"As an attorney, she is deemed to have known better."I thinked "deemed to have known better" is a great phrase. Not merely "should have known better", but a statement that she cannot possibly be an attorney and not know better.
"Her response to the Court’s show cause order is breathtaking in its arrogance and borders on delusional."
Although counsel’s present concern is the location of the President’s birth, it does not take much imagination to extend the theory to his birthday. Perhaps, he looks “too young”to be President, and he says he stopped counting birthdays when he reached age thirty. If he refused to admit publicly that he is older than the constitutional minimum age of thirty-five, should Ms. Taitz be allowed to file a lawsuit and have a court order him to produce his birth certificate? See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. Or perhaps an eccentric citizen has become convinced that the President is an alien from Mars, and the courts should order DNA testing to enforce the Constitution.7
----7The Court does not make this observation simply as a rhetorical device for emphasis; the Court has actually received correspondence assailing its previous order in which the sender, who, incidentally,challenged the undersigned to a “round of fisticuffs on the Courthouse Square,” asserted that the President is not human.
As to whether the Attorney General took time out of his busy schedule to visit an "obscure" "coffee shop" in Columbus, Georgia on July 16, 2009, the Court cannot definitively say because the Court was not there.And apparently the Court cannot definitively say whether the venue was actually a coffee shop or if it was in fact obscure, either?
That's the thing about hate and crazy - they always have another room of ignorance to back into.It's one of the reasons that the whole 'noise machine' approach is so depressingly effective. One starts with a somewhat reasonable, somewhat plausible complaint or objection or scandal -- and as others come in to refute, you slowly but surely shed layers of reasonableness, like ablative armor. And the very second anyone walks away, throwing up their hands in disgust, you tell everyone else -- the people who got bored and stopped listening -- that the person who walked away 'refused to answer' your original, somewhat-reasonable-sounding complaint.
[W]hen a judge calls an argument “ridiculous” or “frivolous,” it is absolutely the worst thing the judge could say. It means that the person arguing the case has absolutely no idea of what he is doing, and has completely wasted everyone’s time. It doesn’t mean that the case wasn’t well argued, or that judge simply decided for the other side, it means that there was no other side. The argument was absolutely, positively, incompetent. The judge is not telling you that you that you were “wrong.” The judge is telling you that you are out of your mind.
Finally, counsel insists that her substantive claims are so meritorious that only a biased judge would find them frivolous. Comparing herself to former Supreme Court Justice and civil rights icon Thurgood Marshall, counsel likens her plight to Justice Marshall’s epic legal battle to desegregate American schools and public places. Quite frankly, the Court is reluctant to even dignify this argument by responding to it, but it captures the essence of counsel’s misunderstanding of the purpose of the courts and her misunderstanding of her own claims.
Yes, Justice Marshall had to extend then-existing law to prevail in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). But he did so by persuading the Court that the de jure discrimination against black schoolchildren violated their rights under the existing Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution—a fundamental truth that had been recognized years earlier by Justice Harlan in his eloquent and prescient dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555-56 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall’s arguments were a logical extension and certainly a necessary modification of then-existing law. Counsel in this case cannot articulate how the President’s ineligibility to hold office, even if proven, violates an Army officer’s individual constitutional rights such that it would authorize that officer to disobey a deployment order. Counsel has likewise never cited any legal authority or made any reasonable argument as to why the traditional abstention doctrine should not have been applied here.
Finally, Justice Marshall had real evidence that black children were being sent to inferior segregated schools based solely on the color of their skin. He had credible evidence as to the impact of inferior segregated schools upon the schoolchildren forced to attend them by their government. Justice Marshall was also able to articulate how this conduct on the part of the government violated the Fourteenth Amendment, an amendment clearly designed to assure that the government finally recognized the promise of the Declaration of Independence: that all men are created equal.
Counsel here has an affidavit from someone who allegedly paid off a government official to rummage through the files at a Kenyan hospital to obtain what counsel contends is the President’s “authentic” birth certificate. Counsel here makes no coherent argument connecting the Constitution’s presidential citizenship requirement to a violation of her client’s individual constitutional rights. Counsel here points to no legal authority—in the Constitution or elsewhere—that could be extended or expanded to create an exception to the well-established doctrine of abstention, which disfavors judicial interference in the internal affairs of the military.
To suggest that an Army officer, who has received a medical education at the expense of the government and then seeks to avoid deployment based upon speculation that the President is not a natural born citizen, is equivalent to a young child, who is forced to attend an inferior segregated school based solely on the color of her skin, demonstrates an appalling lack of knowledge of the history of this Country and the importance of the civil rights movement. Counsel’s attempt to align herself with Justice Marshall appears to be an act of desperation rather than one of admiration. For if counsel truly admired Justice Marshall’s achievements, she would not seek to cheapen them with such inapt comparisons.
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posted by Lacking Subtlety at 9:40 AM on October 13