attempts to abrogate that inescapable facet of living in a large population. Ultimately, one way or another, I think we will be forced to scale back down to a human scale, where that "best way" becomes viable again, and pretensions to a "global" culture are rightfully relegated to the dust bin of bad ideas conjured up by madmen and idiots. All that's really left up to us is whether we'll make that transition peacefully or catastrophically.
But as to the question of whether liberal democracies are the "best way," there is simply nothing to support such a conjecture but for our own smug, ethnocentric sense of self-importance.
Britain had feudalism and I'm pretty sure people thought they "had a place and keeping in that place is a duty". Then we got democracy.
Quite true--and at the time, a lot of British peasants thought they had a duty to remain in their place. Others thought otherwise. Points were tipped, cultures changed. Cultures change all the time: that's what Fukuyama ignores. Because we live in a global society now, he assumes we always will, forevermore. Because liberal democracies are well adapted to the current situation, he assumes that this will never change. But it's so true it's become cliche to point out that change is the only constant.
I think voter turn-out in the US is more to do with the fact that they are recognized. There's nothing else to fight for, it's fine, we can say what we want, we can go out and earn whatever what we want... do I really need to use my vote unless I really care about health policies for the over-50s (or whatever)?
Perhaps, but when you actually ask the people who aren't voting, the most common response is that they do not feel their vote matters. They feel unrecognized. Perhaps they're lying, or perhaps you know how they feel better than they do, but when asked for their reasons, that is the most common answer given.
I don't know Maslow.
Maslow's hierarchy of needs, Wikipedia.
...it's defintely possible to argue economic liberalism has been proven as the best way to create wealth.
I think we're seeing the beginnings of a certain failure of the materialist dream. We're seeing more things like voluntary simplicity, slow food, etc.--as Jeff Vail pointed out in "Vernacular Zen":
The finer things in life can generally be divided into two categories: material and experiential. Despite the relentless psychological barrage of advertising, most of us can readily admit that it is the experiential that is truly rewarding and fulfilling. Many even recognize their own predilection to fulfill their desire for the experiential by compensating with an excess of the material. Commercialism tells us that the experiential--that which requires time--is too costly, out of our reach. Our time, we are led to believe, must be sacrificed to meet the demands of the economy. But time is free for all of us. It is the great equalizer, something to which we all have equally random access. But in the modern economy, where average individuals cannot directly provide for themselves, they are duped into trading time for the basic necessities of life--necessities that are directly available to the poorest of the Earth. As this economic hierarchy has intensified over time, we continue to be duped into trading our time for material possessions--far beyond those required to survive. The memes of our economic culture have convinced us that the material is a fine substitute for the experiential. A nagging doubt, dissatisfaction with our own suburbanization, some unknown, unfulfilled yearning tells us that, despire the overtures of mass-media, even the materially rich among us still long for the experiential.posted by jefgodesky at 11:09 AM on May 8, 2006
Where he earns the title of idiot is the supreme lack of imagination present in his assumption that this is the way things will continue to be
Exactly.
posted by languagehat at 11:23 AM on May 8, 2006
Exactly.
posted by languagehat at 11:23 AM on May 8, 2006
" It was Western civilization that gave us the African slave trade"
Wrong. Africans were perfectly able to start the African slave trade on their own, abbetted by the Arabs.
"But as far as subjugation, slaughter, and slavery, those crimes have never been committed by any other culture on anything like the same scale--in terms of number of victims, or span of time--as they have by those cultures that gave us liberal democracies."
China gave us a liberal democracy? Because, as far as I recall, Maoism holds the title for most number of citizens exterminated.
" it's important to point out that it's very much the legacy of colonialism."
Bullshit. While colonialism is inextricably linked with many instances of inflicted suffering, the legacy of colonialism is a lot more complicated than just "those poor people, victimized by the West." C'mon, let's not over-Orientalize. Fukuyama's comments on the need for a framework to develop stable governmental institutions absent economic markers that have traditionally corelated with democracy is directly addressing this.
"And that is where Fukuyama earns the title of "idiot." klangklangston says Fukuyama's not an idiot because he continues the Hegelian tradition--and yet, it's precisely that, that makes him an idiot! Hegelian historical fatalism was one of the worst ideas, from its very conception, to ever be thoroughly disreputed: and it has."
More bullshit. The Hegelian constuct of historical fatalism is neither good nor bad, and to discard it because of bad anthropology done in the 1800s is the same as discarding astronomy because epicycles are wrong. The most important thing that Hegel's historical fatalism gave us isn't the predictive, but the refletive. Much like how Marx is pretty crap for accurate predictions of the future, but still gives great, great great insight when examing things that have already happened.
"Globalization is a passing mirage, an ephemeral dream permitted only by the enormous energy glut afforded by peak oil production."
More bullshit. Globalization in terms of manufacturing distribution is likely to change, whether from shifts in transport costs or labor costs, but the telecommunications aspects of globalization are unlikely to move backwards. And describing it as a passing mirage is either willfully naive or some obstinant fantasy.
"Globalization is a "one-size-fits-all" solution to all the world's problems, and that means that it will always be a foolish way to do things."
No, it's not. Globalization describes a trend, not a philosophy. Neo-liberalism or corporate extra-national capitalism are philosophies that are too often totalized into global solutions, but globalization is neither a total solution nor representative purely of those philosophies. Christ, there was more nuance in the Presidential debates.
"We will need to come to terms with that. In the end, homogeneity is, was, and ever shall be a momentary thing."
Homogeneity is something that you've cobbled together from a poor understanding of globalization, not a component of globalization itself.
"It is, in fact, highly unstable: a cursory examination of history should be enough to reveal that."
More bullshit. And for two reasons— first off, democracy (especially republican democracy) tends to be the most efficient and adaptable of political organizations, as it is better at reprioritizing and allocating than any other system we've yet tried (even Machiavelli argued that), and so that while it is inherently unstable it tends to be an extremely good system for managing instability. Further, your handwaving about the historical record is both irrelevent and countr ot your point. From Fukuyama's view, the historical record does predict that democracy will continue to thrive, and that requires an acceptance of the Hegelian model to make a prediction either way.
"Again, I would point to U.S. voter turnout as evidence."
Again, you'd be off-base. The feelings of lack of efficacy in voting patterns don't argue that voting is a pale version of recognition and therefore not valuable, but rather that the need is being fulfilled elsewhere and thus it doesn't concern them. From a civic religion point of view, low turnout is bad. As far as a marker of general satisfaction, it's a good thing. Now obviously, the current US situation is much more complex, so I must suspect that you were attempting to make a cheap point instead of wanting to get into a discussion of it. But we've got no Obol-ocracy yet, so it's not that bad.
"Instead, I think the best way we've found of organizing people and beliefs is the first one we ever tried, the one we co-evolved with: the hunter-gatherer band. Now, whether or not that is practical is another matter entirely, but it's my own thinking that all large-scale societies are essentially dehumanizing, even liberal democracies with all their attempts to abrogate that inescapable facet of living in a large population. Ultimately, one way or another, I think we will be forced to scale back down to a human scale, where that "best way" becomes viable again, and pretensions to a "global" culture are rightfully relegated to the dust bin of bad ideas conjured up by madmen and idiots. All that's really left up to us is whether we'll make that transition peacefully or catastrophically."
Anything to support your eschatological paranoia? Hey, how about the fact that as soon as any society can produce a surplus, they leave the hunter/gatherer bands immediately? Oh, and global culture is not opposed to local culture. Christ, you sound like one of the Yobbos protesting in 1999 Seattle. The only way we're going back to your dream society is with a massive pandemic and plague.
posted by klangklangston at 11:58 AM on May 8, 2006
Wrong. Africans were perfectly able to start the African slave trade on their own, abbetted by the Arabs.
"But as far as subjugation, slaughter, and slavery, those crimes have never been committed by any other culture on anything like the same scale--in terms of number of victims, or span of time--as they have by those cultures that gave us liberal democracies."
China gave us a liberal democracy? Because, as far as I recall, Maoism holds the title for most number of citizens exterminated.
" it's important to point out that it's very much the legacy of colonialism."
Bullshit. While colonialism is inextricably linked with many instances of inflicted suffering, the legacy of colonialism is a lot more complicated than just "those poor people, victimized by the West." C'mon, let's not over-Orientalize. Fukuyama's comments on the need for a framework to develop stable governmental institutions absent economic markers that have traditionally corelated with democracy is directly addressing this.
"And that is where Fukuyama earns the title of "idiot." klangklangston says Fukuyama's not an idiot because he continues the Hegelian tradition--and yet, it's precisely that, that makes him an idiot! Hegelian historical fatalism was one of the worst ideas, from its very conception, to ever be thoroughly disreputed: and it has."
More bullshit. The Hegelian constuct of historical fatalism is neither good nor bad, and to discard it because of bad anthropology done in the 1800s is the same as discarding astronomy because epicycles are wrong. The most important thing that Hegel's historical fatalism gave us isn't the predictive, but the refletive. Much like how Marx is pretty crap for accurate predictions of the future, but still gives great, great great insight when examing things that have already happened.
"Globalization is a passing mirage, an ephemeral dream permitted only by the enormous energy glut afforded by peak oil production."
More bullshit. Globalization in terms of manufacturing distribution is likely to change, whether from shifts in transport costs or labor costs, but the telecommunications aspects of globalization are unlikely to move backwards. And describing it as a passing mirage is either willfully naive or some obstinant fantasy.
"Globalization is a "one-size-fits-all" solution to all the world's problems, and that means that it will always be a foolish way to do things."
No, it's not. Globalization describes a trend, not a philosophy. Neo-liberalism or corporate extra-national capitalism are philosophies that are too often totalized into global solutions, but globalization is neither a total solution nor representative purely of those philosophies. Christ, there was more nuance in the Presidential debates.
"We will need to come to terms with that. In the end, homogeneity is, was, and ever shall be a momentary thing."
Homogeneity is something that you've cobbled together from a poor understanding of globalization, not a component of globalization itself.
"It is, in fact, highly unstable: a cursory examination of history should be enough to reveal that."
More bullshit. And for two reasons— first off, democracy (especially republican democracy) tends to be the most efficient and adaptable of political organizations, as it is better at reprioritizing and allocating than any other system we've yet tried (even Machiavelli argued that), and so that while it is inherently unstable it tends to be an extremely good system for managing instability. Further, your handwaving about the historical record is both irrelevent and countr ot your point. From Fukuyama's view, the historical record does predict that democracy will continue to thrive, and that requires an acceptance of the Hegelian model to make a prediction either way.
"Again, I would point to U.S. voter turnout as evidence."
Again, you'd be off-base. The feelings of lack of efficacy in voting patterns don't argue that voting is a pale version of recognition and therefore not valuable, but rather that the need is being fulfilled elsewhere and thus it doesn't concern them. From a civic religion point of view, low turnout is bad. As far as a marker of general satisfaction, it's a good thing. Now obviously, the current US situation is much more complex, so I must suspect that you were attempting to make a cheap point instead of wanting to get into a discussion of it. But we've got no Obol-ocracy yet, so it's not that bad.
"Instead, I think the best way we've found of organizing people and beliefs is the first one we ever tried, the one we co-evolved with: the hunter-gatherer band. Now, whether or not that is practical is another matter entirely, but it's my own thinking that all large-scale societies are essentially dehumanizing, even liberal democracies with all their attempts to abrogate that inescapable facet of living in a large population. Ultimately, one way or another, I think we will be forced to scale back down to a human scale, where that "best way" becomes viable again, and pretensions to a "global" culture are rightfully relegated to the dust bin of bad ideas conjured up by madmen and idiots. All that's really left up to us is whether we'll make that transition peacefully or catastrophically."
Anything to support your eschatological paranoia? Hey, how about the fact that as soon as any society can produce a surplus, they leave the hunter/gatherer bands immediately? Oh, and global culture is not opposed to local culture. Christ, you sound like one of the Yobbos protesting in 1999 Seattle. The only way we're going back to your dream society is with a massive pandemic and plague.
posted by klangklangston at 11:58 AM on May 8, 2006
This guy is really great, he made people talk about him so much just by saying stupidities, pff end of history what a pretentious claim.
posted by zouhair at 11:59 AM on May 8, 2006
posted by zouhair at 11:59 AM on May 8, 2006
jefgodesky,
You miss the point about basic rights. I'm not saying that liberal democracies don't or haven't violated them. You are correct to point out the cultures that produced liberal democracies have done terrible things. But this is meaningless to this debate, just as pointing out that your statement "But as far as subjugation, slaughter, and slavery, those crimes have never been committed by any other culture on anything like the same scale--in terms of number of victims, or span of time--as they have by those cultures that gave us liberal democracies." is false, as the greatest attrocities and oppressions in modern timesoccured in non-democratic, Communist nations. The point is that we have come to recognize basic universal rights as valuable and neccessary to a modern functioning society. You yourself are assuming that societies never change. You can hardly argue that the kind of global agreement and views on rights we have today existed during the slave trade, or even WWII. Wilson's attempts only united essentially the Western powers, and then barely those. A liberal democratic world is a process, not an end. The fact that bad things happen does not negate the process. Horrible things have occured in the past, and have left terrible legacies, but the answer to these problems is through democratic means, such as the ethnic conflicts I have mentioned before.
Globalization is a passing mirage, an ephemeral dream permitted only by the enormous energy glut afforded by peak oil production.
This is simply wrong. Global trade existed long before oil production, and will exist long after. You simply have the wrong idea of trade. The British Empire operated without oil, as did the Spanish and Dutch. The Silk Road didn't need oil. The point is people will always trade, and are always looking to expand their trade, and the history of humanity shows this. The idea of a world of cultures completely isolated and divided until the last two hundred years is simply wrong.
And on top of that, you make all kinds of assumptions and value judgments. You call the global trade "foolish", yet give no reason for doing so. You assume that the decline of available cheap oil will bring about some kind of apocalypse, yet there is little evidence to support that assertion. It's true that oil will run out one day, but that doesn't mean the global system will come crashing down. As you said, societies adapt. New technologies arise, that which is most efficient wins out, which is exactly why globalization is winning, because it is the most efficient means of economic operation we have.
You say you think that we are ultimately going to have to scale things back, but that makes no sense. Why? Short of a total nuclear war or some similar apocalyptic event, there is no reason for this, beyond you saying so. And you misinterpret my point about liberal democracy being the best system. You say that you think a hunter-gatherer system is the best, but that is patently false. Such a small unit does not allow at all for diversity of thought or opinion. Your points about diversity and homogeneity make no sense to me because that is precisely liberal democracy's advantage: flexibility. It is a system that can allow a number of different cultures, religions, ideologies, etc to coexist within it without destroying itself. If there are new problems that have never existed before, the system itself can be changed as needed to fit these new circumstances, as we've seen democracies do time and again. Liberal democracy is the most efficient, most adaptive system. It allows for all the global differences you speak of, which are not obstacles to it, but rather can be embraced by it. Large societies are a reality that has to be dealt with, and your suggestions are completely unrealistic. Even if society were somehow destroyed by some catastrophe, large societies would eventually rise again, and we'd have the same problem. You are simply ignoring it, and offering ideas which you yourself note are not practical. Liberal democracy is the best practical solution to the problem of living together in a world full of people with very, very different beliefs and ways of living. You say you disagree with that, but on what grounds? What other system allows that kind of flexibility, that kind of ability to adapt to new situations and realities without breaking, that kind of ability to include so many different groups? Communism failed because at its heart it is a Utopian view, that all problems will fade away when the communist state has been reached. Liberal democracy is different, because it promises no state of salvation, just an ongoing process that has the ability to adapt to new challenges and include new groups of people.
Your views seem to reflect your own personal beliefs about global trade and society, but where is the evidence that what you say will come true? Oil will run out, this is true. But how does this translate to a collapse of the global system, rather than what seems the much more likely shifts in thinking and method within the system? Do you have any reason to think this, or do you just believe it? Why do you think a hunter-gatherer band is a better way to organize differing peoples without those peoples engaging in constant violence? Such a small unit seems exactly the opposite of what is needed in a diverse world: Balkanization is suicidal. Following the path of liberal democracy, it seems that the trend today is for battles between major powers to be played out on the economic stage, and that is fine. If the worst that happens is a trade dispute, then things would be much better than they are now. The best and only practical way to deal with the reality of diversity is to try and give that diversity a voice in society, and a liberal democracy is the way to do this. Why do you disagree with this? What practical alternative do you offer? Because even if you are right, and global trade is going to go away someday, we still need solutions for today, and liberal democracy is that.
posted by Sangermaine at 12:29 PM on May 8, 2006
You miss the point about basic rights. I'm not saying that liberal democracies don't or haven't violated them. You are correct to point out the cultures that produced liberal democracies have done terrible things. But this is meaningless to this debate, just as pointing out that your statement "But as far as subjugation, slaughter, and slavery, those crimes have never been committed by any other culture on anything like the same scale--in terms of number of victims, or span of time--as they have by those cultures that gave us liberal democracies." is false, as the greatest attrocities and oppressions in modern timesoccured in non-democratic, Communist nations. The point is that we have come to recognize basic universal rights as valuable and neccessary to a modern functioning society. You yourself are assuming that societies never change. You can hardly argue that the kind of global agreement and views on rights we have today existed during the slave trade, or even WWII. Wilson's attempts only united essentially the Western powers, and then barely those. A liberal democratic world is a process, not an end. The fact that bad things happen does not negate the process. Horrible things have occured in the past, and have left terrible legacies, but the answer to these problems is through democratic means, such as the ethnic conflicts I have mentioned before.
Globalization is a passing mirage, an ephemeral dream permitted only by the enormous energy glut afforded by peak oil production.
This is simply wrong. Global trade existed long before oil production, and will exist long after. You simply have the wrong idea of trade. The British Empire operated without oil, as did the Spanish and Dutch. The Silk Road didn't need oil. The point is people will always trade, and are always looking to expand their trade, and the history of humanity shows this. The idea of a world of cultures completely isolated and divided until the last two hundred years is simply wrong.
And on top of that, you make all kinds of assumptions and value judgments. You call the global trade "foolish", yet give no reason for doing so. You assume that the decline of available cheap oil will bring about some kind of apocalypse, yet there is little evidence to support that assertion. It's true that oil will run out one day, but that doesn't mean the global system will come crashing down. As you said, societies adapt. New technologies arise, that which is most efficient wins out, which is exactly why globalization is winning, because it is the most efficient means of economic operation we have.
You say you think that we are ultimately going to have to scale things back, but that makes no sense. Why? Short of a total nuclear war or some similar apocalyptic event, there is no reason for this, beyond you saying so. And you misinterpret my point about liberal democracy being the best system. You say that you think a hunter-gatherer system is the best, but that is patently false. Such a small unit does not allow at all for diversity of thought or opinion. Your points about diversity and homogeneity make no sense to me because that is precisely liberal democracy's advantage: flexibility. It is a system that can allow a number of different cultures, religions, ideologies, etc to coexist within it without destroying itself. If there are new problems that have never existed before, the system itself can be changed as needed to fit these new circumstances, as we've seen democracies do time and again. Liberal democracy is the most efficient, most adaptive system. It allows for all the global differences you speak of, which are not obstacles to it, but rather can be embraced by it. Large societies are a reality that has to be dealt with, and your suggestions are completely unrealistic. Even if society were somehow destroyed by some catastrophe, large societies would eventually rise again, and we'd have the same problem. You are simply ignoring it, and offering ideas which you yourself note are not practical. Liberal democracy is the best practical solution to the problem of living together in a world full of people with very, very different beliefs and ways of living. You say you disagree with that, but on what grounds? What other system allows that kind of flexibility, that kind of ability to adapt to new situations and realities without breaking, that kind of ability to include so many different groups? Communism failed because at its heart it is a Utopian view, that all problems will fade away when the communist state has been reached. Liberal democracy is different, because it promises no state of salvation, just an ongoing process that has the ability to adapt to new challenges and include new groups of people.
Your views seem to reflect your own personal beliefs about global trade and society, but where is the evidence that what you say will come true? Oil will run out, this is true. But how does this translate to a collapse of the global system, rather than what seems the much more likely shifts in thinking and method within the system? Do you have any reason to think this, or do you just believe it? Why do you think a hunter-gatherer band is a better way to organize differing peoples without those peoples engaging in constant violence? Such a small unit seems exactly the opposite of what is needed in a diverse world: Balkanization is suicidal. Following the path of liberal democracy, it seems that the trend today is for battles between major powers to be played out on the economic stage, and that is fine. If the worst that happens is a trade dispute, then things would be much better than they are now. The best and only practical way to deal with the reality of diversity is to try and give that diversity a voice in society, and a liberal democracy is the way to do this. Why do you disagree with this? What practical alternative do you offer? Because even if you are right, and global trade is going to go away someday, we still need solutions for today, and liberal democracy is that.
posted by Sangermaine at 12:29 PM on May 8, 2006
Fukuyama reflects on how his ideas have survived the tides of criticism and political change.
You mean like, how they haven't?
posted by telstar at 1:36 PM on May 8, 2006
You mean like, how they haven't?
posted by telstar at 1:36 PM on May 8, 2006
Wrong. Africans were perfectly able to start the African slave trade on their own, abbetted by the Arabs.
I said scale, didn't I? Other cultures have done nasty things, just never quite as nasty, or quite as overwhelming, as the West. Yes, there was an African slave trade prior to the West's involvement, and yes, both the West and the Arabs before them co-opted local social structures and exploited divisions to get their "goods," but when people refer to the African slave trade, they're referring to a distinctly European enterprise, and with good reason: it positively dwarfed everything that came before.
China gave us a liberal democracy? Because, as far as I recall, Maoism holds the title for most number of citizens exterminated.
For the twentieth century. Even then, the numbers fluctuate depending on what you consider to "count" and "not count" between Mao and his two Western competitors, Hitler and Stalin. Even not considering that, I was taking a longer historical view, wherein the West is still accountable for the Crusades, the Inquisition, colonialism, and innumerable other atrocities. Ours is, without parallel, the most murderous culture in history. That doesn't make every other culture saintly, and it's true that many other cultures have taken after us (Mao was a Communist, after all, and that was hardly an indigenous Chinese innovation), but it should give us pause before presuming to preach morality to the world. The beam in your own eye, and so forth.
While colonialism is inextricably linked with many instances of inflicted suffering, the legacy of colonialism is a lot more complicated than just "those poor people, victimized by the West." C'mon, let's not over-Orientalize.
I said nothing of the sort. It's a lot more complicated than that. Arbitrary lines drawn by European powers unconcerned with local disparities, the exploitation model deliberately creating unstable countries, neocolonialism, and the simple fact that those victimized by brutal regimes often aspire to absolute power themselves in order to alleviate their fear of subjugation creates a nasty millieu of domination, violence and unending conflict that is part the result of traumatic contact, part the result of continued Western meddling and the legacy of past dominion, and part the fact that having taught a culture how to hurt others on a larger scale, we can only expect some of their individuals to put that knowledge to use. But that doesn't mean it's just a matter of those poor people victimized by the West--that's far too much of an over-generalization. But it's also true that most of the conflict in the world today can be traced directly to the long-term consequences of colonialism.
In other words, the problems we face in the world today are the end result of arguments like Fukuyama's.
The Hegelian constuct of historical fatalism is neither good nor bad, and to discard it because of bad anthropology done in the 1800s is the same as discarding astronomy because epicycles are wrong.
No, it's bad. Very, very bad. Hegelian fatalism is, was, and ever shall be a really, irredeemably stupid idea. History no more has an endpoint than evolution does; there is no "goal," there is no one-size-fits-all solution that will end the process, and anyone who is so lacking in imagination that he can possibly think that just because it's so today that it will always be so deserve to be called an idiot.
...but the telecommunications aspects of globalization are unlikely to move backwards.
Telecommunications does have a material base. We're not communicating with each other by magic here. There are building costs and maintenance costs; copper that must be mined, and resources that have their own economic bases. Personally, I think it is very likely, nigh inevitable, that at some point in the future, telecommunications will move backwards. Fortunes wax and wane; change is the only constant. At some point in the future, whether near-term or long-term, it's almost unavoidable that our resources will diminish, and telecommunications will move backwards.
It's funny how quickly we lose sight of all historical perspective. The notion of "history as progress" was only possible in the context of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution; it was unthinkable before that, as things got better, then worse, then better again. Now, most of us think there must be some kind of cosmic principle that everything must progress as they have for the past two centuries, but the whole experiment is the most insignificantly recent sliver of history--even recorded history, which is itself the most insignificantly recent sliver.
Globalization describes a trend, not a philosophy.
It does--a trend towards a "one-size-fits-all" approach to our problems, trying to impose the adaptations made to Western countries to other environments, where those adaptations make little or no sense. It is a trend away from localized solutions, where one maximizes the efficiency of how one adapts to one's specific circumstances. It is a trend towards ignoring your environment and circumstances and plowing ahead, no matter how foolish or costly it is.
Homogeneity is something that you've cobbled together from a poor understanding of globalization, not a component of globalization itself.
Globalization is the trend towards homogeneity. It's never complete. It's also never entirely one-way, but it's always unbalanced. Globalization means Americans picking up some things from India, but it means India picking up a lot more things from America. It worked the same way when it was called "Hellenism," and the center was Greece instead of New York.
...democracy (especially republican democracy) tends to be the most efficient and adaptable of political organizations, as it is better at reprioritizing and allocating than any other system we've yet tried...
Except for all small-scale forms, which beat out all large-scale forms, including republics.
Further, your handwaving about the historical record is both irrelevent and countr ot your point. From Fukuyama's view, the historical record does predict that democracy will continue to thrive, and that requires an acceptance of the Hegelian model to make a prediction either way.
Take Hellenism--exactly the same as globalization, but "globalizing" a different culture, over a different "globe." Fukuyama's point does require a Hegelian model; pointing out that Hellenism was maladaptive to most areas it penetrated and ultimately faded away, and that globalization's inherent weaknesses are likely to send it down the same path, does not require any kind of Hegelian fatalism. It merely requires an understanding that what works in England may not always work in, say, India, combined with a healthy respect for natural selection and the notion that while maladapted systems die out, adapted ones prosper.
The feelings of lack of efficacy in voting patterns don't argue that voting is a pale version of recognition and therefore not valuable, but rather that the need is being fulfilled elsewhere and thus it doesn't concern them.
Not necessarily. We can feel unrecognized overall, and simply not vote because it cannot fulfill our needs any better than anything else. According to Fukuyama, liberal democracies work because people feel that their governments represent them. Yet in the world's most established democracies, their populations increasingly report that they feel their governments do not represent them. Does this not suggest that Fukuyama's liberal democracies are in fact, unstable? Obviously the process is only beginning, but I would expect it to continue for some time to come: as people feel that their republics have ceased to represent them, their legitimacy fades. If that's the case, then how can liberal democracies provide this perfectly stable system that cannot and will not ever be tipped, providing the context of the future forevermore?
Anything to support your eschatological paranoia?
A bit, but that's a discussion for somewhere else. I was only presenting another counter-example to the notion that everyone must aspire to liberal democracy 'cause it's just the greatest thing EVAR.
The point is that we have come to recognize basic universal rights as valuable and neccessary to a modern functioning society.
Where "we" is defined as, "Westerners," and "basic universal rights" are defined as, "Western priorities." I'd imagine that most Westerners would agree that Western culture is good. That's the easy part. Convincing the rest of the world that our culture has a monopoly on what's right and what's not, and that they all need to do as we say--that's a bit harder. Right now, they want our material wealth, and they're willing to listen in order to get it. But an emormous swath of the world's population remains unconvinced with regards to our priorities, our culture, and our forms of government, and that is where our past becomes relevant. It undermines our claim to such an elevated moral station. How can we presume to call our values "universal," when we have been responsible for so many atrocities?
You yourself are assuming that societies never change.
The idea that societies change is a fundamental premise for me. Fukuyama says that once societies adopt liberal democracies, they stop changing: history is merely the story of how they reach that blessed state where they become as wonderful as we are, just like the Victorians before him posited a neat, linear picture of "cultural evolution" from the San Bushman to the Victorian gentleman as the ultimate end-point of human development.
In reality, societies are constantly changing as they adapt to a changing environment and changing circumstances. At the moment, perhaps liberal democracy is the best adaptation. I tend to think that even today there are places it doesn't work terribly well, but I'll grant that for the moment, for the sake of argument. Even then, are we to suppose that such a situation will never change? Resources will never deplete, or if they do, new ones will always be available for substitution, just because we need them? There will never be any more new ideas, or new ways of relating to one another, that may out-compete our current ones? As I said, it's a lack of imagination that earns the title of "idiot."
Global trade existed long before oil production, and will exist long after.
It did. Cahokia was trading from the Rockies to the Gulf of Mexico, with a teeming city bigger than London of that time, while Europe was in the Middle Ages. But globalization is a very different thing from simple trade. Saudis live like Americans, but only because they have the wealth--tokens to be exchanged for energy in various forms--to power air conditioning, so that they can dress like us, the means to import our products, to offset the health costs of living and working and eating a life adapted to northern Europe (if even there) in the middle of the Arabian Desert, and so on. Globalization is driven by trade, but it is not merely trade. Globalization is the transformation of a culture from something adapted to its circumstances, to something adapted to other circumstances.
The British Empire operated without oil, as did the Spanish and Dutch. The Silk Road didn't need oil.
Yes, and none of them were able to progress as far down that trend of globalization as we have, even though they often conscously desired it, while we usually don't. Why? Because they did not have the energy to do it, so they did what they could. We do have the energy to do it, so it happens even when we're not trying to do it.
The idea of a world of cultures completely isolated and divided until the last two hundred years is simply wrong.
You're absolutely right; it's a good thing I never said anything like that. That would just be embarrassing.
You call the global trade "foolish", yet give no reason for doing so.
I called globalization foolish, not global trade. The reason is that the earth is not uniform; neither are cultures. Globalization is created by trade, but it is fundamentally a cultural, not an economic, process. Globalization is the trend by which individuals from other cultures that are adapted to the circumstances that culture developed in, abandon that culture to one degree or another, to follow a culture that is adapted to an entirely different, alien, and irrelevant set of circumstances. This is always costly, because it's always a "square peg in a round hole" kind of problem, but if you have enough energy (e.g., wealth), it can be done, in precisely the same way that if you hammer it enough, you will eventually get the square peg in the round hole.
You assume that the decline of available cheap oil will bring about some kind of apocalypse, yet there is little evidence to support that assertion.
There's all kinds of evidence to support that assertion, but that's not an assumption in my argument here. The decline of cheap energy, whether it's catastrophic or not, will require that energy be used more efficiently. Saudis will need to live like they're in the desert, rather than living like they're in England. They'll need to adjust their lifestyles accordingly. The trend towards American culture will need to end, as individuals will need to waste less energy pursuing maladapted cultural approaches to their situations, and instead adapt to their environments, rather than continue their attempts to defy adaptation. Whether that is catastrophic or not is an entirely different question, but that basic fact is unavoidable: you cannot continue living in the same wasteful ways enjoyed with cheap energy, if energy ceases to be cheap.
New technologies arise, that which is most efficient wins out, which is exactly why globalization is winning, because it is the most efficient means of economic operation we have.
That's just plain wrong. Globalization is the least efficient means of economic operation we have. It's "winning" only because it has so much sheer force behind it. Before you imply that I mean only military means, I don't. It has economic and cultural force behind it, as well. Military force is the most clumsy, and the least powerful, of all the forces that drive globalization, despite its gross inefficiency.
Short of a total nuclear war or some similar apocalyptic event, there is no reason for this, beyond you saying so.
Because it's unsustainable--always was, always will be. It's unsustainable because it's contrary to human nature. There's only one thing that all unsustainable systems have in common: they're never sustained.
You say that you think a hunter-gatherer system is the best, but that is patently false. Such a small unit does not allow at all for diversity of thought or opinion.
Spoken truly as someone who doesn't know very much about hunter-gatherers. Most of the cultural diversity in the human species is accounted for by foragers, even today. As for the idea that hunter-gatherers suppress individuality, I think Paul Radin treated that subject quite well in The Primitive Man as Philosopher.
Your points about diversity and homogeneity make no sense to me because that is precisely liberal democracy's advantage: flexibility. It is a system that can allow a number of different cultures, religions, ideologies, etc to coexist within it without destroying itself.
Oh? Then why all the hubbub about immigration in the U.S. today? I would agree that of the large-scale arrangements, liberal democracy probably does the best on this account, but it is still beaten by even the most homogenous small-scale system.
Liberal democracy is the most efficient, most adaptive system.
Except for all the systems that are more efficient and more adaptive, of which there are many. They are simply usually ignored by Westerners due to simple ethnocentrism. The hunter-gatherer band was far more efficient and adaptive, and saw us through a million years of evolution. The horticultural tribe, too, was far more efficient and adaptive.
It allows for all the global differences you speak of, which are not obstacles to it, but rather can be embraced by it.
No, I don't think that's the case. While the United States has not consciously pursued a policy of cultural imperialism like so many of our European antecedents, American corporations have not always kept such a clean slate. Campaigns to dismantle even basic features of other cultures are somewhat common, because to whatever extent we can reconfigure another culture to be a mirror of our own, we can turn its people into American-style consumers, and that will be good for business. Koreans who eat like Americans are easier to sell American fast food to. Arabs who embrace Western notions of romantic love are easier to pitch a DeBeers diamond to.
Even when we are not dealing with corporations who hire anthropologists specifically to devise campaigns to undermine another culture, liberal democracies need people to embrace Western ideas and attitudes. This is why globalization--a trend towards homogeneity--seems like such an inescapable feature of the modern world. The liberal democracies that mark Fukuyama's "End of History" are ultimately necessary to maximize (1) the consent required for legitimacy, and (2) economic profit. So, a consequence of the "End of History" must be an approach, as much as possible, to a single, homogenous culture.
Even if society were somehow destroyed by some catastrophe, large societies would eventually rise again, and we'd have the same problem.
Why? They didn't for some million years of human evolution, and then they pop up out of nowhere, six times over, when the Holocene starts. It seems to me that it is large-scale societies that are the aberration, and one dependent on the earth's climate.
You are simply ignoring it, and offering ideas which you yourself note are not practical.
Not only do I think they're practical, I think they're the only practical solutions--but I didn't want to derail this with my reasons for being a primitivist.
What other system allows that kind of flexibility, that kind of ability to adapt to new situations and realities without breaking, that kind of ability to include so many different groups?
Simple: having different approaches in different places, for different people. There can never be any one solution to all people, everywhere, that can ever be as adaptive or as flexible as evaluating each circumstance on its own and adapting to those circumstances. In the words of author Daniel Quinn, "there is no one right way to live." What works for one group in one place will not work for another group in another place. You're right, there is no one other system that would do any better (or any worse) than liberal democracies. It's diversity that allows greater flexibility and adaptiveness. Homogeneity--even a homogenous adoption of whatever it is that works well for you--is always a disadvantage.
Your views seem to reflect your own personal beliefs about global trade and society, but where is the evidence that what you say will come true?
Your views seem to reflect your own personal beliefs about global trade and society, but where is the evidence that what you say will come true?
Oil will run out, this is true. But how does this translate to a collapse of the global system, rather than what seems the much more likely shifts in thinking and method within the system? Do you have any reason to think this, or do you just believe it?
1. I didn't say anything about collapse here.
2. I have my reasons, but they're irrelevant to this discussion.
Balkanization is suicidal.
Then how did it work for a million years? It seems to me that it's precisely the opposite that's suicidal, bringing together people who do not like each other, and forcing them to cooperate on such a scale that they feel unrecognized, unimportant and unfulfilled. In the context of human evolution, tribalism kept us apart and served to promote the peace. Today, that very same, natural impulse gives us ethnic cleansing and racism. It's not a question of "good" or "bad" nearly so much as adaptation. Humans are adapted to a given context, and we do well in that context. In a different context, the very things that served us so well otherwise become problems. So no, I don't think Balkinization is suicidal at all; I think it's large-scale society, and the systematic ignoring of human nature, that's suicidal.
Because even if you are right, and global trade is going to go away someday, we still need solutions for today, and liberal democracy is that.
For us, perhaps. But not for everyone. That's the bottom line, as far as I'm concerned. I don't think we could do much better than liberal democracy here in the West. I just think it's idiotic to propose that there's any one-size-fits-all solution to the world's problems--even liberal democracy.
posted by jefgodesky at 1:48 PM on May 8, 2006
I said scale, didn't I? Other cultures have done nasty things, just never quite as nasty, or quite as overwhelming, as the West. Yes, there was an African slave trade prior to the West's involvement, and yes, both the West and the Arabs before them co-opted local social structures and exploited divisions to get their "goods," but when people refer to the African slave trade, they're referring to a distinctly European enterprise, and with good reason: it positively dwarfed everything that came before.
China gave us a liberal democracy? Because, as far as I recall, Maoism holds the title for most number of citizens exterminated.
For the twentieth century. Even then, the numbers fluctuate depending on what you consider to "count" and "not count" between Mao and his two Western competitors, Hitler and Stalin. Even not considering that, I was taking a longer historical view, wherein the West is still accountable for the Crusades, the Inquisition, colonialism, and innumerable other atrocities. Ours is, without parallel, the most murderous culture in history. That doesn't make every other culture saintly, and it's true that many other cultures have taken after us (Mao was a Communist, after all, and that was hardly an indigenous Chinese innovation), but it should give us pause before presuming to preach morality to the world. The beam in your own eye, and so forth.
While colonialism is inextricably linked with many instances of inflicted suffering, the legacy of colonialism is a lot more complicated than just "those poor people, victimized by the West." C'mon, let's not over-Orientalize.
I said nothing of the sort. It's a lot more complicated than that. Arbitrary lines drawn by European powers unconcerned with local disparities, the exploitation model deliberately creating unstable countries, neocolonialism, and the simple fact that those victimized by brutal regimes often aspire to absolute power themselves in order to alleviate their fear of subjugation creates a nasty millieu of domination, violence and unending conflict that is part the result of traumatic contact, part the result of continued Western meddling and the legacy of past dominion, and part the fact that having taught a culture how to hurt others on a larger scale, we can only expect some of their individuals to put that knowledge to use. But that doesn't mean it's just a matter of those poor people victimized by the West--that's far too much of an over-generalization. But it's also true that most of the conflict in the world today can be traced directly to the long-term consequences of colonialism.
In other words, the problems we face in the world today are the end result of arguments like Fukuyama's.
The Hegelian constuct of historical fatalism is neither good nor bad, and to discard it because of bad anthropology done in the 1800s is the same as discarding astronomy because epicycles are wrong.
No, it's bad. Very, very bad. Hegelian fatalism is, was, and ever shall be a really, irredeemably stupid idea. History no more has an endpoint than evolution does; there is no "goal," there is no one-size-fits-all solution that will end the process, and anyone who is so lacking in imagination that he can possibly think that just because it's so today that it will always be so deserve to be called an idiot.
...but the telecommunications aspects of globalization are unlikely to move backwards.
Telecommunications does have a material base. We're not communicating with each other by magic here. There are building costs and maintenance costs; copper that must be mined, and resources that have their own economic bases. Personally, I think it is very likely, nigh inevitable, that at some point in the future, telecommunications will move backwards. Fortunes wax and wane; change is the only constant. At some point in the future, whether near-term or long-term, it's almost unavoidable that our resources will diminish, and telecommunications will move backwards.
It's funny how quickly we lose sight of all historical perspective. The notion of "history as progress" was only possible in the context of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution; it was unthinkable before that, as things got better, then worse, then better again. Now, most of us think there must be some kind of cosmic principle that everything must progress as they have for the past two centuries, but the whole experiment is the most insignificantly recent sliver of history--even recorded history, which is itself the most insignificantly recent sliver.
Globalization describes a trend, not a philosophy.
It does--a trend towards a "one-size-fits-all" approach to our problems, trying to impose the adaptations made to Western countries to other environments, where those adaptations make little or no sense. It is a trend away from localized solutions, where one maximizes the efficiency of how one adapts to one's specific circumstances. It is a trend towards ignoring your environment and circumstances and plowing ahead, no matter how foolish or costly it is.
Homogeneity is something that you've cobbled together from a poor understanding of globalization, not a component of globalization itself.
Globalization is the trend towards homogeneity. It's never complete. It's also never entirely one-way, but it's always unbalanced. Globalization means Americans picking up some things from India, but it means India picking up a lot more things from America. It worked the same way when it was called "Hellenism," and the center was Greece instead of New York.
...democracy (especially republican democracy) tends to be the most efficient and adaptable of political organizations, as it is better at reprioritizing and allocating than any other system we've yet tried...
Except for all small-scale forms, which beat out all large-scale forms, including republics.
Further, your handwaving about the historical record is both irrelevent and countr ot your point. From Fukuyama's view, the historical record does predict that democracy will continue to thrive, and that requires an acceptance of the Hegelian model to make a prediction either way.
Take Hellenism--exactly the same as globalization, but "globalizing" a different culture, over a different "globe." Fukuyama's point does require a Hegelian model; pointing out that Hellenism was maladaptive to most areas it penetrated and ultimately faded away, and that globalization's inherent weaknesses are likely to send it down the same path, does not require any kind of Hegelian fatalism. It merely requires an understanding that what works in England may not always work in, say, India, combined with a healthy respect for natural selection and the notion that while maladapted systems die out, adapted ones prosper.
The feelings of lack of efficacy in voting patterns don't argue that voting is a pale version of recognition and therefore not valuable, but rather that the need is being fulfilled elsewhere and thus it doesn't concern them.
Not necessarily. We can feel unrecognized overall, and simply not vote because it cannot fulfill our needs any better than anything else. According to Fukuyama, liberal democracies work because people feel that their governments represent them. Yet in the world's most established democracies, their populations increasingly report that they feel their governments do not represent them. Does this not suggest that Fukuyama's liberal democracies are in fact, unstable? Obviously the process is only beginning, but I would expect it to continue for some time to come: as people feel that their republics have ceased to represent them, their legitimacy fades. If that's the case, then how can liberal democracies provide this perfectly stable system that cannot and will not ever be tipped, providing the context of the future forevermore?
Anything to support your eschatological paranoia?
A bit, but that's a discussion for somewhere else. I was only presenting another counter-example to the notion that everyone must aspire to liberal democracy 'cause it's just the greatest thing EVAR.
The point is that we have come to recognize basic universal rights as valuable and neccessary to a modern functioning society.
Where "we" is defined as, "Westerners," and "basic universal rights" are defined as, "Western priorities." I'd imagine that most Westerners would agree that Western culture is good. That's the easy part. Convincing the rest of the world that our culture has a monopoly on what's right and what's not, and that they all need to do as we say--that's a bit harder. Right now, they want our material wealth, and they're willing to listen in order to get it. But an emormous swath of the world's population remains unconvinced with regards to our priorities, our culture, and our forms of government, and that is where our past becomes relevant. It undermines our claim to such an elevated moral station. How can we presume to call our values "universal," when we have been responsible for so many atrocities?
You yourself are assuming that societies never change.
The idea that societies change is a fundamental premise for me. Fukuyama says that once societies adopt liberal democracies, they stop changing: history is merely the story of how they reach that blessed state where they become as wonderful as we are, just like the Victorians before him posited a neat, linear picture of "cultural evolution" from the San Bushman to the Victorian gentleman as the ultimate end-point of human development.
In reality, societies are constantly changing as they adapt to a changing environment and changing circumstances. At the moment, perhaps liberal democracy is the best adaptation. I tend to think that even today there are places it doesn't work terribly well, but I'll grant that for the moment, for the sake of argument. Even then, are we to suppose that such a situation will never change? Resources will never deplete, or if they do, new ones will always be available for substitution, just because we need them? There will never be any more new ideas, or new ways of relating to one another, that may out-compete our current ones? As I said, it's a lack of imagination that earns the title of "idiot."
Global trade existed long before oil production, and will exist long after.
It did. Cahokia was trading from the Rockies to the Gulf of Mexico, with a teeming city bigger than London of that time, while Europe was in the Middle Ages. But globalization is a very different thing from simple trade. Saudis live like Americans, but only because they have the wealth--tokens to be exchanged for energy in various forms--to power air conditioning, so that they can dress like us, the means to import our products, to offset the health costs of living and working and eating a life adapted to northern Europe (if even there) in the middle of the Arabian Desert, and so on. Globalization is driven by trade, but it is not merely trade. Globalization is the transformation of a culture from something adapted to its circumstances, to something adapted to other circumstances.
The British Empire operated without oil, as did the Spanish and Dutch. The Silk Road didn't need oil.
Yes, and none of them were able to progress as far down that trend of globalization as we have, even though they often conscously desired it, while we usually don't. Why? Because they did not have the energy to do it, so they did what they could. We do have the energy to do it, so it happens even when we're not trying to do it.
The idea of a world of cultures completely isolated and divided until the last two hundred years is simply wrong.
You're absolutely right; it's a good thing I never said anything like that. That would just be embarrassing.
You call the global trade "foolish", yet give no reason for doing so.
I called globalization foolish, not global trade. The reason is that the earth is not uniform; neither are cultures. Globalization is created by trade, but it is fundamentally a cultural, not an economic, process. Globalization is the trend by which individuals from other cultures that are adapted to the circumstances that culture developed in, abandon that culture to one degree or another, to follow a culture that is adapted to an entirely different, alien, and irrelevant set of circumstances. This is always costly, because it's always a "square peg in a round hole" kind of problem, but if you have enough energy (e.g., wealth), it can be done, in precisely the same way that if you hammer it enough, you will eventually get the square peg in the round hole.
You assume that the decline of available cheap oil will bring about some kind of apocalypse, yet there is little evidence to support that assertion.
There's all kinds of evidence to support that assertion, but that's not an assumption in my argument here. The decline of cheap energy, whether it's catastrophic or not, will require that energy be used more efficiently. Saudis will need to live like they're in the desert, rather than living like they're in England. They'll need to adjust their lifestyles accordingly. The trend towards American culture will need to end, as individuals will need to waste less energy pursuing maladapted cultural approaches to their situations, and instead adapt to their environments, rather than continue their attempts to defy adaptation. Whether that is catastrophic or not is an entirely different question, but that basic fact is unavoidable: you cannot continue living in the same wasteful ways enjoyed with cheap energy, if energy ceases to be cheap.
New technologies arise, that which is most efficient wins out, which is exactly why globalization is winning, because it is the most efficient means of economic operation we have.
That's just plain wrong. Globalization is the least efficient means of economic operation we have. It's "winning" only because it has so much sheer force behind it. Before you imply that I mean only military means, I don't. It has economic and cultural force behind it, as well. Military force is the most clumsy, and the least powerful, of all the forces that drive globalization, despite its gross inefficiency.
Short of a total nuclear war or some similar apocalyptic event, there is no reason for this, beyond you saying so.
Because it's unsustainable--always was, always will be. It's unsustainable because it's contrary to human nature. There's only one thing that all unsustainable systems have in common: they're never sustained.
You say that you think a hunter-gatherer system is the best, but that is patently false. Such a small unit does not allow at all for diversity of thought or opinion.
Spoken truly as someone who doesn't know very much about hunter-gatherers. Most of the cultural diversity in the human species is accounted for by foragers, even today. As for the idea that hunter-gatherers suppress individuality, I think Paul Radin treated that subject quite well in The Primitive Man as Philosopher.
Your points about diversity and homogeneity make no sense to me because that is precisely liberal democracy's advantage: flexibility. It is a system that can allow a number of different cultures, religions, ideologies, etc to coexist within it without destroying itself.
Oh? Then why all the hubbub about immigration in the U.S. today? I would agree that of the large-scale arrangements, liberal democracy probably does the best on this account, but it is still beaten by even the most homogenous small-scale system.
Liberal democracy is the most efficient, most adaptive system.
Except for all the systems that are more efficient and more adaptive, of which there are many. They are simply usually ignored by Westerners due to simple ethnocentrism. The hunter-gatherer band was far more efficient and adaptive, and saw us through a million years of evolution. The horticultural tribe, too, was far more efficient and adaptive.
It allows for all the global differences you speak of, which are not obstacles to it, but rather can be embraced by it.
No, I don't think that's the case. While the United States has not consciously pursued a policy of cultural imperialism like so many of our European antecedents, American corporations have not always kept such a clean slate. Campaigns to dismantle even basic features of other cultures are somewhat common, because to whatever extent we can reconfigure another culture to be a mirror of our own, we can turn its people into American-style consumers, and that will be good for business. Koreans who eat like Americans are easier to sell American fast food to. Arabs who embrace Western notions of romantic love are easier to pitch a DeBeers diamond to.
Even when we are not dealing with corporations who hire anthropologists specifically to devise campaigns to undermine another culture, liberal democracies need people to embrace Western ideas and attitudes. This is why globalization--a trend towards homogeneity--seems like such an inescapable feature of the modern world. The liberal democracies that mark Fukuyama's "End of History" are ultimately necessary to maximize (1) the consent required for legitimacy, and (2) economic profit. So, a consequence of the "End of History" must be an approach, as much as possible, to a single, homogenous culture.
Even if society were somehow destroyed by some catastrophe, large societies would eventually rise again, and we'd have the same problem.
Why? They didn't for some million years of human evolution, and then they pop up out of nowhere, six times over, when the Holocene starts. It seems to me that it is large-scale societies that are the aberration, and one dependent on the earth's climate.
You are simply ignoring it, and offering ideas which you yourself note are not practical.
Not only do I think they're practical, I think they're the only practical solutions--but I didn't want to derail this with my reasons for being a primitivist.
What other system allows that kind of flexibility, that kind of ability to adapt to new situations and realities without breaking, that kind of ability to include so many different groups?
Simple: having different approaches in different places, for different people. There can never be any one solution to all people, everywhere, that can ever be as adaptive or as flexible as evaluating each circumstance on its own and adapting to those circumstances. In the words of author Daniel Quinn, "there is no one right way to live." What works for one group in one place will not work for another group in another place. You're right, there is no one other system that would do any better (or any worse) than liberal democracies. It's diversity that allows greater flexibility and adaptiveness. Homogeneity--even a homogenous adoption of whatever it is that works well for you--is always a disadvantage.
Your views seem to reflect your own personal beliefs about global trade and society, but where is the evidence that what you say will come true?
Your views seem to reflect your own personal beliefs about global trade and society, but where is the evidence that what you say will come true?
Oil will run out, this is true. But how does this translate to a collapse of the global system, rather than what seems the much more likely shifts in thinking and method within the system? Do you have any reason to think this, or do you just believe it?
1. I didn't say anything about collapse here.
2. I have my reasons, but they're irrelevant to this discussion.
Balkanization is suicidal.
Then how did it work for a million years? It seems to me that it's precisely the opposite that's suicidal, bringing together people who do not like each other, and forcing them to cooperate on such a scale that they feel unrecognized, unimportant and unfulfilled. In the context of human evolution, tribalism kept us apart and served to promote the peace. Today, that very same, natural impulse gives us ethnic cleansing and racism. It's not a question of "good" or "bad" nearly so much as adaptation. Humans are adapted to a given context, and we do well in that context. In a different context, the very things that served us so well otherwise become problems. So no, I don't think Balkinization is suicidal at all; I think it's large-scale society, and the systematic ignoring of human nature, that's suicidal.
Because even if you are right, and global trade is going to go away someday, we still need solutions for today, and liberal democracy is that.
For us, perhaps. But not for everyone. That's the bottom line, as far as I'm concerned. I don't think we could do much better than liberal democracy here in the West. I just think it's idiotic to propose that there's any one-size-fits-all solution to the world's problems--even liberal democracy.
posted by jefgodesky at 1:48 PM on May 8, 2006
"Yes, there was an African slave trade prior to the West's involvement, and yes, both the West and the Arabs before them co-opted local social structures and exploited divisions to get their "goods," but when people refer to the African slave trade, they're referring to a distinctly European enterprise, and with good reason: it positively dwarfed everything that came before."
Wrong. First off, anyone who talks about the African Slave Trade is being unclear. If I was refering to the African Slave Trade, I'd be talking about the contemporary slave trade that still occurs. Second, it ISN'T a distinctly European enterprise, and people seeing it that way are, frankly, full of shit and looking for opportunities to avoid critical thinking.
"Even not considering that, I was taking a longer historical view, wherein the West is still accountable for the Crusades, the Inquisition, colonialism, and innumerable other atrocities. Ours is, without parallel, the most murderous culture in history. That doesn't make every other culture saintly, and it's true that many other cultures have taken after us (Mao was a Communist, after all, and that was hardly an indigenous Chinese innovation), but it should give us pause before presuming to preach morality to the world. The beam in your own eye, and so forth."
Again, bullshit. First off, the culture that was responsible for the crusades was not the culture responsible for Hitler, and to conflate the two is to ignore specifics in the hopes of heaping liberal guilt upon the West. Second, Mao was Maoist and communism is not a Western invention. Marxism is, Soviet Socialism is, but again you're coming from a position of ethnocentrism that makes you assume that the West is the white devil, and the poor benighted savages are just pawns in our games. Why do you deny them humanity? (And repeating some Jesus quote won't win you any rhetorical points with me).
"In other words, the problems we face in the world today are the end result of arguments like Fukuyama's."
I'm sorry, that's a non sequitor. You might as well say that the predominance of suffering in the world is caused by arguments like Platos or like Jesus's, sine you're lumping them all into the same culture. Fukuyama, to my knowledge, has never endorsed the exploitation of indigenous cultures etc., and so you attempt to trump up an argument here simply fails on its face. The West is not a monolith, and you're an idiot for contiunually presentig it as so.
"No, it's bad. Very, very bad. Hegelian fatalism is, was, and ever shall be a really, irredeemably stupid idea. History no more has an endpoint than evolution does; there is no "goal," there is no one-size-fits-all solution that will end the process, and anyone who is so lacking in imagination that he can possibly think that just because it's so today that it will always be so deserve to be called an idiot."
But evolution can easily be concieved in narrative form; we do it all the time. Beaks are said to have evolved in order to crack certain nuts or eat snails. Further, as politics (and human history) is often fraught with human intention, it can most definitely be said to have goals and ideals respective to particular projects. No matter how hip you may feel on the quad for denying that, Hegel's model of viewing history has continued to be a powerful one because it speaks to a conceptual need.
"Telecommunications does have a material base. We're not communicating with each other by magic here. There are building costs and maintenance costs; copper that must be mined, and resources that have their own economic bases. Personally, I think it is very likely, nigh inevitable, that at some point in the future, telecommunications will move backwards. Fortunes wax and wane; change is the only constant. At some point in the future, whether near-term or long-term, it's almost unavoidable that our resources will diminish, and telecommunications will move backwards."
Yes, it does. But has there been any real evidence of permanent setbacks regarding communications technology in the history of the world, even during resource-deficit times? No. There may be setbacks, but the current pace of telecommunications technology is outpacing resource consumption by several orders of magnitude, leaving aside the more and more efficient uses of power. Frankly, you're just full of shit on this one, spinning your own personal fears into a global crisis.
"It's funny how quickly we lose sight of all historical perspective. The notion of "history as progress" was only possible in the context of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution; it was unthinkable before that, as things got better, then worse, then better again."
Oh, more bullshit. Yes, in billions of years, our sun will wink out and everything will die. But the Greeks had a notion of progress (even as it was tied in with their infinite recursions), as did the Hebrews, the Romans and the Christians. Oh, and so do the Hindus, the Chinese... I mean, again, your limited view of the West seems to be coloring your arguments.
"It does--a trend towards a "one-size-fits-all" approach to our problems, trying to impose the adaptations made to Western countries to other environments, where those adaptations make little or no sense. It is a trend away from localized solutions, where one maximizes the efficiency of how one adapts to one's specific circumstances. It is a trend towards ignoring your environment and circumstances and plowing ahead, no matter how foolish or costly it is."
Absolute and unfettered ideological bullshit. Really and incredibly idiotic assertion, frankly. If you had argued financial schemes as promulgated by the Breton Woods organizations were on-size-fits-all solution, yeah. Is that part of how globalization has been implimented? Yeah. Is that globalization en toto? No, and only someone with no political science background would assert so.
"Take Hellenism--exactly the same as globalization, but "globalizing" a different culture, over a different "globe." Fukuyama's point does require a Hegelian model; pointing out that Hellenism was maladaptive to most areas it penetrated and ultimately faded away, and that globalization's inherent weaknesses are likely to send it down the same path, does not require any kind of Hegelian fatalism. It merely requires an understanding that what works in England may not always work in, say, India, combined with a healthy respect for natural selection and the notion that while maladapted systems die out, adapted ones prosper."
More bullshit. First off, Hellenism wasn't the same form of globalization, and it didn't operate in the same manner, have the same effects or the same causes. And it didn't fail because it was maladapted in any sense aside from an empty tautological one. Hellenism was centralized in a way that globalization isn't, Hellenism had multiple local competitors in the Ancient Greek world, it wasn't primarily spread during its period of activity, and frankly it held on for around 1000 years if the Romans are included as being inspired by Hellenism. While there may be an anaology there, your attempts to make it into a congruent idea are weak and misguided, and historically wrong.
"Globalization is the trend towards homogeneity. It's never complete. It's also never entirely one-way, but it's always unbalanced. Globalization means Americans picking up some things from India, but it means India picking up a lot more things from America. It worked the same way when it was called "Hellenism," and the center was Greece instead of New York."
Bullshit. Asserting something does not make it true. Globalization means non-aligned pacts as much as it means cultural shift. Hellenism was not Globalization, because Globalization is not simply memetic trade.
"Yet in the world's most established democracies, their populations increasingly report that they feel their governments do not represent them. Does this not suggest that Fukuyama's liberal democracies are in fact, unstable? Obviously the process is only beginning, but I would expect it to continue for some time to come: as people feel that their republics have ceased to represent them, their legitimacy fades. If that's the case, then how can liberal democracies provide this perfectly stable system that cannot and will not ever be tipped, providing the context of the future forevermore?"
Wrong twice over. First off, in the world's most established democracies, people do believe that their government represents them. Take a look abroad. Further, all democracies exist as a method for mitigating instability, and are explicitly functional as such. Every election is a moment of instability, but that doesn't imply an end to democracy. Youd bullshit ideology is blinding you to the fact that democracies exist as pluralistic zones of contention and that's why they tend to survive— people have a vested interest in not fighting when it serves all of their interests and they feel that the system is responsive. Those who are not voting are not taking up arms. Again, you present no evidence for your suppositions and they run counter to a fairly well-established body of political evidence.
"Except for all small-scale forms, which beat out all large-scale forms, including republics."
Bullshit. You keep asserting this WITH NO EVIDENCE.
"Globalization is the trend by which individuals from other cultures that are adapted to the circumstances that culture developed in, abandon that culture to one degree or another, to follow a culture that is adapted to an entirely different, alien, and irrelevant set of circumstances."
I've found the crux. Your definition of globalization is your own ideological bullshit. Globalization is a two-fold trend, one part of it being that communication between disparate geographical points has increased and is likely to keep doing so for the immediate future, and that by increasing communication different peoples become more interconnected. That's it. You're just fucking wrong.
posted by klangklangston at 3:31 PM on May 8, 2006
Wrong. First off, anyone who talks about the African Slave Trade is being unclear. If I was refering to the African Slave Trade, I'd be talking about the contemporary slave trade that still occurs. Second, it ISN'T a distinctly European enterprise, and people seeing it that way are, frankly, full of shit and looking for opportunities to avoid critical thinking.
"Even not considering that, I was taking a longer historical view, wherein the West is still accountable for the Crusades, the Inquisition, colonialism, and innumerable other atrocities. Ours is, without parallel, the most murderous culture in history. That doesn't make every other culture saintly, and it's true that many other cultures have taken after us (Mao was a Communist, after all, and that was hardly an indigenous Chinese innovation), but it should give us pause before presuming to preach morality to the world. The beam in your own eye, and so forth."
Again, bullshit. First off, the culture that was responsible for the crusades was not the culture responsible for Hitler, and to conflate the two is to ignore specifics in the hopes of heaping liberal guilt upon the West. Second, Mao was Maoist and communism is not a Western invention. Marxism is, Soviet Socialism is, but again you're coming from a position of ethnocentrism that makes you assume that the West is the white devil, and the poor benighted savages are just pawns in our games. Why do you deny them humanity? (And repeating some Jesus quote won't win you any rhetorical points with me).
"In other words, the problems we face in the world today are the end result of arguments like Fukuyama's."
I'm sorry, that's a non sequitor. You might as well say that the predominance of suffering in the world is caused by arguments like Platos or like Jesus's, sine you're lumping them all into the same culture. Fukuyama, to my knowledge, has never endorsed the exploitation of indigenous cultures etc., and so you attempt to trump up an argument here simply fails on its face. The West is not a monolith, and you're an idiot for contiunually presentig it as so.
"No, it's bad. Very, very bad. Hegelian fatalism is, was, and ever shall be a really, irredeemably stupid idea. History no more has an endpoint than evolution does; there is no "goal," there is no one-size-fits-all solution that will end the process, and anyone who is so lacking in imagination that he can possibly think that just because it's so today that it will always be so deserve to be called an idiot."
But evolution can easily be concieved in narrative form; we do it all the time. Beaks are said to have evolved in order to crack certain nuts or eat snails. Further, as politics (and human history) is often fraught with human intention, it can most definitely be said to have goals and ideals respective to particular projects. No matter how hip you may feel on the quad for denying that, Hegel's model of viewing history has continued to be a powerful one because it speaks to a conceptual need.
"Telecommunications does have a material base. We're not communicating with each other by magic here. There are building costs and maintenance costs; copper that must be mined, and resources that have their own economic bases. Personally, I think it is very likely, nigh inevitable, that at some point in the future, telecommunications will move backwards. Fortunes wax and wane; change is the only constant. At some point in the future, whether near-term or long-term, it's almost unavoidable that our resources will diminish, and telecommunications will move backwards."
Yes, it does. But has there been any real evidence of permanent setbacks regarding communications technology in the history of the world, even during resource-deficit times? No. There may be setbacks, but the current pace of telecommunications technology is outpacing resource consumption by several orders of magnitude, leaving aside the more and more efficient uses of power. Frankly, you're just full of shit on this one, spinning your own personal fears into a global crisis.
"It's funny how quickly we lose sight of all historical perspective. The notion of "history as progress" was only possible in the context of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution; it was unthinkable before that, as things got better, then worse, then better again."
Oh, more bullshit. Yes, in billions of years, our sun will wink out and everything will die. But the Greeks had a notion of progress (even as it was tied in with their infinite recursions), as did the Hebrews, the Romans and the Christians. Oh, and so do the Hindus, the Chinese... I mean, again, your limited view of the West seems to be coloring your arguments.
"It does--a trend towards a "one-size-fits-all" approach to our problems, trying to impose the adaptations made to Western countries to other environments, where those adaptations make little or no sense. It is a trend away from localized solutions, where one maximizes the efficiency of how one adapts to one's specific circumstances. It is a trend towards ignoring your environment and circumstances and plowing ahead, no matter how foolish or costly it is."
Absolute and unfettered ideological bullshit. Really and incredibly idiotic assertion, frankly. If you had argued financial schemes as promulgated by the Breton Woods organizations were on-size-fits-all solution, yeah. Is that part of how globalization has been implimented? Yeah. Is that globalization en toto? No, and only someone with no political science background would assert so.
"Take Hellenism--exactly the same as globalization, but "globalizing" a different culture, over a different "globe." Fukuyama's point does require a Hegelian model; pointing out that Hellenism was maladaptive to most areas it penetrated and ultimately faded away, and that globalization's inherent weaknesses are likely to send it down the same path, does not require any kind of Hegelian fatalism. It merely requires an understanding that what works in England may not always work in, say, India, combined with a healthy respect for natural selection and the notion that while maladapted systems die out, adapted ones prosper."
More bullshit. First off, Hellenism wasn't the same form of globalization, and it didn't operate in the same manner, have the same effects or the same causes. And it didn't fail because it was maladapted in any sense aside from an empty tautological one. Hellenism was centralized in a way that globalization isn't, Hellenism had multiple local competitors in the Ancient Greek world, it wasn't primarily spread during its period of activity, and frankly it held on for around 1000 years if the Romans are included as being inspired by Hellenism. While there may be an anaology there, your attempts to make it into a congruent idea are weak and misguided, and historically wrong.
"Globalization is the trend towards homogeneity. It's never complete. It's also never entirely one-way, but it's always unbalanced. Globalization means Americans picking up some things from India, but it means India picking up a lot more things from America. It worked the same way when it was called "Hellenism," and the center was Greece instead of New York."
Bullshit. Asserting something does not make it true. Globalization means non-aligned pacts as much as it means cultural shift. Hellenism was not Globalization, because Globalization is not simply memetic trade.
"Yet in the world's most established democracies, their populations increasingly report that they feel their governments do not represent them. Does this not suggest that Fukuyama's liberal democracies are in fact, unstable? Obviously the process is only beginning, but I would expect it to continue for some time to come: as people feel that their republics have ceased to represent them, their legitimacy fades. If that's the case, then how can liberal democracies provide this perfectly stable system that cannot and will not ever be tipped, providing the context of the future forevermore?"
Wrong twice over. First off, in the world's most established democracies, people do believe that their government represents them. Take a look abroad. Further, all democracies exist as a method for mitigating instability, and are explicitly functional as such. Every election is a moment of instability, but that doesn't imply an end to democracy. Youd bullshit ideology is blinding you to the fact that democracies exist as pluralistic zones of contention and that's why they tend to survive— people have a vested interest in not fighting when it serves all of their interests and they feel that the system is responsive. Those who are not voting are not taking up arms. Again, you present no evidence for your suppositions and they run counter to a fairly well-established body of political evidence.
"Except for all small-scale forms, which beat out all large-scale forms, including republics."
Bullshit. You keep asserting this WITH NO EVIDENCE.
"Globalization is the trend by which individuals from other cultures that are adapted to the circumstances that culture developed in, abandon that culture to one degree or another, to follow a culture that is adapted to an entirely different, alien, and irrelevant set of circumstances."
I've found the crux. Your definition of globalization is your own ideological bullshit. Globalization is a two-fold trend, one part of it being that communication between disparate geographical points has increased and is likely to keep doing so for the immediate future, and that by increasing communication different peoples become more interconnected. That's it. You're just fucking wrong.
posted by klangklangston at 3:31 PM on May 8, 2006
jefgodesky,
Thank you for addressing my points. You've been very polite and have given me things to think about. Rather than posting another enormous post in this increasingly long thread, I'd just like to make one point, and ask you two questions:
But an emormous swath of the world's population remains unconvinced with regards to our priorities, our culture, and our forms of government, and that is where our past becomes relevant. It undermines our claim to such an elevated moral station. How can we presume to call our values "universal," when we have been responsible for so many atrocities?
I think perhaps this is the problem. The message (values) needs to be divorced from the messenger (the West), because they are intrinsically valuable, not just to us here in the US or Europe, but to all people everywhere. Yes, the West has done many terrible things, and our past does undermine our efforts to spread these values, but this does not negate the worth of these values. It is not paradoxical that we can have committed many attrocities and call our values universal, because the values we espouse today are not the values of old. The "universal" values we hold today are the results of the lessons we've learned in the past. Look to Germany to see how much we've paid for these lessons. But the lessons themselves are what's important. If we tell other nations that genocide is wrong, that slavery is wrong, that oppressing women is wrong, and they say "but you did it", that does not justify them doing it or make our message less meaningful. The message holds true, it's just harder to convince other people of it, but hypocrisy has no real meaning in the realm of history. Precisely because we did it we know it's wrong. These values are ones that all humans deserve, ones we've hacked out through much blood and toil. Surely you would agree with that?
1. Both of us have been talking about one or another system "working", but I think we are using different meanings of "work". In what sense do you mean a system "works"? My impression from your posts seems to be that you are referring to working in the sense that they allow literal physical survival of the species or the individual. Is that correct?
2. Globalization is the least efficient means of economic operation we have.
Would you mind clarifying this statement? In terms of economic trade, trade specialization does seem to be the most efficient means of economic organization across regional borders.
posted by Sangermaine at 4:31 PM on May 8, 2006
Thank you for addressing my points. You've been very polite and have given me things to think about. Rather than posting another enormous post in this increasingly long thread, I'd just like to make one point, and ask you two questions:
But an emormous swath of the world's population remains unconvinced with regards to our priorities, our culture, and our forms of government, and that is where our past becomes relevant. It undermines our claim to such an elevated moral station. How can we presume to call our values "universal," when we have been responsible for so many atrocities?
I think perhaps this is the problem. The message (values) needs to be divorced from the messenger (the West), because they are intrinsically valuable, not just to us here in the US or Europe, but to all people everywhere. Yes, the West has done many terrible things, and our past does undermine our efforts to spread these values, but this does not negate the worth of these values. It is not paradoxical that we can have committed many attrocities and call our values universal, because the values we espouse today are not the values of old. The "universal" values we hold today are the results of the lessons we've learned in the past. Look to Germany to see how much we've paid for these lessons. But the lessons themselves are what's important. If we tell other nations that genocide is wrong, that slavery is wrong, that oppressing women is wrong, and they say "but you did it", that does not justify them doing it or make our message less meaningful. The message holds true, it's just harder to convince other people of it, but hypocrisy has no real meaning in the realm of history. Precisely because we did it we know it's wrong. These values are ones that all humans deserve, ones we've hacked out through much blood and toil. Surely you would agree with that?
1. Both of us have been talking about one or another system "working", but I think we are using different meanings of "work". In what sense do you mean a system "works"? My impression from your posts seems to be that you are referring to working in the sense that they allow literal physical survival of the species or the individual. Is that correct?
2. Globalization is the least efficient means of economic operation we have.
Would you mind clarifying this statement? In terms of economic trade, trade specialization does seem to be the most efficient means of economic organization across regional borders.
posted by Sangermaine at 4:31 PM on May 8, 2006
Ho Hum, from what I've read of Fukiyama (quite too much) I can sum it up fairly quickly: Fukuyama = Horseshit. Move along, nothing to see here, thanks for playing, reel in the verbosity, history has not in fact ended just cause Fukuyama says so. . .
posted by mk1gti at 8:28 PM on May 8, 2006
posted by mk1gti at 8:28 PM on May 8, 2006
I'm glad I waited to comment in this thread. A quick one on the run --
For my part, I don't think Fukuyama's full of shit. I do think he's wrong on many counts, but he's wrong in a useful and interesting way, frequently.
Thanks for the link.
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 11:04 PM on May 8, 2006
For my part, I don't think Fukuyama's full of shit. I do think he's wrong on many counts, but he's wrong in a useful and interesting way, frequently.
Thanks for the link.
posted by stavrosthewonderchicken at 11:04 PM on May 8, 2006
First, very interesting conversation. I've enjoyed reading over it.
One point that is being miscontrued is that the great tragedies that the West has participated in, such as Hitler and Stalin, or even the global slave trade, are not so much a consequence of Western culture, but of economic developement. The reason that Hitler and Stalin were able to kill so many people was because the process was industrialized. On a lesser economic scale, the same can be said for the slave trade. The arab slavers had a lower economic level and thus, were unable to exploit the slave trade to the same level as their western counterparts (not that Arab culture isn't partly Western).
In China, Mao operated under his own adaptive version of Communism. The majority of people who died under his rule came about as flawed economic decisions that Mao chose to pursue. Like wise, the Japanese had their own horrors, which again, due to their economic level, allowed them to go larger and more expansive than a lesser economic culture might have achieved.
The enemy, really, is economic advancement, which allows the terrible acts of men, all men in all cultures, to enlarge and expand its reach. Unless you want to point out economic advancement as a trait purely a Western Culture, I don't think you can simply claim that Western culture is inherently weighted to cause such events to occur.
In regards to government, much has been said about the quality of small tribe sized communities. However, does not liberal democracy allow for this? Democracy in societies usually encompasses a nation wide level, but also a local level. People use democracy to elect the best leaders for their small communities, and like an ascending pyramid, this selection of choice eventually reaches the national level.
This is contrast to most other forms of government in which local rule is dictated from above, not from below. This is also the form that most non-Western societies chose up until very recently.
I would argue that the Western idea of the individual is a philosophical virus. Once it infects a culture, it will remain and often it will eventually become dominant. Why? Because every style of governing other than democracy rests upon the idea that one person is better suited to making a decision than multiple persons. As long as that one person does so successfully, the system will work, but if they fail, the represented people will become unsatisfied and demand change. Yet, in this system, change can only occur from above and this leads to problems.
When those who are ruled are offered the chance to rule themselves, especially in a situation where they are unsatisfied with their current ruler, they will find democracy a very attractive alternative.
posted by Atreides at 11:42 AM on May 9, 2006
One point that is being miscontrued is that the great tragedies that the West has participated in, such as Hitler and Stalin, or even the global slave trade, are not so much a consequence of Western culture, but of economic developement. The reason that Hitler and Stalin were able to kill so many people was because the process was industrialized. On a lesser economic scale, the same can be said for the slave trade. The arab slavers had a lower economic level and thus, were unable to exploit the slave trade to the same level as their western counterparts (not that Arab culture isn't partly Western).
In China, Mao operated under his own adaptive version of Communism. The majority of people who died under his rule came about as flawed economic decisions that Mao chose to pursue. Like wise, the Japanese had their own horrors, which again, due to their economic level, allowed them to go larger and more expansive than a lesser economic culture might have achieved.
The enemy, really, is economic advancement, which allows the terrible acts of men, all men in all cultures, to enlarge and expand its reach. Unless you want to point out economic advancement as a trait purely a Western Culture, I don't think you can simply claim that Western culture is inherently weighted to cause such events to occur.
In regards to government, much has been said about the quality of small tribe sized communities. However, does not liberal democracy allow for this? Democracy in societies usually encompasses a nation wide level, but also a local level. People use democracy to elect the best leaders for their small communities, and like an ascending pyramid, this selection of choice eventually reaches the national level.
This is contrast to most other forms of government in which local rule is dictated from above, not from below. This is also the form that most non-Western societies chose up until very recently.
I would argue that the Western idea of the individual is a philosophical virus. Once it infects a culture, it will remain and often it will eventually become dominant. Why? Because every style of governing other than democracy rests upon the idea that one person is better suited to making a decision than multiple persons. As long as that one person does so successfully, the system will work, but if they fail, the represented people will become unsatisfied and demand change. Yet, in this system, change can only occur from above and this leads to problems.
When those who are ruled are offered the chance to rule themselves, especially in a situation where they are unsatisfied with their current ruler, they will find democracy a very attractive alternative.
posted by Atreides at 11:42 AM on May 9, 2006
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I find Fukuyama's account problematic and too simplistic on a number of counts. For example, arguing against the possibility of a single, global and democratic governance, Fukiyama points out that:
Successful democracy depends in large measure on the existence of a genuine political community that agrees on certain basic shared values and institutions.
That the modern nation-state is still an embodiement of a cohesive political community is, to my mind, very debatable. Fukuyama does not explore the rapid disintegration of national (and other kinds of) political communities, particularly for the most affluent segments of some of the most "Western" nations -- in other words, the highest culminations of liberal values are already showing signs of self-destruction.
Although he touches on the issue of technology, he doesn't really explore (at least in this forward--I confess I haven't read the book) that technology is re-shaping the social realities on which liberalism and democracy depend.
To put it in slightly more Hegelian terms, it seems to me that "liberalism", in its most sophisticated instances, has been reavealing itself as containing its own negation in some as-yet incohate form, which will -- sooner or later, if not already -- unleash itself in some way that will make light of the notion of an "end of history".
posted by ori at 2:03 AM on May 8, 2006