The Status Quo-alition
July 9, 2023 10:01 AM Subscribe
In his most recent 'collection' military historian Bret Devereaux describes
the Status Quo Coalition. Summed up in a tweet, he thinks
Where I learned of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance of English-speaking countries, which traces its origins back to the Bletchley Park code-breakers of WWII. Also mentions the related ECHELON global surveillance program.
the current international system is less 'American hegemony' and more a coalition of status quo powers, of which the USA is the 'team captain.'
Where I learned of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance of English-speaking countries, which traces its origins back to the Bletchley Park code-breakers of WWII. Also mentions the related ECHELON global surveillance program.
well that was a really fascinating read. like I did not mean to sit down and read the whole thing immediately but really couldn't pull myself away. I have been aware of Bret Devereaux thru MF but never read any of his stuff prior, which is ridiculous since I have a degree in Medieval History for fricks sake!! I feel a deep dive may be coming on...
posted by supermedusa at 12:40 PM on July 9, 2023 [3 favorites]
posted by supermedusa at 12:40 PM on July 9, 2023 [3 favorites]
As usual, a great article from Dr. Devereaux.
I agree with him that the rich and free countries of the world function as a coalition, and I think he makes a compelling case that this is because industrialization has changed the incentives to make peace and trade more popular than war.
I’m not entirely sure I’m persuaded that this state of affairs would have developed absent a large “anchor” superpower like the US, but I see the argument. One reason is that, while the current function of the US looks like “team captain”, the way the coalition developed involved a lot more direct application of US power.
Following World War II, Europe was rebuilt with a lot of assistance from the US, and in a fashion where the US had a lot of influence over the way governments and borders were reestablished. Countries like Japan and South Korea were functionally run by the Allies for years after the war finished. The US may have stepped back to a “team captain” role after a while, but there was a period where it seems to have been a lot more direct.
Relatedly, I have a lot of anxiety over what the coalition would look like in a world where Trump (or similar) withdraws explicitly from NATO and other international institutions. Even if the US just became a lot more disengaged and isolationist, I think the coalition would go through some rough times, just because the US provides a lot of the security guarantees the coalition relies on. I’ve been really happy to see the Ukraine war prompting larger security investments by other NATO nations, because it also reduces the burden carried by a potentially unreliable coalition member.
An actively hostile US would be concerning in the extreme.
posted by learning from frequent failure at 2:17 PM on July 9, 2023 [7 favorites]
I agree with him that the rich and free countries of the world function as a coalition, and I think he makes a compelling case that this is because industrialization has changed the incentives to make peace and trade more popular than war.
I’m not entirely sure I’m persuaded that this state of affairs would have developed absent a large “anchor” superpower like the US, but I see the argument. One reason is that, while the current function of the US looks like “team captain”, the way the coalition developed involved a lot more direct application of US power.
Following World War II, Europe was rebuilt with a lot of assistance from the US, and in a fashion where the US had a lot of influence over the way governments and borders were reestablished. Countries like Japan and South Korea were functionally run by the Allies for years after the war finished. The US may have stepped back to a “team captain” role after a while, but there was a period where it seems to have been a lot more direct.
Relatedly, I have a lot of anxiety over what the coalition would look like in a world where Trump (or similar) withdraws explicitly from NATO and other international institutions. Even if the US just became a lot more disengaged and isolationist, I think the coalition would go through some rough times, just because the US provides a lot of the security guarantees the coalition relies on. I’ve been really happy to see the Ukraine war prompting larger security investments by other NATO nations, because it also reduces the burden carried by a potentially unreliable coalition member.
An actively hostile US would be concerning in the extreme.
posted by learning from frequent failure at 2:17 PM on July 9, 2023 [7 favorites]
Rich countries generally prefer the free flow of goods, because their highly productive economies benefit from trade; they generally prefer the free flow of ideas because both their political and economic systems benefit. They tend to prefer stability in other regions, because they are prime targets for destabilizing refugee flows. Consequently, they tend to prefer the emergence of other rich and free countries, because those tend to be good trade partners who don’t generate massive refugee flows.
Britain rebuilt itself after WWII on net migration and needs inflows of workforce for skilled jobs like healthcare and unskilled jobs like fruit picking. There's a nuance that migrating workers aren't a drain on resources or on job opportunities, but the flow of bodies to bolster an economy is stabilising, not destabilising.
The European Union promises free movement even further in the Schengen zone, the free movement of goods, people, money and services are a corr principle of EU integration. Consider free movement within the federal USA, notably to "Sanctuary Cities"for those seeking refuge during the 45th Presidency of the USA.
I'm glad he arrived at the power of the collective being greater than the power of the individual, it gives me hope for labor organizing and a social safety net in the USA.
posted by k3ninho at 3:44 PM on July 9, 2023 [1 favorite]
Britain rebuilt itself after WWII on net migration and needs inflows of workforce for skilled jobs like healthcare and unskilled jobs like fruit picking. There's a nuance that migrating workers aren't a drain on resources or on job opportunities, but the flow of bodies to bolster an economy is stabilising, not destabilising.
The European Union promises free movement even further in the Schengen zone, the free movement of goods, people, money and services are a corr principle of EU integration. Consider free movement within the federal USA, notably to "Sanctuary Cities"for those seeking refuge during the 45th Presidency of the USA.
I'm glad he arrived at the power of the collective being greater than the power of the individual, it gives me hope for labor organizing and a social safety net in the USA.
posted by k3ninho at 3:44 PM on July 9, 2023 [1 favorite]
I think this is kind of a weird article. It took me a while to put my finger on what it was, but it finally clicked when I got to this sentence from the conclusion: “Of course the most striking example of this are the massive costs that Russia has incurred trying to shift its border to the west.”
The thing is, in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, the rest of the world largely shrugged its shoulders. And I suspect that would’ve been the case, if things had turned out differently in the early weeks of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. For example, if the Ukrainian political leadership had panicked, the rest of the world would’ve essentially shrugged its shoulders again, as Russia continued annexing large chunks of Ukraine.
Now, we don’t live in that world, thank goodness, but I still think that Devereaux is too influenced by the particular contingencies of the 2022 invasion. I also think that he’s overestimating the US’s role in the larger Status Quo Coalition’s response to the invasion. It was Russia and Ukraine’s immediate neighbors which led the way in supplying Ukraine with weapons, constantly pushing the US to do more. Don’t get me wrong, I’m well aware that the US had provided the largest chunk of military aid, by a considerable degree, but partly that’s because they have the capacity to do so. In the early days, it was its allies on the western borders of Russia and Ukraine who rushed whatever military material it had available over to Ukraine. The US was a follower, much more than a leader.
And again, so much of what has happened since depended on contingent events. For instance, a lot of the early success for the Russian invasion in the south of Ukraine rested on the failure of the Ukrainian army to destroy a single bridge over the Dniepr River. If something similar had happened further north, then the war would’ve developed very differently.
A lot of what happened afterwards depended on very specific contingencies, which weren’t pre-determined at all. For instance, while it’s almost certain that whatever would’ve happened, Finland and Sweden’s applications to join NATO would’ve been submitted, but the response could’ve been different. Turkey and Hungary might’ve been even more intransigent, for instance. And I doubt non-aligned countries would’ve agreed not to treat Russia like a normal country, if the initial invasion hadn’t been such a catastrophe.
I’m not just saying this out of the blue, because as I mentioned before, we have a recent example of Russia annexing large territory from Ukraine, and the rest of the world largely acquiescing. It happened just in 2014.
The other thing that bothers me about Devereaux’s argument is that he underplays the effect that the US has in destabilizing the system. He mentions that Iran is outside the system, but a large reason why that is the case, is that US intransigence, has kept it from being integrated. Possibly this is a very specific case that won’t be replicated, but it could also point to a flaw in the system, where local American political concerns have adverse effects on the wider Status Quo Coalition.
I can’t help but think that following the US invasion of Iraq people’s views of geopolitics were very different. Back then, the idea that the US was the “team captain” of a “status quo coalition” would’ve seemed ludicrous. And the thing is, there’s no reason why the US couldn’t again be led by a president as militaristic as George W. Bush.
This status quo is dependent on stability within the political system of the US, which recent decades has shown to be capable of getting dramatically unstable very quickly.
posted by Kattullus at 4:22 PM on July 9, 2023 [11 favorites]
The thing is, in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, the rest of the world largely shrugged its shoulders. And I suspect that would’ve been the case, if things had turned out differently in the early weeks of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. For example, if the Ukrainian political leadership had panicked, the rest of the world would’ve essentially shrugged its shoulders again, as Russia continued annexing large chunks of Ukraine.
Now, we don’t live in that world, thank goodness, but I still think that Devereaux is too influenced by the particular contingencies of the 2022 invasion. I also think that he’s overestimating the US’s role in the larger Status Quo Coalition’s response to the invasion. It was Russia and Ukraine’s immediate neighbors which led the way in supplying Ukraine with weapons, constantly pushing the US to do more. Don’t get me wrong, I’m well aware that the US had provided the largest chunk of military aid, by a considerable degree, but partly that’s because they have the capacity to do so. In the early days, it was its allies on the western borders of Russia and Ukraine who rushed whatever military material it had available over to Ukraine. The US was a follower, much more than a leader.
And again, so much of what has happened since depended on contingent events. For instance, a lot of the early success for the Russian invasion in the south of Ukraine rested on the failure of the Ukrainian army to destroy a single bridge over the Dniepr River. If something similar had happened further north, then the war would’ve developed very differently.
A lot of what happened afterwards depended on very specific contingencies, which weren’t pre-determined at all. For instance, while it’s almost certain that whatever would’ve happened, Finland and Sweden’s applications to join NATO would’ve been submitted, but the response could’ve been different. Turkey and Hungary might’ve been even more intransigent, for instance. And I doubt non-aligned countries would’ve agreed not to treat Russia like a normal country, if the initial invasion hadn’t been such a catastrophe.
I’m not just saying this out of the blue, because as I mentioned before, we have a recent example of Russia annexing large territory from Ukraine, and the rest of the world largely acquiescing. It happened just in 2014.
The other thing that bothers me about Devereaux’s argument is that he underplays the effect that the US has in destabilizing the system. He mentions that Iran is outside the system, but a large reason why that is the case, is that US intransigence, has kept it from being integrated. Possibly this is a very specific case that won’t be replicated, but it could also point to a flaw in the system, where local American political concerns have adverse effects on the wider Status Quo Coalition.
I can’t help but think that following the US invasion of Iraq people’s views of geopolitics were very different. Back then, the idea that the US was the “team captain” of a “status quo coalition” would’ve seemed ludicrous. And the thing is, there’s no reason why the US couldn’t again be led by a president as militaristic as George W. Bush.
This status quo is dependent on stability within the political system of the US, which recent decades has shown to be capable of getting dramatically unstable very quickly.
posted by Kattullus at 4:22 PM on July 9, 2023 [11 favorites]
The thing is, in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, the rest of the world largely shrugged its shoulders. And I suspect that would’ve been the case, if things had turned out differently in the early weeks of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. For example, if the Ukrainian political leadership had panicked, the rest of the world would’ve essentially shrugged its shoulders again, as Russia continued annexing large chunks of Ukraine.
I don't want to get too deep in the weeds re Russia/Ukraine, but I think one reason the US seemed to dither when the Russians invaded in 2022 was because of what had just happened in Afghanistan. In AFG, the US saw a military equipped with modern weapons and 20 years of training essentially collapse like a wet paper bag in the face of the Taliban in Hiluxes with the odd machine gun. This provided weight to a minority view within the US military establishment that has long been simmering beneath the surface, but was largely ignored in the last few decades, which basically says: "handing out weapons and training doesn't produce an army, just a bunch of people with weapons and training", and that if you want an effective army, you first need a set of ideas and ideally some functional institutions which that army can be loyal to. The Afghans (at least the young men comprising the military) don't seem to have ever bought into the abstract concept of "Enlightenment Values", and their government was a corrupt money-funneling scheme that's hard to get excited about, much less contemplate dying for. And so, when their expensively-equipped and -trained military turned out to be not so much a paper tiger as a wet Kleenex, this view suddenly got a lot of reconsideration.
That view, IMO, caused the US to take a largely "wait and see" attitude towards Ukraine. There were (and still are, although I think mostly only explicitly pro-Russian sources) people who claimed that Ukraine wasn't that different from Afghanistan: the body politic lacked cohesion around a shared set of values, the government was corrupt and didn't exactly have a track record of inspiring loyalty, and the average person might not be ready to die just for the privilege of being governed by klept scum from Kyiv instead of Moscow. This, as it turned out, was vastly untrue. But it was on the Ukrainians to essentially prove, in the early hours and days of the war, that they were prepared to fight and had a working command structure, etc., before the US turned on the great logistics spigot.
Getting back to Devereaux's article, I think he makes some excellent points—especially about industrialization making wars of conquest a lot less profitable than they used to be in pre-industrial societies—but he falls into the social-science trap of assuming rational behavior on the part of major participants in the international arena.
And that is not a safe assumption. Sure, it may be a reasonable assumption within some bounds—basically, during peacetime, or between allies, or maybe just generally across 99% of cases one can find and study. Which is great, except that the 1% of times when someone doesn't behave rationally, it can have huge consequences. It's those 1% events, the weird black swans, that we are most interested in, if we are looking to prevent or even just understand war.
Off the top of my head, I'm not sure what major wars between industrial powers didn't turn out to be hugely-costly messes for the original belligerent nation(s). At least after the Great War—when you can at least plausibly argue that the nations involved didn't understand the Pandora's box they were opening—no rational leadership of an industrial country would want to start a war against another industrialized "near peer" nation. Certainly by the end of WWII, with the working-age population and infrastructure of both Germany and the USSR in tatters, it should have been plain: even if you 'win' an industrial war, it's a very expensive way to acquire real estate and human capital.
And yet, here we are in 2023, watching a land war unfold in Eastern Europe once again, between a regional power and a smaller—but still very much industrialized—neighboring state, apparently because Putin and the Russian leadership thought they could do "war on the cheap". The Ukrainians have proved yet again that this is not true, but that the Russians blundered into the tarpit of industrialized, conventional warfare anyway, proves that you can't simply assume that everyone will learn the obvious historical lessons, weigh the odds and pros/cons, and act accordingly.
posted by Kadin2048 at 5:09 PM on July 9, 2023 [8 favorites]
I don't want to get too deep in the weeds re Russia/Ukraine, but I think one reason the US seemed to dither when the Russians invaded in 2022 was because of what had just happened in Afghanistan. In AFG, the US saw a military equipped with modern weapons and 20 years of training essentially collapse like a wet paper bag in the face of the Taliban in Hiluxes with the odd machine gun. This provided weight to a minority view within the US military establishment that has long been simmering beneath the surface, but was largely ignored in the last few decades, which basically says: "handing out weapons and training doesn't produce an army, just a bunch of people with weapons and training", and that if you want an effective army, you first need a set of ideas and ideally some functional institutions which that army can be loyal to. The Afghans (at least the young men comprising the military) don't seem to have ever bought into the abstract concept of "Enlightenment Values", and their government was a corrupt money-funneling scheme that's hard to get excited about, much less contemplate dying for. And so, when their expensively-equipped and -trained military turned out to be not so much a paper tiger as a wet Kleenex, this view suddenly got a lot of reconsideration.
That view, IMO, caused the US to take a largely "wait and see" attitude towards Ukraine. There were (and still are, although I think mostly only explicitly pro-Russian sources) people who claimed that Ukraine wasn't that different from Afghanistan: the body politic lacked cohesion around a shared set of values, the government was corrupt and didn't exactly have a track record of inspiring loyalty, and the average person might not be ready to die just for the privilege of being governed by klept scum from Kyiv instead of Moscow. This, as it turned out, was vastly untrue. But it was on the Ukrainians to essentially prove, in the early hours and days of the war, that they were prepared to fight and had a working command structure, etc., before the US turned on the great logistics spigot.
Getting back to Devereaux's article, I think he makes some excellent points—especially about industrialization making wars of conquest a lot less profitable than they used to be in pre-industrial societies—but he falls into the social-science trap of assuming rational behavior on the part of major participants in the international arena.
And that is not a safe assumption. Sure, it may be a reasonable assumption within some bounds—basically, during peacetime, or between allies, or maybe just generally across 99% of cases one can find and study. Which is great, except that the 1% of times when someone doesn't behave rationally, it can have huge consequences. It's those 1% events, the weird black swans, that we are most interested in, if we are looking to prevent or even just understand war.
Off the top of my head, I'm not sure what major wars between industrial powers didn't turn out to be hugely-costly messes for the original belligerent nation(s). At least after the Great War—when you can at least plausibly argue that the nations involved didn't understand the Pandora's box they were opening—no rational leadership of an industrial country would want to start a war against another industrialized "near peer" nation. Certainly by the end of WWII, with the working-age population and infrastructure of both Germany and the USSR in tatters, it should have been plain: even if you 'win' an industrial war, it's a very expensive way to acquire real estate and human capital.
And yet, here we are in 2023, watching a land war unfold in Eastern Europe once again, between a regional power and a smaller—but still very much industrialized—neighboring state, apparently because Putin and the Russian leadership thought they could do "war on the cheap". The Ukrainians have proved yet again that this is not true, but that the Russians blundered into the tarpit of industrialized, conventional warfare anyway, proves that you can't simply assume that everyone will learn the obvious historical lessons, weigh the odds and pros/cons, and act accordingly.
posted by Kadin2048 at 5:09 PM on July 9, 2023 [8 favorites]
This was a great article— I think it explains a lot of things all at once, from why “revisionist” powers aren't getting a lot of traction to why Latin Americans are less enthusiastic over the coalition.
I don't think Devereaux is downplaying US backsliding at all— he writes "What is going to shake the coalition is not outside pressure [...] but the United States as ‘team captain’ acting in ways that destabilize the status quo." He specifically refers to the Iraq War and Trump as destabilizers.
And on war, I don't think Devereaux, a historian of war, is surprised by wars. His point is not that wars will never happen; it's that they are no longer a good way to increase national power. The wars of the 20th century, and Russia's war in Ukraine, support rather than undermine this point.
posted by zompist at 5:18 PM on July 9, 2023 [5 favorites]
I don't think Devereaux is downplaying US backsliding at all— he writes "What is going to shake the coalition is not outside pressure [...] but the United States as ‘team captain’ acting in ways that destabilize the status quo." He specifically refers to the Iraq War and Trump as destabilizers.
And on war, I don't think Devereaux, a historian of war, is surprised by wars. His point is not that wars will never happen; it's that they are no longer a good way to increase national power. The wars of the 20th century, and Russia's war in Ukraine, support rather than undermine this point.
posted by zompist at 5:18 PM on July 9, 2023 [5 favorites]
Very interesting article. "As long as the US remains a good steward of the coalition" is doing a lot of work though, as US internal politics are tending towards instability and could flip rather quickly into damaging that coalition.There are many good points, but the overlying tone, despite the disavowal at the end, is way too close to End of History.
posted by blue shadows at 5:19 PM on July 9, 2023 [1 favorite]
posted by blue shadows at 5:19 PM on July 9, 2023 [1 favorite]
I think he hits the point towards beginning and but misses one of the big implications—war is not as profitable as economics, but since war is a major justification for the existence of the nation-state, national alliances aren’t as important as they were previously, but are more of a veneer over the real alliances between supranational economic entities. The billionaires don’t need nation states with militaries and ties to the land, instead they are united under a regime which allows them domination. If you look at that map of the US and its allies, it’s a map of all of the countries that have had colonial empires and remained capitalist (or in which imperial colonists replaced indigenous people as the major population).
posted by Jon_Evil at 6:50 PM on July 9, 2023 [3 favorites]
posted by Jon_Evil at 6:50 PM on July 9, 2023 [3 favorites]
Yeah I trailed off so maybe he addressed this but I wondered if what we're seeing is just a general weakening of state power in contrast to an escalating corporate power. Also if nuclear weapons permanently altered the war calculation for all.
I totally lack the knowledge to evaluate any of this.. very interesting and thought provoking article (what I read of it).
posted by latkes at 9:59 PM on July 9, 2023 [2 favorites]
I totally lack the knowledge to evaluate any of this.. very interesting and thought provoking article (what I read of it).
posted by latkes at 9:59 PM on July 9, 2023 [2 favorites]
The thing is, in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, the rest of the world largely shrugged its shoulders. And I suspect that would’ve been the case, if things had turned out differently in the early weeks of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
I think what you're missing though if the smoking of work that went into building up Ukrainian political will and the military. My understanding is that there was a bunch of investment to get to the point where they could fight back. The Ukraine of today is different specifically because of the midterm response after 2014.
edit: to be clear not just or only the coalition powers, but foremost Ukrainians had to invest and make choices.
posted by Carillon at 12:50 AM on July 10, 2023 [3 favorites]
I think what you're missing though if the smoking of work that went into building up Ukrainian political will and the military. My understanding is that there was a bunch of investment to get to the point where they could fight back. The Ukraine of today is different specifically because of the midterm response after 2014.
edit: to be clear not just or only the coalition powers, but foremost Ukrainians had to invest and make choices.
posted by Carillon at 12:50 AM on July 10, 2023 [3 favorites]
A not-so-subtle warning that the US far right poses not only a threat to democracy and individual rights in the States, but to the international order and the relative peace we've had since 1945. Of course, to the demagogues (like Bannon), this is a feature, not a bug. And maybe therein lies a critical difference between 2023's rising fascism and that of the 1920s-30s: domestic industrial and military powers (hopefully) see democracy as an integral component to their power.
I guess we'll see.
posted by touchstone033 at 7:28 AM on July 10, 2023 [4 favorites]
I guess we'll see.
posted by touchstone033 at 7:28 AM on July 10, 2023 [4 favorites]
'some empires, especially very decentralized ones with lots of ‘vassal’ states, can decline for ages before failing very rapidly all at once."
A very good description of the centuries long decline of the Ottoman Empire.
I see the present USA hegemony as a global supply chain which incentives wealthy countries to join.
posted by Narrative_Historian at 2:36 AM on July 11, 2023 [1 favorite]
A very good description of the centuries long decline of the Ottoman Empire.
I see the present USA hegemony as a global supply chain which incentives wealthy countries to join.
posted by Narrative_Historian at 2:36 AM on July 11, 2023 [1 favorite]
since war is a major justification for the existence of the nation-state, national alliances aren’t as important as they were previously, but are more of a veneer over the real alliances between supranational economic entities
I think this is probably true up to a point—but only to a point, and then it ceases being the case rather dramatically.
The economic arguments against inter-state warfare are true for external wars of conquest, in order to gain resources (land, minerals, population, etc.). It does not necessarily hold against using the state's monopoly on violence internally to control or coerce a state's own population. And you see states do this all the time. Arguably, the monopoly (if not de facto than at least de jure) on violence is the defining feature of a state; modern Westphalian nation-states build on this with their emphasis on defined borders, formalized agreements and relations with other states, power structures, etc.
But I think it's a mistake to believe that e.g. multinational corporations exist above nation-states. They may appear to in some cases: Dole or Chiquita or Goodyear may push around the governments of weaker states, but they do so from a position of advantage within the United States. Were this not the case, it seems unlikely that Ecuador or Liberia would let them call the shots; in fact, they might find themselves getting shot.
I would go further and suggest that there isn't really any such thing as a "multinational corporation"; the term is aspirational.
Large companies may like to believe that they exist above the level of petty national governments and their wars and diplomats, but at the end of the day they inhabit the same world as the rest of us, and that world is dominated, in terms of control of actual physical territory, by nation-states. Dole and Goodyear (f.ex.) exist, and were allowed to exert control over states at times, at the pleasure of the United States Government, with whom they had a symbiotic relationship. They were an extension of state power: not the other way around. If the US government had truly found Chiquita's coup-promoting behavior objectionable, they could have sent people with guns to the homes of those executives, and put them in prison or killed them. Such is the prerogative, literally, of a state over its territory and the people who live there.
Blaming misdeeds on multinational corporations is, IMO, a sort of responsibility-shifting sleight of hand that insulates the governments housing those corporations—literally housing their senior employees and their valuable physical assets—from the actions they allowed those corporations to take.
If you're holding a gun to someone's head and let them do something deplorable, you can't just blame it on them: you, having had the opportunity to stop it and failing to do so, are actively complicit. Such is the relationship of modern nation-states to corporations.
posted by Kadin2048 at 1:03 AM on July 15, 2023 [1 favorite]
I think this is probably true up to a point—but only to a point, and then it ceases being the case rather dramatically.
The economic arguments against inter-state warfare are true for external wars of conquest, in order to gain resources (land, minerals, population, etc.). It does not necessarily hold against using the state's monopoly on violence internally to control or coerce a state's own population. And you see states do this all the time. Arguably, the monopoly (if not de facto than at least de jure) on violence is the defining feature of a state; modern Westphalian nation-states build on this with their emphasis on defined borders, formalized agreements and relations with other states, power structures, etc.
But I think it's a mistake to believe that e.g. multinational corporations exist above nation-states. They may appear to in some cases: Dole or Chiquita or Goodyear may push around the governments of weaker states, but they do so from a position of advantage within the United States. Were this not the case, it seems unlikely that Ecuador or Liberia would let them call the shots; in fact, they might find themselves getting shot.
I would go further and suggest that there isn't really any such thing as a "multinational corporation"; the term is aspirational.
Large companies may like to believe that they exist above the level of petty national governments and their wars and diplomats, but at the end of the day they inhabit the same world as the rest of us, and that world is dominated, in terms of control of actual physical territory, by nation-states. Dole and Goodyear (f.ex.) exist, and were allowed to exert control over states at times, at the pleasure of the United States Government, with whom they had a symbiotic relationship. They were an extension of state power: not the other way around. If the US government had truly found Chiquita's coup-promoting behavior objectionable, they could have sent people with guns to the homes of those executives, and put them in prison or killed them. Such is the prerogative, literally, of a state over its territory and the people who live there.
Blaming misdeeds on multinational corporations is, IMO, a sort of responsibility-shifting sleight of hand that insulates the governments housing those corporations—literally housing their senior employees and their valuable physical assets—from the actions they allowed those corporations to take.
If you're holding a gun to someone's head and let them do something deplorable, you can't just blame it on them: you, having had the opportunity to stop it and failing to do so, are actively complicit. Such is the relationship of modern nation-states to corporations.
posted by Kadin2048 at 1:03 AM on July 15, 2023 [1 favorite]
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posted by slogger at 11:37 AM on July 9, 2023 [1 favorite]