Morality Play
August 10, 2010 3:36 PM Subscribe
Scandal brewing at Harvard. Marc Hauser, evolutionary biologist/psychologist who is an authority on how animals think, is taking a year's leave of absence because a university review has concluded that there were "irregularities" in the conduct of his research. One article is being withdrawn. Others under suspicion. Hauser is well-known for his studies of cotton-top tamarin monkeys. Not clear if he will be required to give up his edge.org page. His most recent book is about morality (previously).
Wonder how Harvard got wind of these "irregularities". In my experience, professors within a department tend to stay out of each other's empirical business and save the feces-flinging for peer-review. I'm guessing a dissatisfied grad student or lab tech.
posted by logicpunk at 4:07 PM on August 10, 2010 [1 favorite]
posted by logicpunk at 4:07 PM on August 10, 2010 [1 favorite]
It's all pretty vague right now - as PI of his lab it could be that one of any number of students actually performing the data collection and analysis had acted improperly, which Hauser would be responsible for under certain circumstances. Or it could be a much, much more serious charge than that.
posted by muddgirl at 4:14 PM on August 10, 2010
posted by muddgirl at 4:14 PM on August 10, 2010
Huh. A former housemate of mine is starting her phd in Harvard, in animal cognition. I wonder if this was to be her PI. I'll have to see what she says.
posted by Lemurrhea at 4:36 PM on August 10, 2010
posted by Lemurrhea at 4:36 PM on August 10, 2010
Seems to me that animal cognition optimists have frequently been caught up in this sort of stuff.
People really want to believe other primates think like we do. So far, very little evidence actually shows anything of the sort.
But the public will lap up this stuff.
posted by fourcheesemac at 4:57 PM on August 10, 2010 [1 favorite]
People really want to believe other primates think like we do. So far, very little evidence actually shows anything of the sort.
But the public will lap up this stuff.
posted by fourcheesemac at 4:57 PM on August 10, 2010 [1 favorite]
fourcheesemac--
Some people also want to believe mammals operate on a purely instinctual level, and totally lack emotions. So far, no evidence whatsoever actually shows anything of the sort.
(Mind you: I eat meat.)
posted by effugas at 5:00 PM on August 10, 2010
Some people also want to believe mammals operate on a purely instinctual level, and totally lack emotions. So far, no evidence whatsoever actually shows anything of the sort.
(Mind you: I eat meat.)
posted by effugas at 5:00 PM on August 10, 2010
So far, very little evidence actually shows anything of the sort.
Tools and sign language aren't enough? Grieving isn't enough? (WARNING! extremely sad video; pet owners probably shouldn't click)
posted by Civil_Disobedient at 5:40 PM on August 10, 2010 [2 favorites]
Tools and sign language aren't enough? Grieving isn't enough? (WARNING! extremely sad video; pet owners probably shouldn't click)
posted by Civil_Disobedient at 5:40 PM on August 10, 2010 [2 favorites]
People really want to believe other primates think like we do. So far, very little evidence actually shows anything of the sort.
Unless you choose to count the fact that their brains have most or all of the regions and nuclei ours do, very similarly arranged and connected, though of various relative sizes.
posted by jamjam at 5:59 PM on August 10, 2010
Unless you choose to count the fact that their brains have most or all of the regions and nuclei ours do, very similarly arranged and connected, though of various relative sizes.
posted by jamjam at 5:59 PM on August 10, 2010
So far, very little evidence actually shows anything of the sort.
Tools and sign language aren't enough?
In particular, we're looking for evidence that animals are self-aware. So, for instance, an early paper of Hauser's that was questioned in the 90s was about whether tamarins can recognize themselves in the mirror. There's no evidence that they can, except a paper by Hauser. Critics have claimed that Hauser's evidence doesn't actually show what he claims it shows, that his recordings of tamarins don't show any evidence of mirror recognition.
fourcheesemac is being generous by attributing this to optimism: it's certainly possible that Hauser has been watching the same videos as his critics, and simply, through sheer optimistic bias, seeing what isn't there, projecting his hoped-for results. Possible... sure.
In any case, we're seeing a scholarly version of the winner's curse: too often, papers with provocative results and bad methods get published while papers with boring results but good methods get rejected.
posted by anotherpanacea at 6:11 PM on August 10, 2010 [2 favorites]
Tools and sign language aren't enough?
In particular, we're looking for evidence that animals are self-aware. So, for instance, an early paper of Hauser's that was questioned in the 90s was about whether tamarins can recognize themselves in the mirror. There's no evidence that they can, except a paper by Hauser. Critics have claimed that Hauser's evidence doesn't actually show what he claims it shows, that his recordings of tamarins don't show any evidence of mirror recognition.
fourcheesemac is being generous by attributing this to optimism: it's certainly possible that Hauser has been watching the same videos as his critics, and simply, through sheer optimistic bias, seeing what isn't there, projecting his hoped-for results. Possible... sure.
In any case, we're seeing a scholarly version of the winner's curse: too often, papers with provocative results and bad methods get published while papers with boring results but good methods get rejected.
posted by anotherpanacea at 6:11 PM on August 10, 2010 [2 favorites]
People really want to believe other primates think like we do. So far, very little evidence actually shows anything of the sort.
So that's not actually at all the case. Anectodally, I can tell you that non-human primates are Very Smart. I've watched baby tamarins evaluate the best way to get from one tree to another, getting to the edge of one set of big branches and deciding that the jump was just too long. I've watched baby tamarins watch adults in their group foraging for fruit and then play at foraging, putting sticks and leaves in their mouths and chewing. I've watched them watch adults foraging for bugs and go from begging for bits of bug guts to making attempts to catch bugs to successfully doing so! I've seen play, and deception, and so on and so forth.
More official scientists have seen things like this, too.
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? "There is solid evidence from several different experimental paradigms that chimpanzees understand the goals and intentions of others, as well as the perception and knowledge of others."
Capuchin stone tool use in Caatinga dry forest
Monkey Responses to Three Different Alarm Calls: Evidence of Predator
Classification and Semantic Communication
Etc. etc. No one is saying that cotton topped tamarins are going to start writing great works of literature or that chimpanzees will begin building homes just because they take shelter in caves during the rain. But to discount primate intelligence because they're just not as smart as us is pretty stupid.
posted by ChuraChura at 6:23 PM on August 10, 2010 [5 favorites]
Very weird that there's only the slightest hint as to the nature of the irregularities. Everyone involved is being unusually mysterious about this...
posted by mr_roboto at 6:44 PM on August 10, 2010
posted by mr_roboto at 6:44 PM on August 10, 2010
People really want there to be a bright line between humans and animals, because:
1) We eat animals
2) We have a nasty habit of animalizing humans ("the enemy") right before we kill them
There really isn't a bright line. It's just not there. Cows and pigs are afraid to die. Dogs and cats mourn. Animals in general have a view of the world that involves them.
Their nature does not care about our moral systems.
posted by effugas at 6:58 PM on August 10, 2010 [6 favorites]
1) We eat animals
2) We have a nasty habit of animalizing humans ("the enemy") right before we kill them
There really isn't a bright line. It's just not there. Cows and pigs are afraid to die. Dogs and cats mourn. Animals in general have a view of the world that involves them.
Their nature does not care about our moral systems.
posted by effugas at 6:58 PM on August 10, 2010 [6 favorites]
The post really wasn't about whether animals can talk or think. It was about apparent fraud involving someone who has worked in that area, among others.
posted by cogneuro at 8:02 PM on August 10, 2010 [1 favorite]
posted by cogneuro at 8:02 PM on August 10, 2010 [1 favorite]
In particular, we're looking for evidence that animals are self-aware.
IRC, Sapolsky covers this
posted by P.o.B. at 9:09 PM on August 10, 2010 [1 favorite]
IRC, Sapolsky covers this
posted by P.o.B. at 9:09 PM on August 10, 2010 [1 favorite]
I met a Harvard biophysics guy last summer who, upon hearing of my enthusiasm for Hauser's book Moral Minds, promised me that this scandal would break. I told him he was full of shit and he said "Let's see." I believe I owe him a drink.
Fuck.
posted by inoculatedcities at 9:32 PM on August 10, 2010 [3 favorites]
Fuck.
posted by inoculatedcities at 9:32 PM on August 10, 2010 [3 favorites]
Something tells me that jdroth's "Animal Intelligence" blog just got its critical launch event.
posted by acoutu at 11:13 PM on August 10, 2010
posted by acoutu at 11:13 PM on August 10, 2010
The post really wasn't about whether animals can talk or think. It was about apparent fraud involving someone who has worked in that area, among others.
The fact that this is even a particularly controversial subject, such that fraud is even something people would look for, really comes down to human exceptionalism.
We really, really want to be special.
posted by effugas at 11:31 PM on August 10, 2010
The fact that this is even a particularly controversial subject, such that fraud is even something people would look for, really comes down to human exceptionalism.
We really, really want to be special.
posted by effugas at 11:31 PM on August 10, 2010
My oh My, Euphorb. That speech was a fpp all in itself.
I, for one, am impressed by the flinging of something other than feces.
posted by qinn at 12:49 AM on August 11, 2010
I didn't say other primates were stupid. The evidence for language is paper thin and most of it is tainted by the same desire to confirm fantasies that apparently afflicts Prof Hauser. Tool use is minimal and barely subject to intergenerational transmission. Were vastly similar to all other vertebrates, but that doesn't lead us to attribute fully self aware consciousness to ferrets.
I'm not saying we are not animals or animals are not intelligent, just that 100k years or so of language and culture (a blink of an eye in evolutionary time) have made humans capable of imagining such questions at all.
(Mind you: I eat meat.)
Mind you, I hunt.
posted by fourcheesemac at 3:31 AM on August 11, 2010
I'm not saying we are not animals or animals are not intelligent, just that 100k years or so of language and culture (a blink of an eye in evolutionary time) have made humans capable of imagining such questions at all.
(Mind you: I eat meat.)
Mind you, I hunt.
posted by fourcheesemac at 3:31 AM on August 11, 2010
Or in other words, while there is no bright line (and I frequently argue this point on Mefi, actually, specifically with respect to cultural debates on human sexuality), there is a big gap between vervets using indexical calls for prevarication to steal food or a mate and a Harvard scientist fudging research findings.
You can see them as fulfilling the same purpose or as expressions of the same instincts, which they are.
And you can overstate the significance of this fact, in which case you get Lassie and talking chimps and evolutionary psychology.
Mind you, I'm a linguistic anthropologist. I have a talking dog in this fight.
posted by fourcheesemac at 3:41 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
You can see them as fulfilling the same purpose or as expressions of the same instincts, which they are.
And you can overstate the significance of this fact, in which case you get Lassie and talking chimps and evolutionary psychology.
Mind you, I'm a linguistic anthropologist. I have a talking dog in this fight.
posted by fourcheesemac at 3:41 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
And you can overstate the significance of this fact, in which case you get Lassie and talking chimps and evolutionary psychology.
And what of feelings? Aren't advanced emotional states (love, grief, despair, loathing, etc.) a form of intelligence or at least evolutionary enhancement? Animals may not be as ego-driven as human beings, but isn't being able to remove your ego from a moral equation, like we see in generosity and grief, isn't that significant? Unless you think humanity is simply language and tool use and nothing else (which I think a lot—as in, most—of humanity would take issue with).
posted by Civil_Disobedient at 4:11 AM on August 11, 2010
And what of feelings? Aren't advanced emotional states (love, grief, despair, loathing, etc.) a form of intelligence or at least evolutionary enhancement? Animals may not be as ego-driven as human beings, but isn't being able to remove your ego from a moral equation, like we see in generosity and grief, isn't that significant? Unless you think humanity is simply language and tool use and nothing else (which I think a lot—as in, most—of humanity would take issue with).
posted by Civil_Disobedient at 4:11 AM on August 11, 2010
Seems to me that animal cognition optimists have frequently been caught up in this sort of stuff.
WTF?
posted by DU at 4:56 AM on August 11, 2010
WTF?
posted by DU at 4:56 AM on August 11, 2010
Fourcheesemac, absolutely there's a big gap between vervets and Harvard scientists. I don't think anyone was trying to conflate them? My issue with your comment was more in the vein of "So far, very little evidence actually shows anything of the sort." The difference is in degrees, not the mechanism.
I think evolutionary psych is pretty bullshit (I worked in an ev-psych lab for a little while administering experiments), but I don't see how attributing some understanding of syntax to primates who have been taught human languages causes evolutionary psychology.
Of course, I'm a physical anthropologist (well, grad student, really) so I have a monkey(?) in this fight.
posted by ChuraChura at 5:04 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
I think evolutionary psych is pretty bullshit (I worked in an ev-psych lab for a little while administering experiments), but I don't see how attributing some understanding of syntax to primates who have been taught human languages causes evolutionary psychology.
Of course, I'm a physical anthropologist (well, grad student, really) so I have a monkey(?) in this fight.
posted by ChuraChura at 5:04 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
My cat always thought Hauser was a fraud. I don't think he ever knew.
posted by MuffinMan at 6:11 AM on August 11, 2010 [2 favorites]
posted by MuffinMan at 6:11 AM on August 11, 2010 [2 favorites]
And what of feelings? Aren't advanced emotional states (love, grief, despair, loathing, etc.) a form of intelligence or at least evolutionary enhancement? Animals may not be as ego-driven as human beings, but isn't being able to remove your ego from a moral equation, like we see in generosity and grief, isn't that significant? Unless you think humanity is simply language and tool use and nothing else (which I think a lot—as in, most—of humanity would take issue with).
This is a really extreme straw man challenge -- I am not saying feelings don't matter or animals don't feel (I don't think we even know what the word "feeling" means). "Less ego driven" makes no sense at all to me. First you'd have to establish the existence of rational conscious thought in non-human animals, and I maintain the evidence for that is thin and easily challenged. While language is indeed a tool, it is also the vehicle of rational, conscious expression of thought (not necessarily of thought itself). I am at the far opposite extreme from those who see language as "merely" a tool or simple referential code -- my PhD work was primarily focused on the anthropology of emotion, actually. A chapter of my book is devoted to the semantics of the concept of "feeling" as such in a particular cultural setting.
It's weird to me how my position can be reduced to saying non-human animals don't have cognition or feeling. No other species has evolved anything like human language that we know of (I actually would argue that even if they had, we could only know from indirect evidence of technological accomplishment). The fact that some primates can apparently master very limited versions of human language when trained in a non-natural environment does not tell me that much. Of course non-human animals think and feel, and of course our own abilities to do the same are rooted in the same, common evolutionary history as ferrets or clams for that matter. The other primates are remarkably close to us, but also clearly different in that they have never developed civilizations or moved out of their original environments successfully, and for the most part are facing extinction at our hands.
The conundrum is easily solved with a little bit of non-linear thinking. "Culture" (including language) is an expression of an innate biological faculty for culture -- on this, the ev psychs are correct. But "culture" has allowed humans to consciously manipulate nature over the course of 100K or so years, and especially for the last 25K or so years since we developed agriculture and animal husbandry. Now we're manipulating the genome itself.
We're still animals, but we're also different from any other species after a remarkably short period of evolutionary change, because the emergence of a capacity for abstraction (which is what language is) allowed us to transmit acquired knowledge intergenerationally at a rate of information transfer that far exceeds genetic mutation and natural selection.
But I don't think I'm getting this across. I think somehow I must be saying something that sounds like "non-human animals don't think or feel." Of course they do, but *not like we do.*
posted by fourcheesemac at 7:20 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
This is a really extreme straw man challenge -- I am not saying feelings don't matter or animals don't feel (I don't think we even know what the word "feeling" means). "Less ego driven" makes no sense at all to me. First you'd have to establish the existence of rational conscious thought in non-human animals, and I maintain the evidence for that is thin and easily challenged. While language is indeed a tool, it is also the vehicle of rational, conscious expression of thought (not necessarily of thought itself). I am at the far opposite extreme from those who see language as "merely" a tool or simple referential code -- my PhD work was primarily focused on the anthropology of emotion, actually. A chapter of my book is devoted to the semantics of the concept of "feeling" as such in a particular cultural setting.
It's weird to me how my position can be reduced to saying non-human animals don't have cognition or feeling. No other species has evolved anything like human language that we know of (I actually would argue that even if they had, we could only know from indirect evidence of technological accomplishment). The fact that some primates can apparently master very limited versions of human language when trained in a non-natural environment does not tell me that much. Of course non-human animals think and feel, and of course our own abilities to do the same are rooted in the same, common evolutionary history as ferrets or clams for that matter. The other primates are remarkably close to us, but also clearly different in that they have never developed civilizations or moved out of their original environments successfully, and for the most part are facing extinction at our hands.
The conundrum is easily solved with a little bit of non-linear thinking. "Culture" (including language) is an expression of an innate biological faculty for culture -- on this, the ev psychs are correct. But "culture" has allowed humans to consciously manipulate nature over the course of 100K or so years, and especially for the last 25K or so years since we developed agriculture and animal husbandry. Now we're manipulating the genome itself.
We're still animals, but we're also different from any other species after a remarkably short period of evolutionary change, because the emergence of a capacity for abstraction (which is what language is) allowed us to transmit acquired knowledge intergenerationally at a rate of information transfer that far exceeds genetic mutation and natural selection.
But I don't think I'm getting this across. I think somehow I must be saying something that sounds like "non-human animals don't think or feel." Of course they do, but *not like we do.*
posted by fourcheesemac at 7:20 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
This Hauser, he is Doogie?
posted by spicynuts at 7:24 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
posted by spicynuts at 7:24 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
And DU, my point is that humans have (historically) been fascinated with the question of whether our sharing of a "mechanism" of cognition with other species (I grant the argument Chura, depending on how general one wants to be about the idea of a "mechanism" -- in the end we're talking neurotransmitters and electrical states whether its clams or humans) means we can attribute consciousness as *we* recognize it to other species. Everyone who has ever owned a (domesticated, which is significant) pet knows how tempting the illusion is that we share the same basic form of consciousness (domestication adds another layer to this). Thousands of researchers have been compelled by personal belief and public clamor for evidence to attribute wildly exaggerated (in hindsight, this is almost always the case in the literature on animal "language" that I know well) capacities to non-human animals.
Optimists, in my formulation, are those ethologists who imagine a Doctor Doolittle world and try to prove it exists by anthropomorphizing their research subjects.
posted by fourcheesemac at 7:28 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
Optimists, in my formulation, are those ethologists who imagine a Doctor Doolittle world and try to prove it exists by anthropomorphizing their research subjects.
posted by fourcheesemac at 7:28 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
Of course they do, but *not like we do.*
Which I meant to offer as the null hypothesis, not a statement of fact. I maintain the evidence in support of the contrary hypothesis is mostly very weak and (like lots of other scientific arguments) that the public debate (and a lot of the scientific debate) on this is deeply rooted in cultural biases and imaginative projection.
posted by fourcheesemac at 7:33 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
Which I meant to offer as the null hypothesis, not a statement of fact. I maintain the evidence in support of the contrary hypothesis is mostly very weak and (like lots of other scientific arguments) that the public debate (and a lot of the scientific debate) on this is deeply rooted in cultural biases and imaginative projection.
posted by fourcheesemac at 7:33 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
Also, the best evidence I know would argue that in a certain sense, non-human animals are far *more* "ego-driven than humans -- that culture has enabled us to override instinctive drives that prioritize individual interest and to shift the terms of reproductive fitness over time in the direction of favoring intelligence over physical strength, to name only one vector.
Of course, one could argue that all this rationality has led us to the brink of making ourselves extinct, but that's another debate.
posted by fourcheesemac at 7:36 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
Of course, one could argue that all this rationality has led us to the brink of making ourselves extinct, but that's another debate.
posted by fourcheesemac at 7:36 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
Everyone who has ever owned a (domesticated, which is significant) pet knows how tempting the illusion is that we share the same basic form of consciousness (domestication adds another layer to this).
What's tempting?
To think that your pet has desires?
Feelings?
Fears?
Pleasures?
Adoration?
Hatred?
Worries?
Your pet is a conscious being. He's also your pet. You're not less human for having a conscious being in your thrall. We don't have to ignore ridiculous amounts of evidence just so you can feel ok.
posted by effugas at 7:49 AM on August 11, 2010
What's tempting?
To think that your pet has desires?
Feelings?
Fears?
Pleasures?
Adoration?
Hatred?
Worries?
Your pet is a conscious being. He's also your pet. You're not less human for having a conscious being in your thrall. We don't have to ignore ridiculous amounts of evidence just so you can feel ok.
posted by effugas at 7:49 AM on August 11, 2010
I thought, if I remember my linguistics class, that the difference between primate "language" use and human language use was that even those primates trained to communicate with humans (sign language, whatever) weren't able to innovate or create novel forms outside of what they were taught. Similarly, I thought that there''d been a lot of skepticism applied to Koko regarding how much of her language was her and how much was cues from the scientists around her.
posted by klangklangston at 8:43 AM on August 11, 2010
posted by klangklangston at 8:43 AM on August 11, 2010
I give up. Clearly I must be an idiot not to understand that your schnauzer loves you back.
But one more time, where the fuck did I say non-human animals aren't conscious beings? If you want to argue the science of animal cognition and consciousness with me, you need to know something about that science.
Weird how personally offended it makes some people to suggest that Fido isn't human.
posted by fourcheesemac at 9:24 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
But one more time, where the fuck did I say non-human animals aren't conscious beings? If you want to argue the science of animal cognition and consciousness with me, you need to know something about that science.
Weird how personally offended it makes some people to suggest that Fido isn't human.
posted by fourcheesemac at 9:24 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
We don't have to ignore ridiculous amounts of evidence just so you can feel ok.
That's the most "WTF" response I've ever had on metafilter. Seriously? Your feelings are hurt? Because really, I "feel ok" whatever your relationship is with your pet, and I don't need your approval to feel OK with my knowledge of the subject. I have tenure.
I've taught the animal "language" literature for about 15 years. I'm a linguistic anthropologist. I also love animals and have owned many pets. I don't love animals any less than you do just because I don't attribute human-level consciousness to them. In many ways, I find animal cognition and consciousness utterly fascinating topics. I am fascinated precisely by how different animal cognition clearly is from human cognition, which doesn't mean I don't think (non-human) animals feel pain or attachment or deserve to be treated cruelly.
This is the projection I am talking about, and the optimism I am talking about, although as someone said above, that's the polite word for wishful thinking.
posted by fourcheesemac at 9:29 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
That's the most "WTF" response I've ever had on metafilter. Seriously? Your feelings are hurt? Because really, I "feel ok" whatever your relationship is with your pet, and I don't need your approval to feel OK with my knowledge of the subject. I have tenure.
I've taught the animal "language" literature for about 15 years. I'm a linguistic anthropologist. I also love animals and have owned many pets. I don't love animals any less than you do just because I don't attribute human-level consciousness to them. In many ways, I find animal cognition and consciousness utterly fascinating topics. I am fascinated precisely by how different animal cognition clearly is from human cognition, which doesn't mean I don't think (non-human) animals feel pain or attachment or deserve to be treated cruelly.
This is the projection I am talking about, and the optimism I am talking about, although as someone said above, that's the polite word for wishful thinking.
posted by fourcheesemac at 9:29 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
Ah, I can't resist one more comment on the subject, before someone else tells me that Fluffy is like a sister to them.
Also, you know domesticated pets have been bred over thousands of generations (that's direct human intervention with the genome, which no other animals do) to select for qualities which appear to humans as analogous to our own emotions, and precisely for the quality of being deeply attached and attentive to human needs, moods, and desires.
Take a wild wolf or tiger as a pet and see if you think he feels empathy, adoration, or whatever your strange list of completely anthropomorphized traits includes as he is eating your family for dinner. Lacking a word for any of these, your dog will not dispute your attribution of human traits to him. Many people also think they see human-style intelligence in the structure of the natural world. Doesn't mean there's an actual God in the sky making it so. We project our own limited understanding of nature onto nature. It was ever thus.
posted by fourcheesemac at 9:36 AM on August 11, 2010 [3 favorites]
Also, you know domesticated pets have been bred over thousands of generations (that's direct human intervention with the genome, which no other animals do) to select for qualities which appear to humans as analogous to our own emotions, and precisely for the quality of being deeply attached and attentive to human needs, moods, and desires.
Take a wild wolf or tiger as a pet and see if you think he feels empathy, adoration, or whatever your strange list of completely anthropomorphized traits includes as he is eating your family for dinner. Lacking a word for any of these, your dog will not dispute your attribution of human traits to him. Many people also think they see human-style intelligence in the structure of the natural world. Doesn't mean there's an actual God in the sky making it so. We project our own limited understanding of nature onto nature. It was ever thus.
posted by fourcheesemac at 9:36 AM on August 11, 2010 [3 favorites]
but I don't see how attributing some understanding of syntax to primates who have been taught human languages causes evolutionary psychology.
Failed to respond to this fair point. I'm being a little hyperbolic about the Ev Psych angle. Point is, Ev Psych has mostly focused on showing how human cognition is rooted in the same drives, instincts, and motivations as what we might think of as "animal cognition." Not that they are identical, of course. As a result, EvPsych discounts the influence of cultural evolution on human thought and behavior -- a question of which way you look through the telescope, ultimately.
Because of course humans are very clearly animals, without a doubt. EvPsych would like to take many properties of human behavior that have been attributed to reason or culture or language and reduce them to particular adaptations of underlying faculties that are common to all primates, or all vertebrates, or all species. That's why it is so important to show that other species have *possibly undeveloped) capacities for qualities or behaviors often considered to be uniquely human, just as humans have capacities and drives that make us, in the end, like any other animal.
It comes down to human exceptionalism, and how much range you grant the possibility that language (hence culture) are specific, unique adaptations that have not arisen in any other species, and the overwhelming evidence from language science, at least, is that this is the case.
One more time: I am not saying animals aren't intelligent. In fact, they have intelligences specifically adapted for their environments in ways humans can only dream of, since we've expanded our environmental niches (including now outer space) much faster than our bodies have evolved in reaction to those new niches. Anyone who hunts -- and I do -- knows that animal intelligence can easily outmatch human intelligence under conditions favorable to the animal.
posted by fourcheesemac at 9:46 AM on August 11, 2010 [3 favorites]
Failed to respond to this fair point. I'm being a little hyperbolic about the Ev Psych angle. Point is, Ev Psych has mostly focused on showing how human cognition is rooted in the same drives, instincts, and motivations as what we might think of as "animal cognition." Not that they are identical, of course. As a result, EvPsych discounts the influence of cultural evolution on human thought and behavior -- a question of which way you look through the telescope, ultimately.
Because of course humans are very clearly animals, without a doubt. EvPsych would like to take many properties of human behavior that have been attributed to reason or culture or language and reduce them to particular adaptations of underlying faculties that are common to all primates, or all vertebrates, or all species. That's why it is so important to show that other species have *possibly undeveloped) capacities for qualities or behaviors often considered to be uniquely human, just as humans have capacities and drives that make us, in the end, like any other animal.
It comes down to human exceptionalism, and how much range you grant the possibility that language (hence culture) are specific, unique adaptations that have not arisen in any other species, and the overwhelming evidence from language science, at least, is that this is the case.
One more time: I am not saying animals aren't intelligent. In fact, they have intelligences specifically adapted for their environments in ways humans can only dream of, since we've expanded our environmental niches (including now outer space) much faster than our bodies have evolved in reaction to those new niches. Anyone who hunts -- and I do -- knows that animal intelligence can easily outmatch human intelligence under conditions favorable to the animal.
posted by fourcheesemac at 9:46 AM on August 11, 2010 [3 favorites]
Someone give fourcheesemac a treat before he wigs out.
posted by spicynuts at 10:09 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
posted by spicynuts at 10:09 AM on August 11, 2010 [1 favorite]
This is shocking to me. I've never much agreed with his work, but it's disturbing that some of it has turned out to be phony (worse, details are lacking on what went wrong -- how much of his work should I be discounting?)
I am glad to see that Hauser discovered the irregularities himself and turned himself in. That makes this a case of negligence or honest error, not outright fraud.
posted by justsomebodythatyouusedtoknow at 10:18 AM on August 11, 2010
I am glad to see that Hauser discovered the irregularities himself and turned himself in. That makes this a case of negligence or honest error, not outright fraud.
posted by justsomebodythatyouusedtoknow at 10:18 AM on August 11, 2010
Alright, fourcheesemac, I'd like you to give yourself a little test designed to winkle out whether your apparent insistence on an unbridgeable gap between humans and other animals is actually a residuum of quasi-religious conviction that humans are a special creation of the divine, or chosen by a god-like being in some fashion, or at the very least that language is a spark of divinity that cannot in principle well up from below.
Imagine that we understood the evolution of language well enough that a combination of selective breeding and gene therapy could produce a breeding population of animals capable of language and with near human (or greater) intelligence in, say, ten generations, starting with dogs.
Is your immediate reaction that this is impossible?
Or do you feel at least a mild revulsion at the very idea?
posted by jamjam at 10:40 AM on August 11, 2010
Imagine that we understood the evolution of language well enough that a combination of selective breeding and gene therapy could produce a breeding population of animals capable of language and with near human (or greater) intelligence in, say, ten generations, starting with dogs.
Is your immediate reaction that this is impossible?
Or do you feel at least a mild revulsion at the very idea?
posted by jamjam at 10:40 AM on August 11, 2010
I was aware this had been brewing for a while, and I'm so glad this story broke. His results have struck me as fishy for years. I, personally, wouldn't trust any results from his lab.
From my understanding of the situation (from colleagues and peers), it was indeed some graduate students that exposed systemic problems in his research methodologies.
posted by blandarchy at 10:56 AM on August 11, 2010 [4 favorites]
From my understanding of the situation (from colleagues and peers), it was indeed some graduate students that exposed systemic problems in his research methodologies.
posted by blandarchy at 10:56 AM on August 11, 2010 [4 favorites]
Met Hauser once (briefly), was a weird encounter (weird enough to remember the name). Seeing this makes me reinterpret the encounter a bit.
Animal cognition discussions bring out the stupids.
fourcheesemac: as a linguistic anthropologist you should have some passing familiarity with pragmatic considerations.
Your initial post is written in a way that makes it seem the right way to respond to you is not by careful consideration of your exact words but, rather, by trying to infer your likely beliefs and motivations for posting as you did (and then reacting to those, rather than to what you actually wrote).
It's pretty apparent that that's what's going on with the reactions you're getting.
Based on what you initially posted a natural hypothesis to consider is "fourcheesemac has a generalized animosity towards the idea that animal cognition is like our own, and a generalized disdain for those people who hold that idea".
Everything you wrote in your initial posting is consistent with that hypothesis, which explains the reactions you've been getting.
If you'd stated your position more carefully upfront I doubt you would've gotten as much of a reaction.
posted by hoople at 11:06 AM on August 11, 2010
Animal cognition discussions bring out the stupids.
fourcheesemac: as a linguistic anthropologist you should have some passing familiarity with pragmatic considerations.
Your initial post is written in a way that makes it seem the right way to respond to you is not by careful consideration of your exact words but, rather, by trying to infer your likely beliefs and motivations for posting as you did (and then reacting to those, rather than to what you actually wrote).
It's pretty apparent that that's what's going on with the reactions you're getting.
Based on what you initially posted a natural hypothesis to consider is "fourcheesemac has a generalized animosity towards the idea that animal cognition is like our own, and a generalized disdain for those people who hold that idea".
Everything you wrote in your initial posting is consistent with that hypothesis, which explains the reactions you've been getting.
If you'd stated your position more carefully upfront I doubt you would've gotten as much of a reaction.
posted by hoople at 11:06 AM on August 11, 2010
I'm actually now interested in reading fourcheesemac's dissertation, if that's possible. I'm also actually now really interested in some noodles baked with cheese and sprinkled with breadcrumbs. Hmmm.
posted by spicynuts at 11:08 AM on August 11, 2010
posted by spicynuts at 11:08 AM on August 11, 2010
fourcheesemac--
Here's the deal.
You can scare an animal. It is not feigning fear. It is experiencing fear.
You can earn the trust of an animal. It is not feigning trust. It is experiencing trust.
You can betray an animal. It is not feigning surprise. It is experiencing surprise.
There's no complex simulacrum going on, in which thousands of years of guided evolution have created creatures that really seem to have all these things going on. There's an entire world view going on in those heads. Sure, it's not quite the same. Humans have some very unique higher order cognition going on. I even have no doubt that there have been stretches in terms of finding grammatical structure in animal communication.
But so what? That's just language. You're a linguist, you should be particularly aware of how many layers there are to communication of which words and grammars are just one.
Fido's not human. But Fido's part of a pack. Fido follows his master, defends his master, is fed by his master. You should recognize this precise pattern. You have tenure.
posted by effugas at 4:40 AM on August 12, 2010
Here's the deal.
You can scare an animal. It is not feigning fear. It is experiencing fear.
You can earn the trust of an animal. It is not feigning trust. It is experiencing trust.
You can betray an animal. It is not feigning surprise. It is experiencing surprise.
There's no complex simulacrum going on, in which thousands of years of guided evolution have created creatures that really seem to have all these things going on. There's an entire world view going on in those heads. Sure, it's not quite the same. Humans have some very unique higher order cognition going on. I even have no doubt that there have been stretches in terms of finding grammatical structure in animal communication.
But so what? That's just language. You're a linguist, you should be particularly aware of how many layers there are to communication of which words and grammars are just one.
Fido's not human. But Fido's part of a pack. Fido follows his master, defends his master, is fed by his master. You should recognize this precise pattern. You have tenure.
posted by effugas at 4:40 AM on August 12, 2010
OK, you know what? I'm being a bit of a dick. Sorry, all.
posted by effugas at 5:08 AM on August 12, 2010
posted by effugas at 5:08 AM on August 12, 2010
Apparently it was Hauser's grad students who reported him. From the NYT:
posted by logicpunk at 7:41 AM on August 14, 2010
"...when Marc was in Australia, the university came in and seized his hard drives and videos because some students in his lab said, ‘Enough is enough.’ They said this was a pattern and they had specific evidence.”I'm actually quite glad that a) his students had the nerve to report him and b) Harvard took them seriously.
posted by logicpunk at 7:41 AM on August 14, 2010
I highly recommend people read Folk Physics for Apes by Daniel Povinelli which, among other things, addresses the issues of how and whether chimps think. A big argument of the introduction is that humans see animals engaging in behavior, and from that we make assumptions about how they are thinking; these assumptions may not be correct. For example, I turn and stare at a tree. In response, the chimp stares at the tree. So an assumption would be that chimps understand the concept of gaze, that because they see me pointing my eyes at something, they understand that that is what I am seeing. And in fact, the team in this case exhaustively proved that this was not the case; that chimps (or, at least, the chimps in this study) do not actually understand gaze. If I am looking away from the chimp, it will look at where my eyes are pointing, but it does not realize that means I cannot see the chimp.
Really fascinating stuff and the first thing I thought of when I saw this post.
posted by Deathalicious at 7:48 AM on August 14, 2010
Really fascinating stuff and the first thing I thought of when I saw this post.
posted by Deathalicious at 7:48 AM on August 14, 2010
What does it mean to 'experience' fear? Or experience anything? Animals certainly have behaviors analogous to human behaviors, but that doesn't mean that their subjective experience is the same or that the have an subjective experience at all.
posted by empath at 10:40 AM on August 14, 2010
posted by empath at 10:40 AM on August 14, 2010
select for qualities which appear to humans as analogous to our own emotions, and precisely for the quality of being deeply attached and attentive to human needs, moods, and desires
I realize this is even more of a derail, for which I apologize--but our way of dealing with pets now, where the breeding is almost entirely separate from the selection, brings that process to a halt, doesn't it? If you're picking the sweetest, most attentive pup from the litter, and bringing him up in a way that encourages the appearance of human-like emotion and attentions, but there is no further reproduction based on that (sweet and intelligent Fido, and drooling sociopath Rex, have pretty much equal chances of either fathering litters or going to the vet to be neutered)...then we never get to see if that dog-consciousness ever gets more human-like as time goes on. So the selection stops. Which seems like a shame.
posted by mittens at 10:54 AM on August 14, 2010
I realize this is even more of a derail, for which I apologize--but our way of dealing with pets now, where the breeding is almost entirely separate from the selection, brings that process to a halt, doesn't it? If you're picking the sweetest, most attentive pup from the litter, and bringing him up in a way that encourages the appearance of human-like emotion and attentions, but there is no further reproduction based on that (sweet and intelligent Fido, and drooling sociopath Rex, have pretty much equal chances of either fathering litters or going to the vet to be neutered)...then we never get to see if that dog-consciousness ever gets more human-like as time goes on. So the selection stops. Which seems like a shame.
posted by mittens at 10:54 AM on August 14, 2010
What does it mean to 'experience' fear? Or experience anything? Animals certainly have behaviors analogous to human behaviors, but that doesn't mean that their subjective experience is the same or that the have an subjective experience at all.
This would make sense if the only behaviors animals had, in a situation where we'd experience fear, was running away or fighting or lying down and preparing to be injured. But what about grooming as a way to calm things down after the fearful event? Doesn't that suggest some little degree of subjectivity--a sense that things need to be calmed down? That there was an anxiety that needed to be dealt with, separate from the threat?
posted by mittens at 11:10 AM on August 14, 2010
This would make sense if the only behaviors animals had, in a situation where we'd experience fear, was running away or fighting or lying down and preparing to be injured. But what about grooming as a way to calm things down after the fearful event? Doesn't that suggest some little degree of subjectivity--a sense that things need to be calmed down? That there was an anxiety that needed to be dealt with, separate from the threat?
posted by mittens at 11:10 AM on August 14, 2010
"Alright, fourcheesemac, I'd like you to give yourself a little test designed to winkle out whether your apparent insistence on an unbridgeable gap between humans and other animals is actually a residuum of quasi-religious conviction that humans are a special creation of the divine, or chosen by a god-like being in some fashion, or at the very least that language is a spark of divinity that cannot in principle well up from below."
Dude, seriously? It's entirely possible to believe that animal cognition is so subjectively alien as to be unapprehendable.
posted by klangklangston at 1:44 PM on August 14, 2010
Dude, seriously? It's entirely possible to believe that animal cognition is so subjectively alien as to be unapprehendable.
posted by klangklangston at 1:44 PM on August 14, 2010
But what about grooming as a way to calm things down after the fearful event?
You're projecting a bit there, no? Who knows why they groom?
posted by empath at 2:18 PM on August 14, 2010
You're projecting a bit there, no? Who knows why they groom?
posted by empath at 2:18 PM on August 14, 2010
empath (eponysterical!):
In science, we believe in Occam's Razor -- the simplest explanation is usually the correct one. Animals and humans exhibit many of the same measurable characteristics around emotions -- "memory" effects, behavioral stability or instability, heart rates, etc. In some cases, even the same chemicals may be found in the bloodstream.
These characteristics do not just show up in the extreme case. The simple politics of group dynamics are indeed quite active in chimps and wolf packs.
Sure, it's possible that it's all an incredible simulation of human behavior. But the burden of proof to say it's just our pesky anthropomorphism at play is on you.
Again, they can have all the emotions in the world, and we should still eat them. Humans are omnivores. Managing the cruelty is reasonable though.
posted by effugas at 5:50 PM on August 14, 2010
In science, we believe in Occam's Razor -- the simplest explanation is usually the correct one. Animals and humans exhibit many of the same measurable characteristics around emotions -- "memory" effects, behavioral stability or instability, heart rates, etc. In some cases, even the same chemicals may be found in the bloodstream.
These characteristics do not just show up in the extreme case. The simple politics of group dynamics are indeed quite active in chimps and wolf packs.
Sure, it's possible that it's all an incredible simulation of human behavior. But the burden of proof to say it's just our pesky anthropomorphism at play is on you.
Again, they can have all the emotions in the world, and we should still eat them. Humans are omnivores. Managing the cruelty is reasonable though.
posted by effugas at 5:50 PM on August 14, 2010
Don't get condescending with me, i know what occam's razor is.
Those sorts of things also show up in insects, lizards, snakes and fish. Perhaps even ants. That doesn't mean any of them are conscious, or have an experience of those feelings that in any way relates to ours.
posted by empath at 7:06 PM on August 14, 2010
Those sorts of things also show up in insects, lizards, snakes and fish. Perhaps even ants. That doesn't mean any of them are conscious, or have an experience of those feelings that in any way relates to ours.
posted by empath at 7:06 PM on August 14, 2010
And stop imputing motives to people. It's obnoxious, and you've done it multiple times in this thread.
posted by empath at 7:08 PM on August 14, 2010
posted by empath at 7:08 PM on August 14, 2010
empath--
I will cease imputing motives. My apologies.
Sticking to the facts: Your argument is basically, "It only LOOKS like X, it couldn't possibly BE X". Why? Why couldn't it be? What principle of biology is violated by animals having conscious emotions, like fear, joy, anger, and grief? Physiologically, these aren't exactly elements of higher brain function.
You know, if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, sometimes, it's just a duck. Certainly the non-duck burden is on the person claiming otherwise.
Look, we know a number of things:
1) We know that if you kill one pig in front of another, the other will utterly freak out. This is a problem -- there's a disease that makes very scared pigs *taste really bad*. It's common enough that farms have taken to very carefully hiding pig deaths from one another.
2) We know that dogs exhibit grieving when their masters die, becoming sullen and listless, and howling.
3) We know humans evolved from animals. At some point in the timeline, the mind gained the ability to emit language. Who knows, maybe we were still hairy apes at the time. At some other point in the timeline, emotions formed. That might have been in the ape phase. That might have been in the early mammal stage. Clearly there was a time before emotions, and a time after.
posted by effugas at 7:53 PM on August 14, 2010
I will cease imputing motives. My apologies.
Sticking to the facts: Your argument is basically, "It only LOOKS like X, it couldn't possibly BE X". Why? Why couldn't it be? What principle of biology is violated by animals having conscious emotions, like fear, joy, anger, and grief? Physiologically, these aren't exactly elements of higher brain function.
You know, if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, sometimes, it's just a duck. Certainly the non-duck burden is on the person claiming otherwise.
Look, we know a number of things:
1) We know that if you kill one pig in front of another, the other will utterly freak out. This is a problem -- there's a disease that makes very scared pigs *taste really bad*. It's common enough that farms have taken to very carefully hiding pig deaths from one another.
2) We know that dogs exhibit grieving when their masters die, becoming sullen and listless, and howling.
3) We know humans evolved from animals. At some point in the timeline, the mind gained the ability to emit language. Who knows, maybe we were still hairy apes at the time. At some other point in the timeline, emotions formed. That might have been in the ape phase. That might have been in the early mammal stage. Clearly there was a time before emotions, and a time after.
posted by effugas at 7:53 PM on August 14, 2010
...and in terms of experiences that relate to ours, we can experimentally find PTSD in animals after abuse -- monkeys, dogs, probably even birds. Think about what PTSD implies.
posted by effugas at 7:54 PM on August 14, 2010
posted by effugas at 7:54 PM on August 14, 2010
Put another way, creating a detector for emotional states that worked on humans, but didn't work on higher animals, and didn't depend on linguistic separation, would be an interesting challenge.
posted by effugas at 8:23 PM on August 14, 2010
posted by effugas at 8:23 PM on August 14, 2010
You really are reading a lot more into what I said than I actually said. You simply have no way of knowing what is going on in a dogs head, no matter how many times you assert that you do.
posted by empath at 10:11 PM on August 14, 2010
posted by empath at 10:11 PM on August 14, 2010
What principle of biology is violated by animals having conscious emotions
You can't just assert something is true because there is no reason to believe it isn't. You might as well say they have a soul (or that humans have a soul). For all you know, a tree could have conscious emotions. We don't know even know what consciousness is, and we don't know what the physical or biological requirements are for having it.
So, no you can't say they have conscious feelings or that they are conscious of anything, until you can find some way of interrogating that consciousness.
posted by empath at 10:15 PM on August 14, 2010
You can't just assert something is true because there is no reason to believe it isn't. You might as well say they have a soul (or that humans have a soul). For all you know, a tree could have conscious emotions. We don't know even know what consciousness is, and we don't know what the physical or biological requirements are for having it.
So, no you can't say they have conscious feelings or that they are conscious of anything, until you can find some way of interrogating that consciousness.
posted by empath at 10:15 PM on August 14, 2010
For the record, I am open to the idea of animal consciousness. I don't know where it starts. Maybe it's only us and chimps. Maybe dolphins, maybe parrots, hell, maybe even ant colonies. Until we know how to define and measure consciousness, any statement you make about whether or not animals have it is just wishful thinking.
posted by empath at 10:17 PM on August 14, 2010
posted by empath at 10:17 PM on August 14, 2010
empath--
I'm making a specific prediction: Mechanisms that detect and discriminate emotional state in humans, will also detect and discriminate emotions in many other animals.
Furthermore, I make a second specific prediction: It will be difficult, but not impossible, to create mechanisms that only and exclusively detect emotional state in humans. In other words, similar short term and long term behavioral patterns will be detected, and both chemical and neuro-electrical markers will align across species in a statistically significant manner.
Do you contest either of these predictions? What predictions does your theory make?
You believe there is no way to interrogate conscious thought of animals. Why? Is it because animals can't speak? Neither can infants, but there are many well done papers on the minds of babies at various developmental stages. Furthermore, many cognitive studies are done carefully filtering out the effects of language. I've brought up some very specific examples:
We know conscious, emotional humans experience PTSD. We also know that animals can process experiences such that they behave in very similar ways long after them.
We know humans do not take seeing a fellow human killed particularly well. Experiences on farms shows that cows and pigs have similar reactions.
We know humans enter a period of extended listlessness and malaise when a mate or a child is lost to them. Many animals behave in similar manners.
At some point, if we don't know what's going on in an animal's head, we don't know what's going on in a human's head. Given the human capability to prevaricate, I wouldn't exactly use speech as the golden capability that allows us insight into the minds of others.
posted by effugas at 10:54 PM on August 14, 2010
I'm making a specific prediction: Mechanisms that detect and discriminate emotional state in humans, will also detect and discriminate emotions in many other animals.
Furthermore, I make a second specific prediction: It will be difficult, but not impossible, to create mechanisms that only and exclusively detect emotional state in humans. In other words, similar short term and long term behavioral patterns will be detected, and both chemical and neuro-electrical markers will align across species in a statistically significant manner.
Do you contest either of these predictions? What predictions does your theory make?
You believe there is no way to interrogate conscious thought of animals. Why? Is it because animals can't speak? Neither can infants, but there are many well done papers on the minds of babies at various developmental stages. Furthermore, many cognitive studies are done carefully filtering out the effects of language. I've brought up some very specific examples:
We know conscious, emotional humans experience PTSD. We also know that animals can process experiences such that they behave in very similar ways long after them.
We know humans do not take seeing a fellow human killed particularly well. Experiences on farms shows that cows and pigs have similar reactions.
We know humans enter a period of extended listlessness and malaise when a mate or a child is lost to them. Many animals behave in similar manners.
At some point, if we don't know what's going on in an animal's head, we don't know what's going on in a human's head. Given the human capability to prevaricate, I wouldn't exactly use speech as the golden capability that allows us insight into the minds of others.
posted by effugas at 10:54 PM on August 14, 2010
"Sticking to the facts: Your argument is basically, "It only LOOKS like X, it couldn't possibly BE X". Why? Why couldn't it be? What principle of biology is violated by animals having conscious emotions, like fear, joy, anger, and grief? Physiologically, these aren't exactly elements of higher brain function."
No. This is wrong simply because you are doing massive question begging regarding consciousness. You're saying that because animals have emotions, they have conscious emotions and then arguing that emotions are part of the basic biological tool set. You're wildly abusing the term "conscious." It's entirely possible to have feelings and not know what they are, or even have reactions and not know why those reactions happen, hence consciousness is separate from emotions and reactions; that animals have emotions and reactions does not therefore prove consciousness in emotions.
Further, the argument that because things are similar, they are the same does not inherently follow and the burden of proof is still upon those wishing to connect. And because subjective conscious experience is such a fraught and intractable problem within humanity, making a wild generalization and then expecting to be able to reason from that generalization with regard to all animals is insane.
posted by klangklangston at 12:46 AM on August 15, 2010
No. This is wrong simply because you are doing massive question begging regarding consciousness. You're saying that because animals have emotions, they have conscious emotions and then arguing that emotions are part of the basic biological tool set. You're wildly abusing the term "conscious." It's entirely possible to have feelings and not know what they are, or even have reactions and not know why those reactions happen, hence consciousness is separate from emotions and reactions; that animals have emotions and reactions does not therefore prove consciousness in emotions.
Further, the argument that because things are similar, they are the same does not inherently follow and the burden of proof is still upon those wishing to connect. And because subjective conscious experience is such a fraught and intractable problem within humanity, making a wild generalization and then expecting to be able to reason from that generalization with regard to all animals is insane.
posted by klangklangston at 12:46 AM on August 15, 2010
klangklangston--
Let us stipulate that:
1) Conscious emotions exist
2) Other humans besides ourselves possess them
3) At some point in evolutionary time, humans did not possess conscious emotions
4) At some other point in evolutionary time, humans developed conscious emotions
First, for humans to be the exclusive bearer of conscious emotions, they must have been developed after Homo Erectus. On what phylogenetic basis can such an assumption be made? It is my understanding that the emotional centers of the brain are quite old.
Second, emotions are not random generators of behavior. Awareness of the emotional state of an entity allows prediction of a large amount of that entity's behavior. Were I to describe the behavior of an angry, scared, fascinated, or confused entity, you would have a far greater than chance ability to discern which emotional state I was describing, and a far less than chance ability to determine whether I was describing the actions of a human or a dog.
Third, there is direct evidence that animals (and humans) can communicate via emoting, despite not possessing either a shared language or shared genome. Music is not the universal language -- growling is.
I don't think I'm abusing the word conscious at all. If I take a hammer, and hit a dog in the head with it, I will stand a good chance of knocking him...unconscious. Consciousness is a state of real-time universal interaction, where perceptions are colored by impulses of various sorts. I think all higher animals have emotional impulses. Humans sometimes use rational impulses.
I really don't understand -- and have been admonished not to guess -- why this is such a big deal. The sky is blue. Water is wet. A goat can be afraid to die.
posted by effugas at 1:16 AM on August 15, 2010
Let us stipulate that:
1) Conscious emotions exist
2) Other humans besides ourselves possess them
3) At some point in evolutionary time, humans did not possess conscious emotions
4) At some other point in evolutionary time, humans developed conscious emotions
First, for humans to be the exclusive bearer of conscious emotions, they must have been developed after Homo Erectus. On what phylogenetic basis can such an assumption be made? It is my understanding that the emotional centers of the brain are quite old.
Second, emotions are not random generators of behavior. Awareness of the emotional state of an entity allows prediction of a large amount of that entity's behavior. Were I to describe the behavior of an angry, scared, fascinated, or confused entity, you would have a far greater than chance ability to discern which emotional state I was describing, and a far less than chance ability to determine whether I was describing the actions of a human or a dog.
Third, there is direct evidence that animals (and humans) can communicate via emoting, despite not possessing either a shared language or shared genome. Music is not the universal language -- growling is.
I don't think I'm abusing the word conscious at all. If I take a hammer, and hit a dog in the head with it, I will stand a good chance of knocking him...unconscious. Consciousness is a state of real-time universal interaction, where perceptions are colored by impulses of various sorts. I think all higher animals have emotional impulses. Humans sometimes use rational impulses.
I really don't understand -- and have been admonished not to guess -- why this is such a big deal. The sky is blue. Water is wet. A goat can be afraid to die.
posted by effugas at 1:16 AM on August 15, 2010
(For the record, I actually have strong doubts about lots of the higher layer activity in animals. Gaze tracking? Language beyond a simple noun-adjective form? Could see these being stretches. Emotions with long term memory integration? You have to ignore a lot of evidence to not see that.)
(Don't know enough about tool use to comment.)
posted by effugas at 2:15 AM on August 15, 2010
(Don't know enough about tool use to comment.)
posted by effugas at 2:15 AM on August 15, 2010
klangklangston:
It's entirely possible to have feelings and not know what they are
How? Maybe I'm over-reading the words "feeling" and "emotion," but how do they make sense if there is no awareness of them?
empath:
You simply have no way of knowing what is going on in a dogs head, no matter how many times you assert that you do. [...] So, no you can't say they have conscious feelings or that they are conscious of anything, until you can find some way of interrogating that consciousness.
But I have no way of knowing what's going on in anyone's head, humans included. The tools I have are pretty limited, looking at facial expressions, body language, listening to language, that sort of thing...and the assumption that if it's going on in my head, it must be possible for it to go on in somebody else's head too. My inability to interrogate consciousness very well doesn't imply that you don't have conscious feelings or are not conscious of anything...just says that my tools are weak.
Getting back to one of Klangklangston's points, I don't think it's unreasonable to assume that since a dog has eyes, and doesn't bump into things (much), that his eyes function pretty similarly to mine, and that he possesses vision--maybe less vision than me, maybe a different kind, maybe vision being a complicated term that gets thrown around too loosely, fine, but he's got something going on with his eyes that's a lot like mine. There's no compelling need for reams of scientific proof before making that assumption, and certainly no need to speculate that what a dog has as vision is so radically different from mine, as to make it unapprehendable.
posted by mittens at 6:34 AM on August 15, 2010
It's entirely possible to have feelings and not know what they are
How? Maybe I'm over-reading the words "feeling" and "emotion," but how do they make sense if there is no awareness of them?
empath:
You simply have no way of knowing what is going on in a dogs head, no matter how many times you assert that you do. [...] So, no you can't say they have conscious feelings or that they are conscious of anything, until you can find some way of interrogating that consciousness.
But I have no way of knowing what's going on in anyone's head, humans included. The tools I have are pretty limited, looking at facial expressions, body language, listening to language, that sort of thing...and the assumption that if it's going on in my head, it must be possible for it to go on in somebody else's head too. My inability to interrogate consciousness very well doesn't imply that you don't have conscious feelings or are not conscious of anything...just says that my tools are weak.
Getting back to one of Klangklangston's points, I don't think it's unreasonable to assume that since a dog has eyes, and doesn't bump into things (much), that his eyes function pretty similarly to mine, and that he possesses vision--maybe less vision than me, maybe a different kind, maybe vision being a complicated term that gets thrown around too loosely, fine, but he's got something going on with his eyes that's a lot like mine. There's no compelling need for reams of scientific proof before making that assumption, and certainly no need to speculate that what a dog has as vision is so radically different from mine, as to make it unapprehendable.
posted by mittens at 6:34 AM on August 15, 2010
I don't think I'm abusing the word conscious at all. If I take a hammer, and hit a dog in the head with it, I will stand a good chance of knocking him...unconscious.
Erm. As much as I think that dog has some sort of consciousness, if you'd said instead, "I will stand a good chance of knocking his lights out," that wouldn't mean that the dog started with a set of lights.
posted by mittens at 6:43 AM on August 15, 2010
Erm. As much as I think that dog has some sort of consciousness, if you'd said instead, "I will stand a good chance of knocking his lights out," that wouldn't mean that the dog started with a set of lights.
posted by mittens at 6:43 AM on August 15, 2010
mittens--
The point is that I could describe the act of knocking an entity out with a ball peen hammer, it's sudden fall, its extended somnolescence, it's slow recovery, and possibly the long term effects on the entity...
...and you would not know if the entity was man or dog.
posted by effugas at 7:08 AM on August 15, 2010
The point is that I could describe the act of knocking an entity out with a ball peen hammer, it's sudden fall, its extended somnolescence, it's slow recovery, and possibly the long term effects on the entity...
...and you would not know if the entity was man or dog.
posted by effugas at 7:08 AM on August 15, 2010
effugas. I think the problem here is that you seem to not know what consciousness and awareness mean and how they differ from emotions.
posted by empath at 8:56 AM on August 15, 2010
posted by empath at 8:56 AM on August 15, 2010
empath--
It's more that I reject the definition of conscious as "What humans are".
Look. It's not complicated. An entity that is able to detect the death of its peer, interpret that as a signal that one's own death may be coming, and emit a predicatable series of behaviors associated with panic and distress -- this is a conscious entity.
Where I think people are getting in trouble, is in accepting the view that "self-awareness" or "gaze tracking" or language are somehow big important things. They're neat, sure. If you want to say they are things humans have that most animals don't, sure. I'll buy that.
But I tell you this: When the chips are down, when it's life or death and it's probably going to be death, something happens to man. He does not become less conscious. He does not become less aware. He becomes more.
Put any animal in the same situation, and you'll see the same behaviors, the same focus, the same drive to survive. It's because it's the same thing, empath. Same systems doing the same things they've always done.
Anyway, I'm happy to concede that animals have a different sort of consciousness and awareness compared to humans. No question, we have layers on layers on layers. But it's a simple obvious matter to recognize the deep similarities in emotional responses across the species. They fear. They enjoy. They choose their loyalties. They choose their battles. They grieve. There is simply not some grand simulacrum going on. That is foolish , phylogenetically improbable, and is nothing less than abject ignoring of the evidence.
posted by effugas at 9:18 AM on August 15, 2010
It's more that I reject the definition of conscious as "What humans are".
Look. It's not complicated. An entity that is able to detect the death of its peer, interpret that as a signal that one's own death may be coming, and emit a predicatable series of behaviors associated with panic and distress -- this is a conscious entity.
Where I think people are getting in trouble, is in accepting the view that "self-awareness" or "gaze tracking" or language are somehow big important things. They're neat, sure. If you want to say they are things humans have that most animals don't, sure. I'll buy that.
But I tell you this: When the chips are down, when it's life or death and it's probably going to be death, something happens to man. He does not become less conscious. He does not become less aware. He becomes more.
Put any animal in the same situation, and you'll see the same behaviors, the same focus, the same drive to survive. It's because it's the same thing, empath. Same systems doing the same things they've always done.
Anyway, I'm happy to concede that animals have a different sort of consciousness and awareness compared to humans. No question, we have layers on layers on layers. But it's a simple obvious matter to recognize the deep similarities in emotional responses across the species. They fear. They enjoy. They choose their loyalties. They choose their battles. They grieve. There is simply not some grand simulacrum going on. That is foolish , phylogenetically improbable, and is nothing less than abject ignoring of the evidence.
posted by effugas at 9:18 AM on August 15, 2010
An entity that is able to detect the death of its peer, interpret that as a signal that one's own death may be coming, and emit a predicatable series of behaviors associated with panic and distress -- this is a conscious entity.
I'd submit to you that if it were predictable, it would only prove that they have instincts.
And you're, again, assuming that they are interpreting. Ants react to fellow ants dying as well. That doesn't mean they know anything.
posted by empath at 9:40 AM on August 15, 2010
I'd submit to you that if it were predictable, it would only prove that they have instincts.
And you're, again, assuming that they are interpreting. Ants react to fellow ants dying as well. That doesn't mean they know anything.
posted by empath at 9:40 AM on August 15, 2010
Where I think people are getting in trouble, is in accepting the view that "self-awareness" or "gaze tracking" or language are somehow big important things.
Eek, maybe I'm in the wrong conversation. "Self-awareness" was the whole point of talking about consciousness, I thought--some ability to reflect. When I think about conscious dogs or cats or brine shrimp, I'm wondering how much ability they have to reflect, to have some sort of map of themselves going on.
I was playing with my daughter this morning, with some cards that are supposed to be teaching words for numbers, shapes, emotions (strange mix) so you'd have something like, "3 laughing triangles." So I'm looking at the triangles and thinking, uh-oh, I see a flaw in my "it looks like emotion so it must be emotion" argument. Suddenly I'm thinking about my dog-eye analogy, and those caterpillars and butterflies that have eye-spots to scare predators. But what good does it do to appear to have consciousness and emotion, if you're not an animal liable to be adopted by conscious, emotion-laden humans? Or is that appearance really just some other trait playing itself out in a way I'm not recognizing? "Oh, it looks like puppy anguish, but in the wild, it would really be a way to remove flies from the forehead" or something.
posted by mittens at 9:46 AM on August 15, 2010
Eek, maybe I'm in the wrong conversation. "Self-awareness" was the whole point of talking about consciousness, I thought--some ability to reflect. When I think about conscious dogs or cats or brine shrimp, I'm wondering how much ability they have to reflect, to have some sort of map of themselves going on.
I was playing with my daughter this morning, with some cards that are supposed to be teaching words for numbers, shapes, emotions (strange mix) so you'd have something like, "3 laughing triangles." So I'm looking at the triangles and thinking, uh-oh, I see a flaw in my "it looks like emotion so it must be emotion" argument. Suddenly I'm thinking about my dog-eye analogy, and those caterpillars and butterflies that have eye-spots to scare predators. But what good does it do to appear to have consciousness and emotion, if you're not an animal liable to be adopted by conscious, emotion-laden humans? Or is that appearance really just some other trait playing itself out in a way I'm not recognizing? "Oh, it looks like puppy anguish, but in the wild, it would really be a way to remove flies from the forehead" or something.
posted by mittens at 9:46 AM on August 15, 2010
I'd submit to you that if it were predictable, it would only prove that they have instincts.
Sure, if you want to call all sorts of predictable human behaviors "instincts", you've got me. The point is that we can strongly predict animal and human behaviors given significant emotional stimulus. To whatever degree we have emotions, so do many of them. The agreement is high enough that it is actually difficult to conceive of tests that will differentiate man from dog purely on a description of an emotional reaction -- and the descrip can include physiological data!
But what good does it do to appear to have consciousness and emotion, if you're not an animal liable to be adopted by conscious, emotion-laden humans?
Growling is something of a universal language. And dogs come from wolves, which run in packs that must behave socially. Isn't it funny that young pups will play fight out to figure out the social order?
"Oh, it looks like puppy anguish, but in the wild, it would really be a way to remove flies from the forehead"
Nah. It's puppy anguish. Just let the evidence stand for itself.
posted by effugas at 9:56 AM on August 15, 2010
Sure, if you want to call all sorts of predictable human behaviors "instincts", you've got me. The point is that we can strongly predict animal and human behaviors given significant emotional stimulus. To whatever degree we have emotions, so do many of them. The agreement is high enough that it is actually difficult to conceive of tests that will differentiate man from dog purely on a description of an emotional reaction -- and the descrip can include physiological data!
But what good does it do to appear to have consciousness and emotion, if you're not an animal liable to be adopted by conscious, emotion-laden humans?
Growling is something of a universal language. And dogs come from wolves, which run in packs that must behave socially. Isn't it funny that young pups will play fight out to figure out the social order?
"Oh, it looks like puppy anguish, but in the wild, it would really be a way to remove flies from the forehead"
Nah. It's puppy anguish. Just let the evidence stand for itself.
posted by effugas at 9:56 AM on August 15, 2010
And you're, again, assuming that they are interpreting. Ants react to fellow ants dying as well. That doesn't mean they know anything.
Ants react to pheremones. Cows and pigs react to sights and sounds, just like we do, and freak the hell out, just like we do too.
And, in terms of knowing things, dogs remember abuse for years. Just how it is.
posted by effugas at 9:59 AM on August 15, 2010
Ants react to pheremones. Cows and pigs react to sights and sounds, just like we do, and freak the hell out, just like we do too.
And, in terms of knowing things, dogs remember abuse for years. Just how it is.
posted by effugas at 9:59 AM on August 15, 2010
You realize there is a difference between seeing and hearing and being aware of seeing and hearing, yes?
All animals can react to stimuli in their surroundings. That doesn't mean they are conscious of them. All animals react to stimuli in ways analogous to the ways that humans react to them. Almost all animals avoid injury. That doesn't mean they are aware of feeling pain.
It is possible that some animals do feel pain and feelings very similarly to the way humans do. But you can't know they do. And there's no amount of handwaving and assertion that you can make that will prove your case.
I'll believe an animal has consciousness when it tells me it does. It's the same test I have for AI.
posted by empath at 10:25 AM on August 15, 2010
All animals can react to stimuli in their surroundings. That doesn't mean they are conscious of them. All animals react to stimuli in ways analogous to the ways that humans react to them. Almost all animals avoid injury. That doesn't mean they are aware of feeling pain.
It is possible that some animals do feel pain and feelings very similarly to the way humans do. But you can't know they do. And there's no amount of handwaving and assertion that you can make that will prove your case.
I'll believe an animal has consciousness when it tells me it does. It's the same test I have for AI.
posted by empath at 10:25 AM on August 15, 2010
Hauser wake cont’d: Could the hivemind prevent fraud & misconduct?
posted by homunculus at 3:00 PM on August 15, 2010
posted by homunculus at 3:00 PM on August 15, 2010
empath--
Most humans on earth cannot tell you anything. You do not share a language with them. Would you dehumanize them for this inability?
I don't have to tell you, war is based on the ability to do just this.
There's this great quote: "Botox works the uncanny valley from the other direction." The harder you push that, well, we can't really know the state of an animal, the easier it is to dehumanize. Because all the signs of pleasure, all the signs of pain, all the signs of fear, all the signs of joy, the more of them you take off the table for dogs, the more you take off the table for men.
Look, there's a real challenge here: Come up with a test for emotional state, that does not depend on language, which separates man from dog. In other words, it must tell me which basic emotional state the man is, without also working on a dog.
I've spent some time trying to find such a test. I haven't been successful.
posted by effugas at 6:40 PM on August 15, 2010
Most humans on earth cannot tell you anything. You do not share a language with them. Would you dehumanize them for this inability?
I don't have to tell you, war is based on the ability to do just this.
There's this great quote: "Botox works the uncanny valley from the other direction." The harder you push that, well, we can't really know the state of an animal, the easier it is to dehumanize. Because all the signs of pleasure, all the signs of pain, all the signs of fear, all the signs of joy, the more of them you take off the table for dogs, the more you take off the table for men.
Look, there's a real challenge here: Come up with a test for emotional state, that does not depend on language, which separates man from dog. In other words, it must tell me which basic emotional state the man is, without also working on a dog.
I've spent some time trying to find such a test. I haven't been successful.
posted by effugas at 6:40 PM on August 15, 2010
(Best I can tell, Hauser's being accused of fabricating data regarding challenges that shouldn't even have existed in the first place. You're only conscious if you recognize yourself in a mirror? Really? Are the face blind thus unconscious? What pseudo-religious bunk is this?)
posted by effugas at 6:43 PM on August 15, 2010
posted by effugas at 6:43 PM on August 15, 2010
effugas, serious question-- Forget the animal question for a second -- what do you think people mean when they talk about consciousness? What's your definition of it?
posted by empath at 7:51 PM on August 15, 2010
posted by empath at 7:51 PM on August 15, 2010
empath--
When we say something is conscious, we aren't saying "it can talk" or "it has a complex sense of identity". We're saying:
It knows (assuming sensory input) what's happening around it.
It wants things.
It feels things.
I see us arguing about consciousness on the same plane, because the entire reality/simulacra debate comes down to:
"Are we seeing a conscious response to pain? Or just response to stimuli?"
That's not a deep debate on the importance of language or theory of self. That's a debate on whether the feeling is even occurring. And my point is that any metric that finds a dog unable to feel, will successfully find a human of a sufficiently distant culture to be not a conscious entity.
posted by effugas at 8:16 PM on August 15, 2010
When we say something is conscious, we aren't saying "it can talk" or "it has a complex sense of identity". We're saying:
It knows (assuming sensory input) what's happening around it.
It wants things.
It feels things.
I see us arguing about consciousness on the same plane, because the entire reality/simulacra debate comes down to:
"Are we seeing a conscious response to pain? Or just response to stimuli?"
That's not a deep debate on the importance of language or theory of self. That's a debate on whether the feeling is even occurring. And my point is that any metric that finds a dog unable to feel, will successfully find a human of a sufficiently distant culture to be not a conscious entity.
posted by effugas at 8:16 PM on August 15, 2010
I would find a human who was unable to communicate with me on any level to not be a conscious entity most likely.
But even deaf mutes and severely brain damaged people are able to communicate. Humans can communicate without language fairly well. Hell, even apes can communicate with language in a way that leads me to believe they have some amount of consciousness.
As far as your definition goes, you probably now also need to define knowing, because if 'knowing things' is your criteria, you've just kicked the can down the street a bit. Almost all animals know things, by some definitions of 'knowing'. Even insects and worms. Hell, even slime molds have memory.
posted by empath at 8:35 PM on August 15, 2010
But even deaf mutes and severely brain damaged people are able to communicate. Humans can communicate without language fairly well. Hell, even apes can communicate with language in a way that leads me to believe they have some amount of consciousness.
As far as your definition goes, you probably now also need to define knowing, because if 'knowing things' is your criteria, you've just kicked the can down the street a bit. Almost all animals know things, by some definitions of 'knowing'. Even insects and worms. Hell, even slime molds have memory.
posted by empath at 8:35 PM on August 15, 2010
And 'wanting' is a rather loaded term. All living things 'want' to reproduce, and act in ways that will reproduce the genes they carry. That doesn't mean that they are conscious of that want at all.
And 'feeling' is just a physical response to external stimulus, which again, all living things have. Even plants.
Do you believe that any animals are not conscious?
posted by empath at 8:38 PM on August 15, 2010
And 'feeling' is just a physical response to external stimulus, which again, all living things have. Even plants.
Do you believe that any animals are not conscious?
posted by empath at 8:38 PM on August 15, 2010
empath--
There are people who are "locked in" -- they've lost all muscle control, but they're otherwise completely normal mentally. I don't think there's any debate that they're still conscious -- that's part of the terror of it.
Animals communicate just fine. A bear growls at you or runs from you, you have a pretty good idea of what it has in mind.
Let me repeat the scenario I've brought up four or five times now:
You take two cows.
You kill one.
The surviving cow looks at the dead cow.
The surviving cow understands that it may be killed as well.
The surviving cow absolutely panics.
That's truly one heck of a calculation -- "This thing is like a cow like me. This thing was just killed. I may be next. I do not want to be dead. I may be about to die. Panic!"
Bringing up slime molds and insects and worms and such is reductionist -- it's an appeal to, how can something so alien be like us? And the answer is, well, what do you think we came from? It's like you want there to be some bright line, some magic thing that makes us utterly unique. Well, we've got a neocortex. Nothing else does, as far as I know. It gives us all sorts of nifty intellectual skills.
But nifty skills are not required for consciousness or emotion. The neocortex is not required to detect a threat to life, but detecting a threat to life is an extraordinarily complex action that ultimately is why consciousness probably exists in the first place. It is totally OK to debate whether animals have language skills, and frankly, I wouldn't be surprised in the slightest if they didn't.
But we absolutely do not have a monopoly on emotion, consciousness, or awareness. That stuff is _old code_.
posted by effugas at 9:45 PM on August 15, 2010 [2 favorites]
There are people who are "locked in" -- they've lost all muscle control, but they're otherwise completely normal mentally. I don't think there's any debate that they're still conscious -- that's part of the terror of it.
Animals communicate just fine. A bear growls at you or runs from you, you have a pretty good idea of what it has in mind.
Let me repeat the scenario I've brought up four or five times now:
You take two cows.
You kill one.
The surviving cow looks at the dead cow.
The surviving cow understands that it may be killed as well.
The surviving cow absolutely panics.
That's truly one heck of a calculation -- "This thing is like a cow like me. This thing was just killed. I may be next. I do not want to be dead. I may be about to die. Panic!"
Bringing up slime molds and insects and worms and such is reductionist -- it's an appeal to, how can something so alien be like us? And the answer is, well, what do you think we came from? It's like you want there to be some bright line, some magic thing that makes us utterly unique. Well, we've got a neocortex. Nothing else does, as far as I know. It gives us all sorts of nifty intellectual skills.
But nifty skills are not required for consciousness or emotion. The neocortex is not required to detect a threat to life, but detecting a threat to life is an extraordinarily complex action that ultimately is why consciousness probably exists in the first place. It is totally OK to debate whether animals have language skills, and frankly, I wouldn't be surprised in the slightest if they didn't.
But we absolutely do not have a monopoly on emotion, consciousness, or awareness. That stuff is _old code_.
posted by effugas at 9:45 PM on August 15, 2010 [2 favorites]
Specifically, wanting, feeling, and knowing can all reduce to things that don't mean much. You're not wrong. But when you can get very clear panic and grief responses out of higher animals, it's clear that their model of wanting, feeling, and knowing is not at all alien to our model.
posted by effugas at 9:57 PM on August 15, 2010
posted by effugas at 9:57 PM on August 15, 2010
You take two cows.
You kill one.
The surviving cow looks at the dead cow.
The surviving cow understands that it may be killed as well.
The surviving cow absolutely panics.
The problem is that word, "understands." You could imagine something more straightforward than understanding, an instinct that says, when you see or hear these cues--sound of pain, sight of animal attacked and falling--run or fight or sit still and get ready to survive injury. There wouldn't have to be any reflection, any sense of "I" being in danger, just a reproducible instinct to deal with the nearby danger.
Detecting a threat to life doesn't have to be extraordinarily complex...in fact, it might work better and more quickly the more simple it is, and the more often it errs on the side of yikes-run-away.
posted by mittens at 4:51 AM on August 16, 2010
You kill one.
The surviving cow looks at the dead cow.
The surviving cow understands that it may be killed as well.
The surviving cow absolutely panics.
The problem is that word, "understands." You could imagine something more straightforward than understanding, an instinct that says, when you see or hear these cues--sound of pain, sight of animal attacked and falling--run or fight or sit still and get ready to survive injury. There wouldn't have to be any reflection, any sense of "I" being in danger, just a reproducible instinct to deal with the nearby danger.
Detecting a threat to life doesn't have to be extraordinarily complex...in fact, it might work better and more quickly the more simple it is, and the more often it errs on the side of yikes-run-away.
posted by mittens at 4:51 AM on August 16, 2010
mittens--
Anything is possible, the point is that when precisely the same inputs lead to precisely the same outputs, down to electroencephalographic and chemical signals, the overwhelming biological evidence suggests the same system is at play.
I know we're not supposed to be arguing about why we're arguing this, but lets say we were discussing the composition of stars, and the exact same spectral readings were being found at visible, radio, and microwave frequencies for two stars. It would not at all be a stretch to say the two stars were composed of the same substances, despite the possibility of a coincidental spectral match.
Like, it'd be so much not a stretch, that it'd be weird if there was even an argument.
posted by effugas at 4:58 AM on August 16, 2010
Anything is possible, the point is that when precisely the same inputs lead to precisely the same outputs, down to electroencephalographic and chemical signals, the overwhelming biological evidence suggests the same system is at play.
I know we're not supposed to be arguing about why we're arguing this, but lets say we were discussing the composition of stars, and the exact same spectral readings were being found at visible, radio, and microwave frequencies for two stars. It would not at all be a stretch to say the two stars were composed of the same substances, despite the possibility of a coincidental spectral match.
Like, it'd be so much not a stretch, that it'd be weird if there was even an argument.
posted by effugas at 4:58 AM on August 16, 2010
the overwhelming biological evidence suggests the same system is at play.
That sounds reasonable to me--that cow-panic is going to be physiologically similar to people-panic. But so much of that people-panic is at a bodily level, too--the release of adrenaline, the restriction of bloodflow to the extremities--that the self-aware part doesn't look like the most important part, from a let's-survive-this-stress point of view. So 99% of the reaction is similar, but that one little bit ("Oh god, this is so frightening") could be different, because it's not really necessary for survival.
(Wait, was that totally incoherent?)
posted by mittens at 5:07 AM on August 16, 2010
That sounds reasonable to me--that cow-panic is going to be physiologically similar to people-panic. But so much of that people-panic is at a bodily level, too--the release of adrenaline, the restriction of bloodflow to the extremities--that the self-aware part doesn't look like the most important part, from a let's-survive-this-stress point of view. So 99% of the reaction is similar, but that one little bit ("Oh god, this is so frightening") could be different, because it's not really necessary for survival.
(Wait, was that totally incoherent?)
posted by mittens at 5:07 AM on August 16, 2010
No, that's what I'm talking about. That you can have physiological responses without awareness of those physiological responses.
posted by empath at 6:15 AM on August 16, 2010
posted by empath at 6:15 AM on August 16, 2010
There are people who are "locked in" -- they've lost all muscle control, but they're otherwise completely normal mentally.
There are also people who continue to have physiological responses even though they are entirely unconscious.
posted by empath at 9:38 AM on August 16, 2010
There are also people who continue to have physiological responses even though they are entirely unconscious.
posted by empath at 9:38 AM on August 16, 2010
So 99% of the reaction is similar, but that one little bit ("Oh god, this is so frightening") could be different, because it's not really necessary for survival.
There's going to be a little bit that differs, no question. The point is, what makes this little bit so magical or special that it becomes the standard bearer for consciousness or awareness? It really feels like we're looking for the aspect of human nature that animals don't have, as the defining aspect of consciousness or awareness.
No, that's what I'm talking about. That you can have physiological responses without awareness of those physiological responses.
Do you think awareness is some sort of metaphysical thing, that cannot be measured by any scientific tools?
There are also people who continue to have physiological responses even though they are entirely unconscious.
Yes, and thus we have specific tests that anesthesiologists use to measure awareness and consciousness.
These tests do not work exclusively on humans.
posted by effugas at 12:49 PM on August 16, 2010
There's going to be a little bit that differs, no question. The point is, what makes this little bit so magical or special that it becomes the standard bearer for consciousness or awareness? It really feels like we're looking for the aspect of human nature that animals don't have, as the defining aspect of consciousness or awareness.
No, that's what I'm talking about. That you can have physiological responses without awareness of those physiological responses.
Do you think awareness is some sort of metaphysical thing, that cannot be measured by any scientific tools?
There are also people who continue to have physiological responses even though they are entirely unconscious.
Yes, and thus we have specific tests that anesthesiologists use to measure awareness and consciousness.
These tests do not work exclusively on humans.
posted by effugas at 12:49 PM on August 16, 2010
Some interesting data on measuring consciousness and awareness:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anesthesia_awareness
posted by effugas at 12:58 PM on August 16, 2010
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anesthesia_awareness
Recent advances have led to the manufacture of monitors of awareness. Typically these monitor the EEG, which represents the electrical activity of the cerebral cortex, which is active when awake but quiescent when anesthetized (or in natural sleep). The monitors usually process the EEG signal down to a single number, where 100 corresponds to a patient who is fully alert, and zero corresponds to electrical silence. General anesthesia is usually signified by a number between 60 and 40 (this varies with the specific system used). There are several monitors now commercially available. These newer technologies include the bispectral index (BIS),[14] EEG entropy monitoring, auditory evoked potentials, and several other systems such as the SNAP monitor and the Narcotrend monitor.Far from this being a metaphysical subject, the issue is front and center for anesthesiologists. Interestingly, the demand for commercial tools to detect consciousness are explicitly designed for environments where the subject is "locked in", can't talk, can't communicate, but boy are they aware.
posted by effugas at 12:58 PM on August 16, 2010
The difference between being awake and comatose really isn't the same as having the capacity for consciousness or not, though, right? I mean, they're two different ways of using the word "conscious." Sort of the way there's a difference between saying "You have anemia and your hemoglobin's only 10," and, "You're of a species that doesn't even use hemoglobin."
The point is, what makes this little bit so magical or special that it becomes the standard bearer for consciousness or awareness? It really feels like we're looking for the aspect of human nature that animals don't have, as the defining aspect of consciousness or awareness.
I may have written that badly--it was precisely self-awareness being that little bit, that I meant.
posted by mittens at 3:06 PM on August 16, 2010
The point is, what makes this little bit so magical or special that it becomes the standard bearer for consciousness or awareness? It really feels like we're looking for the aspect of human nature that animals don't have, as the defining aspect of consciousness or awareness.
I may have written that badly--it was precisely self-awareness being that little bit, that I meant.
posted by mittens at 3:06 PM on August 16, 2010
The difference between being awake and comatose really isn't the same as having the capacity for consciousness or not, though, right? I mean, they're two different ways of using the word "conscious." Sort of the way there's a difference between saying "You have anemia and your hemoglobin's only 10," and, "You're of a species that doesn't even use hemoglobin."
The point is that the brain is not some black box which creates an undefinable state of being that cannot be probed, analyzed, or even detected. We are, as the old science fiction tale goes, made of meat.
Sure, it's possible that the neural signals for consciousness in dogs are a perfect simulacra for the neural signals for consciousness in humans. But how many simulacra are we proposing must exist here?
I may have written that badly--it was precisely self-awareness being that little bit, that I meant.
My point is that this is a convenient, and intentionally chosen metric. Animal language skills are uncontroversially weak to nonexistent, while the gold standard for self-awareness is the ability to use the words "I" and "me".
Consider how lame the whole concept of "recognizing oneself in a mirror" really is. How many mirrors exist in nature?
posted by effugas at 8:23 PM on August 16, 2010
The point is that the brain is not some black box which creates an undefinable state of being that cannot be probed, analyzed, or even detected. We are, as the old science fiction tale goes, made of meat.
Sure, it's possible that the neural signals for consciousness in dogs are a perfect simulacra for the neural signals for consciousness in humans. But how many simulacra are we proposing must exist here?
I may have written that badly--it was precisely self-awareness being that little bit, that I meant.
My point is that this is a convenient, and intentionally chosen metric. Animal language skills are uncontroversially weak to nonexistent, while the gold standard for self-awareness is the ability to use the words "I" and "me".
Consider how lame the whole concept of "recognizing oneself in a mirror" really is. How many mirrors exist in nature?
posted by effugas at 8:23 PM on August 16, 2010
Sure, it's possible that the neural signals for consciousness in dogs are a perfect simulacra for the neural signals for consciousness in humans. But how many simulacra are we proposing must exist here?
That's not what simulacra means. Pain is not cognition. Neither is fear. It's a physiological response. The part of the brain that includes thoughts of 'me' and 'i' is not the same part of the brain that produces fear. A body can have a fear response without having an experience of the fear response. Do you not understand this?
Consider how lame the whole concept of "recognizing oneself in a mirror" really is. How many mirrors exist in nature?
If a creature can only respond meaningfully to things which exist in nature, then I'd suggest that's a sign that they are not conscious, leaving aside self-conciousness sside.
That aside, if they can't respond to a mirror, then they probably have no sense of self.
You seem to think that consciousness exists as a continuum, with slime molds exhibiting minimum consciousness and human beings exhibiting maximum. In nature there is something known as a phase-shift. Water doesn't gradually change from water to ice as it gets colder. It's ice, and then it's water. Consciousness may be the same thing. It may be that the brain needs to be a certain size and complexity before consciousness exists at all.
Not to turn this into an abortion debate, but do you believe fetuses are conscious? At what point do you think a fetus gains consciousness? Do you think it's something we could test for?
posted by empath at 8:37 PM on August 16, 2010
That's not what simulacra means. Pain is not cognition. Neither is fear. It's a physiological response. The part of the brain that includes thoughts of 'me' and 'i' is not the same part of the brain that produces fear. A body can have a fear response without having an experience of the fear response. Do you not understand this?
Consider how lame the whole concept of "recognizing oneself in a mirror" really is. How many mirrors exist in nature?
If a creature can only respond meaningfully to things which exist in nature, then I'd suggest that's a sign that they are not conscious, leaving aside self-conciousness sside.
That aside, if they can't respond to a mirror, then they probably have no sense of self.
You seem to think that consciousness exists as a continuum, with slime molds exhibiting minimum consciousness and human beings exhibiting maximum. In nature there is something known as a phase-shift. Water doesn't gradually change from water to ice as it gets colder. It's ice, and then it's water. Consciousness may be the same thing. It may be that the brain needs to be a certain size and complexity before consciousness exists at all.
Not to turn this into an abortion debate, but do you believe fetuses are conscious? At what point do you think a fetus gains consciousness? Do you think it's something we could test for?
posted by empath at 8:37 PM on August 16, 2010
A body can have a fear response without having an experience of the fear response. Do you not understand this?
I'm asking you how you could test for this. I'm just going to keep challenging you to design a test that detects an emotional state in a human, that does not detect that same state in a dog.
If it can't be tested for, I suggest that you are not making a distinction that has anything to do with science. And if it can only be tested for via language, I suggest that you are testing for linguistic capability, not for consciousness or awareness.
If a creature can only respond meaningfully to things which exist in nature, then I'd suggest that's a sign that they are not conscious, leaving aside self-conciousness sside.
The first time a cat sees a mirror, he freaks out.
The tenth time, he doesn't. But he'll still freak out if another cat shows up. So I suspect the entire mirror thing is hokum anyway.
You seem to think that consciousness exists as a continuum, with slime molds exhibiting minimum consciousness and human beings exhibiting maximum.
Certainly consciousness exists as a continuum in humans -- we can be more or less aware, and such awareness can show up on a measurement device.
I am willing to cede phase shift properties. I am not willing to cede that the phase shift happened between Homo Erectus and Homo Sapien, and happened only once. That's silly. The phylogenetic history of all the neurological parts that actually compose consciousness -- you know, the things that anesthesia actually impacts -- does not suggest development that late in the evolutionary timeline.
Not to turn this into an abortion debate
We are not going there.
posted by effugas at 8:56 PM on August 16, 2010
I'm asking you how you could test for this. I'm just going to keep challenging you to design a test that detects an emotional state in a human, that does not detect that same state in a dog.
If it can't be tested for, I suggest that you are not making a distinction that has anything to do with science. And if it can only be tested for via language, I suggest that you are testing for linguistic capability, not for consciousness or awareness.
If a creature can only respond meaningfully to things which exist in nature, then I'd suggest that's a sign that they are not conscious, leaving aside self-conciousness sside.
The first time a cat sees a mirror, he freaks out.
The tenth time, he doesn't. But he'll still freak out if another cat shows up. So I suspect the entire mirror thing is hokum anyway.
You seem to think that consciousness exists as a continuum, with slime molds exhibiting minimum consciousness and human beings exhibiting maximum.
Certainly consciousness exists as a continuum in humans -- we can be more or less aware, and such awareness can show up on a measurement device.
I am willing to cede phase shift properties. I am not willing to cede that the phase shift happened between Homo Erectus and Homo Sapien, and happened only once. That's silly. The phylogenetic history of all the neurological parts that actually compose consciousness -- you know, the things that anesthesia actually impacts -- does not suggest development that late in the evolutionary timeline.
Not to turn this into an abortion debate
We are not going there.
posted by effugas at 8:56 PM on August 16, 2010
I'm just going to keep challenging you to design a test that detects an emotional state in a human, that does not detect that same state in a dog.
Testing for an emotional state in a human has nothing to do with testing for consciousness. Emotions are not the same as consciousness.
posted by empath at 9:02 PM on August 16, 2010
Testing for an emotional state in a human has nothing to do with testing for consciousness. Emotions are not the same as consciousness.
posted by empath at 9:02 PM on August 16, 2010
empath--
OK. I'll clarify then.
Please describe a test that could differentiate "actual" conscious fear from "the mere physiological expressions associated with conscious fear", that works on humans but fails on dogs -- that does not depend on language.
I'm truly not convinced there is one, even as a thought experiment.
posted by effugas at 11:27 PM on August 16, 2010
OK. I'll clarify then.
Please describe a test that could differentiate "actual" conscious fear from "the mere physiological expressions associated with conscious fear", that works on humans but fails on dogs -- that does not depend on language.
I'm truly not convinced there is one, even as a thought experiment.
posted by effugas at 11:27 PM on August 16, 2010
I don't know how many times I have to say this, but emotional responses are entirely separate from the question of consciousness.
posted by empath at 12:28 AM on August 17, 2010
posted by empath at 12:28 AM on August 17, 2010
empath--
If you are unable to describe a testable hypothesis, you are not in fact discussing science. You are perhaps discussing metaphysics, philosophies, ethics, mores, normativities, preferences, faiths, beliefs, desires, or divine will -- but you are not describing science.
Consciousness cannot just be, "Something humans have that animals do not." Consciousness is unquestionably larger than language, because we have machines that detect it even in those without language (at the time they're being tested).
What is it, precisely, that you are claiming humans have that animals don't? By what basis do you claim this thing, whatever it may be, as a prerequisite for consciousness?
Can consciousness encompass more than emotions? No question. Language creates a scale of understanding that allows the world to be perceived on a fundamentally larger scale. But is somebody unconscious if they've never been told that plants grow from seeds? No, they're ignorant. Neither knowledge nor language is required for consciousness.
And anyway, my point throughout this entire thread is that animals pretty clearly have emotions. We can be wishy washy all day about the meaning of consciousness, but either fear is a genuinely felt thing, or the entire suite of physiological reactions is merely stimulus response. If it's merely stimulus response, how do I know that if a human is tortured, that too is not stimulus response?
posted by effugas at 1:59 AM on August 17, 2010
If you are unable to describe a testable hypothesis, you are not in fact discussing science. You are perhaps discussing metaphysics, philosophies, ethics, mores, normativities, preferences, faiths, beliefs, desires, or divine will -- but you are not describing science.
Consciousness cannot just be, "Something humans have that animals do not." Consciousness is unquestionably larger than language, because we have machines that detect it even in those without language (at the time they're being tested).
What is it, precisely, that you are claiming humans have that animals don't? By what basis do you claim this thing, whatever it may be, as a prerequisite for consciousness?
Can consciousness encompass more than emotions? No question. Language creates a scale of understanding that allows the world to be perceived on a fundamentally larger scale. But is somebody unconscious if they've never been told that plants grow from seeds? No, they're ignorant. Neither knowledge nor language is required for consciousness.
And anyway, my point throughout this entire thread is that animals pretty clearly have emotions. We can be wishy washy all day about the meaning of consciousness, but either fear is a genuinely felt thing, or the entire suite of physiological reactions is merely stimulus response. If it's merely stimulus response, how do I know that if a human is tortured, that too is not stimulus response?
posted by effugas at 1:59 AM on August 17, 2010
it is a stimulus response. Being conscious of the stimulus response is not.
posted by empath at 4:43 AM on August 17, 2010
posted by empath at 4:43 AM on August 17, 2010
Not to turn this into an abortion debate, but do you believe fetuses are conscious? At what point do you think a fetus gains consciousness? Do you think it's something we could test for?
I think the fetus--well, the infant, at least--is a persuasive example of why you can talk about a continuum of consciousness. Watching babies develop, there's no line they cross where suddenly you say, "Hey, you have a sense of self!" It's a slow process going from needy little inward-focused creature, to a baby that deals with the outside world with exploration, then to a baby who is able to tell you a little something about her inner state. It would be hard to find a phase-shift there; would it just be waiting around for months before the baby could say "I", then deciding the consciousness switch had been flipped?
The part of the brain that includes thoughts of 'me' and 'i' is not the same part of the brain that produces fear.
There isn't a single part of the brain that is the seat of consciousness, though. It appears to be a whole-brain thing. Although I like that we keep coming back to fear--the amygdala is my favorite little chunk of brain, and one of the things it does, aside from processing memories and getting all jumpy when we're scared, is giving us a sense of personal space, a boundary between self and other people, which seems like a pretty strong requisite for consciousness, there being no "I" if there is no "you."
Please describe a test that could differentiate "actual" conscious fear from "the mere physiological expressions associated with conscious fear", that works on humans but fails on dogs -- that does not depend on language.
It would probably be more interesting to look at them after the fear was over, because if you come after your human test subject with the aforementioned ballpeen hammer, their reaction is going to be pretty instinctual. But that's why I brought up grooming way up there in the thread--I may have been projecting, for all I know, but it seems like an animal seeking the comfort of grooming after anxiety, is doing something extremely different than what he did when he was afraid. And it could be, I guess, just a behavior with no awareness--sit down, groom, let the endorphins flow thanks to whatever you've stimulated by grooming, reset for the next threat--but the desire for calm just strikes me as different than the desire for, say, supper, and seems to require a deeper level of monitoring than "belly full, stop eating."
posted by mittens at 4:58 AM on August 17, 2010
I think the fetus--well, the infant, at least--is a persuasive example of why you can talk about a continuum of consciousness. Watching babies develop, there's no line they cross where suddenly you say, "Hey, you have a sense of self!" It's a slow process going from needy little inward-focused creature, to a baby that deals with the outside world with exploration, then to a baby who is able to tell you a little something about her inner state. It would be hard to find a phase-shift there; would it just be waiting around for months before the baby could say "I", then deciding the consciousness switch had been flipped?
The part of the brain that includes thoughts of 'me' and 'i' is not the same part of the brain that produces fear.
There isn't a single part of the brain that is the seat of consciousness, though. It appears to be a whole-brain thing. Although I like that we keep coming back to fear--the amygdala is my favorite little chunk of brain, and one of the things it does, aside from processing memories and getting all jumpy when we're scared, is giving us a sense of personal space, a boundary between self and other people, which seems like a pretty strong requisite for consciousness, there being no "I" if there is no "you."
Please describe a test that could differentiate "actual" conscious fear from "the mere physiological expressions associated with conscious fear", that works on humans but fails on dogs -- that does not depend on language.
It would probably be more interesting to look at them after the fear was over, because if you come after your human test subject with the aforementioned ballpeen hammer, their reaction is going to be pretty instinctual. But that's why I brought up grooming way up there in the thread--I may have been projecting, for all I know, but it seems like an animal seeking the comfort of grooming after anxiety, is doing something extremely different than what he did when he was afraid. And it could be, I guess, just a behavior with no awareness--sit down, groom, let the endorphins flow thanks to whatever you've stimulated by grooming, reset for the next threat--but the desire for calm just strikes me as different than the desire for, say, supper, and seems to require a deeper level of monitoring than "belly full, stop eating."
posted by mittens at 4:58 AM on August 17, 2010
the desire for calm just strikes me as different than the desire for, say, supper
Maybe I should mention there that the biggest difference is, the calmness is going to happen anyway, the anxiety is going to die down, so there isn't really a need to accelerate the process by grooming.
posted by mittens at 5:02 AM on August 17, 2010
Maybe I should mention there that the biggest difference is, the calmness is going to happen anyway, the anxiety is going to die down, so there isn't really a need to accelerate the process by grooming.
posted by mittens at 5:02 AM on August 17, 2010
I think the fetus--well, the infant, at least--is a persuasive example of why you can talk about a continuum of consciousness.
An excellent argument -- though, what you describe as a "needy little inward-focused creature" -- I've met plenty of adults that meet this description, and I wouldn't exactly call them unconscious (unless you mean, not conscious of the needs of others).
the amygdala is my favorite little chunk of brain, and one of the things it does, aside from processing memories and getting all jumpy when we're scared, is giving us a sense of personal space, a boundary between self and other people, which seems like a pretty strong requisite for consciousness, there being no "I" if there is no "you."
Yes. And the amygdala is most assuredly not neuroanatomically unique to Homo Sapien.
It would probably be more interesting to look at them after the fear was over, because if you come after your human test subject with the aforementioned ballpeen hammer, their reaction is going to be pretty instinctual. But that's why I brought up grooming way up there in the thread--I may have been projecting, for all I know, but it seems like an animal seeking the comfort of grooming after anxiety, is doing something extremely different than what he did when he was afraid.
You're right to speak to the post-fear response. The thing is, though, that animals don't just groom after stress. Given sufficient stress, they'll actually enter a post-traumatic persistent state. Abused dogs and cats are well known to be a little off, and often, more than a little. Certain triggers will just send them into immediate fight or flight.
Not even PTSD is a reliable differentiator between man and dog.
posted by effugas at 5:52 AM on August 17, 2010
An excellent argument -- though, what you describe as a "needy little inward-focused creature" -- I've met plenty of adults that meet this description, and I wouldn't exactly call them unconscious (unless you mean, not conscious of the needs of others).
the amygdala is my favorite little chunk of brain, and one of the things it does, aside from processing memories and getting all jumpy when we're scared, is giving us a sense of personal space, a boundary between self and other people, which seems like a pretty strong requisite for consciousness, there being no "I" if there is no "you."
Yes. And the amygdala is most assuredly not neuroanatomically unique to Homo Sapien.
It would probably be more interesting to look at them after the fear was over, because if you come after your human test subject with the aforementioned ballpeen hammer, their reaction is going to be pretty instinctual. But that's why I brought up grooming way up there in the thread--I may have been projecting, for all I know, but it seems like an animal seeking the comfort of grooming after anxiety, is doing something extremely different than what he did when he was afraid.
You're right to speak to the post-fear response. The thing is, though, that animals don't just groom after stress. Given sufficient stress, they'll actually enter a post-traumatic persistent state. Abused dogs and cats are well known to be a little off, and often, more than a little. Certain triggers will just send them into immediate fight or flight.
Not even PTSD is a reliable differentiator between man and dog.
posted by effugas at 5:52 AM on August 17, 2010
Maybe I should mention there that the biggest difference is, the calmness is going to happen anyway, the anxiety is going to die down, so there isn't really a need to accelerate the process by grooming.
Grooming, being something you wouldn't have time for unless you were safe, might have evolved some links to the neurological systems for ramping down fight or flight.
In other words, the animal equivalent of "smile, and you'll feel better".
posted by effugas at 4:30 AM on August 18, 2010
Grooming, being something you wouldn't have time for unless you were safe, might have evolved some links to the neurological systems for ramping down fight or flight.
In other words, the animal equivalent of "smile, and you'll feel better".
posted by effugas at 4:30 AM on August 18, 2010
Sure, it's possible that it's all an incredible simulation of human behavior. But the burden of proof to say it's just our pesky anthropomorphism at play is on you.
Really?!? Suppose you eat macaroni and cheese whenever you are sad because it makes you happy and reminds you of your happy childhood. You see me eating macaroni and cheese, and assume I must therefore be trying to cheer myself up. There are any number of reasons I might be eating macaroni and cheese -- I've been instructed by my doctor that I need to gain weight or perhaps I started eating it only a year ago and can't get enough of it. Maybe I hate macaroni and cheese but I am eating it because it belongs to my roommate and I am exacting revenge.
The point is, it can be difficult to intuit the emotive reasoning behind behavior in humans. It's relatively easy to gauge logical reasoning, however. Give humans a task or present them with information and their responses will reveal that human beings think about things in a certain way.
These same tests of logic -- not emotion -- have shown pretty convincingly that animals do not think the way we thought they did merely by judging their behavior. The example I stated above involving chimps is an example. Basically, if a chimp is looking at you and you turn your head, it turns its head in the direction you are looking at. The assumption anyone might make from that is that chimps understand that you are looking at something. However, this assumption is wrong. Chimps have no idea that you are looking at anything. Tests of chimpanzees showed they were equally likely to request food from a handler who was not looking at them (or could not see them, or had their back turned to the chimp, or was wearing a mask or a blindfold) as they were to request food from a handler looking directly at them. What did these (exhaustive -- again, read the first few chapters of Folk Physics for Apes for more details) experiments show? That chimpanzees look at where you're looking at because they are interested in the focus of your gaze, not because they have any internal concept of the idea of seeing. Their behavior is far, far from an action associated with cognition or social behavior; it's an instinctual reaction (maybe the other chimp is looking at a predator, maybe they are looking at food).
It's so tempting to want to credit intelligence to behavior that seems intelligent. In fact the researchers of the book stated that they were really dismayed by the results they had found: they wanted their animals to have the intelligence they saw in them. But they simply don't.
posted by Deathalicious at 1:42 PM on August 18, 2010
Really?!? Suppose you eat macaroni and cheese whenever you are sad because it makes you happy and reminds you of your happy childhood. You see me eating macaroni and cheese, and assume I must therefore be trying to cheer myself up. There are any number of reasons I might be eating macaroni and cheese -- I've been instructed by my doctor that I need to gain weight or perhaps I started eating it only a year ago and can't get enough of it. Maybe I hate macaroni and cheese but I am eating it because it belongs to my roommate and I am exacting revenge.
The point is, it can be difficult to intuit the emotive reasoning behind behavior in humans. It's relatively easy to gauge logical reasoning, however. Give humans a task or present them with information and their responses will reveal that human beings think about things in a certain way.
These same tests of logic -- not emotion -- have shown pretty convincingly that animals do not think the way we thought they did merely by judging their behavior. The example I stated above involving chimps is an example. Basically, if a chimp is looking at you and you turn your head, it turns its head in the direction you are looking at. The assumption anyone might make from that is that chimps understand that you are looking at something. However, this assumption is wrong. Chimps have no idea that you are looking at anything. Tests of chimpanzees showed they were equally likely to request food from a handler who was not looking at them (or could not see them, or had their back turned to the chimp, or was wearing a mask or a blindfold) as they were to request food from a handler looking directly at them. What did these (exhaustive -- again, read the first few chapters of Folk Physics for Apes for more details) experiments show? That chimpanzees look at where you're looking at because they are interested in the focus of your gaze, not because they have any internal concept of the idea of seeing. Their behavior is far, far from an action associated with cognition or social behavior; it's an instinctual reaction (maybe the other chimp is looking at a predator, maybe they are looking at food).
It's so tempting to want to credit intelligence to behavior that seems intelligent. In fact the researchers of the book stated that they were really dismayed by the results they had found: they wanted their animals to have the intelligence they saw in them. But they simply don't.
posted by Deathalicious at 1:42 PM on August 18, 2010
Deathalicious,
You're falling for the false pretense that "comprehending the perspective of others" is a necessary prerequisite for consciousness, awareness, or emotion. Being able to imagine a scene from another's perspective is a parlor trick, a neat ability that a creature may or may not be able to execute.
But there is a huge space between "can imagine what I can see" and "is simply responding by rote instinct". If you can understand your environment, predict what is going to occur in it, desire changes in it, and work to effect those changes, you are conscious, you are aware, and you have emotion.
An animal can be comfortable. An animal can be afraid. An animal can plan, can recognize a coming negative fate, can panic, can try to calm itself down, can suffer long term damage from stress. These are all true, testable predictions that don't make sense outside a framework of consciousness, awareness, and emotion.
Logic is a parlor trick too, you know. I'm sure you're aware of the split brain findings? Take a lobotomized person, and tell them in their right ear to do something. They will. Now ask them in the left ear why. They will make up all sorts of logical reasons...none of which that they were told to do so in their right ear.
That all being said, I'd love to know just how careful Folk Physics for Apes was. Did they try an experiment where they'd get away with stealing food, but only if the human was looking away when they did it? Certainly they didn't try being a predator, who could only be evaded when it was distracted.
I say this because chimps are very much tribal animals, and it's hard to imagine a creature lacking a sense of foreign identity when certain individuals have more power than others.
posted by effugas at 4:26 PM on August 18, 2010
You're falling for the false pretense that "comprehending the perspective of others" is a necessary prerequisite for consciousness, awareness, or emotion. Being able to imagine a scene from another's perspective is a parlor trick, a neat ability that a creature may or may not be able to execute.
But there is a huge space between "can imagine what I can see" and "is simply responding by rote instinct". If you can understand your environment, predict what is going to occur in it, desire changes in it, and work to effect those changes, you are conscious, you are aware, and you have emotion.
An animal can be comfortable. An animal can be afraid. An animal can plan, can recognize a coming negative fate, can panic, can try to calm itself down, can suffer long term damage from stress. These are all true, testable predictions that don't make sense outside a framework of consciousness, awareness, and emotion.
Logic is a parlor trick too, you know. I'm sure you're aware of the split brain findings? Take a lobotomized person, and tell them in their right ear to do something. They will. Now ask them in the left ear why. They will make up all sorts of logical reasons...none of which that they were told to do so in their right ear.
That all being said, I'd love to know just how careful Folk Physics for Apes was. Did they try an experiment where they'd get away with stealing food, but only if the human was looking away when they did it? Certainly they didn't try being a predator, who could only be evaded when it was distracted.
I say this because chimps are very much tribal animals, and it's hard to imagine a creature lacking a sense of foreign identity when certain individuals have more power than others.
posted by effugas at 4:26 PM on August 18, 2010
effugas, I'm not debating on whether or not an animal is conscious. Obviously they're conscious in the "conscious as in not blacked out" sense. Conscious in the "I think therefore I am" sense? Probably not, but that's not my point.
My point is that you cannot look at an animal engaging in behavior that a human engages in and assume it is performing that behavior for the same reasons as a human might. In other words, when we see animals behaving the way a human might it is indeed "an incredible simulation of human behavior".
That all being said, I'd love to know just how careful Folk Physics for Apes was. Did they try an experiment where they'd get away with stealing food, but only if the human was looking away when they did it? Certainly they didn't try being a predator, who could only be evaded when it was distracted.
Exhaustively careful. Again, I encourage you to read the book. They did not have an ax to grind; they were not starting out with the goal of proving chimps to be unintelligent. Prior to their research they believed quite strongly that the chimps had a form of awareness and intelligence quite different from what they eventually discovered.
I think it's safe to say that if a chimp stands directly in front of someone who very plainly can not see them, and makes a silent gesture that only makes sense if that person can see them, and is highly motivated to make that gesture in order to be rewarded with fruit, and there is actually another person there who could potentially see them but the chimp makes an honest-to-goodness random choice of which person to gesture in front of, then that chimp does not understand the concept of seeing.
I say this because chimps are very much tribal animals, and it's hard to imagine a creature lacking a sense of foreign identity when certain individuals have more power than others.
This is another example of the same faulty inference:
Therefore, the burden of proof is not on those who say it is "our pesky anthropomorphism at play". It is on those who would ascribe human reasoning, emotions, or logic to the behavior of non-human animals.
qed
posted by Deathalicious at 12:01 PM on August 19, 2010
My point is that you cannot look at an animal engaging in behavior that a human engages in and assume it is performing that behavior for the same reasons as a human might. In other words, when we see animals behaving the way a human might it is indeed "an incredible simulation of human behavior".
That all being said, I'd love to know just how careful Folk Physics for Apes was. Did they try an experiment where they'd get away with stealing food, but only if the human was looking away when they did it? Certainly they didn't try being a predator, who could only be evaded when it was distracted.
Exhaustively careful. Again, I encourage you to read the book. They did not have an ax to grind; they were not starting out with the goal of proving chimps to be unintelligent. Prior to their research they believed quite strongly that the chimps had a form of awareness and intelligence quite different from what they eventually discovered.
I think it's safe to say that if a chimp stands directly in front of someone who very plainly can not see them, and makes a silent gesture that only makes sense if that person can see them, and is highly motivated to make that gesture in order to be rewarded with fruit, and there is actually another person there who could potentially see them but the chimp makes an honest-to-goodness random choice of which person to gesture in front of, then that chimp does not understand the concept of seeing.
I say this because chimps are very much tribal animals, and it's hard to imagine a creature lacking a sense of foreign identity when certain individuals have more power than others.
This is another example of the same faulty inference:
- A human social organization requires the understanding of an "other" in order to understand hierarchy. This may not be so for chimps.
- You assume that being able to know that someone else "sees" speaks to this understanding of the "other". They may be entirely unrelated phenomena. It may be that chimps do have an understanding of other chimps but don't understand that they also see. I believe some of this is elaborated in the Physics book, but it's been two years since I last read it.
Therefore, the burden of proof is not on those who say it is "our pesky anthropomorphism at play". It is on those who would ascribe human reasoning, emotions, or logic to the behavior of non-human animals.
qed
posted by Deathalicious at 12:01 PM on August 19, 2010
...then that chimp does not understand the concept of seeing.
So, that chimp does not understand the concept of seeing. Chimps also do not understand the concept of football. What does that have to do with consciousness?
You're making a very interesting argument, actually. You're basically saying:
1) Humans can misinterpret animal activity as being highly logical, when it isn't
2) Therefore, we can't trust any of our observations regarding the mental state of animals
That's quite the leap, there, given that the set of observations, and the set of mental states that can be observed, is quite enormous. One silly parlor trick, arbitrarily chosen to define "intelligence", and no observations about any mental states are valid?
Let me repeat:
An animal can be comfortable. An animal can be afraid. An animal can plan, can recognize a coming negative fate, can panic, can try to calm itself down, can suffer long term damage from stress. These are all true, testable predictions that don't make sense outside a framework of consciousness, awareness, and emotion.
There is an absolutely absurd amount of data that suggests this is true, from behavioral to anatomical to genetic to chemical to electrical. I issued the challenge earlier: Describe a non-language test that yields the emotional state of a man, but not a dog.
Do you have a concept of such a test?
posted by effugas at 2:53 PM on August 19, 2010
So, that chimp does not understand the concept of seeing. Chimps also do not understand the concept of football. What does that have to do with consciousness?
You're making a very interesting argument, actually. You're basically saying:
1) Humans can misinterpret animal activity as being highly logical, when it isn't
2) Therefore, we can't trust any of our observations regarding the mental state of animals
That's quite the leap, there, given that the set of observations, and the set of mental states that can be observed, is quite enormous. One silly parlor trick, arbitrarily chosen to define "intelligence", and no observations about any mental states are valid?
Let me repeat:
An animal can be comfortable. An animal can be afraid. An animal can plan, can recognize a coming negative fate, can panic, can try to calm itself down, can suffer long term damage from stress. These are all true, testable predictions that don't make sense outside a framework of consciousness, awareness, and emotion.
There is an absolutely absurd amount of data that suggests this is true, from behavioral to anatomical to genetic to chemical to electrical. I issued the challenge earlier: Describe a non-language test that yields the emotional state of a man, but not a dog.
Do you have a concept of such a test?
posted by effugas at 2:53 PM on August 19, 2010
You honestly think that having a sense of 'self' and 'other' is an insignificant parlour trick? It's why we can use tools, plan for the future, change our envirornment, create a complex society, develop language, and basically all of the things that we can do that animals can't. I wouldn't be so dismissive of it.
Animals do not plan, btw.
posted by empath at 3:37 PM on August 19, 2010
Animals do not plan, btw.
posted by empath at 3:37 PM on August 19, 2010
You honestly think that having a sense of 'self' and 'other' is an insignificant parlour trick? It's why we can use tools, plan for the future, change our envirornment, create a complex society, develop language, and basically all of the things that we can do that animals can't. I wouldn't be so dismissive of it.
Sure. Humans have special magic things they can do. That just doesn't give them exclusive realm over the concept of consciousness, awareness, and emotion.
Maybe it gives them more. Call it something else -- agency, sentience, whatever. But this dichotomy -- if you aren't human, you're just operating on a simple predictable instinctual program -- I mean, it's just false. Untrue. Not reflective of reality.
Animals do not plan, btw.
Really? You want to assert that humans are the only creatures on the planet that execute series of actions in multiple stages chosen in advance in pursuit of a desired outcome?
posted by effugas at 3:45 PM on August 19, 2010
Sure. Humans have special magic things they can do. That just doesn't give them exclusive realm over the concept of consciousness, awareness, and emotion.
Maybe it gives them more. Call it something else -- agency, sentience, whatever. But this dichotomy -- if you aren't human, you're just operating on a simple predictable instinctual program -- I mean, it's just false. Untrue. Not reflective of reality.
Animals do not plan, btw.
Really? You want to assert that humans are the only creatures on the planet that execute series of actions in multiple stages chosen in advance in pursuit of a desired outcome?
posted by effugas at 3:45 PM on August 19, 2010
Let me repeat:
Let me repeat: "I'm not debating on whether or not an animal is conscious."
You're making a very interesting argument, actually. You're basically saying:
1) Humans can misinterpret animal activity as being highly logical, when it isn't
2) Therefore, we can't trust any of our observations regarding the mental state of animals
I'd say that's a mischaracterization of my argument. First of all, I made no claim as to whether non-human animal activity is logical or not (I would argue that it's at least as logical as the behavior of humans, it's just it may not involve cognition as our behavior usually does). And furthermore, we're not talking about the observations of the mental state of animals.
We can certainly make some very educated hypotheses about their mental state based on expected behavior. For example, based on their performance, we can say that chimpanzees do not have even a basic understanding of statics -- that is, putting things on top of other things. If you give a fairly young child (not sure of the exact age, maybe 3 or 4) a set of blocks in various shapes, they will understand that the blocks are generally most stable when laid on their flat sides. A chimp will try over and over to place a block on its corner point.
What we're talking about is whether the reasoning, emotions, or motivations behind non-human behavior can be explained based on our own.
At this point I feel that you're beating a dead horse. Obviously you believe that animals are conscious. I don't really have an opinion one way or another. However, I do know that it is human nature -- possibly human instinct -- to anthropomorphize. When we see non-human animals behaving similarly to humans, that it is for the same reasons humans do. Povinelli calls this "argument by analogy":
posted by Deathalicious at 11:27 PM on August 19, 2010
Let me repeat: "I'm not debating on whether or not an animal is conscious."
You're making a very interesting argument, actually. You're basically saying:
1) Humans can misinterpret animal activity as being highly logical, when it isn't
2) Therefore, we can't trust any of our observations regarding the mental state of animals
I'd say that's a mischaracterization of my argument. First of all, I made no claim as to whether non-human animal activity is logical or not (I would argue that it's at least as logical as the behavior of humans, it's just it may not involve cognition as our behavior usually does). And furthermore, we're not talking about the observations of the mental state of animals.
We can certainly make some very educated hypotheses about their mental state based on expected behavior. For example, based on their performance, we can say that chimpanzees do not have even a basic understanding of statics -- that is, putting things on top of other things. If you give a fairly young child (not sure of the exact age, maybe 3 or 4) a set of blocks in various shapes, they will understand that the blocks are generally most stable when laid on their flat sides. A chimp will try over and over to place a block on its corner point.
What we're talking about is whether the reasoning, emotions, or motivations behind non-human behavior can be explained based on our own.
At this point I feel that you're beating a dead horse. Obviously you believe that animals are conscious. I don't really have an opinion one way or another. However, I do know that it is human nature -- possibly human instinct -- to anthropomorphize. When we see non-human animals behaving similarly to humans, that it is for the same reasons humans do. Povinelli calls this "argument by analogy":
Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were at work. In this paper. we show how this argument by analogy is flawed with respect to the case of second-order mental states. As a test case, we focus on the question of how other species conceive of visual attention, and in particular whether chimpanzees interpret seeing as a mentalistic event involving internal states of perception, attention, and belief. We conclude that chimpanzees do not reason about seeing in this manner, and indeed, there is considerable reason to suppose that they do not harbor representations of mental states in general. We propose a reinterpretation model in which the majority of the rich social behaviors that humans and other primates share in common emerged long before the human lineage evolved the psychological means of interpreting those behaviors in mentalistic terms. Although humans, chimpanzees, and most other species may be said to possess mental states, humans alone may have evolved a cognitive specialization for reasoning about such states.Toward a science of other minds: escaping the argument by analogy
posted by Deathalicious at 11:27 PM on August 19, 2010
Deathalicious--
Well, lets see if you disagree with the primary presumptions of this thread. Fourcheesemac says:
People really want to believe other primates think like we do. So far, very little evidence actually shows anything of the sort.
I reply:
Some people also want to believe mammals operate on a purely instinctual level, and totally lack emotions. So far, no evidence whatsoever actually shows anything of the sort.
I'm pretty specific here. An animal is conscious if:
It knows (assuming sensory input) what's happening around it.
It wants things.
It feels things.
I describe a specific situation where a cow behaves indistinguishably from a human:
You take two cows.
You kill one.
The surviving cow looks at the dead cow.
The surviving cow understands that it may be killed as well.
The surviving cow absolutely panics.
This is what I mean when I say, we're getting hung up in parlor tricks. It doesn't matter what a chimp can see, or whether they have the same grasp on statics as a four year old. It really doesn't. Those aren't critical to survival. Nobody's saying non-humans have an identical view on the world, and I'm happy to stipulate all sorts of missing capabilities in non-humans. We have a neocortex, they don't, it does things their brains can't do.
But you write:
What we're talking about is whether the reasoning, emotions, or motivations behind non-human behavior can be explained based on our own.
The problem is that once you get below neocortex-requiring behaviors, we have this huge set of indicators that are _all_ identical between man and beast. How do you explain that? And how does that not shift the burden of proof?
posted by effugas at 4:42 AM on August 20, 2010
Well, lets see if you disagree with the primary presumptions of this thread. Fourcheesemac says:
People really want to believe other primates think like we do. So far, very little evidence actually shows anything of the sort.
I reply:
Some people also want to believe mammals operate on a purely instinctual level, and totally lack emotions. So far, no evidence whatsoever actually shows anything of the sort.
I'm pretty specific here. An animal is conscious if:
It knows (assuming sensory input) what's happening around it.
It wants things.
It feels things.
I describe a specific situation where a cow behaves indistinguishably from a human:
You take two cows.
You kill one.
The surviving cow looks at the dead cow.
The surviving cow understands that it may be killed as well.
The surviving cow absolutely panics.
This is what I mean when I say, we're getting hung up in parlor tricks. It doesn't matter what a chimp can see, or whether they have the same grasp on statics as a four year old. It really doesn't. Those aren't critical to survival. Nobody's saying non-humans have an identical view on the world, and I'm happy to stipulate all sorts of missing capabilities in non-humans. We have a neocortex, they don't, it does things their brains can't do.
But you write:
What we're talking about is whether the reasoning, emotions, or motivations behind non-human behavior can be explained based on our own.
The problem is that once you get below neocortex-requiring behaviors, we have this huge set of indicators that are _all_ identical between man and beast. How do you explain that? And how does that not shift the burden of proof?
posted by effugas at 4:42 AM on August 20, 2010
(I will concede that humans have a tendency to anthroporphize. They also have a tendency to detect that the sky is blue. Doesn't mean they're wrong.)
posted by effugas at 8:23 AM on August 20, 2010
posted by effugas at 8:23 AM on August 20, 2010
New Scientist: Harvard confirms misconduct by morality researcher.
posted by zarq at 8:54 AM on August 21, 2010
posted by zarq at 8:54 AM on August 21, 2010
Hours later, Dr. Hauser, a rising star for his explorations into cognition and morality, made his first public statement since news of the inquiry emerged last week, telling The New York Times, “I acknowledge that I made some significant mistakes” and saying he was “deeply sorry for the problems this case had caused to my students, my colleagues and my university.”
posted by availablelight at 10:28 AM on August 21, 2010
posted by availablelight at 10:28 AM on August 21, 2010
More specific details from the Chronicle of Higher Education.
posted by logicpunk at 1:56 PM on August 22, 2010
posted by logicpunk at 1:56 PM on August 22, 2010
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