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	<title>MetaFilter posts tagged with ssh</title>
	<link>http://www.metafilter.com/tags/ssh</link>
	<description>Posts tagged with 'ssh' at MetaFilter.</description>
	<pubDate>Fri, 16 May 2008 22:01:42 -0800</pubDate> <lastBuildDate>Fri, 16 May 2008 22:01:42 -0800</lastBuildDate>

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		<title>15 bits of crypto should be enough for anybody</title>
		<link>http://www.metafilter.com/71730/15%2Dbits%2Dof%2Dcrypto%2Dshould%2Dbe%2Denough%2Dfor%2Danybody</link>
		<description> On May 13, security advisories published by &lt;a href=&quot;http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html&quot;&gt;Debian&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-612-1&quot;&gt;Ubuntu&lt;/a&gt; revealed that, for over a year, their OpenSSL libraries have had a major flaw in their &lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographically_secure_pseudorandom_number_generator&quot; title=&quot;Wikipedia: Cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator&quot;&gt;CSPRNG&lt;/a&gt;, which is used by &lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_generation&quot; title=&quot;Wikipedia: Key generation&quot;&gt;key generation&lt;/a&gt; functions in many widely-used applications, which caused the &quot;random&quot; numbers produced to be extremely predictable. &lt;small&gt;[&lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.rominet.net/2008/05/debianopenssl-debacle.html&quot;&gt;lolcat summary&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/small&gt; How bad is it? It&apos;s &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.debian.org/security/key-rollover/&quot;&gt;pretty&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys&quot;&gt;bad&lt;/a&gt;. Understand that these keys are used not only for encryption, but also for authentication. The keyspace has been reduced to a mere 32,768 possibilities, and you can already &lt;a href=&quot;http://metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/&quot;&gt;download them all&lt;/a&gt;, along with tools to use them. Worse still, in the days &lt;em&gt;before&lt;/em&gt; the issue became publicly known, there was a &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/attacks/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=207603339&quot;&gt;noticeable&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://stats.denyhosts.net/stats.html&quot;&gt;spike&lt;/a&gt; in the number of brute-force attacks on SSH servers, indicating that there has already been significant exploitation of this vulnerability.

Partial timeline of events: In May 2006, &lt;a href=&quot;http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=363516&quot;&gt;a bug&lt;/a&gt; led to &lt;a href=&quot;http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.openssl.devel/10917&quot;&gt;a question&lt;/a&gt; which led to &lt;a href=&quot;http://svn.debian.org/viewsvn/pkg-openssl/openssl/trunk/rand/md_rand.c?rev=141&amp;r1=140&amp;r2=141&quot;&gt;the fateful patch&lt;/a&gt; being applied to &lt;a href=&quot;http://svn.debian.org/viewsvn/pkg-openssl/openssl/trunk/rand/md_rand.c?rev=141&amp;view=markup&quot;&gt;md_rand.c&lt;/a&gt; (in Debian&apos;s &quot;unstable&quot; development branch). In April 2007, Debian 4.0 &quot;etch&quot; and Ubuntu 7.04 were both released, which was the beginning of the inclusion of the buggy version of OpenSSL in officially-released distributions. The bug remained unfixed through the releases of Ubuntu 7.10 and 8.04. On May 7, 2008, the &lt;a href=&quot;http://svn.debian.org/viewsvn/pkg-openssl/openssl/trunk/crypto/rand/md_rand.c?rev=300&amp;view=diff&amp;r1=300&amp;r2=299&quot;&gt;patch to fix the problem&lt;/a&gt; was committed to Debian&apos;s source repository, and on May 13 the issue was officially disclosed and updated packages were made available to users. (The patch&apos;s availability days before public disclosure of the bug appears to be a violation of &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.debian.org/doc/developers-reference/ch-pkgs.en.html#s-bug-security-confidentiality&quot;&gt;Debian&apos;s policy&lt;/a&gt;.)

&lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.drinsama.de/erich/en/linux/2008051401-debian-openssl-desaster.html&quot;&gt;Here&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.drinsama.de/erich/en/linux/2008051401-consequences-of-sslssh-weakness.html&quot;&gt;are&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://changelog.complete.org/posts/714-Thoughtfulness-on-the-OpenSSL-bug.html&quot;&gt;some&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.aigarius.com/blog/2008/05/14/too-similar-to-be-different/&quot;&gt;responses&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://algebraicthunk.net/~dburrows/blog/entry/worst-ever/&quot;&gt;from&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.advogato.org/person/branden/diary/5.html&quot;&gt;Debian&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.steve.org.uk/i_still_don_t_know_why_i_m_here.html&quot;&gt;blogs&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.links.org/?p=327&quot;&gt;two&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.links.org/?p=328&quot;&gt;from&lt;/a&gt; an OpenSSL developer. </description>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 16 May 2008 22:01:42 -0800</pubDate>
		<category>crypto</category>
		<category>cryptography</category>
		<category>debian</category>
		<category>internet</category>
		<category>linux</category>
		<category>math</category>
		<category>numbers</category>
		<category>owie</category>
		<category>prng</category>
		<category>probability</category>
		<category>random</category>
		<category>security</category>
		<category>ssh</category>
		<category>ssl</category>
		<category>ubuntu</category>
		<dc:creator>finite</dc:creator>
	</item>
      <item>
		<title></title>
		<link>http://www.metafilter.com/432/</link>
		<description>&lt;a href="http://www.cri.cz/kra/index.html"&gt;a good reason to dump telnet for&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&apos;http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ssh/&apos;&gt;ssh:&lt;/a&gt; The main goal of the &lt;a href=&apos;ftp://ftp.gncz.cz/pub/linux/hunt/hunt-1.4bin.tgz&apos;&gt;HUNT&lt;/a&gt; project is to develop tool for exploiting well known weaknesses in the TCP/IP protocol suite. &lt;a href=&apos;http://www.cri.cz/kra/index.html&apos;&gt;I tried to implement&lt;/a&gt; some &apos;new&apos; features which I didn&apos;t see in any free product. (connection synchronization after attack, ARP relayer, ...)  </description>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:metafilter.com,1999:site.432</guid>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Dec 1999 20:25:00 -0800</pubDate>
		<category>HUNT</category>
		<category>security</category>
		<category>ssh</category>
		<category>tcp-ip</category>
		<category>telnet</category>
		<dc:creator>greyscale</dc:creator>
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