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	<title>MetaFilter posts tagged with crypto</title>
	<link>http://www.metafilter.com/tags/crypto</link>
	<description>Posts tagged with 'crypto' at MetaFilter.</description>
	<pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2009 09:29:32 -0800</pubDate> <lastBuildDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2009 09:29:32 -0800</lastBuildDate>

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	<docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
	<ttl>60</ttl>
	<item>
		<title>AES &amp;#0224; la XKCD</title>
		<link>http://www.metafilter.com/85386/AES%2D%2Dla%2DXKCD</link>
		<description>&lt;a href="http://www.moserware.com/2009/09/stick-figure-guide-to-advanced.html"&gt;A stick figure guide&lt;/a&gt; to the &lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard&quot;&gt;Advanced&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf&quot;&gt;Encryption Standard&lt;/a&gt;.  &lt;small&gt;[via &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/a_stick_figure.html&quot;&gt;Bruce Schneier&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/small&gt;  </description>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:metafilter.com,2009:site.85386</guid>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2009 09:29:32 -0800</pubDate>
		<category>aes</category>
		<category>cipher</category>
		<category>crypto</category>
		<category>cryptography</category>
		<category>encryption</category>
		<category>interpretivedance</category>
		<category>rijndael</category>
		<category>stickfigure</category>
		<category>stickfigures</category>
		<dc:creator>Electric Dragon</dc:creator>
	</item>
      <item>
		<title>15 bits of crypto should be enough for anybody</title>
		<link>http://www.metafilter.com/71730/15%2Dbits%2Dof%2Dcrypto%2Dshould%2Dbe%2Denough%2Dfor%2Danybody</link>
		<description> On May 13, security advisories published by &lt;a href=&quot;http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html&quot;&gt;Debian&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-612-1&quot;&gt;Ubuntu&lt;/a&gt; revealed that, for over a year, their OpenSSL libraries have had a major flaw in their &lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographically_secure_pseudorandom_number_generator&quot; title=&quot;Wikipedia: Cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator&quot;&gt;CSPRNG&lt;/a&gt;, which is used by &lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_generation&quot; title=&quot;Wikipedia: Key generation&quot;&gt;key generation&lt;/a&gt; functions in many widely-used applications, which caused the &quot;random&quot; numbers produced to be extremely predictable. &lt;small&gt;[&lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.rominet.net/2008/05/debianopenssl-debacle.html&quot;&gt;lolcat summary&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/small&gt; How bad is it? It&apos;s &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.debian.org/security/key-rollover/&quot;&gt;pretty&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys&quot;&gt;bad&lt;/a&gt;. Understand that these keys are used not only for encryption, but also for authentication. The keyspace has been reduced to a mere 32,768 possibilities, and you can already &lt;a href=&quot;http://metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/&quot;&gt;download them all&lt;/a&gt;, along with tools to use them. Worse still, in the days &lt;em&gt;before&lt;/em&gt; the issue became publicly known, there was a &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/attacks/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=207603339&quot;&gt;noticeable&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://stats.denyhosts.net/stats.html&quot;&gt;spike&lt;/a&gt; in the number of brute-force attacks on SSH servers, indicating that there has already been significant exploitation of this vulnerability.

Partial timeline of events: In May 2006, &lt;a href=&quot;http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=363516&quot;&gt;a bug&lt;/a&gt; led to &lt;a href=&quot;http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.openssl.devel/10917&quot;&gt;a question&lt;/a&gt; which led to &lt;a href=&quot;http://svn.debian.org/viewsvn/pkg-openssl/openssl/trunk/rand/md_rand.c?rev=141&amp;r1=140&amp;r2=141&quot;&gt;the fateful patch&lt;/a&gt; being applied to &lt;a href=&quot;http://svn.debian.org/viewsvn/pkg-openssl/openssl/trunk/rand/md_rand.c?rev=141&amp;view=markup&quot;&gt;md_rand.c&lt;/a&gt; (in Debian&apos;s &quot;unstable&quot; development branch). In April 2007, Debian 4.0 &quot;etch&quot; and Ubuntu 7.04 were both released, which was the beginning of the inclusion of the buggy version of OpenSSL in officially-released distributions. The bug remained unfixed through the releases of Ubuntu 7.10 and 8.04. On May 7, 2008, the &lt;a href=&quot;http://svn.debian.org/viewsvn/pkg-openssl/openssl/trunk/crypto/rand/md_rand.c?rev=300&amp;view=diff&amp;r1=300&amp;r2=299&quot;&gt;patch to fix the problem&lt;/a&gt; was committed to Debian&apos;s source repository, and on May 13 the issue was officially disclosed and updated packages were made available to users. (The patch&apos;s availability days before public disclosure of the bug appears to be a violation of &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.debian.org/doc/developers-reference/ch-pkgs.en.html#s-bug-security-confidentiality&quot;&gt;Debian&apos;s policy&lt;/a&gt;.)

&lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.drinsama.de/erich/en/linux/2008051401-debian-openssl-desaster.html&quot;&gt;Here&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.drinsama.de/erich/en/linux/2008051401-consequences-of-sslssh-weakness.html&quot;&gt;are&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://changelog.complete.org/posts/714-Thoughtfulness-on-the-OpenSSL-bug.html&quot;&gt;some&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.aigarius.com/blog/2008/05/14/too-similar-to-be-different/&quot;&gt;responses&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://algebraicthunk.net/~dburrows/blog/entry/worst-ever/&quot;&gt;from&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.advogato.org/person/branden/diary/5.html&quot;&gt;Debian&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.steve.org.uk/i_still_don_t_know_why_i_m_here.html&quot;&gt;blogs&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.links.org/?p=327&quot;&gt;two&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.links.org/?p=328&quot;&gt;from&lt;/a&gt; an OpenSSL developer. </description>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:metafilter.com,2008:site.71730</guid>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 May 2008 22:01:42 -0800</pubDate>
		<category>crypto</category>
		<category>cryptography</category>
		<category>debian</category>
		<category>internet</category>
		<category>linux</category>
		<category>math</category>
		<category>numbers</category>
		<category>owie</category>
		<category>prng</category>
		<category>probability</category>
		<category>random</category>
		<category>security</category>
		<category>ssh</category>
		<category>ssl</category>
		<category>ubuntu</category>
		<dc:creator>finite</dc:creator>
	</item>
      <item>
		<title>Bruce Forcing</title>
		<link>http://www.metafilter.com/64414/Bruce%2DForcing</link>
		<description>&lt;a href="http://nsa.unaligned.org/index.php"&gt;NSA@home is a fast FPGA-based SHA-1 and MD5 bruteforce cracker.&lt;/a&gt; Based on HDTV equipment from eBay, &quot;It is capable of searching the full 8-character keyspace (from a 64-character set) in about a day in the current configuration for 800 hashes concurrently.&quot; Previous well-publicized brute-force attacks include &lt;a href=&apos;http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Crypto/Crypto_misc/DESCracker/&apos;&gt;the EFF breaking DES in 56 hours&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&apos;http://www.tmto.org&apos;&gt;1.6TB of md5 hashes you can search online.&lt;/a&gt;  </description>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:metafilter.com,2007:site.64414</guid>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Sep 2007 14:47:37 -0800</pubDate>
		<category>bruteforce</category>
		<category>crack</category>
		<category>crypto</category>
		<category>diy</category>
		<category>fpga</category>
		<category>hash</category>
		<category>md5</category>
		<category>sha</category>
		<category>sha1</category>
		<dc:creator>Skorgu</dc:creator>
	</item>
      <item>
		<title></title>
		<link>http://www.metafilter.com/20036/</link>
		<description> &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0209.html#1&quot; title=&quot;cryptogram: aes news. aes may have been broken&quot;&gt;AES may have been broken&lt;/a&gt;.  The new standard in crypto, &lt;a href=&quot;http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/rijndael/&quot; title=&quot;aes info at nist&quot;&gt;AES&lt;/a&gt;, and other algorithms, appear to be vulnerable to &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.minrank.org/aes/&quot; title=&quot;some xsl, xl details&quot;&gt;xsl&lt;/a&gt;.  This is not a practical attack, yet, but if you&apos;re interested in crypto it&apos;s fascinating (and shocking) news.  </description>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:metafilter.com,2002:site.20036</guid>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Sep 2002 04:06:27 -0800</pubDate>
		<category>aes</category>
		<category>attack</category>
		<category>crypto</category>
		<category>cryptography</category>
		<category>xsl</category>
		<dc:creator>andrew cooke</dc:creator>
	</item>
      <item>
		<title></title>
		<link>http://www.metafilter.com/10679/</link>
		<description>&lt;a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1234-2001Sep20.html"&gt;Crypto guru getting blamed for his software.&lt;/a&gt; PGP writer Phil Zimmermann&apos;s hate mail goes a little something like this, &quot;Phil -- I hope you can sleep at night with the blood of 5,000 people on your hands.&quot;  If Phil is guilty of anything so is everyone who has ever used their credit card online, including Mr. Hate Mail.   </description>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:metafilter.com,2001:site.10679</guid>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Sep 2001 13:26:17 -0800</pubDate>
		<category>crypto</category>
		<category>cryptography</category>
		<category>email</category>
		<category>mail</category>
		<category>pgp</category>
		<category>phil</category>
		<category>philzimmermann</category>
		<category>zimmermann</category>
		<dc:creator>skallas</dc:creator>
	</item>
      <item>
		<title></title>
		<link>http://www.metafilter.com/10540/</link>
		<description> War on Civil Liberties Watch: Usable encryption is in deep doo-doo. &lt;a href=&quot;http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-7215723.html?tag=dd.ne.dht.nl-hed.0&quot;&gt;A new poll&lt;/a&gt; finds 72% of Americans now supporting a ban on unbreakable encryption. (Apparantly breakable, and thus useless, encryption is just fine.) Besides the obvious fact that this stuff is already out there and cannot be taken back, particularly from non-US citizens who don&apos;t give a damn about our laws (such as, say, the exact people we&apos;re trying to defeat), is there any hope that the courts will find any such new laws unconstitutional?  </description>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:metafilter.com,2001:site.10540</guid>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Sep 2001 16:46:37 -0800</pubDate>
		<category>crypto</category>
		<category>cryptography</category>
		<category>encryption</category>
		<dc:creator>aaron</dc:creator>
	</item>
      <item>
		<title></title>
		<link>http://www.metafilter.com/10240/</link>
		<description>&lt;a href="http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46816,00.html"&gt;Terrorism&apos;s first win? Bye-Bye crypto.&lt;/a&gt; The rubble is still burning and the Republicans are ready to strip of our right to use crypto products.  Opportunists feeding off fear.  That&apos;s how you win at the terrorist game.  </description>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:metafilter.com,2001:site.10240</guid>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Sep 2001 19:05:57 -0800</pubDate>
		<category>911</category>
		<category>backdoors</category>
		<category>crypto</category>
		<category>cryptography</category>
		<category>decryption</category>
		<category>encryption</category>
		<category>espionage</category>
		<category>intelligence</category>
		<category>privacy</category>
		<category>RightToPrivacy</category>
		<category>surveillance</category>
		<category>Wired</category>
		<dc:creator>skallas</dc:creator>
	</item>
      <item>
		<title></title>
		<link>http://www.metafilter.com/8391/</link>
		<description>&lt;a href="http://www.newscientist.com/dailynews/news.jsp?id=ns9999881"&gt;An all encompassing crypto application&lt;/a&gt; sounds great, but is it really feasible? If you try to do too much we&apos;ll just end up with another halfass program no one really trusts.   </description>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:metafilter.com,2001:site.8391</guid>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Jun 2001 03:56:29 -0800</pubDate>
		<category>anonymizer</category>
		<category>anonymous</category>
		<category>brokenlink</category>
		<category>crypto</category>
		<category>cryptobox</category>
		<category>NikolaBobic</category>
		<category>software</category>
		<dc:creator>monkeyboy</dc:creator>
	</item>
      <item>
		<title></title>
		<link>http://www.metafilter.com/5141/</link>
		<description>&lt;a href="http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/ghosh-2000-03-p1.html"&gt;The battle for unrestricted encryption continues.&lt;/a&gt; Professor Bernstein won&apos;t rest; he&apos;s not going to let this go. More power to him and let&apos;s hope he ultimately wins. [He&apos;s challenging the US government restrictions on private encryption on free-speech grounds, and so far he&apos;s won in every court where the case has been heard. The government has been using delaying actions, and their relaxation of restrictions may partially have been in hopes he&apos;d give up, leaving them still capable of some control. He&apos;s not going to, though. He&apos;s got blood in his eye, so to speak.]  </description>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:metafilter.com,2001:site.5141</guid>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Jan 2001 09:32:41 -0800</pubDate>
		<category>brokenlink</category>
		<category>crypto</category>
		<category>cryptography</category>
		<category>encryption</category>
		<category>Gigalaw</category>
		<dc:creator>Steven Den Beste</dc:creator>
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