And this brings me to my final point about winners and losers. Under the guise of respecting legislatures, O'Connor has given the federal courts new powers to rewrite abortion statutes based on existing doctrinal categories. This is consistent with O'Connor's general tendency throughout her career to use seemingly narrow holdings to maximize future judicial discretion.posted by monju_bosatsu at 10:25 AM on January 18, 2006
So if you want to know who really was the big winner in Ayotte, the answer is simple: It was the federal courts. They are now freed up to selectively rewrite new abortion statutes in the asserted name of respecting legislative intention and democracy.
On the other hand, New Hampshire and abortion opponents lose to the extent that the new rule the Court adopts is not exactly identical to an as-applied challenge. First, it does not necessarily require the development of a record after a full trial, although the court may of course demand one. Second, courts are allowed to hold unconstitutional applications invalid immediately as to everyone, and not just as applied to the parties before the court. Third, the courts can hold multiple features of the statute unconstitutional immediately. This last point becomes clear in the instructions on remand: O'Connor says that the lower court should consider the other constitutional objections that the plaintiffs raise. Thus, legislatures and abortion opponents lose to the extent that courts are given greater leeway to cut up their abortion statutes.posted by monju_bosatsu at 10:46 AM on January 18, 2006
Read most broadly, though, the opinion could be understood as laying down a new limit on lower court judges' authority to issue sweeping decisions that nullify new abortion laws, end to end.While I agree with the sentiment, I disagree with the scope. I think it would be more reasonable to think of this as an interpretive limit on lower court judges' authority to broadly nullify any new laws based on an issue with a specific (and statistically narrow) example of enforcement. I don't read it as specific to abortion laws in any way. This may lend support to the idea that this is good-to-the-last-drop (Burke-style) judicial conservatism, as well as the idea that people who write law blogs like to make everything into a tempest. Isn't it good for the Supreme Court to check the excesses of lower courts?
If, in fact, that is the way the decision is applied by lower courts in this and other cases, it could amount to a narrowing of abortion rights.I don't think this is exactly fair, either. Again, perhaps Denniston is reading a bit too deeply into this one, in search of something salacious. If the court is recommending narrower relief when addressing the constitutionality of laws, they are simply recommending that lower courts try to avoid using a sledgehammer to fine tune the law, when a Ball Pein is available, and does the job so much more neatly. To state that this amounts to a narrowing of abortion rights is to presuppose that those rights are solely granted and protected by declaring abortion legislation unconstitutional. If Denniston believes this, his bias is showing. I'm glad it's not so easily identified in the opinion of the Court.
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posted by monju_bosatsu at 10:06 AM on January 18, 2006