Mr Wolfowitz is the leader of a small group of foreign-policy neo-conservatives who have been hanging around Washington since the 1970s. They criticised the realpolitik approach to foreign affairs championed by Henry Kissinger for accepting the cold war's status quo and for implying that there was a moral equivalence between the Soviet Union and the United States. They argued that America should be much more willing to champion its values, insisting that this would advance, not threaten, global security. The biggest threats to America's security were regimes based on values that America, and other free countries, deplore; change those regimes by advancing western values and—hey presto—you strengthen American security.Historian Eric Bergerud on Kissinger and the "decent interval" theory:
Kissinger admired the great diplomats of the 19th Century: Metternich, Bismarck, etc. Bismarck in particular never thought that events could be predicted with precision. When a policy was pursued a range of outcomes could be expected. The trick was to develop policy where the minimum outcome (today we might call it a worst case scenario) was acceptable. If a triumph ensued great. If it was something in between, don't die of surprise.posted by russilwvong at 5:31 PM on May 26, 2006 [3 favorites]
It was no secret that many "Henry watchers" inside and outside the administration thought that Kissinger considered Thieu expendable. (Thieu thought this.) He did not desire the fall of SVN, but believed that LBJ and others had grossly overestimated the harm that a Hanoi victory would have on America's position. Kissinger was, however, extremely concerned about the overall course of the Cold War and wanted American concentration firmly pointed in the correct direction - dealing with Moscow. I rather think Kissinger enjoyed juggling the fears and desires of Moscow, Beijing and other lesser players. The biggest obstacle to playing the game, as made clear in his memoirs, was the Vietnam War. Therefore Paris was a good deal from Kissinger's point of view. The minimum outcome was an American withdrawal from Vietnam and a face-saving interval of peace: an acceptable position from which to get down to truly important business even if the
GVN failed in the end. The maximum outcome, which I suppose sounded feasible, was that Thieu would stick it out and the US could, at some future date, claim victory. The important point is that wherever events fell on the minimum-maximum continuum, America was out of the war and had its hands free to play the great game on even terms. In sum, I think Kissinger would have considered Paris good work regardless of what took place ultimately in Vietnam.
Kissinger has never acknowledged having planted the seeds for the article. But in an interview with Business Week that same year, he delivered a thinly veiled threat to the Saudis, musing about bringing oil prices down through "massive political warfare against countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran to make them risk their political stability and maybe their security if they did not cooperate."What I really mean, I suppose, is that we can still view Kissinger in the 70's as playing at realpolitik.
From the very start of the negotiations in 1969, the North Vietnamese made their position clear—the removal of the South Vietnamese regime headed by General Nguyen Van Thieu and the equivalent of a North Vietnamese victory. Nixon's policy was three-fold—the progressive removal of American troops from South Vietnam, the continued pressure on North Vietnam by large-scale bombing and mining of North Vietnamese harbors, together with refusal to give up on Thieu.It seems to me that it's a lot easier to get into a quagmire than it is to get out. (See Iraq.)
According to Haldeman, both Nixon and Kissinger were strangely optimistic about ending the war rapidly. On March 20, 1969, Nixon "stated flatly that war will be over by next year." On October 8, 1969, Nixon "fully expected that an acceptable, if not totally satisfactory, solution would be achieved through negotiation within the first six months." In April 1970, both Nixon and Kissinger agreed that the war could be wound up this year "if we keep enough pressure on and don't crumble at home." In March 1971, both again agreed that "there's a 50/50 chance at least of getting a Vietnam settlement this summer and ending the war completely."
When none of these expectations was fulfilled, Nixon resorted to heavy bombing in Cambodia and Laos and the mining of Haiphong harbor. Through all of these setbacks and miscalculations, Nixon continued to bring back American troops; both he and Kissinger agreed in May 1972 that "regardless of what happens now, we'll be finished with the war by August." By the end of 1972, 500,000 American troops were reduced to 20,000. A break came on October 8, 1972; the chief North Vietnamese negotiator, Le Duc Tho, agreed to end the war without removing Thieu. More months passed before the final accord was reached. It gave the North Vietnamese all they wanted except for one thing—the United States was not going to take responsibility for kicking out Thieu.
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posted by delmoi at 4:20 PM on May 26, 2006