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The Invisible Fist of the Free Market
February 18, 2008 4:32 PM   RSS feed for this thread Subscribe

What market has grown from $900 billion in 2000 to more than $45.5 trillion and is completely unregulated? Welcome to the world of Credit Default Swaps. Speculative derivatives have been described as "financial weapons of mass destruction" by some guy named Warren Buffet. Some people wonder how you can have "$1 trillion in swaps bet on the success or failure of GM when the entire market cap of GM is a mere $15 billion." Credit Default Swaps are being triggered from Northern Rock in the UK to ANZ Bank down under as the "subprime" crisis unravels. AIG's CDS loss portfolio has already climbed to $5 billion from a previsouly estimated $1 billion.

Previously on MeFi.
posted by ryoshu (87 comments total) 21 users marked this as a favorite

JPMorgan Chase, with $7.8 trillion, is the largest player; Citibank and Bank of America are behind it with $3 trillion and $1.6 trillion respectively.

Motherfuckers. New law: all people in the finance industry regularly tested for coke, because this has gotten out of hand. If only there was a test for "greedy and reckless."
posted by a robot made out of meat at 4:48 PM on February 18 [1 favorite]


Don't you wish that your job in life was to make money appear out of thin air?
posted by Rubbstone at 4:54 PM on February 18


also see, cf.
posted by kliuless at 5:00 PM on February 18


Viva Las Vegas.
posted by kuujjuarapik at 5:04 PM on February 18 [1 favorite]


I posted a long excerpt from the Credit Bubble Bulletin here.

Short form: things are really bad, and getting worse extremely quickly. The subprime contagion is spreading.

Been talking about this for years now, to the point of exhaustion. I'm sure my family thought I was a lunatic. There's a small amount of glee at "I told you so!", but... I'd much rather have been wrong.

At least now they're starting to understand why I was so upset about this whole thing.
posted by Malor at 5:12 PM on February 18


America's entire economy is smoke and mirrors. What bullshit that when Wall Street winces the fed steps in to adjust the interest rate. Can't have fat rich bastards seeing the down side of their own greed, after all. It has to all be a gravy train all the time for that top 2% and the rest of us can go to hell.
posted by 45moore45 at 5:19 PM on February 18 [1 favorite]


What's there to be upset about? Doesn't this mean we're all richer?
posted by UbuRoivas at 5:19 PM on February 18


This s exactly why I have guns, liquor, gold Krugerrands, and cigarettes hidden under my bed. Well, that, and, you know, I like to party.
posted by Astro Zombie at 5:21 PM on February 18 [14 favorites]


TRICKLE-DOWN turmoil from the US subprime crisis is gathering momentum, with ANZ Bank saying its dealings with companies strained by the global debacle will wipe away first-half profit growth. ANZ shares lost 6% on the announcement that the bank would have to hold back about $367 million from profit for the six months to March 31, most of it the result of dealings with companies struggling in the global credit market.

The shares closed $1.45 lower at $22.46. ANZ chief executive Mike Smith stressed that, were it not for the one-off provisions, profit would have grown by more than last year's 11.5%.


I can sympathise with that. After all, I'd be a millionaire now if only my ostrich farm investment hadn't gone sour.
posted by UbuRoivas at 5:24 PM on February 18 [1 favorite]


Motherfuckers. New law: all people in the finance industry regularly tested for coke, because this has gotten out of hand. If only there was a test for "greedy and reckless."

They Already do, at least according to AskMe. But according to that thread, most i-bankers also do coke. So apparently they're not doing it enough. (Not that i actually know if Cocaine use would actually cause people to screw up this way, I think the companies are just worried about people stealing money to pay for drugs, or something like that)
posted by delmoi at 5:26 PM on February 18 [1 favorite]


when Wall Street winces the fed steps in

also see, cf.
posted by kliuless at 5:28 PM on February 18


Man, I'm glad this is happening during the bush administration, and the result of his policies. Can you imagine if it had happened a year later and the economy crashed then? Everyone would blame the new democratic president.
posted by delmoi at 5:32 PM on February 18 [3 favorites]


Yeah, but I think it's gonna be getting worse for a decade or more, delmoi, just like Japan, so the next President is likely to be a one-termer. Like Carter, he'll be sandbagged by the economic mess he inherited.
posted by Malor at 5:34 PM on February 18 [2 favorites]


(or 'she', if Hillary gets the nomination, but I expect Obama to win at this point.)
posted by Malor at 5:35 PM on February 18


It should be noted that Mr. Buffett dabbles in this market, despite his rhetoric.

By the way, a bunch of financial firms losing money on hedges is hardly the end of the world. Not sure why all the handwringing. Such a gloomy group here!
posted by blue mustard at 5:38 PM on February 18 [2 favorites]


oh and brad setser helpfully puts it all in global context :P

cheers!
posted by kliuless at 5:40 PM on February 18


All these derivatives have made our economy more vulnerable than the last Tsar's hemophiliac son, Prince Alexei, who threatened to bleed to death from any scratch. Obama had better have a lot more going for him than Rasputin, or we are all in big trouble.
posted by jamjam at 5:42 PM on February 18 [2 favorites]


delmoi: everyone knows that this is really Slick Willie's fault!
posted by papakwanz at 5:48 PM on February 18


Oh, and by the way... could someone explain what the fuck this all means? I'm a stupid liberal arts type.
posted by papakwanz at 5:49 PM on February 18


Speculation on derivatives caused the bankruptcy of Orange County, California, back in the mid-90s.
posted by Cool Papa Bell at 5:52 PM on February 18


delmoi: everyone knows that this is really Slick Willie's fault!

A lot of it was. The original stock market mania was all Greenspan and Clinton. The fallout from that should have been terrible, but Greenspan went hog-wild with the cash supply to prop things up... and, of course, made them ten times worse.

Now, make no mistake, the Bushies have been asleep at the switch while the new bubbles blew up to 10 times the size of the originals, and are absolutely culpable at this point.... but the Clintonistas share the blame.
posted by Malor at 6:12 PM on February 18


According to the CIA world factbook, the GDP of the entire world it $50.36 trillion. For whatever that's worth.
posted by absalom at 6:19 PM on February 18


Malor--thanks for pointing out that no one chief executive is to blame, but couldn't you have worked a little harder and shown that everyone back to King George III is also somewhat culpable?
posted by hexatron at 6:22 PM on February 18


According to the CIA world factbook, the GDP of the entire world it $50.36 trillion.

The $45.5 trillion number above almost certainly comes from ISDA's 2007 mid year survey, but ISDA reports that as the notional amount outstanding, so it can't be directly compared to the value of other markets
posted by Mr. President Dr. Steve Elvis America at 6:42 PM on February 18


It should be noted that Mr. Buffett dabbles in this market, despite his rhetoric.

While it's true that Berkshire Hathaway (the giant corporation which Buffett runs) sells credit default insurance (to a limited extent), this doesn't really make Buffett a hypocrite. Berkshire sells insurance. It's a giant insurance company that participates in all sorts of insurance specialty lines and has adequate reserves to backup its losses. It's only natural that it would write credit/securities insurance to some degree. Those policies can be defined as derivatives, but this doesn't indicate that Berkshire is a player in the CDS market.

The problem with the CDS market is that there is little transparency into who holds the liabilities and whether or not they have adequate reserves to pay out losses. I doubt Buffett is speculating in the broader CDS market, as either a buyer or seller.
posted by mullacc at 6:44 PM on February 18


In unrelated news, my new band is called The Speculative Derivatives. We're a little pretentious and nobody comes to our shows, but Warren Buffet gave us a big ironic thumbs-up in his zine.
posted by damehex at 6:45 PM on February 18 [4 favorites]


Those policies can be defined as derivatives, but this doesn't indicate that Berkshire is a player in the CDS market.

And just to be clear, Berkshire does indeed participate in the CDS market. Quoting from the WSJ article I linked above (emphasis mine):
Sellers of stock- and credit-insurance contracts typically bet that the risk priced into the underlying reference securities is overstated. The notional value of the underlying contracts, which include equity-index options and credit-default swaps, has increased by $12 billion, or 52%, to $35 billion since the end of 2006.

I'm not really calling Buffett a hypocrite, because I really have no idea of the nature of his company's position other than what I read in the WSJ. That is, I'll give him the benefit of the doubt and assume he's trading in flavors of derivatives that aren't what he considers "financial weapons of mass destruction." Presumably Berkshire's positions are less speculative than some.
posted by blue mustard at 7:07 PM on February 18


Too bad that whole "privatization of social security" didn't happen, or the 2% could offload their losses to the unwashed masses.
posted by yesster at 7:12 PM on February 18 [4 favorites]


but Greenspan went hog-wild with the cash supply

I swear when I first read this I thought you'd called him 'Greedspawn.'
posted by jamjam at 7:22 PM on February 18 [2 favorites]


Man, I'm glad this is happening during the bush administration, and the result of his policies. Can you imagine if it had happened a year later and the economy crashed then? Everyone would blame the new democratic president

Apparently, you are not reading from the proper script. Whatever bad happens during Bush's administration, right up until the last minute, is all the result of something Clinton did. Or heck, maybe even Carter. The exact moment he's out of office, anything bad that happens from that point forward, or is already happening for that matter, will be the fault of his successor. Do keep up.
posted by Devils Rancher at 7:26 PM on February 18 [5 favorites]


but couldn't you have worked a little harder and shown that everyone back to King George III is also somewhat culpable?

Heh, well, actually, it goes back to LBJ. I suppose you could argue that it goes back to 1917, when the Fed was created, but I think of the modern dysfunction starting with the Great Society, and very slowly snowballing from there. Nixon taking us off the gold standard, Reagan and voodoo economics, Clinton with his rejiggering of the inflation numbers and lies about a balanced budget, and Bush with his absolute ineptitude all contributed... and then, of course, there's Greenspan and Helicopter Ben.

Since LBJ, it would appear our primary governmental focus has been avoiding paying the bills from the prior administrations, and then, in later years, central management of the economy and making sure Nothing Bad Ever Happens Here.

Try as I might, though, I'm not coming up with any way to work King George in. Sorry about that.:)
posted by Malor at 7:43 PM on February 18


Oh, I think the Clinton administration gamed the GDP numbers, too. I think a lot of the really egregious lies about economic performance started under his watch.
posted by Malor at 7:46 PM on February 18


Oh, and by the way... could someone explain what the fuck this all means? I'm a stupid liberal arts type.

It's a bet between two parties that a credit event will/will not take place in a third party.

My basic understanding: Speculative Funds, LLC decides it wants to place a bet on Widgets Inc. There aren't enough corporate bonds from Widget Inc. so Speculative Funds, LLC (the seller) finds another party -- Greedy Bastards, LLC (the buyer) -- that will cover their bet on the other side. As long as a credit event (the bet) doesn't occur, Greedy Bastards pay Speculative Funds a fee. If the credit event does occur, Speculative Funds takes delivery of the "bonds" and settles with Greedy Bastards.

So, where's the problem? Say Widget Inc. has $1 billion in outstanding debt and CDS are being traded for $10 billion. Widget Inc. defaults with a 75% recovery rate. The loss to investors in Widget Inc. would be $250 million. The loss to the CDS sellers would be $2.5 billion, 2.5 times the outstanding debt Widget Inc. had in the first place, i.e. they are just making shit up and potentially fucking the markets in the meantime.

"But ryoshu," you may ask, "surely no one would be stupid enough to do that?" Well, going back to the original post, GM has a market cap of $15 billion, but there are $1 trillion in credit default swaps placed on it.

This relates to the subprime industry since surely some of the companies effected by the "subprime"[0] fiasco are covered by the unregulated credit default swaps. No one knows if the sellers have enough to cover the losses that are going to occur, since these things are unregulated and stuff.

[0] - subprime is a misnomer. The problems are now spreading to prime market as well.
posted by ryoshu at 8:14 PM on February 18 [5 favorites]


blue mustard writes: And just to be clear, Berkshire does indeed participate in the CDS market. Quoting from the WSJ article I linked above (emphasis mine):
Sellers of stock- and credit-insurance contracts typically bet that the risk priced into the underlying reference securities is overstated. The notional value of the underlying contracts, which include equity-index options and credit-default swaps, has increased by $12 billion, or 52%, to $35 billion since the end of 2006.


You're confusing the description of the entire market with what Berkshire is specifically doing. Berkshire writes some insurance policies based on the value of underlying equity indexes or bonds. Such an insurance policy is technically a derivative contract and therefore part of the universe of "stock- and credit-insurance contracts". Credit default swaps (CDS) are also part of that universe. CDS are unique, in part, because they are an attempt to create a standardized insurance contract that can be freely traded among buyers and sellers--that is, they're a way for players other than insurance companies to speculate on credit insurance. Berkshire takes credit risk through insurance policies, but they do it as a traditional insurance carrier, not as a trader of CDS. The difference can be difficult to understand for financial outsiders, but it's not trivial.
posted by mullacc at 8:20 PM on February 18


Obama had better have a lot more going for him than Rasputin, or we are all in big trouble.

In that case, we're surely doomed.

Rasputin had Boney M on his side, whereas Obama only has that I've got a crush on Obama girl.
posted by UbuRoivas at 8:37 PM on February 18 [3 favorites]


CDS are unique, in part, because they are an attempt to create a standardized insurance contract that can be freely traded among buyers and sellers--that is, they're a way for players other than insurance companies to speculate on credit insurance.

I'm not sure how helpful dividing the CDS universe into "insurance" and "speculation" really is. CDS aren't regulated as insurance, and the precise same CDS can be used as either "insurance" or "speculation."

I don't know the extent to which Berkshire hedges its position when entering into CDSs, but the business model is premised on profiting from identifying debt that is less risky than the market believes. Fundamentally, Berkshire is taking a position on the underlying debt.

Maybe it's not "speculation" because the guys at Berkshire are really smart and they're careful to try to limit their losses, but it's not a fundamentally different activity.
posted by Mr. President Dr. Steve Elvis America at 8:49 PM on February 18


I don't know about this, but has anyone actually tried to value vanilla cds? Oh so fun! Oh so fun! I haven't had this much fun since interest rate swaps, seriously.

In any case, it shouldn't really be viewed as insurance and the risks are obvious to 90% who deal with this. I'm more worried about another SocGen or "rogue" trader doing something stupid, somewhere and destabilizing the market when they try to sloppily unwind their positions. Far, far more dangerous than vanilla and exotic options will ever be on their own.
posted by geoff. at 8:58 PM on February 18


Bill Fleckenstein, over at Fleckenstein Capital, had this to say at the end of January, more than two weeks ago. Note that this is a pay service, so I try not to quote him very often, but this is just such a good explanation of the root causes of the mess that I couldn't resist.

No Need to Dread a Prudent Fed
I am somewhat surprised that after having been head-faked by the fraud in France, people aren't a bit more anxious about whether or not the Fed will again cut rates 50 points on Wednesday. Before the problems at SoGen were revealed, folks were looking for 50 basis points, and now, after the Fed got head-faked out of 75, people think we should get another 50, making a total of 125. I grant you, the economy is weak, but I didn't see anyone making the case two weeks ago that it was so weak that the Fed should cut 125 basis points (in sum: 75 + 50) -- which it's now expected to do.

To me, it just shows how completely in over his head Ben Bernanke is. Of course, the root cause of the problems we face is the interest-rate targeting championed by Greenspan and Bernanke. Only someone completely delusional would think that he knew how to pick the right interest rate to run a $14 trillion economy.

Paul Volcker achieved his greatest anti-inflationary success when he targeted the money supply. Money, admittedly, is not an easy target to define, let alone to hit. Some have suggested that the Fed just control the one thing it can indisputably control, namely, its own balance sheet. Let the Fed's footings expand by, say 3%, or 4% a year, and let interest rates go where they will. Greenspan and Bernanke fixed the funds rate and let credit growth go where it would. It went up.

The side benefit of a Fed targeting a somewhat quantifiable measure (like money supply) is that it lets the world know that interest rates are going to go where they're going to go, thereby reducing speculation. Thus, in addition to creating the misallocation of capital, the policy of targeting interest rates caused people to take far too much risk.

That's a quick and dirty explanation of the problems that are unwinding. Of course, they're far more severe than that, but regular Rap readers are well versed in the main problems in this country -- which stem from the fact that the average person can't afford his house and is now saddled with a debt that he's having trouble servicing.

posted by Malor at 9:02 PM on February 18 [1 favorite]


It all starts with the Great Society? Never mind that other expensive government initiative that expanded under LBJ--the Vietnam War. Its expense from '65 to '68 dwarfs that of the Great Society programs, easily. I don't think you'll find exact figures online, but you'd be hard pressed to find any decent presidential historian or public administration or public finance/budgeting specialist who'd disagree.
posted by raysmj at 9:10 PM on February 18


Well, I really meant Great Society PLUS Vietnam.... overspending, and our subsequent bankruptcy under Nixon (which is what taking us off the gold standard was; a bankruptcy by any reasonable standard). Then, our complete reinvention of the world monetary system, and our gradual abandonment of anything resembling fiscal sense or actual free-market capitalism.

It's taken us a tremendously long time to fail, because we were so immensely wealthy when the process started. The government was bankrupt in 1971, but the country certainly wasn't. Now, a generation later, both are in debt beyond their ability to pay.
posted by Malor at 9:35 PM on February 18


I'm not sure how helpful dividing the CDS universe into "insurance" and "speculation" really is. CDS aren't regulated as insurance, and the precise same CDS can be used as either "insurance" or "speculation."

I wasn't trying to divide up the CDS market. The equity-linked and credit insurance that Berkshire is writing isn't in the form of CDS (at least, as far as I can tell--that WSJ article is unclear and so is BRK's annual report). I was trying to draw a distinction between insurance policies written by regulated insurance carriers and trade-able CDS contracts. Because the former is not traded, it's much easier to determine who the risk-taker is and what the status of their reserves are. Buffett's criticism of the derivatives market has to do, in part, with this dubious status of counter-parties.

Maybe it's not "speculation" because the guys at Berkshire are really smart and they're careful to try to limit their losses, but it's not a fundamentally different activity.

I agree that it's not a fundamentally different activity. But Berkshire is in a better position to pay out losses than many protection-sellers in the CDS market (and as a protection-buyer in the CDS market, it's hard or impossible to manage this counter-party risk). So buying credit insurance from Berkshire IS a fundamentally different proposition than buying a CDS.

As an aside, Berkshire liquidated its financial derivatives subsidiary, Gen Re Securities, back in 2002 (though it's a long-tailed operation, so it's still in run-off).
posted by mullacc at 9:50 PM on February 18


I agree that it's not a fundamentally different activity. But Berkshire is in a better position to pay out losses than many protection-sellers in the CDS market (and as a protection-buyer in the CDS market, it's hard or impossible to manage this counter-party risk). So buying credit insurance from Berkshire IS a fundamentally different proposition than buying a CDS.

We basically agree. It sounds like neither of us knows how Berkshire is structuring their credit protection. I don't think "CDS" necessarily carries the same connotations of free transferability and anonymous counterparties that you do, but whatever.

The big point is that risk is like entropy. It can only be shifted from place to place, not reduced overall, and everything you do creates more.

In the case of derivatives, every transaction creates counterparty risk on top of the risk that is being shifted by the contract. While derivatives allow the underlying risk to be distributed better, and I think they're fundamentally a sound idea, they introduce additional risks that need to be carefully managed.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, some institutions' ideas of "careful management" was "ignoring it," but so it goes.
posted by Mr. President Dr. Steve Elvis America at 10:02 PM on February 18 [1 favorite]


Whoops, I'm an idiot. I was reading that WSJ article completely wrong. It does specifically say that Berkshire is buying CDS. But the BRK financials use the vague term "credit default derivative contracts", which can have a broader meaning than just CDS. Mea culpa. Sorry, blue mustard and Dr. Steve.
posted by mullacc at 10:06 PM on February 18


er, not buying CDS, but selling CDS.
posted by mullacc at 10:11 PM on February 18


In other news: Banks "quietly" borrow $50 billion from Fed
Banks in the United States have been quietly borrowing "massive amounts" from the U.S. Federal Reserve in recent weeks, using a new measure the Fed introduced two months ago to help ease the credit crunch, according to a report on the web site of The Financial Times.

posted by PenDevil at 11:25 PM on February 18


Why is US government debt so bad?

Looking at the wikipedia ranking of countries by government debt the US is only ranked 65th in the world.

Surely, with the reversal of Bush II's tax cuts and an end to the Iraq war, both of which are quite likely, the situation is not that dire at all.

(The subprime thing is bad though, that is clearing causing, and will cause more pain).
posted by sien at 11:34 PM on February 18


Because both the GDP and the debt numbers are bogus.

GDP point A: the numbers are largely untrustworthy, being badly distorted by hedonic adjustments. Almost all of the famed 'productivity improvements' of the 90s were from statistical hoodoo on the computer-sector numbers. Dell shipped a 486-33 in 1994 for $3000, and a 486-66 in 1995 for the same $3000, so... hey, productivity doubled! With all the components in the computer doubling every 18 months, this single sector resulted in about half of the "productivity growth" of the entire country... when no more actual dollars were changing hands. They even had the balls to call this entirely fictional value 'real dollars'.

GDP point B: the American consumer is presently spending about 125% of what he or she makes. That means that consumer spending has to drop by 25% just to get back to a zero savings rate. I don't know how that will directly transfer to GDP, but it wouldn't shock me if it had a total effect GREATER than 25%, since we're counting the same dollars changing hands multiple times, and those same bullshit 'real dollar' multipliers are going to be equally large going in reverse. Each dollar that's not spent in computer products probably counts for 30+ dollars of GDP by now.

Debt: per the GAO, the US has a fifty trillion dollar debt, not the paltry nine trillion it claims. That means, to pay all the debts we've taken on, we need to have fifty trillion dollars in cash earning interest right now to be sure we can pay all our bills.

So, the debt is five times larger than what shows on that table, the GDP is fictional to begin with and HAS TO shrink dramatically, meaning tax revenues are going to decline sharply.... and we haven't even touched the consumer debt, the trade deficit, or the gigantic dollar holdings by overseas entities.

We're in deep shit.
posted by Malor at 12:17 AM on February 19


(oh and I'm probably wrong about what model of 486 was shipping in what year -- that's a figurative example, not a literal one.)
posted by Malor at 12:17 AM on February 19


Boy, I really oughta proofread better. I said, "when no more actual dollars were changing hands", but that's obviously untrue, since the computer sector really was growing very very quickly. But the hedonic adjustments overstated that growth's impact on productivity numbers and GDP by a gigantic degree.
posted by Malor at 12:23 AM on February 19


Ok, FPP starts out with "Credit Default Swaps are being triggered ..."

Great. That's precisely what the instruments were designed to do. And in spite of some of the skepticism (we've seen such expressions during earlier times of systemic stress) the market seems to be coping rather well, and more than likely creating additional opportunities for well placed participants.

For example, when Delphi went under in 2005, the protection in force at that time exceeded the underling debt by a factor of ten.

Credit Default Swaps allowed some market participants to assume economic exposure to Delphi (a view, in other words on the viability of this company as an ongoing concern) but without having to locate and purchase the underlying paper. So that's a plus.

Meanwhile, precisely none of the protection sellers themselves defaulted. And that market opp? Well the price of Dephi bonds spiked, so if you were long the paper or fleet of foot (maybe had prop trading in that segment of the market thus quickly gaining a sense that something was going on and went long the paper on a hunch) you made money.

At the end of the Deplhi event, the money shook out this way: protection sellers had to make protection buyers whole on their losses. So they paid out but what's the problem? They were selling protection, Delphi's bankruptcy didn't come as a surprise so this probability was priced in.

Protection buyers got precisely what they paid for - insurance against their losses. So they were only out premiums, not the value of the underlying assets (or more precisely net of recovery value).

Folks that were long Delphi bonds probably made money as they shook out at about seventy cents on the dollar and they were previously traded (off the top of my head mind you) at perhaps twenty cents on the dollar - longs did well.

"The problem with the CDS market is that there is little transparency into who holds the liabilities and whether or not they have adequate reserves to pay out losses."

I haven't worked in this market for about six years, but when I did it all transactions were strictly counterparty to counterparty i.e., not exchange traded (which is itself controversial, but a centralised exchange would guarantee contract performance and although Euronext has plans to offer exchange traded CDS' this won't be realised until mid 2009 IIRC)

Yeh, this is indeed a concern, but a couple of rules apply - first of all, who are you purchasing your protection from? The basic questions are what is the reference asset? In other words, what are you trying to purchase protection on? Then, who is guaranteeing the protection? It would be ill advised to purchase, for example, default protection from Delphi on their own bonds. Or even another auto manufacturer on Delphi bonds (systemic issues).

So desks have to perform their own due diligence - that's what they're paid for.

One things for sure - the current credit event would be a lot worse if not for CDS'.
posted by Mutant at 1:03 AM on February 19 [1 favorite]


Guns don't kill people, people do. All financial instruments are just tools. The risk comes with how they are used, and unfortunatley many of them allow risk to migrate to those least able to price it. There is nothing wrong with betting on sports if you know what you are doing. Putting your life savings on a "sure thing" your friend told you about might appear to be a less good idea.

This seems to escape the boards of many organisations.

The real issue is the the banks have become the high rollers, and are no longer the casino. Being a casino is a good thing.

What is worse is that many of the high rollers are relatively unsophisticated pension fund managers, insurance fund managers and government agencys, who are 'investing' in things they don't understand with your money.

Having your money with a Buffet is better because at least he thinks about these things before they happen, while most of the industry seems to get surprised a lot.

HSBC warned on the subprime issue in Q3 2006. What was everybody else doing at the time?
posted by fistynuts at 2:32 AM on February 19


Mutant is completely correct if the CDS were being triggered. Except they're not. There's been one recent default that triggered CDS protection (Quebecor). The link in the FPP explicitly says that the CDS has not been triggered, though the premium payable by a new buyer has risen. (As an aside, that looks like a prime selling opportunity for a couple of years - the government is unlikely to let NR go bust). I'm not surprised the Bershire Hathaway has a portfolio of CDS - it's the job of insurance companies to take on that kind risk.

The point about the outstanding notional being higher than the value of outstanding debt of a reference entity has been dealt with before in the comments a different, equally alarmist, FPP. Essentially, the headline figure is made up of double/triple/etc counting so the real figure at risk is substantially lower.

Given that the CDS market is OTC all the contracts should be collateralised under standard ISDA CSAs - the net counterparty exposure between the banks should be very low at any time.

AIG is a somewhat special case as its portfolio of CDS are written on the extremely safe portions of the capital structure (where safe means that the CDS protection is unlikely to be triggered, not that it is immune from declines in value) and it relied on certain accounting tricks to make cash.

I am biased, given that it's my day job, but credit default swaps conceptually make the world a better place by allowing credit risk to be allocated to those best placed to take it. The growth in the market does throw up questions though, in particular whether banks who have bought CDS protection that would previously have had an interest in keeping companies alive will now prefer to let them go bust so the bank can collect under the CDS. If the downturn continues there may be a larger wave of bankruptcies than there would be otherwise.
posted by patricio at 3:17 AM on February 19 [1 favorite]


fistynuts - you've made two very good points that really can't be separated - that many of these instruments are being sold to folks that shouldn't be alowed to purchase them.

Secondly, what are the boards up to while this is happening? It does indeed seem like governance or, more properly, lack of is the real issue here, not the instruments themselves.

Someone else posted a link about the Orange County bankruptcy. That's an interesting case - Robert L. Citron, by most accounts an experienced fund manager, someone who should have known better purchased instruments known as "inverse floaters" and, compounding the mistake, leverage up the position by borrowing (disclaimer - I haven't watched the video as I'm at work, but I'm familiar with the case).

Leverage is of interest here as a the market participant can effectively multiply returns by borrowing, but sometimes the fact is overlooked that unless hedged, the positions losses can be multiplied as well. Whoops!

Citron's strategy was cash flow positive as long as short term interest rates remained below long term, but in February 1994 The Fed started raising rates and his position rapidly lost value.

The whole mess became public once he'd lost $2 billion of about $7.5 billion nominal.

Since then Orange County has put in a lot more oversight. At the bank I work for I've been opining this current market stress will see a lot more regulatory oversight into certain segments of business, which is both good and bad.

Good as we probably won't see the same types of market stress we're now seeing.

Bad because considering the sums involved, the sheer money that can be made, banks and funds almost always find a way to game the system. The denser the rulebook, the more regulation the better as its more likely holes will be found.

That being said, I do rather like the UK's principles based approach to market regulation rather than The US' rules based.

On preview - patricio - excellent point about NR; we were talking along these same lines this AM, trying to see if we could line up an opp. Rather curious situtation BOE has gotten themselves into. I'm betting they aint' got an exit strategy so this could get messy ...
posted by Mutant at 3:26 AM on February 19


I'm glad some guys who understand this business better then I came in at the end to help explain why its not necessarily a bad thing that the notional value of CDS' based on a particular security may be a multiple of the actual outstanding value of that reference issue.

One thing I can't let go - comparing a company's equity market value and the notional value of derivatives on its debt is just silly. Literally apples and oranges.
posted by JPD at 4:55 AM on February 19


"...but has anyone actually tried to value vanilla cds? Oh so fun! Oh so fun! I haven't had this much fun since interest rate swaps, seriously."

Gosh I'm missing something here. The valuation exercise does seem relatively straightforward, if we make some assumptions - namely, no risk of counterparty default and independent distribution of default probabilities, interest rates, and recovery rates. In actual practice two of the last three do exhibit some degree of dependence - probabilty of default being positively correlated with interest rates - but we have other modeling techniques that can help us deal with series such as this.

In any case, these assumptions provide us with a model that can calculate a baseline value, much like a textbook Black Scholes will give a rather crude metric of far value for an option. Hull did much of this work in early 2000.

Relaxing the assumption 'no risk of counterparty default' is the first step toward a more realistic model; again, Hull & White worked through this problem towards the end of 2000.

Tavakoli was into her second edition on this topic back in 2001 ("Credit Derivatives and Synthetic Structures", I've only read the first and its well worth the twenty quid Amazon is flogging it for), so the basic models were rapidly mainstreaming five, six years ago.

Academic literature is but one driver in finance and I'm sure many desks have much more advanced models. At least they must have different models, otherwise there would hardly be a market, what with single views on price and all...and a robust market for CDS exists, in fact was the opening sentence of this FPP.

I know the guys behind Quantlib (open sourced under a BSD license) were talking about incorporating CDS back in 2005. I haven't kept up with their work but it does seem that models valuing plain vanilla CDS are widely available.

Of course I always tell folks having a model is one thing - data is the real problem. So you've got a model? Great! Simple model, fancy model, doesn't matter - the question is how do you plan to calibrate it? Calibration is a very difficult exercise, especially so in the rather opaque market for Credit Default Swaps. If that was your point, I'd agree with you.

Valuation's easy. Calibration's a bitch.
posted by Mutant at 5:19 AM on February 19


I see that the $45T mark is fake, but I'm still quite worried by Mr. Buffet's underlying point. Because a) they aren't openly traded and b) pricing is allegedly difficult, he thinks that they are not sending risk to those best able to tolerate it. Rather, they are creating the false appearance of safety for a number of institutions while nominal risk is concentrated in a very few hands. Because those few are under-reserved, the actual protection is minimal. The possibility that financial institutions (like those I pointed out at the beginning) are systemically miscalculating their risk exposure is pretty frightening after some of our recent episodes of poor risk-allocation.
posted by a robot made out of meat at 6:39 AM on February 19


Mutant: I'm a little confused by your commentary on Delphi...the article implies that many protection-buyers expected to be made whole to the tune of par for every $1,000 in protection bought but the auction process resulted in only $366.25 for their $1,000. Was the gap equal to the expected recovery value on the bonds, or was this a case of compromise on the part of protection-buyers? The article seems to say that $366.25 was all the protection-sellers could afford.
posted by mullacc at 7:20 AM on February 19


mullacc - the auction outcome was 63.375% (i.e. that was the recovery) so the number in the article is the loss amount that was paid to protection buyers to make them whole.
posted by patricio at 7:32 AM on February 19


patricio: Thanks. The Delphi example in the NYT article was horribly misleading. From the article:

Had they been valuing their Delphi insurance coverage at $1,000 per bond, they would have had to write off that position by $633.75 per $1,000 bond.

Was this actually a problem for anyone, I wonder? If it was, that's hardly a problem with the CDS market and entirely a problem with someone's shifty accounting practices.
posted by mullacc at 7:39 AM on February 19


A question for whoever... If an investor has a large amount of money invested in whether or not a company defaults, doesn't it eventually make it likely that the investor will try to bring about that outcome.

Say I "bet" a trillion dollars that Ford was going to default, considering how much I had invested, wouldn't it be a good idea to actively get involved in Ford's defaulting, say by getting a slate of people who will make the moves I want to Ford's board.
posted by drezdn at 9:01 AM on February 19


"The possibility that financial institutions (like those I pointed out at the beginning) are systemically miscalculating their risk exposure is pretty frightening..."

Frightening I agree, but I'd argue the probability is relatively small. In terms of calculating risk, models for CDS are admittedly complex as we're dealing with both credit and market risk drivers.

Just to illustrate - if we were discussing an equity only portfolio then we're concerned solely with changes in the market value of our holdings. Value at Risk, VAR, is pretty simple and anyone with a high school education and knowledge of basic statistics is able to comprehend how this stuff works, representations of some of my stuffier colleagues in finance (none posting on MeFi 'tho!) aside.

If we were looking at, for example, Commercial Products, as loans to corporate counterparty's are called at our institution, then you're concerned with Credit Risk. There are a two main approaches to looking at Credit Risk - Structural and Reduced Form.

Again, I always tell people if you can't explain it simply then YOU don't understand it. So that being said, hopefully I'll do ok here. Structural models are just what the name implies - we look at the structure of the obligors balance sheet. Assets, liabilities, cash flow in vs. cash flow out, ability to pay bills in other words. Structural Models are really that simple. Sure, a few bells and whistles might be bolted on but at their core not much more to them than this.

Reduced form models get a little funkier (aka difficult to visualise) as we're dealing with mathematical models predicting obligor default based on an underlying process representing the asset / liability ratio in general and specifically how it evolves over time. Depending upon the model used (the literature is rich, lots of variants) calibration might make use of financial ratios, macroeconomic factors or share prices all of which, under some circumstances, will result in the value of the firms liabilities exceeding those of its assets - bankrupt, in other words.

A curious aside, and you might have caught on to this - Structural Models are by definition, largely backward looking as we make use of financial data captured on the balance sheet. Reduced form can model forward looking probabilities, as they make use of an assumed data generating process to evolve the asset liability ratio over time. In practice Structural Models have been tweaked to calculate forward looking probabilities, typically by enriching their results with other data sets (e.g., given a AAA rated obligor we can use previously calculated ratings transition probabilities as well as default probabilities to gain insight into where this obligor most likely will end up across some horizon)

Now a CDS is an interesting creation from the point of view of calculating risk exposure, as the instrument has both market and credit drivers. Two sets of credit sensitivities, actually.

In its simplest definition, we got a reference asset, something that we want to insure the value of. Let's say this is an IBM bond.

Next thing we need is a protection seller, some market entity that is willing to make us whole, in other words pay any loss of value associated with a credit event (need not be bankruptcy by the way, there are six or so different ISDA recognised events) impacting the value of our wonderful IBM bond.

So the value of our bond is impacted by both market and credit risk, reflecting changes in the bonds value due to overall market conditions (e.g., interest rates) as well as effects of IBM's ability to pay their bills, in finance-speak "service their debt", in this case the coupons due on the bond they issued.

But the value of the CDS (or more properly, volatility or changes in its value)isn't determined solely by the riskyness of the IBM bond; you've also got to take into account the protection seller across a couple of dimensions. First creditworthiness - after all, insurance purchased from a AAA rated seller MUST be worth more than the same product sold by a BBB (one step above junk). Secondly, you've got to look at the degree of default correlation between the protection seller and the reference asset. You really shouldn't purchase default protection for your IBM bond from IBMs financial services subsidiary. Or another computer manufacturer such as Dell. Both are impacted by the same systemic factors or risks. No, you want your protection seller to have relatively low default correlation with the asset you're trying to protect. After all, you can't be made whole on your losses if your protection seller is also bankrupt!

So I realise this is terribly verbose but not because I'm trying to illustrate how complicated all of this is, rather that there are so many choices available to each market participant that I don't believe the chances of systemic miscalculation - in other words, making the same choises, identical assumptions, using the same data for calibration, to name but a few alternatives here - are very high.

Non zero, yes. Approaching unity? Nope.
posted by Mutant at 9:32 AM on February 19 [1 favorite]


drezdn - yes, if an investor takes a purely speculative position then you're right, there is an incentive to cause a quick default. However, getting protection under a CDS doesn't give you any voting or other rights over the company so your influence is limited. The things that do give you those rights (e.g. stock) lose value if the company tanks, so it's not exactly a straightforward strategy (and is probably illegal in various ways).
posted by patricio at 9:43 AM on February 19


Frightening I agree, but I'd argue the probability is relatively small.

We are talking about the same industry that packaged mortgages into CDOs, backed them with insurance through companies that don't have enough to cover in the face of a major housing downturn, used those companies to get the CDOs a AAA rating, then lived on the assumption that real estate always goes up?

First creditworthiness - after all, insurance purchased from a AAA rated seller MUST be worth more than the same product sold by a BBB (one step above junk).

Like Ambac and MBIA?

...I don't believe the chances of systemic miscalculation - in other words, making the same choises, identical assumptions, using the same data for calibration, to name but a few alternatives here - are very high.

It doesn't have to be about making the same choices and calculations system wide, it could be something like a major downturn in a single market that a lot of people have hedged against. What happens if the sellers can't pay up? Someone is going to take a bath. A lot of someones is my guess.

Sorry if I sound like a pessimist. I tend to get worried when the financial whiz kids start getting too cute by half with markets that tend be un- or under-regulated.

Here you have AIG, a company one would hope knows something about insurance, and their CDS desk was wrong by at least a factor of 5. AIG can meet their obligations since they do this insurance type stuff for a living (I'd put BRK in the same boat). But it's going to hurt, potentially to the tune of 10% of AIG's equity and 3/4 of its earnings.

What about the other folks? It's not like the mortgage mess is close to fully unwinding yet.
posted by ryoshu at 10:19 AM on February 19


One things for sure - the current credit event would be a lot worse if not for CDS'.

I believe this is untrue. The current credit event wouldn't be HAPPENING if not for CDSes.

Why do I say that? Because if banks can't get protection against a default, they wouldn't make the loans in the first place. Because they could buy protection, they were willing to make the loans. The people who sold protection, in many cases, can't actually provide it, because they're depending on their unproven models to provide protection instead of their assets. Because everyone feels protected, rveryone takes on more risk. The system, as it stands, is rotten with the stuff.

The whole point of hedging is to protect a small player by using the deep pockets of much larger ones. When the hedger IS the market, as soon as things go south, there's nobody left who can pay the bills.

I also think the notional values of these swaps are important. All speculation exerts force on the economy underneath. With the sheer size and leverage of these notional values, this allows relatively small entities to exert wildly disproportionate forces. This is damaging. Extracting value from the economy, as though you have 10 or 100 times the capital you actually do, means that other people, somewhere, are losing that value.
posted by Malor at 11:23 AM on February 19


The absolutely ineluctable problem with all derivatives of this kind is that if they are successful and do what they say they will do, they result in the destruction of the currency.

The aim and the claim of all these sorts of instruments is to prevent monetary losses no matter what economic conditions eventuate-- or even to make money.

However, if money can be made no matter what happens, or at least can never be lost, then money loses any connection to underlying economic reality. That is the very definition of worthlessness for a currency.

In practice, therefore, derivatives which work as advertised (and do not destroy the currency) must impose the monetary losses they prevent on other players, and the situation is even worse if they actually make money, because if everyone is protected from monetary loss by such a derivative in bad economic times, no one loses money, but money itself is the loser, because more or an equal amount of money is pursuing fewer goods.

Inflation, in other words, and the various positive feedback loops in the economy will tend to make that hyperinflation in short order.

Game over.
posted by jamjam at 11:33 AM on February 19 [4 favorites]


jamjam - that makes no sense at all. The claim for credit derivatives is that the protection buyer will be compensated for the decline in value of the obligations of a specified company if that company defaults. The protection seller explicitly has to make a payment and will suffer a loss. The equivalent is insurance -- insurance companies have been around for a while...
posted by patricio at 1:33 PM on February 19


ryoshu -- "We are talking about the same industry that packaged mortgages into CDOs, backed them with insurance through companies that don't have enough to cover in the face of a major housing downturn, used those companies to get the CDOs a AAA rating, then lived on the assumption that real estate always goes up?"

Well, you do know the industry is NOT single minded or monolithic, with hundreds of people involved in structuring a CDO. Not sure how many work at the monolines and I have no idea how many folks were / are involved with selling real estate. My point is, there are hundreds of thousands - perhaps a few million - of independent entities working in the industry. They don't all have the same goals or objectives.

"Like Ambac and MBIA?"

That comparison is out of context. My point is a rational market participant will value protection sold by a AAA higher than a BBB, and the premium will be priced accordingly - less in the case of a AAA, because in the limit you've got far more confidence this participant will be around to pay off

"It doesn't have to be about making the same choices and calculations system wide, it could be something like a major downturn in a single market that a lot of people have hedged against."

Such as? I'd like to see an example of an entire market moving one way that caught all market participants out. Again, markets are NOT monolithic and everyone does not take the same side of a trade. I find this point abstract, I'm not aware of an event such as your describing. Which would, of course, be rather nasty - for some. Not everyone will line up on the same side, markets just don't work like that. After all, in the fundamental instance for a market to exist there must be two views on price. Otherwise there is no trade, and hence no market.

"I tend to get worried when the financial whiz kids start getting too cute by half with markets that tend be un- or under-regulated."

But these "whiz kids" as you're describing them - quants, I'm assuming - are part of a team. That's just how modern trading desks, whether an iBank or fund, operate. Some "whiz kid" just doesn't decide to move the market, or singlehandedly assume positions on behalf of the firm that might destablise a market. Sure, Soc Gen recently showed us a single rogue trade can seriously impact the viability of a bank, but he hardly threatened the viability of the markets, the excitement of that day aside.

Sure, AIG got it wrong. It happens, even for those who presumably know their market. Its just the nature of this business.

Malor -- "Because everyone feels protected, rveryone takes on more risk. "

Interesting position, but I'm not sure I agree. Banks are highly regulated, and for every position they assume, insured or not, they must set aside regulatory capital. The Central Banks, operating accordiing to the Basel II accord, have determined what capital is needed to support a position. I agree that CDS' have both widened and deepened the lending pool to some extent, but I'm not sure they're (solely) responsible for this problem.

"The whole point of hedging is to protect a small player by using the deep pockets of much larger ones. "

Actually hedging is a form of risk transference, where the relative wealth of your counterparty doesn't figure. I think this cuts both ways, with sometimes smaller players getting bailed out by a much larger counterparty who was willing to assume some risk for a fee.

jamjam -- "The aim and the claim of all these sorts of instruments is to prevent monetary losses no matter what economic conditions eventuate..."

I don't see this. Let's look at the simplest example again - someone purchases default protection on IBM bonds.

The holder of IBM bonds pays a relatively small premium to the protection seller who will, in the event of a credit event make them whole; in other words, make good on their loss.

So scenario A is no credit event. Protection seller makes out as this entity has collected a premium but delivered nothing. The protection buyer, meanwhile, enjoys full economic benefit of their asset, the IBM bond. If anyone lost here it would be the prudent IBM bond holder, who purchased insurance they didn't (with benefit of hindsight) need.

Scenario B is the credit event. Protection seller is informed by the protection buyer of their need to be made whole. The reference asset is valued at the ISDA agreed time, and the sums necessary to cover the protection buyers losses are paid. So protection seller effectively lost money, protection buyer was made whole. Winner - protection buyer, loser protection seller.

I just don't see who we're preventing monetary losess no matter what and I'm afraid I don't get the connection between derivatives and inflation.
posted by Mutant at 1:58 PM on February 19


Malor: "I believe this is untrue. The current credit event wouldn't be HAPPENING if not for CDSes. Why do I say that? Because if banks can't get protection against a default, they wouldn't make the loans in the first place. Because they could buy protection, they were willing to make the loans."

I think there is some truth in that, but not really at the mortgage level. The reason mortgage lending became lax is that banks were able securitise the mortgages through SPVs and sell on into the asset-backed paper market. A similar thing has happened to lending standards in the leveraged loan market (i.e. those backing buyouts) where lending criteria slipped because of the massive demand for loans from CLO vehicles. Where CDS are particularly used as hedging tools is on a more reactive than proactive basis -- they are used to e.g. reduce exposure to huge portfolios of loans to small and mid size corporate clients of banks with lending arms.
posted by patricio at 3:51 PM on February 19


Here's part of a talk that Doug Noland gave, almost five years ago... it's not like this stuff has been invisible. This disaster has been entirely obvious if you just looked at all the pieces and assembled them into a very slightly different whole than the established orthodoxy. You can read his full speech here.

(again, Mr. Noland has this really horrible habit of Inappropriately Capping Everything. It drives me nuts, but his fundamental insights are so good that I tolerate the pain. All underlines are his, not mine.)

Regarding the Proliferation of Derivatives, I have in the past used a flood insurance analogy: If inexpensive and easily accessible flood insurance becomes available, this development will arouse a self-reinforcing building boom along the river. The newly offered insurance will increase individual risk-taking behavior and set in motion dynamics that pyramid systemic risk. Yet the insurance business will thrive, the riverside economy will boom, and it will appear to happy onlookers as a “miracle economy.” That is, until the inevitable flood arrives.

For the system, derivatives provide the means for altering, disguising and transferring risk, but not the mitigation of risk. And, unfortunately for systemic stability, this risk is too often transferred to speculators and highly leveraged players without the wherewithal to manage this risk in the event of a systemic crisis. Moreover, derivatives and structured finance nurture risk-taking. Specifically, they cultivate aggressive lending and leveraged speculation.

And a few comments are in order regarding the Government-sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). These are very problematic, unmanageable institutions at the very heart of today’s Bubbles. The GSEs enjoy unlimited access to Credit, thus operating with an extraordinary capacity to expand liabilities and create system liquidity. They are the major force fueling a historic Mortgage Finance Bubble, fostering destabilizing asset-inflation, over-consumption, endless trade deficits, and severe economic maladjustment. Moreover, they are the leading creators of system liquidity. This role becomes paramount during periods of systemic stress. I argue that they now operate as the key “Buyers of First and Last Resort” throughout the Credit market, essentially functioning as a Dual Central Bank. They have evolved into the Liquidity Backstop, emboldening the leveraged speculating community. This is an especially powerful and dangerous role for the GSEs. But, at the same time, they are the “Guardians of the American Dream.” Especially in today’s environment, the GSEs are politically invulnerable, and the debt market knows this.

And this transitions smoothly to the U.S. Bubble Economy. Recall the old adage “You are what you eat”? Well, I say “An Economy is How it Lends.” Financial Arbitrage Capitalism and its Dysfunctional Monetary Processes guarantee endemic unsound lending and the wholesale misallocation of resources. The character of liquidity now significantly impacts the nature of demand. The underlying structure of the economy is dictated by, and developed for, Credit-induced over-consumption, while the general economy has evolved to be asset inflation and services-centric. This ensures extreme investment and structural distortions.

The outcome is a lot of non-tangible “output” and “productivity,” along with an enormous inflation of financial claims. The problem is there is little in the way of true economic wealth to support this inflation. Therefore, today’s “monetary” economy is acutely vulnerable to any reduction in the growth of Credit.

Today’s Critical Issues:

The paramount issue is the intractable Credit Bubble – the antithesis of the stability offered by The Way We Were. The old banking system was relatively simple to govern, while today’s complex, expansive Credit system is virtually unmanageable. There are today three interrelated Bubbles. First, the Mortgage Finance Bubble. Second, the Leveraged Speculation Bubble throughout the Credit system. And third, the Risk Intermediation/“Structured Finance” Bubble

There is also the critical dilemma that we Can’t Even Turn These Bubbles Down, Let Alone Turn Them Off. Mortgage Finance is today the horse, while the economy is the cart. The Bubble throughout mortgage finance has become the overriding source for system liquidity and income growth.

Regarding GSE risk intermediation: The thinly-capitalized GSEs balloon exposure and use resulting boom-time experience to claim they will never suffer severe Credit losses. The GSEs have basically become the market, and the day they turn more cautious is the day the Bubble is in serious jeopardy. Unprecedented mortgage Credit growth has national prices levitated and many major localities in dangerous Bubbles. Any reduction in liquidity risks setting in motion a telecom-style bust.

Closely related is the issue of the Credit insurers. These thinly capitalized financial guarantors have written well over $1 trillion of insurance. But what would be the consequence - what impact on Credit Availability - if the insurers were to back away from writing new policies? I argue this is yet another Bubble; it only functions well during expansion.
Pulling this one quote out, which I think was quite prescient:

"The GSEs have basically become the market, and the day they turn more cautious is the day the Bubble is in serious jeopardy. "

And, when that happened, the wheels indeed started to come off the cart. It was Fannie Mae's sudden decision to tighten lending standards that started this gigantic landslide of failure.

Once again, let me remind you: that speech was FIVE YEARS ago.
posted by Malor at 4:11 PM on February 19 [3 favorites]


Academic literature is but one driver in finance and I'm sure many desks have much more advanced models. At least they must have different models, otherwise there would hardly be a market, what with single views on price and all...and a robust market for CDS exists, in fact was the opening sentence of this FPP.

Right, I have more fun with the disparity between model predictions and actual price. In fact I have never in my life done a black box trade, but I still find modeling data useful. At the very least it provides me a foundation to falsify a hypothesis. And as someone smarter than me once said about the markets, I forget who: if you have a hypothesis test it.

Of course I've spend weeks deep in thought on models and mathematics only conclude that it is just Platonic horse-shit, that it doesn't mean anything and you can't in the end begin to model this like the motions of planets ... but I didn't say anything about the validity of models, did I? It is sort of like a Pynchon novel. A fun intellectual feat, but don't go beyond that.
posted by geoff. at 4:36 PM on February 19


My point is, there are hundreds of thousands - perhaps a few million - of independent entities working in the industry. They don't all have the same goals or objectives.

True. We also know that a major crisis can cause ripples through other industries when things like credit dry up. The Fed doesn't call an emergency session to drop the rate by 75 points for giggles (not trying to divert the conversation, this stuff is already complex enough as is).

That comparison is out of context. My point is a rational market participant will value protection sold by a AAA higher than a BBB, and the premium will be priced accordingly

I got your point, I was just pointing out that a AAA rating can mean nothing depending on the fundamentals being, um, fundamentally broken. I'm not a financial genius by any measure, but some of this stuff has been obvious for years. The unraveling of the "new market paradigm" was painfully clear the first time "Flip That House" aired.

I'd like to see an example of an entire market moving one way that caught all market participants out.

It's not a matter of catching "all market participants" out. You are absolutely correct that having two sides of a trade make a market. The problem occurs, in my limited view, when part of a substantial market (say, real estate) can't meet their obligations. The risk taken on, thanks to CDOs and the CDS that accompany the risk, is that banks were more likely to make risky loans. After all, they can spread the risk around, and if they are buying the CDOs, well, they're insured! AAA!

But these "whiz kids" as you're describing them - quants, I'm assuming - are part of a team.

Quants are one issue, but some of these exotic derivatives go beyond the quants. I get nervous when MBAs get together with math guys to "figure out the market." But that's a bit different than my overall concern of boys playing with their very large financial toys.

Call it irrational exuberance 9.0.

btw, Mutant (and everyone else), thanks for engaging in this discussion. I'm a bit of a novice at this finance stuff. I tend to follow my gut[0] on things and my gut tells me bad things are on the horizon. Your insight into this has been very helpful.

[0] - a ton of reading and a more than passing familiarity with stats
posted by ryoshu at 6:15 PM on February 19


from my perspective -- what might charitably be described as 'shotgun impressionism' -- the larger issue is the US has been consuming more than it can produce and trade for and more than its income, so it has borrowed from foreign central banks -- namely from china and saudi arabia, but from other 'emerging markets' as well -- against the full faith and credit of the US gov't, i.e. you the US taxpayer, to stunning result. even greenspan has noted "the change in U.S. home mortgage debt over the past half-century correlates significantly with our current account deficit." in short, when you go into debt to finance spending (rather than productive investment, and i don't think residential investment qualifies, unless you count mortgage-backed securities as 'tradeables'), you are living beyond your means, which in the long run isn't sustainable (ben "bueller?" stein's dad btw).

so if the job of the US is to (over)consume and for the rest of the world to (over)produce -- aka 'peaceful development' -- and then to go on and finance the US' (ultra)consumption, what happens if americans are no longer consuming (against the value of their homes), when 'vendor financing' runs out? well your crack dealer predatory lenders creditors might reasonably start to question your ability to repay your loans [cf. the opium wars]. but unlike a credit agency capping yo repoing recoverable assets or a bank foreclosing on a house, the claims made against the US can only be settled in dollars, and guess who has an unlimited supply (and/or the proverbial 'helicopter')? moreover, it's the US -- the borrower/deficit nation -- that sets the interest rate. imagine if you maxed out your credit card, lost your job and were unable to roll/refinance your debt. what rate of interest would you charge yourself? why not just walk away, esp in high LTV/negative equity/impaired collateral situations... wait, what was i talking about again? oh right, diminished prestige. like keynes' maxim -- "if you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you have a problem. but if you owe a million, it has" -- this is the 'exorbitant privilege' of a profligate reserve currency nation and why, when nixon took us off the gold standard, the US treasury sec'y quipped the dollar is "our currency, but your problem" to miffed europeans everywhere (who, btw, subsequently went about creating their own currency bloc). they wanted gold and all they got was paper.

now if you're a foreign creditor to the US chafing under global 'dollar hegemony' (or 'bretton woods II') that sounds like a raw deal. four decades ago there was nothing you could really do about it --'modern' central banking was still nascent and unproven -- but now with trillions in forex reserves available (backed by supposedly-sound central banks, independent stewards, zealously guarding their credibility the money supply), a burgeoning industrial/infrastructure base, higher growth rates and a comparative advantage in increasingly scarce (and demand-inelastic) commodities, they have more options at their disposal.

first tho, an aside: while the fed controls short-term interest rates, they have less influence over long-term rates, which are determined more by inflation and inflation expectations -- intuitively, higher inflation should raise the cost of borrowing. measuring inflation is a tricky business, but overall with emerging markets (re)joining the global economy, adding to the labor force and adopting technology, the world has been 'disinflationary' the last few decades. however, that's beginning to change as the process is running into resource constraints and political bottlenecks. in the US, this can be seen in increasing food & energy prices, conveniently ignored for the most part by the fed, who're more concerned about 'core' measures of inflation. but if 'ex-core' measures of inflation aren't about to come back down and they are, as they say, necessities, then 1) they will eat up more of our income, and 2) start to exert upward pressure on overall levels of inflation. the rest of the world is experiencing higher inflation too, only moreso, because food & energy make up bigger portions of their consumption baskets and, at any rate, most central banks around the world don't exclude food & energy from their measures of inflation.

so what's a foreign central bank, which has been quietly and patiently, if somewhat surreptitiously, financing US consumption (accumulating vast sums of US debt in the process), to do? in other words, with the mountain of IOUs you have, how do you prevent getting stiffed with yet more (depreciating) IOUs? two things come to mind:
  1. revalue. food & energy are globally traded (and remember increasingly scarce) commodities. they are also priced in dollars. if foreign central banks allowed their currencies to appreciate versus the dollar (recall they have been intervening to prevent this) their countries would be better able to afford higher living standards and mitigate, if not limit, inflation.

    of course, doing so would prevent them from financing US consumption (their export market), but if that was faltering anyway, then no big loss; they can just focus on their own markets, fostering domestic demand and consumption -- ostensibly their original development goal anyway.*

  2. a 'debt/equity swap'. whereas foreign creditors can adeptly ride inflation/exchange rate waves to greater prosperity, by shifting into real assets and out of nominal ones, an asset class preference swap from debt to equity (ownership, if not control, and not disallowed by congress**) they may fairly insulate themselves from both inflation and exchange rate dynamics.

    the joke/irony is that this entails 'cross-border nationalisation' or 'state capitalism'. if gov't-owned/run businesses are unacceptable in the US, why should foreign gov't be able to? regardless, they can and are, just another example of 'innovation' outpacing any attempt to prudentially consider the matter beforehand and thus leaving legal gray areas it its wake. as usual, we're making it up as we go along.
letting support for the dollar go, tho, is unambiguously negative for the US in the short run. a weaker dollar reduces US purchasing power while simultaneously raising borrowing costs/interest rates, everything else equal. arguably, exactly what the US does not need right now, or perhaps precisely what it does...

as the emperor once said: "As you can see, my young apprentice, your friends have failed. Now witness the firepower of this fully ARMED and OPERATIONAL battle station!"

only it's the rebels who have the death star SWFs trained against the empire; the shields are down and the barbarians are at the gate ;P

---
*furthermore, by letting their currencies appreciate they would have to book losses on their existing dollar hoards. i think people (who care) already implicitly acknowledge at least paper losses will be realised, whether or not everyone else, in the fullness of time, admits them as such is left to be determined. money, after all, is a function of collective memory. like market participants are sometimes rewarded by not adding to losses anymore; the mere recognition of ceasing to dig the hole deeper implies an attempt to climb out.
**tacit approval could be won, for example, thru trained intermediaries, passive indexing or greater transparency and regulatory oversight.

posted by kliuless at 6:39 PM on February 19


re: noland - that's like saying seat belts, 4wd and airbags contribute to higher incidence of crashes, which i think is debatable, cuz they've also saved lives... actually, i think studies have shown that while they increase survivability and decrease casualties overall (lowering the bell curve/normal distribution) 'losses' that are incurred tend to be more catastrophic (fattening the tails for dame fortune).

it bears repeating: they're just tools, which can be used for hedging as well as speculation; understanding what they are with a healthy regard for their limitations -- what they can and cannot accomplish -- is paramount. underappreciation of the risks, as always, gets one into trouble, but then there's that whole decision making under uncertainty thing... um, which is why god invented conditional probabilities/bayesian statistics, cf. causal inference :P

cheers!
posted by kliuless at 7:28 PM on February 19


that's like saying seat belts, 4wd and airbags contribute to higher incidence of crashes,

No, it really isn't, because seat belts actually mitigate risk. Derivatives don't. They just move it to other people. If you're not running the risk, you're going to be willing to take more risks.

It's like saying, "ok, this car is magic: if you hit a wall, a lot of other people get hurt, but only a little bit each." So, everyone starts driving too goddamn fast.
posted by Malor at 9:12 PM on February 19 [2 favorites]


I agree with you Malor, but your analogy is flawed

You make the 'lot of other people' seem like innocents, they have, in contract ,agreed to get hurt if the car crashes.

Now you may argue that these risk takers have been 'sold' the risk when they didn't know what it was, but the regulators don't allow 'selling' in that sense and the banks are very aware of the potential for mis-selling. You will struggle to find a 'salesman' at an investment back who will advise their client to buy anything. Its much more like Wall-Mart ... this is what we have, you want it?

In any arms length transaction between market profesionals, "we didn't know what we were buying" is not an excuse that the courts will uphold.
posted by fistynuts at 6:20 AM on February 20



Malor -- ...part of a talk that Doug Noland gave, almost five years ago..."

Yeh, Noland is an interesting guy, folks here bounce his stuff around and I've read some from time to time. At least he's got a consistent view, 'cause what he was saying five years ago he's been saying pretty much every year since your excerpt above. In fact looking at his archive and pulling out a relevant piece every November or so seems to parse down to the same message. I have found his stuff thought inspiring on many levels, not least of which is the markets have changed but the message hasn't. Which makes me curious.

So while I respect and enjoy his work I can't accept it as a central driver of my thought process on this topic. Noland clearly has a view and more importantly a voice capable of making his message heard, but I've wondered in the past if there wasn't an agenda tying his published work to that fund those folks are running? The fund's objectives are clearly aligned with his (excellent) work.

Since I've put this on the table I guess I'll be up front and say it clearly - if one is advising a fund that is short the market, its no surprise their published work backs that view and warns (for years!) of doom & gloom. Also curious - lots of concerns raised about derivatives but it seems ok to use them sometimes, like in a fund designed to be short the market? After all, if a fund manager is looking for excess alpha (who isn't?) one sure fire way to generate it is to leverage up, and like it or not the safest & cheapest way to do this is via some form of derivative product. Easier to cap your (inevitable) losses, for starters.

"unfortunately for systemic stability, this risk is too often transferred to speculators and highly leveraged players without the wherewithal to manage this risk..."

Well, I realise it's not your statement but as this fallacy is central to our discussion I'd like to comment. In general, this is not true. It really depends upon the derivative under discussion. Puts and Futures for example - the type of derivative traded by the fund Noland's associated with - are guaranteed by an exchange or clearing house. There is no counterparty risk (the exchange is your counterparty), except in the case of OTC trades, perhaps CDS' like we're discussing. But then the banks own know your customer obligation comes into play, and you damn well better know who you're trading with, your firms exposure to them and have some idea of their overall creditworthiness.

'Cause if you don't you're going to have a problem, and not just from internal groups at your bank who are paid to police this activity (and incentivised accordingly) but from a key party that everyone in this thread seems to have missed even though I've raised it before - banks are highly regulated. You just can't create money by assuming positions ad infinitum, as some folks upthread seem to believe. Every position has to be backed by capital (well, except in the case of SIV's but let's not muddy the water at this point). This capital, regulatory capital supports the positions, and is intended to protect the bank (and the entire financial system) from not only what we call known losses but also (and most importantly!) unknown losses.

So this need to set aside capital covering positions in the market mitigates and regulates banking activity. After all, banks have limited equity.

While we're on the topic of limits, another phrase that I've seen before so I won't attribute soely to Noland, but it does bug the hell out of me "The GSEs enjoy unlimited access to Credit..."

How so? That isnt' true at all. There is an implicit guarantee to their paper, but this tenuous, implied government guarantee hardly approximates unlimited access. This guarantee is markedy less formalised (and reliable) than the German Landesbanken, for example. So I've always had a problem with this argument whenever I've seen it, and I wish someone would explain how this works. 'Cause even a Northern Rock here in the UK aint' got no such access (well, these are different times so maybe I'll retract the Northern Rock comment as BOE is already exhibited some degree of recklessness by getting into the consumer mortgage biz, and as I said yesterday I got money on the table saying they ain't got no exit strategy either ...)

geoff -- "I have more fun with the disparity between model predictions and actual price." Yeh, I suspected this was your point and it always is challenging (that's spelled impossible) to get model and market in agreement. In the past I've attributed this somewhat to expectations of participants, in addition to the other issues previously raised (e.g., and working backwards, calibration, assumptions regarding the relative importance of various factors, even implementation specific details). It's definitely art leveraged onto science in many cases.

ryoshu -- "I was just pointing out that a AAA rating can mean nothing depending on the fundamentals being, um, fundamentally broken. I'm not a financial genius by any measure, but some of this stuff has been obvious for years. The unraveling of the "new market paradigm" was painfully clear the first time "Flip That House" aired."

Well, we do know - based on historical, backwards looking data - that a Aaa rated entity has a (roughly, looking at 2002 tables) 93% chance of still being rated Aaa in one years time, a 5% chance the entity will be rated Aa (one step lower) and so on. Again, this is just how the system works, and you'll have to present a case of the fundamentals being so flawed that system wide, a large number of Aaa' are all of sudden downgraded. One step, or more. As we haven't seen this happen before we're back to my original point - a non zero probability of this event happening? Yes, anything can happen.. But a probability approaching unity - nope

Ok, now I just did something horribly confusing - switched to Moody's ratings (for example, Aaa is the Moody's equivalent of an S&P AAA rating) as that's what I'm most familiar with - I should have started out with that system so apologies if I've mislead anyone ...

"...when part of a substantial market (say, real estate) can't meet their obligations."

But can you quantify part of? 'Cause I know the folks structuring CDOs not only can, but have. Default risk is priced in, at various assumed rates of default. As is recovery value of the underlying asset (after all, the property still exists, so unless we're talking nuclear strike systemic event there will be some residual value, and I suspect a log higher than some people wish to admit to), once again, at various, assumed rates. We'd have to ask someone working on a desk structuring these products - no disrespect to anyone but I wouldn't trust blogger links like some other FPPs have provided as "evidence" to back up assertions - but when I worked on a MBS desk in New York back in the early 90's, we did run all these assumptions through. NOT because we were bored and looking for busy work, but - and this is very important but everyone seem to over look this in an attempt to paint this as dot com 2.0 - the customer requires it.

Why? Well, various reasons. First, the ratings agencies won't go near it unless they get this transparancy. If a agency hasn't rated your paper - provided an alternative (and presumably unbiased metric on it's riskyness - let's not discuss their failings at this point in time) your funding costs will be higher as nobody will purchase your paper. A ratings agency wants to see your models, your data as inputs, as you've already told them what you think it should be rated at and what it's gonna pay. So getting the ratings agencies onboard is critical.

Second, and covering market participants who openly operate - banks, mutual funds, etc - the regulators require it. Once again, if you're holding that paper the your banks (or funds) Risk Management folks are gonna want to know how it works, how it's funded, etc. Same quesitons as the ratings agencies in fact, but from a different perspective.

And I guess the third interested party would be market participants who don't operate openly - hedge funds, perhaps soverign wealth funds, etc. Often times understaffed they certainly ain't gonna hold a structured product - no matter how attractive the yield or cheap the price - if they don't know how it works, and they haven't got the headcount to exhaustively reverse engineer it. So they'll want to know before they buy.

"The risk taken on, thanks to CDOs and the CDS that accompany the risk, is that banks were more likely to make risky loans. After all, they can spread the risk around, and if they are buying the CDOs, well, they're insured! AAA!"

But once again I'll point out there is no such thing as a free lunch, banks have to set aside capital to support these positions. So yes, they may have been more likely to make a riskier loan, but I'd suggest systemically (that's what we're discussing after all) not to the point of recklessness. After all, why use your capital to support a very risky loan when you can take on the books one with less risk? The CDS' isn't free either, so that's effectively cost needed to assume, in addition to capital requirements. So sure, there no doubt were and are reckless counterpartys out there. But is this line of business the norm? Or well publicised outlyers?

"Quants are one issue, but some of these exotic derivatives go beyond the quants. I get nervous when MBAs get together with math guys to "figure out the market." But that's a bit different than my overall concern of boys playing with their very large financial toys."

Yeh, I agree that some of the more exotic derivatives are somewhat suspect; while a CDO is fine and synthetic CDO's not much of a problem, I've got a real issue trying to understand a CDO squared (CDO where each tranche itself is composed of a CDO) let alone a CDO cubed. Still, I wonder how much actual issuance of these products there is. But on the topic of the folks doing the structuring, while I'm not sure who else but an MBA (presumably in finance) is qualified I'd once more make the point that they aren't operating alone, they are part of a team, and no matter how singular the creation of a baseline product is, before that instrument is sold or traded a large body of folks have signed off.

"btw, Mutant (and everyone else), thanks for engaging in this discussion. I'm a bit of a novice at this finance stuff. "

Well I've got to thank you (as well as everyone else) for what I'd call an engaging discussion. And novice or not, your questions are comments are fairly incisive and we're all having a great time.

kliuless -- "a 'debt/equity swap'. whereas foreign creditors can adeptly ride inflation/exchange rate waves to greater prosperity, by shifting into real assets and out of nominal ones…"

Now this is a very interesting point and something that I won't say has been going on below the radar, very few people seem to grasp the significance of. Folks can think what they want about the propriety of Chinese acquistions of foreign enterprises (US included, however The Aussies seem to have reacted particualrly poorly), but you've got admit at least they're spending their money on productive assets e.g., energy, manufacturing, etc) rather than art and "trophy" real estate like another group of cash rich folks (also demonised to some extent) were up to perhaps twenty years ago.

Wow guys once again lots of great points in this thread. I've said it before - MeFi finance threads rock!
posted by Mutant at 9:34 AM on February 20


"The risk taken on, thanks to CDOs and the CDS that accompany the risk, is that banks were more likely to make risky loans. After all, they can spread the risk around, and if they are buying the CDOs, well, they're insured! AAA!"

But once again I'll point out there is no such thing as a free lunch, banks have to set aside capital to support these positions. So yes, they may have been more likely to make a riskier loan, but I'd suggest systemically (that's what we're discussing after all) not to the point of recklessness. After all, why use your capital to support a very risky loan when you can take on the books one with less risk? The CDS' isn't free either, so that's effectively cost needed to assume, in addition to capital requirements. So sure, there no doubt were and are reckless counterpartys out there. But is this line of business the norm? Or well publicised outlyers?


I think there's perhaps more to this point that you allow. The availability of the CLO market was a (if not the) main driver in the substantial weakening of covenants in leveraged loans for a couple of years. Originating banks were so confident that they weren't going to have to keep any of the loan on their books that they acquiesced to extraordinary cov-lite/no cov documentation. The moment that market went away the safeguards in the docs returned pretty much instantly. At the margin the availability of off-balance sheet securitisation must mean that riskier loans are made - there is no capital cost to the originating bank (perhaps bar the equity tranche if they can't get a hedge fund interested) and there are fees/spreads to be made in the process. I'd say the cost attached to CDS is why it's used more reactively as a portfolio risk management tool and probably has less effect on the riskiness of lending.

Your comments on Noland are interesting too, thanks. I'm interested in the point about systemic stability too -- I don't think you can ignore the failure of the rating agencies in this process. It now appears that there was far too little buy-side due diligence done and investors effectively outsourced it to the rating agencies. That has intuitive appeal but when the raters claim first amendment protection for their ratings you might want something more substantial to fall back on (or perhaps I just want to set up a buy-side DD consultancy...).
posted by patricio at 11:06 AM on February 20


Well, I realise it's not your statement but as this fallacy is central to our discussion I'd like to comment. In general, this is not true. It really depends upon the derivative under discussion.

I don't think of gets and puts as being a problem. What I think of as being a problem is the example of a relatively small-time player who sells default protection on a high-risk tranche in a CDO, and hedges by buying protection on the low-risk tranche, reasoning that if one blows up, the other has to as well, so the big players will make him whole and he can make his customers whole. But if the model breaks down, he's dead. He's covering his bets with a model, not an asset, but other players definitely will buy his paper. This spreads risk into the system, as they themselves will use this paper as the justification to write paper of their own.

Every position has to be backed by capital (well, except in the case of SIV's but let's not muddy the water at this po