SubscribeThe Language of Noncombatant Death - Perhaps, however, what the "incidents" have in common -- and what they really tell us about the war in Iraq (as in Vietnam long ago) -- is this: In both Haditha and Ishaqi, the dead were largely or all civilian noncombatants: an aged amputee in a wheelchair holding a Koran, small children, grandparents, students, women, and a random taxi driver all died... In modern wars, especially those conducted in part from the air (as both Iraq and Afghanistan have been), there's nothing "collateral" about civilian deaths. If anything, the "collateral deaths" are those of the combatants on any side. Civilian deaths are now the central fact, the very essence of war. Not seeing that means not seeing war.Collateral Damage: The "Incident at Haditha"
On Oct. 1, 1946, judgment was delivered by the Nuremberg Tribunal. From the judgment:Haditha, Bush & Nuremberg's Law
“To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole. ...Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”
The first nugget we find hidden inside is that this battalion-sized task force, comprising the equivalent of 10 platoons and 50 or so assorted vehicles including M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, was assigned to cover an area of Iraq of over 1,000 square kilometers.From The Power of Weakness, Again:
Now, we all know how few troops are in Iraq relative to the size of the country. After all, we occupied a much smaller geographic area of a thoroughly beaten Germany with approximately 60 U.S. divisions in 1945. But 1,000 square kilometers truly took my breath away. Any U.S. police or sheriff’s department would consider such a patrol requirement impossible under peacetime conditions, let alone during an insurgency...
To this observer, admittedly safe at home in the U.S., it often appears that our military regards winning over the Iraqi population to be the primary goal of counterinsurgency. This couldn’t be farther from the truth. The primary goal of counterinsurgency is to control the population. Which is also the goal of insurgency. Those they cannot persuade to join them or remain neutral they terrorize.
But a counterinsurgent can only control a population by providing them with security. It doesn’t matter how many schools and clinics we open, how many soccer balls and candy bars we hand out to the kids, how many Iraqi reporters we pay to write articles about what nice people we really are, or all the civil affairs and psychological operations we conduct. All these things don’t matter if, after we do them, we then drive back to our bases and leave the population in the hands of an enemy who knocks on their doors at night and doesn’t take no for an answer.
Worse, if we’re just driving through the neighborhoods, then all the tasks we employ for counterterrorism and force protection (and how easily they can become one and the same) begin to backfire. If people are not secure in their homes (it’s no accident that appears in our Constitution), then all our checkpoints, roadblocks, aggressive high-speed driving to avoid IEDs and suicide bombers, helicopters overhead all night, house raids, and detention of suspects become objects of at best antipathy and at worst resentment. Not to mention our bunkered bases with levels of service and luxury the majority of the native population can only dream about.
Now, to see the situation as it is, turn that telescope around. Every firefight we win in Iraq or Afghanistan does little for our pride, because we are so much stronger than the people we are defeating. Every time we get hit successfully by a weaker enemy, we feel like chumps, and cannot look ourselves in the mirror (again, with IED attacks this happens quite often). Whenever we use our superior strength against Iraqi civilians, which is to say every time we drive down an Iraqi street, we diminish ourselves in our own eyes. Eventually, we come to look at ourselves with contempt and see ourselves as monsters. One way to justify being a monster is to behave like one, which makes the problem worse still. The resulting downward spiral, which every army in this kind of war has gotten caught in, leads to indiscipline, demoralization, and disintegration of larger units as fire teams and squads simply go feral.
That powerpoint is absolutely asinine. As is posting it on the day that Iraq appointed important ministers to round out the government.
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See also Whose Security ?
PDF: The Quarterly Report on Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: 'Fact, Fallacy, and an Overall Grade of 'F'
Short version: Anthony Cordesman: Give the Defense Department an 'F'
posted by y2karl at 9:51 AM on June 8, 2006