it seems to me that the virtues of this particular approach - plying the armed insurgents with cash - can't really have been that obvious except in hindsight
A fascinating piece in the May 19 Defense News quotes Gen. Tommy Franks, chief of U.S. Central Command, confirming what had until now been mere rumors picked up by dubious Arab media outlets—that, before Gulf War II began, U.S. special forces had gone in and bribed Iraqi generals not to fight.-- "Smart Bribes: Centcom's real secret weapon," Slate, May 20, 2003.
Actually, one of the reasons we encountered so little resistance during the initial invasion was that we promised to pay everyone-- the generals, the soldiers-- off.
Hell, that's exactly what they did in Afghanistan: They paid the Northern Alliance tribes who were formerly cozy with the Taliban to switch sides.
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posted by homunculus at 8:17 PM on May 19