http://www.metafilter.com/tags/StephenBiddle Posts tagged with 'StephenBiddle' at MetaFilter. Wed, 21 Jun 2006 10:13:22 -0800 Wed, 21 Jun 2006 10:13:22 -0800 en-us http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 http://www.metafilter.com/52448/Wheres%2Dthe%2Dexit The debate over exit strategies for Iraq. <a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85201/stephen-biddle/seeing-baghdad-thinking-saigon.html?mode=print">Stephen Biddle</a>. <em>The biggest problem with treating Iraq like Vietnam is Iraqization -- the main component of the current U.S. military strategy. In a people's war, handing the fighting off to local forces makes sense because it undermines the nationalist component of insurgent resistance, improves the quality of local intelligence, and boosts troop strength. But in a </em><b>communal civil war</b><em>, it throws gasoline on the fire. Iraq's Sunnis perceive the "national" army and police force as a Shiite-Kurdish militia on steroids.</em> Biddle also emphasizes the need for a <b>compromise</b> <em>based on a constitutional deal with ironclad power-sharing arrangements protecting all parties</em>. <a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060701faresponse85412/larry-diamond-james-dobbins-chaim-kaufmann-leslie-h-gelb-stephen-biddle/what-to-do-in-iraq-a-roundtable.html?mode=print">Roundtable</a> responses from Larry Diamond, James Dobbins, Chaim Kaufmann, and Leslie Gelb. <a href="http://jebin08.blogspot.com/2006/05/cordesman-on-iraq.html">Anthony Cordesman</a>, who <a href="http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/iraq_wound.pdf">anticipated the current situation</a> (PDF), emphasizes the need for ongoing US involvement in the region. <a href="http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-benjamin24nov24,0,4137156.story?coll=la-news-comment-opinions">Daniel Benjamin</a> is pessimistic, describing the US as being in a no-win situation whether it stays or leaves. A list of proposed <a href="http://www.comw.org/pda/0512exitplans.html">exit strategies</a> collected by the Project for Defense Alternatives. <a href="http://www.theonion.com/content/node/30931">The Onion</a>. tag:metafilter.com,2006:site.52448 Wed, 21 Jun 2006 10:13:22 -0800 AnthonyCordesman DanielBenjamin exitstrategy Iraq StephenBiddle russilwvong http://www.metafilter.com/34591/Toppling%2DSaddam%2DIraq%2Dand%2DAmerican%2DMilitary%2DTransformation <a href="http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/biddle.pdf" title=>Toppling Saddam: Iraq and American Military Transformation <small>(pdf)</small></a> <small>The relative speed and ease of the first phase of the war in Iraq are due in part to U.S. military prowess, but also to Iraqi weakness, according to a critical internal account prepared for the U.S. Army."The shortcomings of Saddam's military played an important role in limiting the cost of major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Coalition strengths were important contributors, but so were Iraqi weaknesses."As a result, there are "important limitations on the Iraq War's lessons for other defense planning challenges.... The Iraqis' shortcomings created a permissive environment for Coalition technology that a more skilled opponent elsewhere might not," according to the study Foreword. The study, which does represent an official U.S. Army perspective, has not been formally released.</small> See also <a href="http://www.thestate.com/mld/state/news/opinion/9133715.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp" title="''Without the targets' errors to exploit the same technology can produce very different results,'' the study says. ''The Iraqis' shortcomings created a permissive environment for coalition technology that a more skilled opponent elsewhere might not. The 2003 outcome was thus a product of a powerful interaction effect between coalition strengths and Iraqi weaknesses. Our strengths were indeed essential for the outcome, but so were the Iraqis' shortcomings. Both advanced technology AND a major skill imbalance were required.'''' ">Joe Galloway: Don't Take Too Much From U.S.' Iraq War Experience</a> See also <a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FG28Ak01.html" title="The authors argue that a central component of the answer lies in a synergistic interaction between advanced technology and a major skill differential. In 2003, advanced technology in skilled hands enabled the coalition to punish Iraqi mistakes with extraordinary severity. The Iraqis in 2003 made many errors, allowing US technology to operate at maximum effectiveness; the resulting lethality enabled a small but skilled coalition force to defeat the world's 12th-largest military at a very low cost to itself. But technology's effects are strongly influenced by its targets' behavior: without the targets' errors to exploit, the same technology can produce very different results. The Iraqis' shortcomings created a permissive environment for coalition technology that a more skilled opponent elsewhere might not. The 2003 outcome was thus a product of a powerful interaction effect between coalition strengths and Iraqi weaknesses. The coalition's strengths were indeed essential for the outcome, but so were Iraq's shortcomings: both advanced technology and a major skill imbalance were required.">The Fallacies Of Military Transformation</a> See also <a href="http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html" title="The standard explanations of the Gulf War's outcome are wrong. The orthodox view explains the war's one-sidedness in terms of the Coalition's strengths, especially its advanced technology, which is often held to have destroyed the Iraqis' equipment or broken their will without exposing Coalition forces to extensive close combat on the ground. 1- The main rival explanation emphasizes Iraqi shortcomings, such as their weak morale, poor training and leadership, or numerical inferiority in the theater of war. 2 - Both schools appeared within a few months of the cease-fire, and have changed surprisingly little since then. 3 - The information base on the war's conduct, however, has changed substantially with the recent appearance of the first detailed official and semi-official independent histories of the war. 4 - This new information, combined with the results of counterfactual analysis using new computer simulation techniques, undermines both schools' conclusions.">Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict</a> See also <a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030301faessay10337/stephen-biddle/afghanistan-and-the-future-of-warfare.html?mode=print" title="Both sides in the debate assume that the Afghan campaign was waged at standoff ranges, with precision weapons annihilating enemies at a distance, before they could close with U.S. commandos or indigenous allies. For proponents of the Afghan model, this is what gives the model its broad utility: with SOF-guided bombs doing the real killing at a distance, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they have to do is screen U.S. commandos from occasional hostile survivors and occupy abandoned ground later on. America can thus defeat rogues at global distances with few U.S. casualties and little danger of appearing to be a conquering power. For Afghan model detractors, conversely, it is the apparent ability to annihilate from afar that makes the campaign seem so anomalous and a product of idiosyncratic local factors.">Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare</a> tag:metafilter.com,2004:site.34591 Tue, 27 Jul 2004 10:01:33 -0800 Iraq iraqwar StephenBiddle y2karl