"Never again, regulators vowed"
May 18, 2020 8:13 AM   Subscribe

Whistleblower: Wall Street Has Engaged in Widespread Manipulation of Mortgage Funds (Heather Vogell, ProPublica, 15 May 2020)
ProPublica closely examined six loans that were part of CMBS in recent years to see if their data resembles the pattern described by the whistleblower. What we found matched the allegations: The historical profits reported for some buildings were listed as much as 30% higher than the profits previously reported for the same buildings and same years when the property was part of an earlier CMBS. As a rough analogy, imagine a homeowner having stated in a mortgage application that his 2017 income was $100,000 only to claim during a later refinancing that his 2017 income was $130,000 — without acknowledging or explaining the change.
. . . .
After lobbying by commercial real estate organizations and advocacy by real estate investor and Trump ally Tom Barrack — who warned of a looming commercial mortgage crash — the Federal Reserve pledged in early April to prop up CMBS by loaning money to investors and letting them use their CMBS as collateral. The goal is to stabilize the market at a time when investors may be tempted to dump their securities, and also to support banks in issuing new bonds. (Barrack’s company, Colony Capital, has since defaulted on $3.2 billion in debt backed by hotel and health care properties, according to the Financial Times.)

The Fed didn’t specify how much it’s willing to spend to support the CMBS, and it is allowing only those with the highest credit ratings to be used as collateral. But if some ratings are based on misleading data, as the complaint alleges, taxpayers could be on the hook for a riskier-than-anticipated portfolio of loans.
posted by Not A Thing (44 comments total) 32 users marked this as a favorite
 
posted by Not A Thing

Alas, not eponysterical
posted by Going To Maine at 8:50 AM on May 18 [3 favorites]


Who do I short?
posted by cloeburner at 9:07 AM on May 18 [2 favorites]


If you're wondering why so many stores fronts have bank branches with next to no foot traffic, well, wonder no more.
posted by ocschwar at 9:09 AM on May 18 [3 favorites]


I just came in to add-in yesterday's excellent Husan Minhaj Patriot Act episode on the upcoming/current/ongoing rent crisis in part driven by Rent Backed Securities. I don't have a cogent point to make - I'm too depressed - but it's well worth a watch and is somewhat-related about real-estate securities screwing people over (again).
posted by inflatablekiwi at 9:28 AM on May 18 [3 favorites]


Who do I short?

Seems likely that there's similar action going on with commercial mortgages packaged into CLOs. You can probably figure out a way to short those, though I don't know if anyone will write CDS on them these days.
posted by praemunire at 9:31 AM on May 18 [1 favorite]


One person you can thank for this is Obama's treasury secretary Timothy Geithner. A big part of the problem is that the bond issuing banks select and pay the rating agency that reviews their bond and gives it a risk rating for investors. The obvious corruption is that the rating agency has an inventive to give a good rating or else the bank won't hire them again.

Senator Al Franken wrote an amendment to be included in the 2010 Dodd Frank finance reform act that would remove this corrupt incentive by having the SEC randomly select which rating agency would review each new bond proposal. This removes any incentive for the rating agency to inflate their ratings to please the bankers. A bank can't retaliate against a rating agency giving them a bad rating since they don't get to choose the agency.

Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner successfully lobbied to kill the Franken amendment.
posted by JackFlash at 9:58 AM on May 18 [36 favorites]


Who do I short?

Commercial real estate. Companies that own a lot of commercial real estate and rent it out. I'm not one for saying shorting is a good strategy, but if you can go long on a short for commercial real estate? You're probably gonna make a buck.
posted by tclark at 10:29 AM on May 18 [1 favorite]


Yes I know "going long on a short" is an oxymoron, but I mean if you can short it over a year? If I had spare $ I'd give it a shot. But you have to have a lot of $ to be let into that game.
posted by tclark at 10:31 AM on May 18 [1 favorite]


Looks like commercial REITs have already shit the bed globally (to the tune of 30%) due to Covid.
posted by RobotVoodooPower at 10:38 AM on May 18 [3 favorites]


Looks like commercial REITs have already shit the bed globally (to the tune of 30%) due to Covid.

Which might be the precipitating event that causes the whole house of cards to collapse. But given the president's massive conflicts of interest in this area, there will be a lot of pressure to keep propping up the commercial real estate market. He's certainly no stranger to lying on loan applications (and I note with interest that Deutsche Bank, basically Trump's only lender at this point, is one of the banks named in the complaint).
posted by jedicus at 10:51 AM on May 18 [8 favorites]


I'm shocked! Shocked!
posted by From Bklyn at 11:04 AM on May 18 [5 favorites]


Who do I short?

Every trade has a winner and a loser, and winner is often someone who knows how the current game is played, and the loser is often a sucker. So, if you have to ask this question, you (hopefully) probably know where you fall on the scale.
posted by sideshow at 11:28 AM on May 18 [5 favorites]


Ok I had to draw a diagram to understand this article, but I think I follow. Am I getting this right?

1) Restaurants and hotels (or similar) apply for a loan from a bank to rent/buy a building.
2) The bank gives them a loan, but exaggerates how much profit the restaurant/hotel owners are likely to make, thus making the loan look less risky than it really is. This is the fraudulent bit.
3) The bank sells on that loan (along with many others, in a bundle) to an 'investor', as a 'bond'.
4) The investor has paid the bank the cost of what all the loans would be, so the bank is now out the picture. From here on, the restaurants/hotels owe the rest of the loan amount to the investor, not the bank.
5) But then, the restaurant/hotel gets in trouble and defaults on the loan: and this is more likely to happen than the investor expected, or happens sooner, because of the false accounting earlier on by the bank.

The consequences are then that... The investor loses money? Right? The restaurant/hotel goes out of business, but possibly that would have happened anyway -- or it wouldn't have been able to open in the first place -- if it was never going to be profitable.

But here's my question: who are the 'investors' in this scenario? Why do we care if they lose their money? If they didn't do due diligence to check out whether the loans were good in the first place, isn't that just their own fault? I mean, it seems like the banks shouldn't be lying... but the whole idea of buying someone else's loans (and especially without checking up on whether they are sound first) sounds a bit dodgy. If you are an investor and you made a stupid bet, shouldn't you bare the risk of that? Why would the government think it important to pay back the investors for their loss? (Particularly when they could be giving money to the restaurant/hotel directly instead)
posted by EllaEm at 11:31 AM on May 18 [10 favorites]


What's interesting about a lot of the specific examples at the bottom of the article is that many of the income changes might not be strictly fraudulent. In many of those cases, they took an existing loan with existing income, and then scoured it for any non-recurring past expenses that they could delete to boost future income before reselling the loan. Some of those changes may indeed be fraudulent, but if most of them aren't, it could still be increasing systemic risk. If the loan value reflects a probability of default based on income, but past income tended to include lots of non-recurring expenses while post-revision income does not, then regardless of whether the "cleaning up" of that income is honest, it systemically shifts everyone's income upward without changing the default/income relationship -- ie, you are still just as likely to default, but now you are in a higher income bracket and given a bigger loan.

Multiply that by billions and you get systemic risk even if it's all just due to honest lenders deciding to work more diligently to strip non-recurring expenses. Of course, there's probably fraud there too, presumably lots of it if past experience is any guide. But there may not have to be to generate major systemic risk.
posted by chortly at 11:33 AM on May 18 [6 favorites]


But here's my question: who are the 'investors' in this scenario? Why do we care if they lose their money?

The investors are, largely, other, bigger, non-consumer-facing banks. And we care because this exact same scenario (but for home residential mortgages instead of commercial loans; replace "exaggerating expected profits" with "exaggerating home values and household incomes") is what led to the market crash in 2008. I'm not going to get into the "bailouts good or bailouts bad?" argument, I'll just note that it's the argument we're going to have to have (again) when the commercial lending market goes belly-up.
posted by mstokes650 at 11:48 AM on May 18 [8 favorites]


If you are an investor and you made a stupid bet, shouldn't you bare the risk of that?

Securities fraud is illegal because we think it is both ill-advised morally and economically inefficient to force investors to bear the risk of deliberate fraud (or, in certain narrow cases, lack of care) on the part of those creating, selling, or underwriting investments.

BTW, the investors in these cases are often entities such as pension funds.
posted by praemunire at 11:58 AM on May 18 [10 favorites]


But here's my question: who are the 'investors' in this scenario? Why do we care if they lose their money?

I'm not whatever the correct term is for 'guy what does finance good and understands' but pension funds might be one type of investor in CMBSs. You should care because a lot of people who are not big-shot speculators might suddenly lose a big chunk of the money they thought was going to be there for their retirement.
posted by logicpunk at 12:04 PM on May 18 [6 favorites]


because we think it is both ill-advised morally and economically inefficient to force investors to bear the risk of deliberate fraud

Clearly we don't ALL think that.
posted by ctmf at 12:04 PM on May 18 [4 favorites]


But here's my question: who are the 'investors' in this scenario? Why do we care if they lose their money?

I think one problem might be that the investor could be a pension fund, for instance. People get told that they should invest in securities to prepare for retirement, because a traditional savings account nowaday means you're basically going to lose money due to inflation. They don't have any expertise about the stock exchange and don't have the time and inclination to acquire it, so they might for instance buy investment certificates to participate in a bond fund managed by an investment company. The investement company tells their customers that they employ experts who will pick only the safest investments and put together a diversified portfolio consisting of many such bonds with good ratings, so that even if some debtors default, you're still coming out ahead with the interest from the other bonds. And in theory that should work. All the textbooks still say that bonds are a comparatively safe investment, because unlike with stocks you get a fixed rate of interest and that fonds are a good way to diversify risks. But of course any of this only works if people tell the truth.

The investor could also be an institutional investor who is "too big to fail" (like another big bank) and needs to be bailed out by the taxpayer once the shit hits the fan.
posted by sohalt at 12:06 PM on May 18 [6 favorites]


After seeing how much of the 2007 subprime lending crisis was technically legal, I'm afraid I don't have the stomach to use the word "interesting" to describe the fact that banksters devoted their resources to goosing the value of their investment vehicles in ways that don't immediately scream "fraud". I don't need to know that they had an intent to deceive to know that deception is part of their business model, or that the real scandal is what's legal.

The first as tragedy, then as farce.
posted by tonycpsu at 12:06 PM on May 18 [3 favorites]


But here's my question: who are the 'investors' in this scenario? Why do we care if they lose their money? If they didn't do due diligence to check out whether the loans were good in the first place, isn't that just their own fault?

The first reason to care is that fraud is bad. Markets work better if people aren't completely lying to each other all the time and everyone more-or-less gets what they think they paid for. And there are supposed to be mechanisms in place, like ratings agencies and accountants, who check this stuff out and are supposed to be giving investors accurate information, so it's important to everyone if those mechanisms are utterly failing at their jobs.

I bought a bike helmet recently. I did some due diligence on my purchase: I relied on the fact that Consumer Reports, Virginia Tech, and the CPSC all checked it out and rated it well. I didn't personally insist on reviewing the test results or the definitions of all the tests and safety standards or the scientific literature on head trauma because I don't have the knowledge or qualifications or time to make sense of all that. I didn't commission a lab to run tests myself. I'm also trusting that the helmet I got is an authentic version of the same thing that was tested. If my trust in those systems was mistaken, it doesn't just hurt me (if I fall, literally); it hurts everyone participating in the bike helmet marketplace because nobody can trust anything.

It's the same problem here. Investors should do due diligence, but the information they get also needs to be accurate so they know what they're buying.

But also, the article has a clue:
Investors don’t comb through financial statements, added Riordan, who used to manage the CMBS portfolio for retirement fund giant TIAA-CREF. Instead, he said, they rely on summaries from investment banks and the credit ratings agencies that analyze the securities. To make wise decisions, investors’ information “out of the gate has to be pretty close to being right,” he said. “Otherwise you’re dealing with garbage. Garbage in, garbage out.”
TIAA-CREF is a giant retirement fund; it stands for Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America-College Retirement Equities Fund. If the retirement accounts of teachers and faculty are backed by garbage, the people getting hosed at the end of the day aren't faceless investors. Some of the debt may be held by banks none of us feel any particular sympathy towards, but systemic risk is called that for a reason: the entire system can start to collapse when things go south. And for better or worse, we're all a part of that system, so there's a self-interested reason to care.

In many of those cases, they took an existing loan with existing income, and then scoured it for any non-recurring past expenses that they could delete to boost future income before reselling the loan. Some of those changes may indeed be fraudulent, but if most of them aren't, it could still be increasing systemic risk.

I feel like this is the same game as Adjusted EBITDA: you can make a reasonable case that some non-recurring expenses should be removed because they're truly extraordinary, but if you remove enough non-recurring expenses, you give a misleading picture of your risk. It's like from a personal finance perspective if I tell a bank I can afford a big mortgage and they point out my credit card debt is constantly increasing: "well sure, but I can afford based on my monthly bills, just take out the non-recurring expenses." The problem is that there are always non-recurring expenses.
posted by zachlipton at 12:49 PM on May 18 [17 favorites]


Another induced risk, I should think, is that the restaurants are taking out larger loans than they need to which is probably distorting at least twice - higher interest leading to more defaults, but also the restaurants are fancier than they need to be, which does weird things to the whole restaurant scene. Drives out perfectly good family businesses, afaict. Which noophilic consumers love, because there’s always more of the new cool, but it seems to kill the economic middle of a city sort of like the leverage that builds all McMansions and no starter houses at any particular zoning level does.

I know various Seattlites who stuck it out after the 1960s crash and won the water quality, shoreline preservation, farmers’ markets, high school bands that made 1990s Seattle desirable. I should ask them what theyd do in advance if they had it to do over again, because they’ve done their stints, my turn.
posted by clew at 12:52 PM on May 18 [2 favorites]


I don't need to know that they had an intent to deceive to know that deception is part of their business model, or that the real scandal is what's legal.

Sure, but it matters a lot in terms of what we do to prevent it. For instance, if it's not just fraud by the businesses or ratings agencies, then we need in addition to stricter fraud prevention and oversight, higher-level rules that oversee any change in behavior that might entail systemic risk. And those rules have to be legally enforceable with potential punishments, even if the behaviors themselves are not illegal. It's like tax evasion: on the one hand, you need strong rules and oversight to prevent fraud, but you also need other rules that prevent the sorts of inevitable evasions that occur that may be legal (because loopholes, like computer vulnerabilities, are somewhat inevitable) but are socially undesirable and need to be blocked by other mechanisms than solely fraud protection. But again, this isn't about minimizing fraud punishment, it's about how in addition to that, we must restrict the inherent tendency of capitalism to find a way around any rules, even non-fraudulently, in ways that hurt the rest of us.

The problem is that there are always non-recurring expenses.

Yes, but in this case the fix is to change the rules for how "non-recurring" future expenses are estimated. This is separate from deliberate fraud. As technology progresses, or people just figure out a system, they often get better at optimizing, learning new tricks to avoid taxes, report income, whatever. Some of that is fraudulent, but a lot of it is just the sort of learning that's baked into the free market model. Part of the trick in defending against systemic risk is not just avoiding outright fraud, but figuring out how to deal with inherent optimization. The AMT, for instance, was an example: we can't figure out how to catch and ban every loophole, so we instead just create this catch-all mechanism that tries to catch anyone who has somehow figured out how to optimize their tax avoidance too well. It's not the best system, of course, but it's an example of how to fight systemic problems under the assumption that clever rich people will almost inevitably find ways to legally optimize in ways that hurt society.
posted by chortly at 1:06 PM on May 18 [3 favorites]


Thanks, everyone, for your explanations. I was honestly not being facetious; this is all outside my expertise and something I struggle to get my head around. But these explanations have really helped me understand what the stakes are.
posted by EllaEm at 1:18 PM on May 18 [6 favorites]


seeing how much of the 2007 subprime lending crisis was technically legal,

Mostly technically not pursued. When motivated entities brought cases, a lot of money was recovered despite some bad rulings.
posted by praemunire at 1:46 PM on May 18 [1 favorite]


It's so heartening to know that the bipartisan lack of prosecutions for the 2008 financial crisis was the tough enforcement that the market needed to regulate itself.
posted by Ouverture at 1:57 PM on May 18 [3 favorites]


Regulators were harsh in the global financial crisis: tens of billions in penalties and multiples of that in "bail ins" - forced loss absorption by shareholders and bondholders.

What the prosecutors were unable to do is to prove more than a tiny amount of the financial crisis was due to criminal misconduct.
posted by MattD at 2:55 PM on May 18 [1 favorite]


Ok I had to draw a diagram to understand this article, but I think I follow. Am I getting this right?

I've made charts and graphs that should finally make it clear.
posted by Evilspork at 3:07 PM on May 18


> Regulators were harsh in the global financial crisis: tens of billions in penalties and multiples of that in "bail ins" - forced loss absorption by shareholders and bondholders.

Upton Sinclair said all that needs to be said about your use of "harsh" there.
posted by tonycpsu at 3:08 PM on May 18 [5 favorites]


Regulators were harsh in the global financial crisis: tens of billions in penalties and multiples of that in "bail ins" - forced loss absorption by shareholders and bondholders.

What the prosecutors were unable to do is to prove more than a tiny amount of the financial crisis was due to criminal misconduct.


Because they didn't even try. In the 1987 savings and loan crisis, there were over 30,000 criminal referrals and over 1000 bankers went to jail.

In the 2008 great financial crisis, just one, a relatively minor player. It's one of the greatest failings of the Obama administration, that they protected the criminal bankers from prosecution. Too big to jail wasn't just catchy a slogan. It was a policy.
posted by JackFlash at 3:11 PM on May 18 [12 favorites]


"bail ins" - forced loss absorption by shareholders and bondholders.

Shareholders and creditors are supposed to take losses.

Also, "tens of billions" may sound big to people who don't understand the amount of money actually involved here, but not to others.
posted by praemunire at 3:56 PM on May 18 [1 favorite]


Shareholders and creditors are supposed to take losses.

Of course, but the perpetrators are supposed to take the jail time.
posted by JackFlash at 4:17 PM on May 18 [5 favorites]


When the Fed is willing to Weimar us into oblivion to kick the can past the election, rational expectations regarding shorting may not apply.

Just as likely you'll get kicked in the shorts and die of irony poisoning.

Also, "tens of billions" may sound big to people who don't understand the amount of money actually involved here, but not to others.

If you can yadda yadda "tens of billions" you are part of the problem, or in service to it.
posted by snuffleupagus at 4:24 PM on May 18


Of course, but the perpetrators are supposed to take the jail time.

Porque no los dos?

If you can yadda yadda "tens of billions" you are part of the problem, or in service to it.

OK, I'll just ask the government entity which I helped to recover a few billion dollars from the banks on the financial-crisis frauds to give it all back. It was terribly problematic of me; I repent.
posted by praemunire at 4:45 PM on May 18 [3 favorites]


Then you're not brushing it off, are you? Or does it depend on the valence of the comment you're responding to?

It's either a lot of money worth clawing back, or it isn't. I'm going to stay firmly in the "$10B is a lot of money" camp. Sorry (not sorry) if that strikes you as unsophisticated.
posted by snuffleupagus at 4:57 PM on May 18


It's a lot of money to normal people. It's Cost of Doing Business to the fuckers who almost destroyed the economy in 2008.
posted by tobascodagama at 5:17 PM on May 18 [3 favorites]


At this point, I'm wondering when 401k's will be targeted by an inventive financial instrument that's capable of passing unnoticed by regulators until the damage is done.

Because that's a shitload of money and I cannot believe it's untouchable by any means after the last decade's financial chicanery.
posted by Slackermagee at 5:18 PM on May 18 [2 favorites]


401k's will be targeted by an inventive financial instrument that's capable of passing unnoticed

Doesn't even have to be unnoticed anymore. Republican congress will back any amount of looting in broad daylight if you give them enough heads up to write a hole into the law against it. Oh, and if you forget to give them the time, it's ok. They'll just refuse to prosecute anyway.

I'm waiting for my military retirement and DoD civilian retirement plans to get slashed without recourse, after I did the time to earn them (for much less money in pay, because "good benefits are worth money"). Meanwhile, my cost of military medical will go through the roof while available service goes down. Only thing saving them right now is even bigger siphons into their pockets available as a distraction.
posted by ctmf at 5:31 PM on May 18 [1 favorite]


People of bad faith are literally relying on your being unsophisticated enough not to know that billions doesn't mean all that much when many trillions are in play, so that when they say, "oh my god we paid WHOLE TENS OF BILLIONS!!!", you are impressed and think, "Gosh, those poor bankers, they really paid for their sins." I'm not sure why you'd cling firmly to being hustled in this fashion, but obviously I can't stop you.
posted by praemunire at 5:32 PM on May 18 [3 favorites]


I'm not sure why you think I'm such a rube that I can't simultaneously consider $10B to be a lot of money and also understand it's a drop in the bucket in that context, but whatever, maybe it's something I need a biglaw pedigree to understand. /s
posted by snuffleupagus at 6:14 PM on May 18


> I'm not sure why you think I'm such a rube that I can't simultaneously consider $10B to be a lot of money and also understand it's a drop in the bucket in that context

I think it's the part where you specifically took it out of that context for a cheap dunk.
posted by tonycpsu at 6:18 PM on May 18 [2 favorites]


[Folks please drop the sarcastic one liners and backhanded "well fine, if you want to [uncharitable read]" stuff. They lead to pointlesss crappiness among people who I think are mostly ...agreeing with each other that the banks didn't pay enough of a price for 2008.]
posted by LobsterMitten (staff) at 6:26 PM on May 18 [2 favorites]


Contrarian view:

The amount of fraud for the 2008 housing crisis was for the most part in-line statistically with every other year, that's probably why they didn't try for many prosecutions. And the laws they passed to 'protect' us from the bankers' maleficence in 2008 and before really stuck it to those in the midwest who now pay more for rent and can't even get a mortgage (for less than rent) because the property they can purchase isn't worth enough and credit scores are the gods to which we now pray to deem who to loan money to. And since rent is rising, it's lead to endless architectural complaints that 'apartments all look the same'. Those negative effects may have not been the goal, but they were the outcome.

Look at the 'people say their was fraud, so there was fraud in this report from Standard and Poors:
Standard and Poor Fraud
"The following characteristics associated with each group were analyzed: LTV, CLTV, FICO, debt-to-income (DTI), weighted-average coupon (WAC), margin, payment cap, rate adjustment frequency, periodic rate cap on first adjustment, periodic rate cap subsequent to first adjustment, lifetime max rate, term, and issuer. Our results show no statistically significant differentiation between the two groups of transactions on any of the above characteristics."

Apparently there was so much fraud that over 2 years, every single factor that you could use to identify fraud all rose at rates consistent enough to hide it. That's pretty amazing. Check it out: "issuer" was not explanatory, so every bank was frauding exactly equally. Amazing! Every stat was completely in line with loans made in 2000.

Note: I'm not suggesting there was no fraud, just that there was a normal amount of fraud, no different then any other time period.

The stats also show that there wasn't a statistically abnormal amount of lending to people with low income/low scores, so there was no particular need to inflate those across the US as a business practice. Credit Growth and the Financial Crisis: A New Narrative .

This paper suggests that the majority of the defaults were 'real estate investors', but that is a job and the primary impact to this group was job losses. Fine if you think 'flippers' are vultures (some totally are) but unless you are personally handy then we can see from my flippant comment about the lower income homes in the midwest that flippers can perform a valuable service. Houses do deteriorate, so you can hate on flippers, or you can hate on migration to other places and sprawl, but you pretty much have to pick one.

This article gets into the exact same stuff: the hard hitting complaints against an aging hotel, an aging stripmall, a really old office building (art deco place in Philly) and a trailer park. It even says that the lender (Ladder) who inflated the values foreclosed on one their own properties.

Think of it this way: say the loans had been turned down, and these places continued to decline and people were laid off. Then we would be 'bailing' these people out, just more directly through unemployment insurance. At least with a slightly riskier loan, they could try to make it on their own, which has positive effects. There is less difference than one might imagine, and tightening lending standards really only an effect on the lower end of the markets.
posted by The_Vegetables at 11:23 AM on May 19


Note: I'm not suggesting there was no fraud, just that there was a normal amount of fraud, no different then any other time period.

Oh, really? The bank crisis was followed by over $250 billion dollars of fines and penalties to the big banks for securities fraud, mortgage fraud, money laundering, forgery, robo-signing, foreclosure fraud, consumer fraud, price fixing and much, much more.

And this is just the big banks like JP Morgan, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs. Not to speak of the lesser actors like Countrywide and Washington Mutual.

So you are saying that a quarter trillion dollars in fines and penalties for criminal behavior is just run of the mill fraud? Lord, help us.

Curiously, $250 billion in fraud did not result in a single banker going to jail. Nice work, if you can get it.
posted by JackFlash at 6:39 PM on May 19 [3 favorites]


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