An evolutionary psychology debate
February 4, 2009 3:21 PM Subscribe
Here is an interesting critique of evolutionary psychology by philosopher of science David Buller. Clark Barrett and Edouard Machery published a critique of Buller's book (pdf). Anthropologist James Holland Jones has been following the debate and is compelled by arguments on both sides.
Here are some more detailed responses to Buller by evolutionary psychologists, including this defense (pdf) of the Cinderella Effect.
Here are some more detailed responses to Buller by evolutionary psychologists, including this defense (pdf) of the Cinderella Effect.
“the human brain consists of a large collection of functionally specialized computational devices that evolved to solve the adaptive problems regularly encountered by our hunter-gatherer ancestors”
I would like to pound whoever said that. Evolving "functionally specialized computational devices" is a miserable way to solve adaptive problems, because its likely that once you've evolved the computational device, the problem is different. You need something general that adapts itself to the problem at hand - the brain is a big ol' generalization machine.
ANTHROPIC FAIL.
posted by logicpunk at 3:36 PM on February 4, 2009
I would like to pound whoever said that. Evolving "functionally specialized computational devices" is a miserable way to solve adaptive problems, because its likely that once you've evolved the computational device, the problem is different. You need something general that adapts itself to the problem at hand - the brain is a big ol' generalization machine.
ANTHROPIC FAIL.
posted by logicpunk at 3:36 PM on February 4, 2009
The last episode of Radio 4's Material World featured Evolutionary Psychology... if you are quick you can still download the podcast here
posted by fearfulsymmetry at 3:40 PM on February 4, 2009
posted by fearfulsymmetry at 3:40 PM on February 4, 2009
Evolutionary psychology is the new social darwinism. Some people like it because they can use it to justify their biases. However, it has no basis in actual science.
We accept the principal of natural selection because it can be empirically proven; you mate two red cows, and you get 3 red offspring and a white one. You can't do anything remotely like this with evolutionary psychology.
posted by Afroblanco at 3:42 PM on February 4, 2009
We accept the principal of natural selection because it can be empirically proven; you mate two red cows, and you get 3 red offspring and a white one. You can't do anything remotely like this with evolutionary psychology.
posted by Afroblanco at 3:42 PM on February 4, 2009
Seconding localroger's and logicpunk's posts. The idea of the brain being a massively modular system of use-specific evolutionary-adaptive "devices" or "tools" seems too cumbersome and complicated by half. Furthermore, and this is the real deal breaker, unless and until there is specific genetic evidence for the existence of such fine-grained/adaptive, functionally specific "devices," the theoretical framework of EP would seem to be grossly unsubstantiated.
posted by ornate insect at 3:48 PM on February 4, 2009 [1 favorite]
posted by ornate insect at 3:48 PM on February 4, 2009 [1 favorite]
Evolving "functionally specialized computational devices" is a miserable way to solve adaptive problems
Ants seem to do just fine.
posted by Pyry at 4:06 PM on February 4, 2009
Ants seem to do just fine.
posted by Pyry at 4:06 PM on February 4, 2009
...but other scholars argue that the grand claims lack solid any evidence.
Uh, would that be the critique?
I mean seriously, I recently took some grief from someone in my group for being too much a theorist. That attitude pretty much dried up once I was able to explain some perplexing observations.
These guys are long on ideas of why we do the things we do, but come up short on testable hypothesis. I mean, sure, there are fields where you can't do experiments, but in the other kind of evolutionary theory you can at least point to new observations that the theory would predict (We need vitamin C; cats, dogs, cows, chickens, mice, rats - not so much; chimps need vitamin C. Guess who evolutionary bioloigst say is the most closely related to us.)
posted by Kid Charlemagne at 4:20 PM on February 4, 2009
Uh, would that be the critique?
I mean seriously, I recently took some grief from someone in my group for being too much a theorist. That attitude pretty much dried up once I was able to explain some perplexing observations.
These guys are long on ideas of why we do the things we do, but come up short on testable hypothesis. I mean, sure, there are fields where you can't do experiments, but in the other kind of evolutionary theory you can at least point to new observations that the theory would predict (We need vitamin C; cats, dogs, cows, chickens, mice, rats - not so much; chimps need vitamin C. Guess who evolutionary bioloigst say is the most closely related to us.)
posted by Kid Charlemagne at 4:20 PM on February 4, 2009
localroger: If you're interested, Gary Marcus has some fascinating thoughts about the genome's "gene shortage" and the complexity of the human mind:
Reflection on the relation between brain and body immediately vitiates the gene shortage argument: if 30,000 genes weren’t enough to have significant influence on the 20 billion cells in the brain, they surely wouldn’t have much impact on the trillions that are found in the body as a whole. The confusion, once again, can be traced to the mistaken idea of genome as blueprint, to the misguided expectation of a one-to-one mapping from individual genes to individual neurons; in reality, genomes describe processes for building things rather than pictures of finished products: better to think of the genome as a compression scheme than a blueprint.posted by AceRock at 4:26 PM on February 4, 2009 [2 favorites]
Computer scientists use compression schemes when they want to store and transmit information efficiently. All compression schemes rely in one way or another on ferreting out redundancy. For instance, programs that use the GIF format look for patterns of repeated pixels (the colored dots of which digital images are made)...Computer scientists have devised dozens of different compression schemes, from JPEGs for photographs to MP3s for music, each designed to exploit a different kind of redundancy. The general procedure is always the same: some end product is converted into a compact description of how to reconstruct that end product; a “decompressor” reconstructs the desired end product from that compact description.
Biology doesn’t know in advance what the end product will be; there’s no StuffIt Compressor to convert a human being into a genome. But the genome is very much akin to a compression scheme, a terrifically efficient description of how to build something of great complexity—perhaps more efficient than anything yet developed in the labs of computer scientists (never mind the complexities of the brain—there are trillions of cells in the rest of the body, and they are all supervised by the same 30,000-gene genome). And although nature has no counterpart to a program that stuffs a picture into a compressed encoding, it does offer a counterpart to the program that performs decompression: the cell. Genome in, organism out. Through the logic of gene expression, cells are self-regulating factories that translate genomes into biological structure.
Cascades are at the heart of this process of decompression, because the regulatory proteins that are at the top of genetic cascades serve as shorthand that can be used over and over again, like the subroutine of a software engineer. For example, the genome of a centipede probably doesn’t specify separate sets of hundreds or thousands of genes for each of the centipede’s legs; instead, it appears that the leg-building “subroutine”—a cascade of perhaps hundreds or thousands of genes—gets invoked many times, once for each new pair of legs. Something similar lies behind the construction of a vertebrate’s ribs. And within the last few years it has become clear that the embryonic brain relies on the same sort of genetic recycling, using the same repeated motifs—such as sets of parallel connections known as topographic maps—over and over again, to supervise the development of thousands or even millions of neurons with each use of a given genetic subroutine. There’s no gene shortage, because every cascade represents the shorthand for a different reuseable subroutine, a different way of creating more from less.
Evolution is the fundamental theory of biology. Psychology is a product of the brain, which is a biological organ.
The onus is on the doubters to prove that the brain is the exception to the rule.
posted by DU at 4:45 PM on February 4, 2009
The onus is on the doubters to prove that the brain is the exception to the rule.
posted by DU at 4:45 PM on February 4, 2009
I am especially interested in evolutionary aesthetics. Why, when a Pacific Islander could simple build a canoe, does he insist on making it a work of art? I think Darwinian thought explains some of this, as does it explain our love of narrative. Both adaptive selection and sexual selection can explain art...although the interaction between cultural and genetic adaptation is a huge question mark cast on all these speculations.
posted by kozad at 5:34 PM on February 4, 2009
posted by kozad at 5:34 PM on February 4, 2009
EP is just a response to the academic wankery of tabula rasa. Therefore also a bunch of wankery. It swings far too far in the other direction, it and Pinker provide the context for the Larry Summers of the world to claim that their girl children love pink. What, no really, they just do, because I grew them in a vat in the middle of the ocean and they still chose pink!
It's harmfully reductionist, and extremely harmfully bigoted and pro-status-quo. I've read Buller before and I think he's mostly quite spot on. But what's really upsetting to me is that EP doesn't exist without context, really glaring context especially with the Summers+Pinker at Harvard example. It makes me sad and sick and when Pinker was on NPR a few years ago trotting out the myth about eskimos having a kajillion words for snow, I knew all I needed to know about his adherence to...not just googling some shit.
posted by birdie birdington at 5:46 PM on February 4, 2009 [3 favorites]
It's harmfully reductionist, and extremely harmfully bigoted and pro-status-quo. I've read Buller before and I think he's mostly quite spot on. But what's really upsetting to me is that EP doesn't exist without context, really glaring context especially with the Summers+Pinker at Harvard example. It makes me sad and sick and when Pinker was on NPR a few years ago trotting out the myth about eskimos having a kajillion words for snow, I knew all I needed to know about his adherence to...not just googling some shit.
posted by birdie birdington at 5:46 PM on February 4, 2009 [3 favorites]
These guys are long on ideas of why we do the things we do, but come up short on testable hypothesis.
That's why we need to raise children as test subjects in controlled environments, but nooo, that would be unethical, the bleeding hearts say.
posted by 0xdeadc0de at 6:17 PM on February 4, 2009
That's why we need to raise children as test subjects in controlled environments, but nooo, that would be unethical, the bleeding hearts say.
posted by 0xdeadc0de at 6:17 PM on February 4, 2009
That Barrett and Machery critique is quite good. I hadn't seen that, thanks.
Most of the arguments in this thread are waaaay too sweeping (e.g. "evolving "functionally specialized computational devices" is a miserable way to solve adaptive problems"). They would serve as arguments against the evolution of language parsers, facial recognition, color vision, dead reckoning (in animals), circadian clocks, nausea reflexes, snake-detectors, etc. No one with any scientific respectability thinks that we're born tabula rasa and there's no functional localization in the brain; everyone who accepts that we have traits that were selected for accepts some amount of evolutionary psychology. Barrett and Machery do a good job of arguing this. Given that some features of our psychology were selected for, there's no argument to be made against evolutionary psychology in principle: all we can do is quibble about individual proposals for selected psychological mechanisms. Some of them -- cheater-detection modules, for instance -- are genuinely up in the air. But in-principle arguments are all that are on offer in this thread so far.
Some of the arguments here ("the genome can't encode enough information to capture the intricacies of the mind!") are used by creationists to argue against the evolution of the eye or anything that looks even remotely complex. Same with the "no testable hypotheses" bromide. Check the Barrett and Machery article for some examples of hypotheses that have been made.
posted by painquale at 6:17 PM on February 4, 2009 [3 favorites]
Most of the arguments in this thread are waaaay too sweeping (e.g. "evolving "functionally specialized computational devices" is a miserable way to solve adaptive problems"). They would serve as arguments against the evolution of language parsers, facial recognition, color vision, dead reckoning (in animals), circadian clocks, nausea reflexes, snake-detectors, etc. No one with any scientific respectability thinks that we're born tabula rasa and there's no functional localization in the brain; everyone who accepts that we have traits that were selected for accepts some amount of evolutionary psychology. Barrett and Machery do a good job of arguing this. Given that some features of our psychology were selected for, there's no argument to be made against evolutionary psychology in principle: all we can do is quibble about individual proposals for selected psychological mechanisms. Some of them -- cheater-detection modules, for instance -- are genuinely up in the air. But in-principle arguments are all that are on offer in this thread so far.
Some of the arguments here ("the genome can't encode enough information to capture the intricacies of the mind!") are used by creationists to argue against the evolution of the eye or anything that looks even remotely complex. Same with the "no testable hypotheses" bromide. Check the Barrett and Machery article for some examples of hypotheses that have been made.
posted by painquale at 6:17 PM on February 4, 2009 [3 favorites]
painquale--
a) I'm not sure that each of these things-- language parsers, facial recognition, color vision, dead reckoning (in animals), circadian clocks, nausea reflexes, snake-detectors---has a corresponding special functional localization in the brain, but I could be wrong. Certainly the "language organ" argued for by Pinker and Chomsky is widely contested (as I understand it), and the other functions you cite would seem to be rudimentary physiological animal reflexes (i.e. only psychological in a very broad sense). They are hardly the kinds of examples of complex human psychology and cognitive functionalism that a good deal of EP would seem in its sociobiological zeal to wish to find explanation for (i.e. literature, courtship, etc).
b) Some of the arguments here ("the genome can't encode enough information to capture the intricacies of the mind!")
I'm not sure that's the argument (see localroger upthread) being voiced on this thread. Indeed, the argument here would seem to be that because the brain is so complex one must be very careful when attempting to find reductive functional correspondences. Without some clear evidence of functional compartments, either genetic or done through cognitive/neural mapping, a lot of EP's larger claims can seem specious. Clearly, in some sense the brain is functional: I don't see anyone arguing against that here. What is being argued is that human psychology likely evolved according to more non-localized, generalized (rather than particularized) adaptability and plasticity. At least that's my take, but I agree w/you that one can overstate the case against discreet functionalism.
posted by ornate insect at 7:09 PM on February 4, 2009
a) I'm not sure that each of these things-- language parsers, facial recognition, color vision, dead reckoning (in animals), circadian clocks, nausea reflexes, snake-detectors---has a corresponding special functional localization in the brain, but I could be wrong. Certainly the "language organ" argued for by Pinker and Chomsky is widely contested (as I understand it), and the other functions you cite would seem to be rudimentary physiological animal reflexes (i.e. only psychological in a very broad sense). They are hardly the kinds of examples of complex human psychology and cognitive functionalism that a good deal of EP would seem in its sociobiological zeal to wish to find explanation for (i.e. literature, courtship, etc).
b) Some of the arguments here ("the genome can't encode enough information to capture the intricacies of the mind!")
I'm not sure that's the argument (see localroger upthread) being voiced on this thread. Indeed, the argument here would seem to be that because the brain is so complex one must be very careful when attempting to find reductive functional correspondences. Without some clear evidence of functional compartments, either genetic or done through cognitive/neural mapping, a lot of EP's larger claims can seem specious. Clearly, in some sense the brain is functional: I don't see anyone arguing against that here. What is being argued is that human psychology likely evolved according to more non-localized, generalized (rather than particularized) adaptability and plasticity. At least that's my take, but I agree w/you that one can overstate the case against discreet functionalism.
posted by ornate insect at 7:09 PM on February 4, 2009
I want to qualify what I just wrote in my previous post, b/c I'm not happy with it.
To back up a bit, here's what I think: human language and culture are, in some very broad sense, both epiphenomenal (they were a kind of evolutionary excess of our outsized brains and the speech capacities of our larynx) and also cognitively extensional (all our linguistic acts and cultural acts should be viewed as technological extensions of our cognitive capacities). Though they have clear evolutionary advantages, what they opened up in terms of who we are transcends easy biological determinism (i.e. EP).
What this means in terms of EP is this: human psychology clearly evolved from our brain capacities, but language was a technology of cognition that increased our psychological complexity far more than any of our simian brethren (whose language, if it is a language, remains extremely "primitive," i.e. non-recursive, etc).
Putting aside the question of whether or not language (i.e. grammar) is localized in the brain, the upshot is that language makes our psychology far more complex in evolutionary terms than that of the behavior of fruitflies or mountain gorillas. This may sound like homo-sapien-exceptionalism, and in some sense it is: we are exceptional creatures in evolutionary terms...for having developed language that is a turbo jet in what it affords our psychology and technology, at least in comparison with other animals. But it makes attempts to untangle what is cultural from what is biological extremely, extremely difficult.
Just as it would be way too simplistic, and ultimately misleading, to say we build skyscrapers for phallic (i.e Freudian) reasons, so too is it too simplistic to assert that the breadth of human behavior can be reduced to specific evolutionary functions: language already threw us off the chart.
posted by ornate insect at 7:43 PM on February 4, 2009
To back up a bit, here's what I think: human language and culture are, in some very broad sense, both epiphenomenal (they were a kind of evolutionary excess of our outsized brains and the speech capacities of our larynx) and also cognitively extensional (all our linguistic acts and cultural acts should be viewed as technological extensions of our cognitive capacities). Though they have clear evolutionary advantages, what they opened up in terms of who we are transcends easy biological determinism (i.e. EP).
What this means in terms of EP is this: human psychology clearly evolved from our brain capacities, but language was a technology of cognition that increased our psychological complexity far more than any of our simian brethren (whose language, if it is a language, remains extremely "primitive," i.e. non-recursive, etc).
Putting aside the question of whether or not language (i.e. grammar) is localized in the brain, the upshot is that language makes our psychology far more complex in evolutionary terms than that of the behavior of fruitflies or mountain gorillas. This may sound like homo-sapien-exceptionalism, and in some sense it is: we are exceptional creatures in evolutionary terms...for having developed language that is a turbo jet in what it affords our psychology and technology, at least in comparison with other animals. But it makes attempts to untangle what is cultural from what is biological extremely, extremely difficult.
Just as it would be way too simplistic, and ultimately misleading, to say we build skyscrapers for phallic (i.e Freudian) reasons, so too is it too simplistic to assert that the breadth of human behavior can be reduced to specific evolutionary functions: language already threw us off the chart.
posted by ornate insect at 7:43 PM on February 4, 2009
Okay, how about this - if evolutionary psychology counts as science, why don't you go ahead and use it to predict something?
posted by Afroblanco at 9:03 PM on February 4, 2009
posted by Afroblanco at 9:03 PM on February 4, 2009
Fine, we can't agree on human behavior. Then what about animals?
Why do wolves travel in packs, while tigers are solitary hunters? If EP doesn't exist, then why haven't we seen packs of tigers hunting in groups with coordinated behaviors? That would make the hunting easier.
But we don't see that. And a tiger's brain is just as sophisticated as a wolf's. What makes wolves so smart that they're apparently teaching their offspring, in each generation, how best to hunt?
Answer: The wolves aren't super-smart, EP does exist in animals, and wolf behaviors and tiger behaviors are encoded and each animal is happy-happy in its own evolutionary niche.
So, if EP easily explains the behaviors of some mammals, why not all mammals?
posted by Cool Papa Bell at 9:10 PM on February 4, 2009 [1 favorite]
Why do wolves travel in packs, while tigers are solitary hunters? If EP doesn't exist, then why haven't we seen packs of tigers hunting in groups with coordinated behaviors? That would make the hunting easier.
But we don't see that. And a tiger's brain is just as sophisticated as a wolf's. What makes wolves so smart that they're apparently teaching their offspring, in each generation, how best to hunt?
Answer: The wolves aren't super-smart, EP does exist in animals, and wolf behaviors and tiger behaviors are encoded and each animal is happy-happy in its own evolutionary niche.
So, if EP easily explains the behaviors of some mammals, why not all mammals?
posted by Cool Papa Bell at 9:10 PM on February 4, 2009 [1 favorite]
why don't you go ahead and use it to predict something?
OK, I predict that the concept of the nuclear family will continue to exist as the predominant paradigm across the majority of human civilizations for the next several thousand years. Because we evolved that way, it will take a significant length of time for various factors to evolve that paradigm into something significantly different for the vast majority of people.
posted by Cool Papa Bell at 9:14 PM on February 4, 2009
OK, I predict that the concept of the nuclear family will continue to exist as the predominant paradigm across the majority of human civilizations for the next several thousand years. Because we evolved that way, it will take a significant length of time for various factors to evolve that paradigm into something significantly different for the vast majority of people.
posted by Cool Papa Bell at 9:14 PM on February 4, 2009
cool papa bell-- is evolutionary psychology the same as evolutionary behavior? Is all animal behavior "psychological"? I am not taking a stance on this question: I honestly do not have a clear idea of what behavior is psychological and what behavior is just...behavior. Clearly fish behave in certain ways, but can we speak of fish psychology? Psychology would seem to be an order that emerges out of physiology, and humans are not, I agree with you, immune from animal behavior. We are animals, after all. Nevertheless, I maintain that human language extends our behavior in such a way that the link between animal behavior and human culture is often obscure. Note that I am not saying such a link does not exist. Just that discerning how our behavior has been shaped by evolutionary constraint is not an easy task. Clearly some elements of EP are potentially legitimate, at least in my view. The problem is that evolution applied to the social and cultural realms of human behavior does not have a promising history science-wise.
posted by ornate insect at 9:25 PM on February 4, 2009
posted by ornate insect at 9:25 PM on February 4, 2009
cool papa bell-- is evolutionary psychology the same as evolutionary behavior?
Well, I could be pedantic and point out that most definitions of psychology include a phrase like "it's the study of mental processes and behavior." ;-)
But seriously, I don't see a difference in what we're talking about -- are the things we see the result of an evolutionary, genetic process or something else? IMO, the answer is yes, and moreover, most people that insist otherwise are being willfully obtuse about it for the purposes of political correctness. Because EP says things about humans that some people just don't want to hear.
Wolves have evolved pack behaviors. Everyone agrees there. Then why MUST human tribal behaviors be the result of some other process? Either it works for all animals or it doesn't. Despite our ability to process language, humans are just not that unique.
posted by Cool Papa Bell at 9:41 PM on February 4, 2009
Well, I could be pedantic and point out that most definitions of psychology include a phrase like "it's the study of mental processes and behavior." ;-)
But seriously, I don't see a difference in what we're talking about -- are the things we see the result of an evolutionary, genetic process or something else? IMO, the answer is yes, and moreover, most people that insist otherwise are being willfully obtuse about it for the purposes of political correctness. Because EP says things about humans that some people just don't want to hear.
Wolves have evolved pack behaviors. Everyone agrees there. Then why MUST human tribal behaviors be the result of some other process? Either it works for all animals or it doesn't. Despite our ability to process language, humans are just not that unique.
posted by Cool Papa Bell at 9:41 PM on February 4, 2009
DU: Evolution is the fundamental theory of biology. Psychology is a product of the brain, which is a biological organ.
Certainly, and while there are a few people who argue that the brain (or rather, the mind) is a metaphysically transcendental organ, most people on both sides of this debate generally agree that the brain is both biological and evolved.
The onus is on the doubters to prove that the brain is the exception to the rule.
The problem is that this "rule" is far from a universal statement of biological principle. There are many cases in biology where a phenomena appears to be best explained by a dynamic interaction of some very simple genetic principles with environmental forces. As an example, colonies of Bacillus can form structures on agar that look like spirals, clouds, and moss. But it's a mistake to think that the shape of a spiral, or branching moss is somehow encoded in the genes of a single-celled organism. The communal behavior of colonies can be explained entirely in terms of the variance in cell motility and viscosity of the medium.
Evolution is a theory in biology. But it certainly is not the only theory in biology. And if you are going to invoke evolution, you might as well invoke the E=MC2 of modern evolutionary theory: P = (A + D) + (E + I) . The phenotypic value of an individual is the sum of additive and dominant genetic factors, combined with environmental and interactive factors.
Which of course, evolutionary psychologists freely admit if cornered on the issue. Specially when you get to Pinker's own defensive whines about his personal evolutionary failure.
posted by KirkJobSluder at 9:49 PM on February 4, 2009
Certainly, and while there are a few people who argue that the brain (or rather, the mind) is a metaphysically transcendental organ, most people on both sides of this debate generally agree that the brain is both biological and evolved.
The onus is on the doubters to prove that the brain is the exception to the rule.
The problem is that this "rule" is far from a universal statement of biological principle. There are many cases in biology where a phenomena appears to be best explained by a dynamic interaction of some very simple genetic principles with environmental forces. As an example, colonies of Bacillus can form structures on agar that look like spirals, clouds, and moss. But it's a mistake to think that the shape of a spiral, or branching moss is somehow encoded in the genes of a single-celled organism. The communal behavior of colonies can be explained entirely in terms of the variance in cell motility and viscosity of the medium.
Evolution is a theory in biology. But it certainly is not the only theory in biology. And if you are going to invoke evolution, you might as well invoke the E=MC2 of modern evolutionary theory: P = (A + D) + (E + I) . The phenotypic value of an individual is the sum of additive and dominant genetic factors, combined with environmental and interactive factors.
Which of course, evolutionary psychologists freely admit if cornered on the issue. Specially when you get to Pinker's own defensive whines about his personal evolutionary failure.
posted by KirkJobSluder at 9:49 PM on February 4, 2009
No matter how sloppy and speculative the science being criticized, I've never seen a critic of evolutionary psychology offer an alternative explanation for anything that wasn't the vaguest hand-waving. It is a god in the gaps argument without the god.
Why would a general purpose brain require less information to build than a brain of specialized composite parts?
What is the architecture of a general purpose brain? If you don't know, how do you judge it less cumbersome than the alternative?
What is the physical existence of something epiphenomenal?
How does one know when a behavior transcends easy biological determinism?
How does human language dictate a human behavior?
posted by 0xdeadc0de at 9:50 PM on February 4, 2009
Why would a general purpose brain require less information to build than a brain of specialized composite parts?
What is the architecture of a general purpose brain? If you don't know, how do you judge it less cumbersome than the alternative?
What is the physical existence of something epiphenomenal?
How does one know when a behavior transcends easy biological determinism?
How does human language dictate a human behavior?
posted by 0xdeadc0de at 9:50 PM on February 4, 2009
birdy birdington: EP is just a response to the academic wankery of tabula rasa.
To a large extent, EP is the enterprise of arguing against a strawman of behavioral psychology. Which is countered on the other side by behavioral psychologists arguing against a strawman of biological determinism. The EPs would have a better point, if it didn't rely on cherry-picking and misrepresentation.
Cool Papa Bell: OK, I predict that the concept of the nuclear family will continue to exist as the predominant paradigm across the majority of human civilizations for the next several thousand years. Because we evolved that way, it will take a significant length of time for various factors to evolve that paradigm into something significantly different for the vast majority of people.
Except that the nuclear family is a quirk of post-war industrialized cultures. For a large chunk of history, the dominant paradigm has been the multi-generational extended family, and looking across cultures the mother-father kinship bond is certainly not a human universal. Furthermore, even if we take it as given that a trait exists across a "majority" of human cultures, you are still left with finding some explanation not rooted in the behavior of a tiny paleolithic population for that variance.
But seriously, I don't see a difference in what we're talking about -- are the things we see the result of an evolutionary, genetic process or something else? IMO, the answer is yes, and moreover, most people that insist otherwise are being willfully obtuse about it for the purposes of political correctness. Because EP says things about humans that some people just don't want to hear.
Of course the answer is yes. The nature/nurture argument is one waged by keyboard pundits lacking an understanding of either evolution or the current state of developmental psychology.
But of course, EP says things about humans that some people don't want to hear. I really dislike pseudoscience that seeks to explain certain statistical facts using untestable just so stories regarding an OBE that we have a minimal understanding of.
posted by KirkJobSluder at 10:10 PM on February 4, 2009
To a large extent, EP is the enterprise of arguing against a strawman of behavioral psychology. Which is countered on the other side by behavioral psychologists arguing against a strawman of biological determinism. The EPs would have a better point, if it didn't rely on cherry-picking and misrepresentation.
Cool Papa Bell: OK, I predict that the concept of the nuclear family will continue to exist as the predominant paradigm across the majority of human civilizations for the next several thousand years. Because we evolved that way, it will take a significant length of time for various factors to evolve that paradigm into something significantly different for the vast majority of people.
Except that the nuclear family is a quirk of post-war industrialized cultures. For a large chunk of history, the dominant paradigm has been the multi-generational extended family, and looking across cultures the mother-father kinship bond is certainly not a human universal. Furthermore, even if we take it as given that a trait exists across a "majority" of human cultures, you are still left with finding some explanation not rooted in the behavior of a tiny paleolithic population for that variance.
But seriously, I don't see a difference in what we're talking about -- are the things we see the result of an evolutionary, genetic process or something else? IMO, the answer is yes, and moreover, most people that insist otherwise are being willfully obtuse about it for the purposes of political correctness. Because EP says things about humans that some people just don't want to hear.
Of course the answer is yes. The nature/nurture argument is one waged by keyboard pundits lacking an understanding of either evolution or the current state of developmental psychology.
But of course, EP says things about humans that some people don't want to hear. I really dislike pseudoscience that seeks to explain certain statistical facts using untestable just so stories regarding an OBE that we have a minimal understanding of.
posted by KirkJobSluder at 10:10 PM on February 4, 2009
Evolutionary psychology is a bunch of bullshit.
Except that the nuclear family is a quirk of post-war industrialized cultures. For a large chunk of history, the dominant paradigm has been the multi-generational extended family
I agree. The "Nuclear family" is kind of anomalous.
posted by delmoi at 10:38 PM on February 4, 2009
Except that the nuclear family is a quirk of post-war industrialized cultures. For a large chunk of history, the dominant paradigm has been the multi-generational extended family
I agree. The "Nuclear family" is kind of anomalous.
posted by delmoi at 10:38 PM on February 4, 2009
0xdeadc0de: No matter how sloppy and speculative the science being criticized, I've never seen a critic of evolutionary psychology offer an alternative explanation for anything that wasn't the vaguest hand-waving. It is a god in the gaps argument without the god.
Well, what, in particular, is wrong with, "I don't know"? Especially when you have pretty much a complete and total lack of data around which to construct a reasonable hypothesis? For much of human behavior, we have a weak understanding of modern humans, some provocative case studies of other primates, and and some highly speculative ideas about human behavioral origins based on fragmentary and ambiguous evidence.
So, just to take an example. Let's take the ability to perform simple arithmetic operations. There certainly is strong evidence that it evolved somehow. Few animals come close to this skill, and profound dyscalcula appears to be hereditary and linked to certain types of brain injury. On the other hand, early exposure to math and teaching pedagogies also have an influence on how well a person performs these skills. Many otherwise normal and functional people are innumerate. Developmental age is also a factor. So most developmental psychologists will agree that there is something evolved and biological there, but educational and cultural factors have big roles to play in how well a person performs this skill.
We don't fully understand the phenotype to a degree that allows us to plug in all the numbers of the equation I posted above, much less to make the sweeping claim that differential achievement in technology fields for contemporary men and women are the result of fantasy gender roles in an entirely speculative neolithic human society.
How does one know when a behavior transcends easy biological determinism?
Well, we have a variety of ways. 1) we can document how people learn that behavior, and 2) we can show that other factors such as education and socio-economic status offer better predictive models. Of course, neither side proposes biological determinism as a good model.
How does human language dictate a human behavior?
Tell me, what button did you click to post your message?
posted by KirkJobSluder at 10:53 PM on February 4, 2009
Well, what, in particular, is wrong with, "I don't know"? Especially when you have pretty much a complete and total lack of data around which to construct a reasonable hypothesis? For much of human behavior, we have a weak understanding of modern humans, some provocative case studies of other primates, and and some highly speculative ideas about human behavioral origins based on fragmentary and ambiguous evidence.
So, just to take an example. Let's take the ability to perform simple arithmetic operations. There certainly is strong evidence that it evolved somehow. Few animals come close to this skill, and profound dyscalcula appears to be hereditary and linked to certain types of brain injury. On the other hand, early exposure to math and teaching pedagogies also have an influence on how well a person performs these skills. Many otherwise normal and functional people are innumerate. Developmental age is also a factor. So most developmental psychologists will agree that there is something evolved and biological there, but educational and cultural factors have big roles to play in how well a person performs this skill.
We don't fully understand the phenotype to a degree that allows us to plug in all the numbers of the equation I posted above, much less to make the sweeping claim that differential achievement in technology fields for contemporary men and women are the result of fantasy gender roles in an entirely speculative neolithic human society.
How does one know when a behavior transcends easy biological determinism?
Well, we have a variety of ways. 1) we can document how people learn that behavior, and 2) we can show that other factors such as education and socio-economic status offer better predictive models. Of course, neither side proposes biological determinism as a good model.
How does human language dictate a human behavior?
Tell me, what button did you click to post your message?
posted by KirkJobSluder at 10:53 PM on February 4, 2009
OK, I predict that the concept of the nuclear family will continue to exist as the predominant paradigm across the majority of human civilizations for the next several thousand years.
Well, I guess I'll see you several thousand years from now and we'll have to compare notes then.
And I'm not just being snarky here. You've absolutely made my point for me. Evolutionary psychology is not science.
Mendelian genetics is science. It is testable, as our friend Gregor demonstrated. You can use it to predict things. You can apply it in fields as diverse as medicine and agriculture. This is why we care about it, and why we get angry when hayseed preachers want to stop schools from teaching evolution. Because it is science. SCIENCE!
Psychology is science. People run psychological experiments all the time and draw valuable conclusions. It is testable. It can be used to predict things. It can be used to influence peoples' actions or improve their mood. It has solid, well-known applications. Because it is science. SCIENCE!
Evolutionary psychology is not testable. You cannot use it to predict anything. It offers nothing but convenient, plausible-sounding explanations. People like it because it "sounds like it makes sense," much in the same way that social darwinism "sounded like it made sense" a century ago. But it is not science.
Not science.
posted by Afroblanco at 11:45 PM on February 4, 2009 [1 favorite]
Well, I guess I'll see you several thousand years from now and we'll have to compare notes then.
And I'm not just being snarky here. You've absolutely made my point for me. Evolutionary psychology is not science.
Mendelian genetics is science. It is testable, as our friend Gregor demonstrated. You can use it to predict things. You can apply it in fields as diverse as medicine and agriculture. This is why we care about it, and why we get angry when hayseed preachers want to stop schools from teaching evolution. Because it is science. SCIENCE!
Psychology is science. People run psychological experiments all the time and draw valuable conclusions. It is testable. It can be used to predict things. It can be used to influence peoples' actions or improve their mood. It has solid, well-known applications. Because it is science. SCIENCE!
Evolutionary psychology is not testable. You cannot use it to predict anything. It offers nothing but convenient, plausible-sounding explanations. People like it because it "sounds like it makes sense," much in the same way that social darwinism "sounded like it made sense" a century ago. But it is not science.
Not science.
posted by Afroblanco at 11:45 PM on February 4, 2009 [1 favorite]
I agree with most of what you say, ornate insect. I just don't think it makes sense to criticize evolutionary psychology as a field any more than it makes sense to criticize evolutionary biology. You can criticize certain claims, but you can't criticize the whole project; there's no deep difference between the claim that a desire for fatty foods is an adaptation and a desire for certain courtship rituals is an adaptation.
why don't you go ahead and use it to predict something?
OK, I predict that the concept of the nuclear family will continue to exist as the predominant paradigm across the majority of human civilizations for the next several thousand years.
This is the wrong tack to take. If a creationist challenges you to make a prediction based on evolution, it's a bad move to make a prediction about how future evolution will go. There are better predictions to make, such as predictions about vestigial traits that a descendant will have, or predictions about the traits of an ancestor had (usually done from the fossil record), or predictions about homologous traits that cousin species will have, or predictions about shared traits between species that occupy similar niches. Similarities you predict can be either genetic or phenotypic -- analogously, in evolutionary psychology, the similarities you predict can be either neurological or psychological.
Psychology is replete with predictions that are made on the basis of evolutionary explanations. Here's an example. Early researchers in animal number cognition noticed that animals (birds, rats, primates, etc.) had some concept of number, but were subject to making some dramatic mistakes in gauging the difference in magnitude of two groupings. The systematic mistakes these animals made led researchers to posit the existence of an "accumulator" mechanism that is for processing small magnitude calculations. Their arithmetic skills are lumpy and approximate and only work for small numbers, but those approximate calculations served their purposes, and the mechanism was fast. It was predicted that although humans have a more robust comprehension of mathematics, we have an accumulator and it influences our arithmetical abilities. Here's Stanislas Dehaene:
"Evolution is a conservative mechanism [...] if our closest cousins, the chimpanzees, possess some competence for arithmetic, and if species as different as rats, pigeons, and dolphins are not devoid of numerical abilities, it is likely that we Homo Sapiens have received a similar heritage. Our brains, like the rat's, are likely to come equipped with an accumulator [...] In the next chapters, we will scrutinize human mathematical abilities, looking for vestiges of the animal mode of apprehending numbers."
As it turns out, he finds a lot of the evidence that he predicted. We are subject to a lot of the same mistakes that animals make. It looks like we use an accumulator for fast calculations.
This is evolutionary psychology. It's good stuff, and it's not at all atypical of what is done elsewhere in psychology. I think some people might not want to call it EP because it sounds reasonable, but there's no difference in principle between saying that we have evolved mechanisms that influence our calculation and that we have evolved mechanisms that influence our procreation... or our kinship preferences, or mate selection, or moral attitudes, or what have you.
I think people hate EP because it's become so politicized. But it's wrong to oppose it for political reasons too.
posted by painquale at 11:51 PM on February 4, 2009 [4 favorites]
why don't you go ahead and use it to predict something?
OK, I predict that the concept of the nuclear family will continue to exist as the predominant paradigm across the majority of human civilizations for the next several thousand years.
This is the wrong tack to take. If a creationist challenges you to make a prediction based on evolution, it's a bad move to make a prediction about how future evolution will go. There are better predictions to make, such as predictions about vestigial traits that a descendant will have, or predictions about the traits of an ancestor had (usually done from the fossil record), or predictions about homologous traits that cousin species will have, or predictions about shared traits between species that occupy similar niches. Similarities you predict can be either genetic or phenotypic -- analogously, in evolutionary psychology, the similarities you predict can be either neurological or psychological.
Psychology is replete with predictions that are made on the basis of evolutionary explanations. Here's an example. Early researchers in animal number cognition noticed that animals (birds, rats, primates, etc.) had some concept of number, but were subject to making some dramatic mistakes in gauging the difference in magnitude of two groupings. The systematic mistakes these animals made led researchers to posit the existence of an "accumulator" mechanism that is for processing small magnitude calculations. Their arithmetic skills are lumpy and approximate and only work for small numbers, but those approximate calculations served their purposes, and the mechanism was fast. It was predicted that although humans have a more robust comprehension of mathematics, we have an accumulator and it influences our arithmetical abilities. Here's Stanislas Dehaene:
"Evolution is a conservative mechanism [...] if our closest cousins, the chimpanzees, possess some competence for arithmetic, and if species as different as rats, pigeons, and dolphins are not devoid of numerical abilities, it is likely that we Homo Sapiens have received a similar heritage. Our brains, like the rat's, are likely to come equipped with an accumulator [...] In the next chapters, we will scrutinize human mathematical abilities, looking for vestiges of the animal mode of apprehending numbers."
As it turns out, he finds a lot of the evidence that he predicted. We are subject to a lot of the same mistakes that animals make. It looks like we use an accumulator for fast calculations.
This is evolutionary psychology. It's good stuff, and it's not at all atypical of what is done elsewhere in psychology. I think some people might not want to call it EP because it sounds reasonable, but there's no difference in principle between saying that we have evolved mechanisms that influence our calculation and that we have evolved mechanisms that influence our procreation... or our kinship preferences, or mate selection, or moral attitudes, or what have you.
I think people hate EP because it's become so politicized. But it's wrong to oppose it for political reasons too.
posted by painquale at 11:51 PM on February 4, 2009 [4 favorites]
The existence of online trolls implies a trolling gene, which gives rise to and governs trolling behavior. The fact that an internet trolling gene could come into being and become so prevalent in such a short period of time is a testimony to the adaptability of the human genome. I look forward to the impending age where we can pre-screen fetuses and abort the ones that will be prone to posting links to pictures that make me uncomfortable.
posted by idiopath at 3:18 AM on February 5, 2009
posted by idiopath at 3:18 AM on February 5, 2009
Evolutionary psychology is not testable. You cannot use it to predict anything.
I wish people would RTFA instead of just coming in with preconceived notions. I posted this to raise the level of discourse about e.p. and psychology in general on mefi, because a lot of people have some funny misconceptions about it.
From the Barrett et al paper:
posted by AceRock at 4:21 AM on February 5, 2009
I wish people would RTFA instead of just coming in with preconceived notions. I posted this to raise the level of discourse about e.p. and psychology in general on mefi, because a lot of people have some funny misconceptions about it.
From the Barrett et al paper:
"The proper role of adaptationist thinking here is a heuristic one, which guides empirical work but does not substitute for it. While there are many possible hypotheses about adaptive solutions to environmental hazards, not all hypotheses are equally plausible, and evidence ultimately adjudicates between them."A quick example from a Guardian profile on Robert Trivers:
From abstract notions about the flow of genes he had come up with concrete and testable ideas about the ways our minds work; and it turned out to be demonstrably true that we find it much easier to solve logical puzzles if they are framed as if they are about cheating rather than an emotionally neutral subject, even though the two ways of putting the problem are logically equivalent.This was a hypothesis that came from e.p. as a generative theoretical framework that was then tested and shown to be a real phenomenon.
posted by AceRock at 4:21 AM on February 5, 2009
I find it interesting to think about a lot of evolutionary psychology as making predictions that are theoretically, but not practically testable. E.g. the most hand wavy stuff like "humans find it comforting to be hugged because when our ancestors lived in trees, there was a danger of falling, so mothers held their babies tightly". Well, this is indeed interesting if it's more generally applicable, so we might form the hypothesis "social animals that have a stage in their evolutionary history where they lived in trees will be more likely to hug each other than animals that did not have such a stage". This is a perfectly respectable hypothesis; if we imagine for a moment that we have god-like powers we could set up an experiment - go out into the universe and find 100 planets with highly social life forms, divide them up into those that did or did not have a tree-dwelling stage in their evolutionary history, then bring the usual scientific apparatus of statistical analysis etc. to test the hypothesis. Within the evolved-from-tree-dwelling group of aliens, we might even test for correlation between the strength of gravity on their home planet and the amount they like to be hugged.
posted by primer_dimer at 4:54 AM on February 5, 2009
posted by primer_dimer at 4:54 AM on February 5, 2009
'Evolutionary psychology' is a narrow subtype of the overall general theory that evolution has in some way affected human behaviour. It posits (as people have said above) that behaviour is the result of specialised cognitive modules which turn given inputs (stimuli) into highly specific outputs (behaviours) in an inflexible way.
An obvious alternative view is that, as other animals do, humans respond to stimuli with a mixture of genetically conditioned and improvised behaviours. Humans (it seems to me) find it easier to improvise behaviour than most, perhaps all, other animals. Thus the alternative hypothesis is that the human mind produces composite and flexible behaviours. This is what we call intelligence.
The bad side (in this hypothesis) of human intelligence is we also probably feel more anticipatory anxiety than other animals, and this means we also generate a lot of compensatory anxiety-limiting behaviours, which you might even call neurotic. To the extent that I think neurotic behaviours - not directly functional in themselves - are normal for human beings.
Thus the alternative to evolutionary psychology is that humans have evolved to be more flexible, but probably less rational, in their responses to their environment. This seems to match the facts more closely.
posted by communicator at 5:27 AM on February 5, 2009
An obvious alternative view is that, as other animals do, humans respond to stimuli with a mixture of genetically conditioned and improvised behaviours. Humans (it seems to me) find it easier to improvise behaviour than most, perhaps all, other animals. Thus the alternative hypothesis is that the human mind produces composite and flexible behaviours. This is what we call intelligence.
The bad side (in this hypothesis) of human intelligence is we also probably feel more anticipatory anxiety than other animals, and this means we also generate a lot of compensatory anxiety-limiting behaviours, which you might even call neurotic. To the extent that I think neurotic behaviours - not directly functional in themselves - are normal for human beings.
Thus the alternative to evolutionary psychology is that humans have evolved to be more flexible, but probably less rational, in their responses to their environment. This seems to match the facts more closely.
posted by communicator at 5:27 AM on February 5, 2009
It's harmfully reductionist, and extremely harmfully bigoted and pro-status-quo.
Actually, evolutionary psychologists Tooby and Cosmides have done some good work showing that people are NOT programmed to be racist. Rather, they say that:
posted by AceRock at 5:28 AM on February 5, 2009
Actually, evolutionary psychologists Tooby and Cosmides have done some good work showing that people are NOT programmed to be racist. Rather, they say that:
...racism is actually an unfortunate by-product of another phenomenon—a tendency to assign people to “coalition groups”, and to use whatever cues are available, be they clothing, accent or skin colour, to slot individuals into such groups (or “stereotype” them, as modern usage might term it). The good news is that experiments done by the researchers suggest that such stereotypes are easily dissolved and replaced with others. Racism, in other words, can be eliminated.The linked article has details about the experiments and their result which are quite compelling.
posted by AceRock at 5:28 AM on February 5, 2009
educational and cultural factors have big roles to play in how well a person performs this skill
And many higher mammals must practice the skills they are instinctively predisposed to using before they are successful. I don't see how this is in any way not "evolutionary". As others have said, our DNA does not describe what we are, it describes the engine that builds what we are. Why can't an engine that builds a machine that learns particular skills be selected for?
Tell me, what button did you click to post your message?
The one that has made my post appear in previous attempts. The other one is a trick, it makes it appear, but then it disappears.
I can't help but wonder if being a software developer alters my perception of language so that I see it plainly while others find it magical. My language is a motive force, it causes machines do things it would take a million people a thousand years to accomplish without them. But never am I under the delusion that the words themselves are what they mean. They're just symbols, information my brain manipulates to model my environment, or in this case, the behavior of a machine. The grammar mirrors reality, it is a system of cause and effect, objects and their attributes. I think of the result I want, and then I choose the words that make it happen. It is never the other way around, and it is the same in English as it is in code.
Human culture is just another aspect of our environment. Like our senses it gives us complex information which we process and react to, and occasionally we mark our scent on that environment by typing into a box on a blue page.
posted by 0xdeadc0de at 5:46 AM on February 5, 2009
And many higher mammals must practice the skills they are instinctively predisposed to using before they are successful. I don't see how this is in any way not "evolutionary". As others have said, our DNA does not describe what we are, it describes the engine that builds what we are. Why can't an engine that builds a machine that learns particular skills be selected for?
Tell me, what button did you click to post your message?
The one that has made my post appear in previous attempts. The other one is a trick, it makes it appear, but then it disappears.
I can't help but wonder if being a software developer alters my perception of language so that I see it plainly while others find it magical. My language is a motive force, it causes machines do things it would take a million people a thousand years to accomplish without them. But never am I under the delusion that the words themselves are what they mean. They're just symbols, information my brain manipulates to model my environment, or in this case, the behavior of a machine. The grammar mirrors reality, it is a system of cause and effect, objects and their attributes. I think of the result I want, and then I choose the words that make it happen. It is never the other way around, and it is the same in English as it is in code.
Human culture is just another aspect of our environment. Like our senses it gives us complex information which we process and react to, and occasionally we mark our scent on that environment by typing into a box on a blue page.
posted by 0xdeadc0de at 5:46 AM on February 5, 2009
0xdeadc0de: And many higher mammals must practice the skills they are instinctively predisposed to using before they are successful. I don't see how this is in any way not "evolutionary". As others have said, our DNA does not describe what we are, it describes the engine that builds what we are. Why can't an engine that builds a machine that learns particular skills be selected for?
Well, the question I have to ask is exactly, who is arguing that our capacity for learning is not an evolved characteristic? In spite of lots of political finger-pointing, you won't find this idea in the behaviorism of James or Skinner, both of whom acknowledged both innate behaviors and the fact that humans have an innate capacity for learning.
posted by KirkJobSluder at 6:10 AM on February 5, 2009
Well, the question I have to ask is exactly, who is arguing that our capacity for learning is not an evolved characteristic? In spite of lots of political finger-pointing, you won't find this idea in the behaviorism of James or Skinner, both of whom acknowledged both innate behaviors and the fact that humans have an innate capacity for learning.
posted by KirkJobSluder at 6:10 AM on February 5, 2009
0xdeadc0de: I can't help but wonder if being a software developer alters my perception of language so that I see it plainly while others find it magical.
Exactly who sees it as magical? I'm just pointing out an obvious answer to your question as to how language shapes human behavior. The behavior of clicking on a pair of words on a visually distinct symbol saying "Post comment" is a socio-political construct that (probably) didn't exist when you were born.
painquale: I agree with most of what you say, ornate insect. I just don't think it makes sense to criticize evolutionary psychology as a field any more than it makes sense to criticize evolutionary biology. You can criticize certain claims, but you can't criticize the whole project; there's no deep difference between the claim that a desire for fatty foods is an adaptation and a desire for certain courtship rituals is an adaptation.
Except, of course, while we have a fairly robust understanding of the biological mechanisms behind appetite, we are just scratching the surface in regards to understanding human sexuality. Furthermore, the specific claims made by EPs regarding human sexuality are notorious because they are untestable, reductionist in ways that fail to account for observed human diversity, and often silly and obviously biased.
Take, for example, the profoundly stupid proposal that female genital response to auditory and visual sexual stimuli is a defensive mechanism to prevent injury during rape. There are a number of obvious objections to this hypothesis including 1) it's demands untestable speculation about rape and sexuality in the OBE, 2) structurally the pelvis and vagina are considerably more robust than the human penis, and 3) we still have no way of isolating environmental and hereditary factors from that data.
Until you have a good model for the data that isolates the environmental and hereditary factors, you can't start to consider the kinds of selective pressures that shaped those hereditary factors.
I think people hate EP because it's become so politicized. But it's wrong to oppose it for political reasons too.
It's because EP appears to be primarily the political enterprise of braying that developmental and cognitive psychology, was ignoring issues of heredity and evolution. When, in fact, theories about the theoretical atoms of numeric processing predate EP by some time.
posted by KirkJobSluder at 6:53 AM on February 5, 2009
Exactly who sees it as magical? I'm just pointing out an obvious answer to your question as to how language shapes human behavior. The behavior of clicking on a pair of words on a visually distinct symbol saying "Post comment" is a socio-political construct that (probably) didn't exist when you were born.
painquale: I agree with most of what you say, ornate insect. I just don't think it makes sense to criticize evolutionary psychology as a field any more than it makes sense to criticize evolutionary biology. You can criticize certain claims, but you can't criticize the whole project; there's no deep difference between the claim that a desire for fatty foods is an adaptation and a desire for certain courtship rituals is an adaptation.
Except, of course, while we have a fairly robust understanding of the biological mechanisms behind appetite, we are just scratching the surface in regards to understanding human sexuality. Furthermore, the specific claims made by EPs regarding human sexuality are notorious because they are untestable, reductionist in ways that fail to account for observed human diversity, and often silly and obviously biased.
Take, for example, the profoundly stupid proposal that female genital response to auditory and visual sexual stimuli is a defensive mechanism to prevent injury during rape. There are a number of obvious objections to this hypothesis including 1) it's demands untestable speculation about rape and sexuality in the OBE, 2) structurally the pelvis and vagina are considerably more robust than the human penis, and 3) we still have no way of isolating environmental and hereditary factors from that data.
Until you have a good model for the data that isolates the environmental and hereditary factors, you can't start to consider the kinds of selective pressures that shaped those hereditary factors.
I think people hate EP because it's become so politicized. But it's wrong to oppose it for political reasons too.
It's because EP appears to be primarily the political enterprise of braying that developmental and cognitive psychology, was ignoring issues of heredity and evolution. When, in fact, theories about the theoretical atoms of numeric processing predate EP by some time.
posted by KirkJobSluder at 6:53 AM on February 5, 2009
Evolutionary Psychology is a worthwhile endeavor. "Pop-EP," however, sounds like an utter waste of time. When it comes to science, "Pop" anything is probably a bad way to go. Boiling down highly specialized knowledge to format that can reach a lay audience is not what science is all about, and scientists know this.
Because EP doesn't lend itself to immediate readily testable hypotheses, it takes huge amounts of shit. However, it's clear that brains evolved, and are still evolving. Making empirical claims based on unchecked speculation is never good, but rational speculation is how hypotheses are developed. Bridging the gap between anthropology and psychology is an ongoing process, and I doff my hat to the folks making an effort to do so.
I do not adhere to the modularist school of neural development, and this view is waning among cognitive scientists of all stripes, but just because a school of thought isn't currently in vogue doesn't mean we can learn from its proponents.
posted by solipsophistocracy at 9:03 AM on February 5, 2009 [1 favorite]
Because EP doesn't lend itself to immediate readily testable hypotheses, it takes huge amounts of shit. However, it's clear that brains evolved, and are still evolving. Making empirical claims based on unchecked speculation is never good, but rational speculation is how hypotheses are developed. Bridging the gap between anthropology and psychology is an ongoing process, and I doff my hat to the folks making an effort to do so.
I do not adhere to the modularist school of neural development, and this view is waning among cognitive scientists of all stripes, but just because a school of thought isn't currently in vogue doesn't mean we can learn from its proponents.
posted by solipsophistocracy at 9:03 AM on February 5, 2009 [1 favorite]
Where did the assumption that hypotheses that come from EP are not testable come from? Surely not from evolutionary psychologists themselves:
posted by AceRock at 9:31 AM on February 5, 2009 [1 favorite]
Every decent evolutionary explanation has testable predictions about the design of the trait. For example, the hypothesis that pregnancy sickness is a byproduct of prenatal hormones predicts different patterns of food aversions than the hypothesis that it is an adaptation that evolved to protect the fetus from pathogens and plant toxins in food at the point in embryogenesis when the fetus is most vulnerable – during the first trimester. Evolutionary hypotheses – whether generated to discover a new trait or to explain one that is already known – carry predictions about the design of that trait. The alternative – having no hypothesis about adaptive function – carries no predictions whatsoever. So which is the more constrained and sober scientific approach?(from this interview)
posted by AceRock at 9:31 AM on February 5, 2009 [1 favorite]
AceRock: How do you test the hypothesis that contemporary childbearing behavior is rooted in neolithic or paleolithic behaviors? We have almost no theories of human behavior in prehistory that's not extrapolated from contemporary human behavior. Most explanations proposed by evolutionary psychologists are therefore circular. Contemporary human behavior is explained in terms of hypotheses about prehistoric human behavior, which are derived from observations of contemporary human behavior.
Every decent evolutionary explanation has testable predictions about the design of the trait. For example, the hypothesis that pregnancy sickness is a byproduct of prenatal hormones predicts different patterns of food aversions than the hypothesis that it is an adaptation that evolved to protect the fetus from pathogens and plant toxins in food at the point in embryogenesis when the fetus is most vulnerable – during the first trimester. Evolutionary hypotheses – whether generated to discover a new trait or to explain one that is already known – carry predictions about the design of that trait. The alternative – having no hypothesis about adaptive function – carries no predictions whatsoever. So which is the more constrained and sober scientific approach?
Of course the obvious objection is that these are not two mutually exclusive hypotheses. Even if we grant that pregnancy sickness is an evolutionary adaptation, the mechanism by which pregnancy sickness is caused is likely to involve the release of hormones, as are quite a few things in human psychology. The hypothesis that the timing and effects of prenatal hormones during pregnancy were shaped by natural selection is a fairly sound hypothesis, and there would be few people in cognitive or developmental psychology who would disagree.
And the second counter is that in many cases, hypotheses that don't involve adaptive function provide robust predictable hypotheses. Let's take an example from early in the interview:
But let me give you the same information in absolute frequencies – an ecologically valid information format for a hunter-gatherer mind: Out of every 1000 women, 10 have breast cancer and test positive; 30 test positive but do not have breast cancer. So: out of every 1000 women, 40 will test positive, but only 10 of these will have breast cancer. This format makes it clear that, if you had a positive mammogram, your chance of having breast cancer is only 1 in 4…that is, 25%, not 97%.
This is something that just about any cognitive psychologist who works with mathematical concepts could have predicted without invoking fantasies of the stone-age hunter-gatherer mind. There is abundant research to support the general principle that presenting mathematical information with the lowest possible levels of abstraction better communicates that concept to a larger population. It's something that lends its self quite well to double-blind experimental studies.
Furthermore, we can make a strong argument that this particular quirk of human information is biological: it requires a certain level of neurological brain development. And as a result, we can say that this particular way of understanding numbers evolved. Which is where cognitive psychology ends.
The evolutionary psychology claim that this can be placed as an adaptation of stone-age hunter-gatherers is both sloppy and untestable. The "stone-age" includes agrarian and pastoral neolithic groups and pre-Homo homonids. We do not have enough information to place the evolution of this particular trait at any specific point of human evolution. It was definitely there by the neolithic, and could have vestigial roots in the common ancestors of Pan and Homo. Lacking our ability to observe the behavior of more than three species in the relevant clade, we can't test hypotheses regarding this trait's evolutionary origin.
The problem with evolutionary psychology is not that it proposes human behavioral capabilities evolved. Most people involved in this debate grant that it did. The problems are two-fold: 1) asserting evolutionary adaptation as explanations for behaviors where hereditability has not been established, 2) proposing specific origin models that can't be tested given our ability to observe only three species in the relevant clade.
posted by KirkJobSluder at 10:51 AM on February 5, 2009
Every decent evolutionary explanation has testable predictions about the design of the trait. For example, the hypothesis that pregnancy sickness is a byproduct of prenatal hormones predicts different patterns of food aversions than the hypothesis that it is an adaptation that evolved to protect the fetus from pathogens and plant toxins in food at the point in embryogenesis when the fetus is most vulnerable – during the first trimester. Evolutionary hypotheses – whether generated to discover a new trait or to explain one that is already known – carry predictions about the design of that trait. The alternative – having no hypothesis about adaptive function – carries no predictions whatsoever. So which is the more constrained and sober scientific approach?
Of course the obvious objection is that these are not two mutually exclusive hypotheses. Even if we grant that pregnancy sickness is an evolutionary adaptation, the mechanism by which pregnancy sickness is caused is likely to involve the release of hormones, as are quite a few things in human psychology. The hypothesis that the timing and effects of prenatal hormones during pregnancy were shaped by natural selection is a fairly sound hypothesis, and there would be few people in cognitive or developmental psychology who would disagree.
And the second counter is that in many cases, hypotheses that don't involve adaptive function provide robust predictable hypotheses. Let's take an example from early in the interview:
But let me give you the same information in absolute frequencies – an ecologically valid information format for a hunter-gatherer mind: Out of every 1000 women, 10 have breast cancer and test positive; 30 test positive but do not have breast cancer. So: out of every 1000 women, 40 will test positive, but only 10 of these will have breast cancer. This format makes it clear that, if you had a positive mammogram, your chance of having breast cancer is only 1 in 4…that is, 25%, not 97%.
This is something that just about any cognitive psychologist who works with mathematical concepts could have predicted without invoking fantasies of the stone-age hunter-gatherer mind. There is abundant research to support the general principle that presenting mathematical information with the lowest possible levels of abstraction better communicates that concept to a larger population. It's something that lends its self quite well to double-blind experimental studies.
Furthermore, we can make a strong argument that this particular quirk of human information is biological: it requires a certain level of neurological brain development. And as a result, we can say that this particular way of understanding numbers evolved. Which is where cognitive psychology ends.
The evolutionary psychology claim that this can be placed as an adaptation of stone-age hunter-gatherers is both sloppy and untestable. The "stone-age" includes agrarian and pastoral neolithic groups and pre-Homo homonids. We do not have enough information to place the evolution of this particular trait at any specific point of human evolution. It was definitely there by the neolithic, and could have vestigial roots in the common ancestors of Pan and Homo. Lacking our ability to observe the behavior of more than three species in the relevant clade, we can't test hypotheses regarding this trait's evolutionary origin.
The problem with evolutionary psychology is not that it proposes human behavioral capabilities evolved. Most people involved in this debate grant that it did. The problems are two-fold: 1) asserting evolutionary adaptation as explanations for behaviors where hereditability has not been established, 2) proposing specific origin models that can't be tested given our ability to observe only three species in the relevant clade.
posted by KirkJobSluder at 10:51 AM on February 5, 2009
KirkJobSluder: I generally agree that it is often problematic to try to explain the origins of behaviors in evolutionary terms, but the same can be said about other explanations offered for behaviors: if heritability hasn't been unestablished, we can't assume a purely cultural or environmental origin either.
Evo-psych is much more interesting to me as a powerful framework for generating new, testable, predictive hypotheses about how the mind works. (Obviously, other areas of psychology produce good hypotheses as well) I find it a shame that EP is demonized when as a hypothesis generating heuristic, it is really quite valuable.
posted by AceRock at 11:18 AM on February 5, 2009 [1 favorite]
Evo-psych is much more interesting to me as a powerful framework for generating new, testable, predictive hypotheses about how the mind works. (Obviously, other areas of psychology produce good hypotheses as well) I find it a shame that EP is demonized when as a hypothesis generating heuristic, it is really quite valuable.
posted by AceRock at 11:18 AM on February 5, 2009 [1 favorite]
And I should add, the proposal that a preference for phrases like "10 out of 1000" evolved out of the needs of stone-age hunter-gatherer cultures ignores the evidence that contemporary hunter-gatherer cultures sometimes lack the numeric vocabulary to communicate large numbers. (Although not a sense for basic number theory.)
posted by KirkJobSluder at 11:19 AM on February 5, 2009
posted by KirkJobSluder at 11:19 AM on February 5, 2009
AceRock: I generally agree that it is often problematic to try to explain the origins of behaviors in evolutionary terms, but the same can be said about other explanations offered for behaviors: if heritability hasn't been unestablished, we can't assume a purely cultural or environmental origin either.
Believe it or not, most of the work in psychology doesn't assume a purely cultural or environmental origin either.
But for some very practical reasons, there is quite a bit of work that is done around the best way to, as an example, make the cognitive jump from basic mathematics to symbolic algebra. And there we see that environmental interventions play a huge role.
posted by KirkJobSluder at 11:23 AM on February 5, 2009
Believe it or not, most of the work in psychology doesn't assume a purely cultural or environmental origin either.
But for some very practical reasons, there is quite a bit of work that is done around the best way to, as an example, make the cognitive jump from basic mathematics to symbolic algebra. And there we see that environmental interventions play a huge role.
posted by KirkJobSluder at 11:23 AM on February 5, 2009
The nature versus nurture argument, no matter what form it comes in, always gets a little heated.
posted by Edgewise at 8:45 PM on February 5, 2009
posted by Edgewise at 8:45 PM on February 5, 2009
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If fine-grained responses are not heritable then nearly every EP argument goes out the window, because education patterns can change rapidly and therefore aren't influenced much at all by ancient needs. Evolution must not only satisfy needs, it must work within the framework of genetic possibility, which is why birds have not evolved helicopter rotors.
posted by localroger at 3:30 PM on February 4, 2009 [2 favorites]