The vague wording of Marshall’s June 1947 speech made it difficult for the Soviet leaders to reach definite conclusions about the purpose of his offer, and they initially hoped it might prove to be a source of capital for the reconstruction of the war-damaged USSR. As the details of the American plan unfolded, however, the Soviet leadership slowly came to view it as an attempt to use economic aid not only to consolidate a Western European bloc, but also to undermine recently-won, and still somewhat tenuous, Soviet gains in Eastern Europe. They feared that the U.S. economic aid program sought to transform Stalin’s new chain of Soviet-oriented buffer states into a revamped version of the “cordon sanitaire” of the interwar years. The plan appeared to aim at the reintegration of Eastern Europe into the capitalist economic system of the West, with all the political ramification that implied. Thus the Marshall Plan, conceived by U.S. policymakers primarily as a defensive measure to stave off economic collapse in Western Europe, proved indistinguishable to the Kremlin leadership from an offensive attempt to subvert Soviet security interests.
Confronted with the ambiguous American initiative, Stalin first hesitated, then assumed the worst and acted accordingly. The Soviet leader did not desire to provoke a confrontation with the Western powers, but in the situation created by the Marshall Plan, he apparently felt that he had no other choice. The upshot was what we have come to know as the Cold War. ...
What the new documentation helps us see more clearly, then, is that the real difficulty and source of conflict in 1947 was neither Soviet nor American “aggression.” Rather, it lay in the unstable international economic and political conditions in key European countries which led both sides to believe that the current status quo was unstable, and that assertive action was required to defend that status quo. It was in this environment that the Western powers felt compelled to design the details of the Marshall Plan in such a way that it would stabilize Western Europe, but only at the cost of provoking a confrontation with the USSR. And it was this same environment that compelled Stalin to respond to the plan with a series of tactically offensive maneuvers which fanned the flames of confrontation even higher. This decisive moment in the emergence of the Cold War was thus more a story of tragedy than evil. Neither the West nor the Soviet Union deliberately strove to provoke a confrontation with the other. Instead, the fluid political and economic conditions in postwar Europe compelled each side to design policies which were largely defensive, but had the unfortunate consequence of provoking conflict with the other.
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posted by languagehat at 2:42 PM on June 2, 2006