Intermarium
February 20, 2023 12:40 PM   Subscribe

A new military alliance is emerging in eastern Europe which will redefine the geopolitical order in the region. It will also mark the emergence of Poland as a major European actor, entrench the position of the US and the UK in European affairs, and marginalise France, Germany and the EU.

Imagined Geographies of Central and Eastern Europe: The Concept of Intermarium, PDF (Marlene Laruelle and Ellen Rivera, IERES Occasional Papers, March 2019)
The Intermarium belongs to the long genealogy of geopolitical concepts looking for and promoting a Central and Eastern European unity: sandwiched between a Mitteleuropa under German leadership in the nineteenth century and a Near Abroad under Moscow’s supervision after 1991, the “middle of Europe” or the “land between the seas” has been searching for historical models in everything from the Jagellonian dynasty and the Polish-Lithuanian Rzeczpospolita to the Austro-Hungarian empire.

Launched by Polish state leader Józef Piłsudski in the 1920s, the idea of a Międzymorze (the Land between the Seas, latinized as Intermarium) has since been regularly revived in evolving contexts and finds itself reactivated today. In its current form, it refers to the Central and Eastern “new Europe” dear to George Bush, Donald Rumsfeld and now Donald Trump, celebrated for being more pro-Atlanticist than the Western “old Europe,” which is seen as being too conciliatory with Russia. The Intermarium has also, gradually, come to comprise a conservative Central and Eastern Europe that sees itself as the “other” Europe—that is, opposed to the European Union—and advances a conservative agenda sometimes permeable, as we see in the Ukrainian case, to far-right ideological schemes.

Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine Inaugurate ‘Lublin Triangle’ (Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 2020)
The ministers of foreign affairs of Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine held a trilateral meeting in the southeastern Polish city of Lublin, on July 28 [and] established the “Lublin Triangle,” a new political platform invoking the integrationist heritage of the 1569 Union of Lublin. [...] The trilateral declaration emphasizes that the Lublin Triangle’s objective is to bring Ukraine closer not only to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but also to “other regional formats.” Indeed, Ukraine used to more regularly cooperate with the Visegrad Four (Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary), for instance. [...]

Setting up the Lublin Triangle also has significant propaganda or myth-making effect since it invokes to the heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, established by the Union of Lublin, in July 1569. This is why the three foreign ministers’ joint press conference took place next to the Union of Lublin Monument. It is also why the joint trilateral Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG, stood up in September 2014) has its headquarters in Lublin (New Eastern Europe, May–August 2017) and was named after Hetman Konstanty Ostrogski—the victorious commander at the 1514 Battle of Orsha against the Grand Duchy of Moscow. Symbolism is of great importance for the three nations, which seek such uniting factors to offset bilateral conflicts over historical remembrance.

NATO enlargement to the east: Bucharest nine as a game-changer within the Alliance, PDF (Christelle Calmels, NATO: Past and Present, Centre for Conflict, Security, and Societies (Cardiff University), December 2020)
When it comes to influencing the decision-making process, central and eastern European countries lack instruments used by more prominent allies within NATO [...] Considering these limitations, eastern and central European countries have turned to other channels [currently the most visible of which] is Bucharest nine [created] by a Polish-Romanian initiative in 2014 [...]

[...] Bucharest nine countries benefited from an Anglo-American momentum for the strengthening of the Alliance embodied by the Obama-Cameron joint statement ‘We will not be cowed by barbaric killers.’ [Therefore] it is not surprising that Russia and collective defence were the main issues put on the agenda of the [2016 NATO Warsaw Summit] and reflected in [the Summit] Communiqué. [...] The language of the Communiqué was however measured, and reaffirmed NATO's will to [maintain communication channels] through NATO-Russia Council [which] can be explained by a coordinated French, Belgian, Spanish, and German call to soften the language on Russia during the negotiations. [...]

[...] Analysing Bucharest nine countries' defence strategies and white books, it is possible to observe divergent depictions of their security environment. [Only] Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Estonia explicitly address the conventional and hybrid threats posed by Russia to their territories. [...], Poland is undoubtedly the most assertive [...] By contrast, Slovakia adopts a more cautious approach [...] Hungary [emphasises] migration and terrorism [...] Bulgaria and the Czech Republic mention threats, which could emanate from Russia without being specific [...] Finally, Latvia stands out from its eastern allies by encouraging cooperation with Russia in its 2012 [State Defence Concept]

If the mere reading of strategic documents is insufficient to draw conclusions, especially when some of them seem outdated, they nonetheless help to nuance the image of unity portrayed [...] As such, Czech Republic silence on Russia in its defence strategy may be explained by a lack of consensus between government officials on the attitude to adopt vis-à-vis Russia. Furthermore, together with Slovakia, the country doesn’t advocate or praise for NATO and US military presence in eastern countries because of its historical refusal of stationing foreign troops in its own territory. They thus differ from Poland, Romania and the Baltic states which have been vocal advocates of such presence since they acceded to NATO.

Central Europe as a Transition Zone Between West and East, PDF (Karen Denni, Traditiones, Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2017)
My native city, Berlin, was the symbol of the hermetical separation of West and East during the Cold War. Politically, West Berlin was counted among the Western states but geographically it was to the east of the East German cities of Dresden and Leipzig. I became aware of the fact that geography by itself is not an important determinant, but what matters is how space is socially and politically constructed [...] Nonetheless, the propaganda worked very well so that people believed blindly in these ideologies of West and East, which had great consequences for social life. The mental borders persist longer than the material ones. Even today I am often asked if I was born in the west or east side of the city. This is not an innocent question because the West is often associated with the good and fortunate side, and the East with the bad or unlucky side. To avoid this schematization, I answer “in the south of Berlin” – which is, in fact, true [...]

Central Europe’s history is characterized by two tendencies: the idea of unity, which implies a homogenous region, and resistance to these efforts and the struggle for the autonomy of the peoples living in Central Europe. These antagonistic tensions led to the fragility of political consensus in this geographic area. The weakness of political stability is evident in the balkans, where the occupying powers were seen as an alien element because the multiethnic and cross-cultural landscape was not chosen voluntarily, but imposed by empires. Nationalism was prevalent within these young nations with strong primordial roots whose desire for nation-building was hampered by foreign powers, but whose cultural identity was strong enough to by and large avoid assimilation and integration in a supranational system. [...]

It is striking that the first ideas of Central Europe were pronounced by Austrians and Germans, who seemed to have many interests in a construct of Central Europe. “Central Europe” as a geopolitical entity emerged at the time of the Congress of Vienna in the context of Metternich’s vision of a political balance of powers between the Western powers, Britain and France, and the eastern power, Russia. Central Europe, under the dominant Habsburg empire, was viewed as the guarantor of the balance of powers both in terms of international politics as well as in a cultural sense.

Note: This is a thread about the history and evolution of (central) European (geo)politics. This is not a thread about Ukraine or the war. (those can be found here)

Of course, the war looms so large, that it's impossible to avoid. Yet I'm hoping that despite the war, it's also still possible to imagine Europe beyond (this) war. To that end, I'd like to ask to limit war talk within the context of concrete European policy proposals and initiatives. To try and prevent derailing the thread right out of the gate, I have avoided links that reference the war, by only including articles prior to February 24 of last year (with the exception of the link above the fold).
posted by dmh (59 comments total) 24 users marked this as a favorite
 
I'm definitely curious how the US and UK exploit their leverage in Poland, et al against Germany, France, and other EU nations.  I'd expect energy policy plays a major role of course, so hopefully the EU still manages to depart the evil energy charter treaty without the sunset clause or other concessions.
posted by jeffburdges at 1:43 PM on February 20, 2023 [1 favorite]


The UK ain't entrenching any position in European affairs.
posted by lesbiassparrow at 1:52 PM on February 20, 2023 [15 favorites]


I mean they're going to be hard put to stay together as a union over the next 10 years and that's all thanks to Brexit, which it's worth remembering was accompanied by a lot of of anti-Eastern European hate mongering.
posted by lesbiassparrow at 1:55 PM on February 20, 2023 [18 favorites]


What’s the latest on the Three Seas Initiative?

Also a series of Eastern European Cooperation ideas; but more in terms of major infrastructure projects. A Trans-Carpathian Highway, triangular rail links from the Black Sea to the Baltic and Adriatic, electric and gas lines, etc.

It’s not politically or ideologically unifying, but regional cooperation is cooperation nonetheless.
posted by bartleby at 2:33 PM on February 20, 2023 [2 favorites]


Here's a more recent piece on the issues Poland will have to turn its influence in the war into power in the EU and Europe:

https://ecfr.eu/article/east-side-story-polands-new-role-in-the-european-union/
posted by lesbiassparrow at 2:36 PM on February 20, 2023 [2 favorites]


First, calling this the New Warsaw Pact is more than a little inappropriate.

Second, I don't see this as marginalizing the EU, but rather Poland and other eastern European states feeling strong enough to assert themselves rather than put up with being considered on the periphery of the EU. If anything, this should make the European Union stronger, a continent full of equals. If the EU is marginalized because of Ukraine, then the blame should be on the Germany and other western European states for not understanding they can't talk down to their eastern neighbors anylonger.
posted by riruro at 2:36 PM on February 20, 2023 [18 favorites]


There's a ton of things going on between Poland and the EU that have nothing to do with the war, and have everything to do with the legal situation in Poland and arguments about whether its justice system is now free from political control. This has been going on for several years and has nothing to do with talking down to Poland.
posted by lesbiassparrow at 2:48 PM on February 20, 2023 [14 favorites]


My understanding is that basically nobody in the EU or their local neighborhood really likes Poland, so having them be somehow central in a new power structure seems a bit far fetched. They're a huge country and they should have more standing, but I think everyone is going to need to find a path toward making friends before they're going to be doing much more.
posted by hippybear at 3:27 PM on February 20, 2023 [2 favorites]


This post reminded me of this meme. Crazy to think it's been 20 years.

And the neocons are on the march again. Plus ça change.
posted by Borborygmus at 3:43 PM on February 20, 2023 [6 favorites]


The idea of the UK being a crucial part of any alliance… hope you don’t like that alliance or want it to succeed at anything.

(Fortunately this all seems to be a bunch of speculative hoo ha)
posted by Artw at 3:44 PM on February 20, 2023 [11 favorites]


entrench the position of the US...
Plus ça change
.

Buffer Zone
posted by clavdivs at 3:55 PM on February 20, 2023 [2 favorites]


I think it's perfectly reasonable that Poland can become an important European country particularly if remains firmly part of the EU. It has twice the population of the next largest European state. But it's still dwarfed by Germany, France, and Italy. Also, no one can really trust the US to keep a focus on Europe for political reasons. And no one can really trust the British full stop.

The main thing that's disconcerting about Poland's rise is the culturally conservative politics the government espouses (which keeps getting worse IMO) and some lingering questions about the independence of their judiciary.
posted by plonkee at 4:01 PM on February 20, 2023 [15 favorites]


I think the people of Belarus and Kaliningrad are going to be rather upset over a Lublin triangle alliance.

The Suwalki corridor could be a flash point.
posted by Marky at 4:28 PM on February 20, 2023


Why don’t they like Poland?
posted by BlunderingArtist at 4:58 PM on February 20, 2023 [1 favorite]


The Suwalki corridor could be a flash point.

Could be. But it is probably hard for Russia to fight a two-front war at the moment. Particularly when they are not doing well with the one front on their hands, and also when the other front would lead to an open conflict with all of NATO and the United States.
posted by They sucked his brains out! at 5:43 PM on February 20, 2023 [3 favorites]


The Suwalki corridor could be a flash point.

Maybe we should all be wondering when China will decide it can simply grab Vladivostok; it's not like Russia can stop them, and having seen how their vaunted hardware fails to perform, I'm not convinced the Russians could even mount a credible ICBM strike.

...I mean, shit, at this point maybe the North Koreans could grab Vladivostok and get away with it.
posted by aramaic at 6:09 PM on February 20, 2023 [4 favorites]


Do ... do they want to grab Vladivostok?
posted by grobstein at 7:17 PM on February 20, 2023 [1 favorite]


I’d argue it’s less about what they want, and more about what they can get away with.

Russia is flailing around, incoherent, dying. Those adjacent can choose to grab a slice while the patriarch is dying, or let someone else grab it instead. Shakespeare once again.

…like, really, China could grab everything east of the Amur, and Russia would have no way to stop them aside from praying their nukes still work.

It’s bonkers. We’re watching the world reshape itself yet again.
posted by aramaic at 7:35 PM on February 20, 2023 [1 favorite]


moving 🎲🎲🎲 into Kamchatka.
posted by clavdivs at 7:36 PM on February 20, 2023 [10 favorites]


And the neocons are on the march again.

How so?
posted by Artifice_Eternity at 8:04 PM on February 20, 2023


Why don’t they like Poland?

Coincidentally this happened just a couple of days ago, on Feb 15: The European Commission decides to refer POLAND to the Court of Justice of the European Union for violations of EU law by its Constitutional Tribunal

At its most basic level, the conflict is a power struggle between the Polish government, run since 2015 by the hard-right, Christian-identitarian Law and Order party (PiS), and the European Commission, which is the closest thing the EU has to an executive.

Within the EU, each Member State has a national court system, with its own laws and jurisdiction. In addition, there is the acquis communautaire, an (enormous) body of EU guidelines, directives, and regulations, that national lawmakers & courts are supposed to apply. It's the job of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg (ECJ) to ensure this happens in keeping with the letter and spirit of EU law, with EU law having primacy over national law.

Now, since EU law depends for its implementation on the national courts, the whole system only works if the national courts are willing to actually apply EU law and can be trusted to do so. Otherwise it breaks down.

This is what's now happening in Poland. In 2021, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal declared that certain provisions of EU law violate the Polish Constitution. This directly challenges the primacy of EU law, and would represent a real fracture in the Union, since the primacy of EU law is the backbone of EU law jurisprudence.

Worse, it's not just this one declaration made by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal that's problematic — the entire Polish Constitutional Tribunal is itself problematic, because the judges are fatally tainted by political meddling by incoming President Duda in 2015. From Wikipedia:
On 15 December 2015, Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, described the political situation in Poland as dramatic, with the latest actions of the Polish government having "characteristics of a coup". Schulz explicitly refused to withdraw this appraisal after protests by the Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło and Minister of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski.[47] On 10 January 2016, Schulz was quoted as describing the situation in Poland as a "Putinisation" of European politics
posted by dmh at 8:21 PM on February 20, 2023 [18 favorites]


First -- what a great post. Thank you for the time and effort put into this. Metafilter iss not just cats caught in scanners or printers or whatever it was/is. I know so little of this, this post is my first steps into this whole thing.

When Germany invaded Poland both UK and France are now in the fray. Not that they did much, there was a long quiet period as everyone sorted everything out. If I recall correctly Hitler was surprised that UK and France held to their commitment to be in it if Poland got attacked.

This I am pretty sure of: Poland lost a larger percentage of it's population than any other nation, the Germans from the east, then the Russians from the west, then Germany and Russia running them down like a dog on the freeway. Lawyers, priests, teachers -- anyone with any smarts and/or in position of power murdered. So I sortof love Poland, just that they've been able to put together a nation at all They flew in the RAF and were absolutely fearless, hellacious fighters.

So I know that. I know that many -- most? -- of the German death camps were in Poland. So I know a bit of 80 year old history but nothing about yesterday.

I think it's totally chicken-shit that France and Germany are not willing to put any skin in the game, wanting to keep their precious Russian energy flowing. I think it's totally chicken-shit that they are sortof forming their nice little safe EU, no weapons, no money, no nothing. I suspect that Poland will remember these antics and I damn sure hope they do.

If I'm reading this all correctly Putin has stepped into a buzzsaw that will leave Russia destitute. That would so totally rock the house -- I don't want your basic Russian man or woman or family to get stuck and I do think that this new alliance would lead to that happening for your basic Melvin and Myrtle Redflag and their children. Not their fault but it's not Polands fault either, nor any of the rest of the countries forming this alliance...

I'm over my head here and ought to stop. It's a great post and it got into me. Time to set the laptop down I think, and go over here and scratch myself and stuff.
posted by dancestoblue at 8:37 PM on February 20, 2023 [7 favorites]


I think the people of Belarus and Kaliningrad are going to be rather upset over a Lublin triangle alliance.

I imagine the people of Belarus would love to get in on that actually.

Kaliningrad is tougher, not sure what should become of that strange little bit of siezed land.
posted by Meatbomb at 11:08 PM on February 20, 2023 [2 favorites]


Poland's government is, in fact, so right wing that Ukrainian women who were raped by Russian soldiers could not get legal abortions. The idea that any Eastern European nationalist government, whether Russian, Polish, Hungarian, Ukrainian, Baltic or any other, is ultimately going to contribute to human flourishing is really mistaken. The interwar nationalist regimes in these places in almost all cases had a terrible political record that only looked somewhat better in retrospect because of the Nazis and the Soviet occupation (at least, in those places where the local nationalists didn't immediately become Nazi auxiliaries).
posted by derrinyet at 11:15 PM on February 20, 2023 [10 favorites]


I think it's totally chicken-shit that France and Germany are not willing to put any skin in the game, wanting to keep their precious Russian energy flowing. I think it's totally chicken-shit that they are sortof forming their nice little safe EU, no weapons, no money, no nothing. I suspect that Poland will remember these antics and I damn sure hope they do.

I think maybe you should read something about the EU (which Poland is a full member of), how it's governed and structured, Brexit, and modern Europe. The EU is an entirely fully formed entity, but does not have an army. It is also not just a French and German entity.
posted by lesbiassparrow at 12:05 AM on February 21, 2023 [3 favorites]


There's major historical reasons why the Germans have always been hesitant to get militarily involved in any conflict even one on its own doorstep. Has a lot to do with WWII, in fact. The belief, though, that member states (including France) haven't sent weapons and that the EU has not sent money is just wrong.

It's also the case that some members of the EU, like Ireland, are neutral, so the EU deciding to get involved in the war as an entity would conflict with and have to be agreed to by them - which in Ireland's case would mean amending the constitution of the country. It's not just France and Germany that get to decide and the rest of the members come along for the ride.
posted by lesbiassparrow at 12:12 AM on February 21, 2023 [9 favorites]


Right, derrinyet, but you're cherry picking and then blending the worst of current events of one place with the worst from the past of another to drive a narrative about central/eastern Europe. You can apply the formula to any region anywhere and get the same result.
posted by UN at 12:42 AM on February 21, 2023 [1 favorite]


[To be clear, it doesn't make those specific histories and laws good. There's a reason the basic formula was used in the Soviet Union against the West and by Putin's troll factories for years: it's effective. Nobody likes rapists and nobody likes Nazis so throw them at the conversation and let chaos ensue. Result: Eastern Europe? I heard it's full of Nazis. It's better under the protection of Moscow, we don't want those barbarians out in the open.]
posted by UN at 1:01 AM on February 21, 2023 [4 favorites]


As far as I’ve been able to tell, any nostalgia for the never-really-existed Intermarium is mostly a right-wing Anglosphere thing. Does anyone know if it’s discussed much in the countries that were supposed to be part of it?
posted by Kattullus at 1:15 AM on February 21, 2023 [1 favorite]


I don’t know about this but I hope at least that people have stopped peddling that line about how Putin is the consummate master of subtle strategy, comprehensively outplaying the West.
posted by Phanx at 1:20 AM on February 21, 2023 [1 favorite]


The idea of the UK being a crucial part of any alliance… hope you don’t like that alliance or want it to succeed at anything.

Sorry about that time we kicked your granny’s shin.
posted by Phanx at 1:23 AM on February 21, 2023


I feel like Brexit and the inability to honour the Northern Ireland Protocol and thus endangering the Good Friday Agreement might be more relevant than any shin kicking myself.
posted by lesbiassparrow at 1:33 AM on February 21, 2023 [5 favorites]


Does anyone know if it’s discussed much in the countries that were supposed to be part of it?

I've never heard it spoken in my highly political or serving military family/friends in the region. Honestly I think most people will by any measure prefer NATO and a stronger alliance with the US. In fact, outside of PiS, I think many would prefer Germany do more for central European security. I don't think Romania and Slovakia are as much on the radar in that sense. The economies of the proposed alliance are just too small vs. the US or Germany/France/UK/Italy.

That said, the Russian military has shown its weaknesses in Ukraine so maybe there's a point that central European countries would do well figuring out ways to get cheaper but effective weapons (ie by partnering with South Korea) for the specific threat of Russian invasion that still isn't taken quite so seriously by France or Germany.

French/German/UK/US defense industry is consolidated and it puts Poland in a position of simply being a consumer, especially having sold off many of its arms manufacturers that produce things like helicopters. In the long term that's not a good position to be in, so maybe 'teaming up' with some of its neighbors would help. I don't really know how or if that would work since, say, Romania's interests are not the same as Poland's. Nor do I really trust the current Polish government to pull it off, but who knows.
posted by UN at 1:39 AM on February 21, 2023 [3 favorites]


This reads like an extended fantasy about the US and UK, arm in arm, saving the world together while the "fragile" EU looks on.

This same author wrote in 2017 about the imminent collapse of liberalism in the EU and applauded the UK for
"The most decisive response .., which decided in a referendum last year to break free of the EU’s liberal strictures by leaving the union. That is the luxury of a large and powerful state with global reach and a range of geopolitical options open to it."
It strikes me that the Eastern European pact is the new CANZUK - wishful thinking from Brexiters about how the world will magically realign with the US and UK at the center and the EU will finally crumble. It is never spelled out why the US needs the UK in these scenarios other than - of course they do.

It is all consistent with Britain's almost delusional outsized view of itself, most recently on show in the YouGov poll asking which country did the most to defeat the Nazis. Most countries say the US or Russia. But people in the UK insist it was overwhelmingly themselves.

Of course there is tension between the EU and Poland right now. But, despite all of that, the EU is viewed positively by the Polish people and only British papers mention the idea that Poland would break away or realign itself in any way.
posted by vacapinta at 2:05 AM on February 21, 2023 [16 favorites]


In what world could the anecdote I cited be interpreted as in any way pro-Russian? Anyway, Eastern European nationalists are about evenly divided in terms of their attitude to Putin (Orban and Erdogan basically pro, Duda and the Baltics anti), so the idea that criticizing them is somehow pro-Russian is baseless. Unless this viewpoint reflects an underlying unwillingness to admit that the world might not actually be divided into Big Bad Putin on one side and the Free World Avengers on the other.
posted by derrinyet at 5:01 AM on February 21, 2023


This same author wrote in 2017 about the imminent collapse of liberalism in the EU and applauded the UK for

"The most decisive response .., which decided in a referendum last year to break free of the EU’s liberal strictures by leaving the union. That is the luxury of a large and powerful state with global reach and a range of geopolitical options open to it."


I've been spending a while browsing Timothy Less' work and it's impressive how much everything he's predicted has not happened. But he's still working hard on hoping and pushing for the disintegration of various Balkan* states, so I guess he's got energy if not accuracy.

*Not entirely sure what Bosnia did to him, but it must have been something terrible.
posted by lesbiassparrow at 5:08 AM on February 21, 2023 [5 favorites]


The idea of the so-called Intermarium is entirely a phantom caused by the historical (and now no longer true) refusal by Western European EU states to fail to take seriously the security concerns of their Eastern neighbours relating to Russian imperialism. There is no enduring political identity that magically skips over Germany, Denmark, and The Netherlands to somehow align itself with the UK and the US - it was a phantom which purely reflected that (temporary) lack of geopolitical realism about what Russia was and what it intended for its neighbours.

Trying to ground a temporary set of aligned countries like that in political and economic realities which are 18th century at best is just nuts.

It strikes me that the Eastern European pact is the new CANZUK - wishful thinking from Brexiters about how the world will magically realign with the US and UK at the center and the EU will finally crumble. It is never spelled out why the US needs the UK in these scenarios other than - of course they do.

Yes, that element is slightly strange.

This isn't really a movement towards the "US and UK" but "towards NATO" and as a secondary result making the EU look less important in purely relative terms (even if in absolute terms it has shown the strength and importance of the EU, only a few years serious people were talking about NATO being essentially done for). I mean, yeah, the EU is not a security alliance and some of its member states are militarily neutral. So if you have two *almost* overlapping power blocs which tie a group of countries together then logically in countries which *are* members of both, during a time of peace, the EU will rise in terms of relative importance and during times of threatened and actual war, NATO will.

There's a lot of waffle but ultimately many European countries have done exactly what Crazy Donny said out loud and relied on the US to fund their security for decades now. That was never a good idea, everybody knew it, and now everybody regrets it.

Who are major NATO members but not EU members? Well principally the US, the UK, Turkey, Norway and Canada and some others and very much in that order1. So in that sense, yes this increases the influence of the US and UK (and the others) in Eastern Europe but really this is a re-assertion of American influence via NATO and only very secondarily an increase in the influence of the others.

The US has a very large military and with the rise of specifically military threats, US support is just more relevant for countries like Poland than German support. That is leading to a larger pivot towards the US (including the selection of AP1000 rather than EPR technology for the Polish reactor fleet and movements in that direction by Ukraine as well. EDF was *unbelievably* salty about this and put out a press release about how they couldn't believe that anyone wouldn't choose the "European" technology of the EPR, but Poland is also thinking that it may not be able to rely on security guarantees from the "European" parts of its alliance structure so why not buy American?).

This was the same issue that led Australia to go for US (with UK involvement) nuclear submarines instead of French - buying into the wider US security alliance is just better because it is more powerful. There as well there was a slightly fantastical belief that this was in some ways an alliance of three equals (in the UK, Australians believe a lot of old cobblers but not that at least) rather than a complex decision having to do with the UK variant of submarines needing fewer crew and having fewer components that the US would never share even with its allies.

It is in fact the case that specifically the UK has lost a lot of influence in Eastern and Central Europe because although in terms of "values" it was aligned with the Western European countries, in terms of the role of the EU vs national competencies it was closer to the Visegrad countries i.e. they would frequently have a shared position. Without that shared position, there are much weaker shared economic interests and unlike the US, the UK military just isn't particularly strong. All the money has been invested in the RAF and the RN which leaves them without much ground gear to provide to Ukraine and without much potential support to provide militarily to Poland and other Eastern states.

At least Timothy Less is honest that Brexit only makes sense if the EU is on the brink of break-up anyway, though. It doesn't really look like it is, though, does it Timmy?

(1) Arguably in the Ukraine conflict Turkey is more important because of its position though.
posted by atrazine at 6:19 AM on February 21, 2023 [5 favorites]


In what world could the anecdote I cited be interpreted as in any way pro-Russian?

It’s not the anecdotes, it’s how you use them.
posted by UN at 6:22 AM on February 21, 2023


This same author wrote in 2017 about the imminent collapse of liberalism in the EU and applauded the UK for
"The most decisive response .., which decided in a referendum last year to break free of the EU’s liberal strictures by leaving the union. That is the luxury of a large and powerful state with global reach and a range of geopolitical options open to it."


Heh. That was the vote in which the UK declared themselves to be small minded petty racists who will loudly embrace their own destruction to reject anything else. The success of the vote was largely down to:

1. Assorted Peter Thiel style fascist billionaires who love Russia and hate democracy
2. Home grown racists who hate Poland
And, very distantly…
3. Russia, which is Russia

So of course this person thinks that makes it for to be the lynchpin of this new world order they’ve dreamed up.
posted by Artw at 7:43 AM on February 21, 2023 [4 favorites]


I think Russian incompetence has been laid so completely bare that any real influence they have had on the politics of other countries has to be taken with a large grain of salt but we hardly need Yet Another Brexit Takes thread so I'll leave it at that.
posted by atrazine at 8:44 AM on February 21, 2023 [1 favorite]


I don’t think Poland’s economy will be able to afford the military their leaders envision. Im skeptical of the ability of individual EU members to afford to keep having completely separate militaries. Germany and France struggle and they are much bigger economies than Poland.
posted by interogative mood at 5:56 PM on February 21, 2023


There is no enduring political identity that magically skips over Germany, Denmark, and The Netherlands to somehow align itself with the UK and the US

As Olaf Scholz observed, "The centre of Europe is moving eastwards", widening the gap between Western and Central/Eastern EU, and exacerbating conflicts of interest along predictable fault lines: money goes West to East, people go East to West, while EU Council decision making that requires a qualified majority vote (55% of EU Member States representing 65% of EU population) benefits populous/high birth rate countries like Poland. And of course the UK and the US have an interest in playing each side off of each other. Maybe that doesn't constitute an enduring political identity, but marriages of convenience over shared interests can nevertheless be mutually beneficial & long-lived.
posted by dmh at 6:37 PM on February 21, 2023


I don’t think Poland’s economy will be able to afford the military their leaders envision. Im skeptical of the ability of individual EU members to afford to keep having completely separate militaries. Germany and France struggle and they are much bigger economies than Poland.

If you look at the military spending of these nations France, the UK and Germany are around 60b US$ per year, Poland is ~14b. So I agree, that Poland does not and will not for a long time have the same weight.
As a percentage of GDP France, the UK and Poland are all around 2%, while Germany is at just 1.4%. I don't think any of these are very high and Germany's is rather low. I don't think they struggle all that hard.
It would throw off the balance bitween the traditional big three in Europe if Germany increased their spending to a similar percentage of GDP.
posted by the_dreamwriter at 10:21 PM on February 21, 2023


populous/high birth rates like Poland

Poland's birth rate is 1.38. That's extremely low.

There's no planet on which Poland is going to swing towards the UK. The US, yes, but the UK really did itself no favours with the rhetoric about countries like Poland during the Brexit campaign.
posted by lesbiassparrow at 12:20 AM on February 22, 2023 [3 favorites]


(The idea that somehow the UK is going to wield a new power in Eastern Europe seems about as well founded as the idea that Ireland is going to leave the EU so as to maintain its ties to the UK. There's nothing about how the UK is managing post-Brexit that would lead any EU nation to look at it as a regional power worth courting madly. Brexit made the EU more stable and powerful, not less.)
posted by lesbiassparrow at 1:49 AM on February 22, 2023 [3 favorites]


Poland's birth rate is 1.38. That's extremely low.

I'm an idiot--I should have just said "populous".

Brexit made the EU more stable and powerful, not less.

I agree. de Gaulle was right, the UK was never a good fit, and I would be happy never to hear from them again. But then I'm much more interested in Europe than in the UK.
posted by dmh at 4:27 AM on February 22, 2023 [2 favorites]


Thanks for helping me understand this issue better, everyone. I hope you do not take it as a reflection upon your explanations that, as a result, I say "what a mess".
posted by BlunderingArtist at 4:53 AM on February 22, 2023 [1 favorite]


> "The centre of Europe is moving eastwards"

The Poland/Malaysia model - "Poland's exports are very diversified, but the electronics and automotive sectors make up the biggest pieces."
Most analyses of Poland’s development tend to focus on its transition away from communism and central planning after 1989, and on its accession to the European Union in 2004. Many scholars believe that joining the EU prompted a bunch of deep institutional changes that were extremely beneficial for Poland... Poland, like Malaysia, attracted a lot of FDI, with the first big inflows coming in the late 90s...

How did Poland do this? Well, being close to Europe, having EU-compliant institutions, and having cheap labor certainly helped. But the big FDI boom started almost a decade before Poland joined the EU. What happened in the mid-90s? At least part of the answer, unsurprisingly, is “special economic zones”... This is a bit similar in spirit to the way Tennessee, Kentucky, and Alabama lured U.S. automakers away from high-wage unionized northern states with the promise of cheaper non-union labor. You don’t see Tennessee or those other states becoming home to the new Detroit; all the big car brands are still headquartered elsewhere...

Poland is starting to build a few good manufacturing brands of its own, including Solaris, the household appliance maker Amica, and the bathroom appliance maker Cersanit. And outside of manufacturing, Poland is starting to build some brands in other sectors like retail, software, and entertainment. You might not recognize the names of any Polish carmakers, but chances are you know who [the witcher] is... I just wrote a post about a Polish-Japanese anime collaboration the other day.

And as for technology, eventually, investments in good universities and strong intellectual property systems will bear fruit. High-tech startups might require a bit of government support at some point to poach talented locals away from the multinationals, but that doesn’t sound like an impossible task. And it’s a lot easier to be trying to solve this problem when you’re at $30,000 of per capita GDP than when you’re at $8,000.
> Russia is flailing around, incoherent, dying. Those adjacent can choose to grab a slice while the patriarch is dying, or let someone else grab it instead.

Soros says Russian defeat in Ukraine would trigger dissolution of 'Russian empire' - "The countries of the former Soviet Union can hardly wait to see the Russians defeated in Ukraine because they want to assert their independence..."*
posted by kliuless at 6:32 AM on February 22, 2023


France and the UK have a lot of their defence budgets tied up in their blue-water navies, long distance airlift, and other high price capabilities though. A country like Poland could be quite canny and have huge numbers of moderately priced tanks, guided rocket artillery, and infantry anti-tank weapons and create an immensely powerful territorial defence force with the ability to operate in Poland and neighbouring countries but not elsewhere and that matches their stated objectives better anyway.

Saying "de Gaulle was right" is the same in fact as saying that the Brexiteers were right which isn't a position I would endorse.

Almost no country, individually speaking, is a "good fit" for the EU if you want to make that kind of post hoc argument. Belgium maybe? An argument that sounds vaguely logical can be made for the lack of "fit" for every single EU member, even Germany and France themselves. The EU exists to keep mutual peace and prosperity between a bunch of squabbling nation states who in the absence of its (often infuriating) deliberative mechanisms would be constantly and unproductively at each other's throats. In other words, the EU needs to exist precisely because nobody fits rather than inevitably existing because many countries do.
posted by atrazine at 6:37 AM on February 22, 2023 [3 favorites]


Saying "de Gaulle was right" is the same in fact as saying that the Brexiteers were right which isn't a position I would endorse.

Almost no country, individually speaking, is a "good fit" for the EU if you want to make that kind of post hoc argument


de Gaulle was hardly making a "post hoc" argument, given that he was adamant about keeping the UK out from before there even was such as thing as a "EU". He viewed the UK as a trojan horse for US interests, and in the final analysis simply didn't trust them—a judgment whereof the wisdom has been amply demonstrated, I would say.

I think it's awfully revisionist to equate the historical UK-outside-EU position with Brexit and its parade of malevolent clowns, given that the political stakes were reversed, with it being Labour who voiced the strongest objections against the Treaty of Accession in 1972.

Just the fact that the UK has a deeply rooted common law tradition whereas the continent follows a civil law tradition makes the UK an poor fit. I mean there are real differences there. (to wit, also, the whimsical system of measures, and their heretical Church, and the god-awful food)
posted by dmh at 8:02 AM on February 22, 2023 [2 favorites]


de Gaulle wasn't, of course, but my point is that having left the EU, one can make this convincing sounding argument that of course it was inevitable that the UK would because of: *list of differences* but that we can really make fairly convincing lists of that sort for more or less any country in the EU or on its boundaries.

Is it obvious that Norway and Iceland would be out of the EU but in the EEA? I get the feeling that if Norway was in the EU but Iceland wasn't, we'd be able to come up with a plausible sounding set of reasons for that (land borders, proximity, etc.) and in fact, any ideas of nationally distinctive characteristics reminds me of Icelandic bankers pre-2008 who with I-swear-to-god-straight-faces claimed that the Icelandic tradition of high-seas fishing meant they were culturally good at assessing and taking risk.

Take the Common / civil law split. Scotland has a legal system that isn't common law derived and the way in which civil law is actually implemented across different European countries is extremely different. In particular, there are very particular strains of Napoleonic, Germanic, and Nordic traditions within civil law. It's like saying that Finnish and Hungarian are linguistically close - technically true but good luck ordering dinner in Hungarian in Helsinki.

I think the common / civil law split is actually a very English way of looking at it because it requires understanding the English system in depth but having only a slightly vague view of "the Continent" as being different when the reality is that in many ways differences between different civil law frameworks are pretty big. That's before you even get the overlays of whether they had homegrown or imposed totalitarian governments in the 19th and 20th centuries and how that will have affected legal traditions of independence and public views towards that.

You could equally argue that the "natural" seam in Europe has to do with length of parliamentary traditions, the role of the "rule of law" in society - extremely important to the Dutch for example, which grew out of the English and low countries bourgeois revolutions and which is important but with a very different flavour in France, or loads of other things. The Dutch have a view of the courts as being outside of the state and a controlling influence on it that is quite different from many other Civil Law countries.

Or you could say that the former Hanseatic league cities, Copenhagen, and The Western Netherlands plus the City of London form a sort of world within a world with much more outward orientation than each of their respective national hinterlands.

Or draw the line at places that historically followed post-marriage neo-localism vs places that didn't and end up with a different barrier.

Or draw the line at the historical boundary between Western Catholicism and its schismatic offshoots and Eastern Orthodoxy.

The Russian Empire also had its own systems of measurements which can pop up in informal contexts, I don't think I'd make the argument that there's a "Verst line" that splits Europe.

More broadly, the idea that there is a common European-ness which can be drawn from Faro to Talinn to Lesbos but which meets just a little too much difference at Dover seems fanciful to the extreme to me. That's my view anyway as a non-British person who's lived in many places throughout Europe and also outside of it.

All European food North of the Rhine varies between splendid medieval barbarism at best to Scandinavian Fish Crimes at worst so I'm not sure that's a suitable partition principle...
posted by atrazine at 9:31 AM on February 22, 2023 [8 favorites]


When people show you who they are, believe them. The UK has been whining and pleading ever since it entered that it was not Europe, that it was special.

OK, OK, you are not Europe. You're special.
posted by Meatbomb at 10:52 AM on February 22, 2023 [3 favorites]


de Gaulle wasn't, of course, but my point is that having left the EU, one can make this convincing sounding argument that of course it was inevitable that the UK would because of: *list of differences* but that we can really make fairly convincing lists of that sort for more or less any country in the EU or on its boundaries.

Right, except that the crucial distinction, between the UK and all the other countries for which you could make the argument, is that the UK actually left. Maybe the differences don't matter to you, but the fact of the matter is that they seem to do.

More broadly, the idea that there is a common European-ness which can be drawn from Faro to Talinn to Lesbos but which meets just a little too much difference at Dover seems fanciful to the extreme to me. That's my view anyway as a non-British person who's lived in many places throughout Europe and also outside of it.

Absolutely. There's a Scandinavian Europe, a Southern Europe, a Catholic Europe, a Rhineland Europe, a Hanseatic Europe, a West Europe, an East Europe, a Tomato Europe, a Potato Europe... There are numerous Europes, and they wax and wane, opportunistically at times. This thread is about a few ways to conceive of Europes near what we think of as the east/center of Europe.
posted by dmh at 12:39 PM on February 22, 2023 [3 favorites]


To bring this home, perhaps... I hope it's clear I'm not arguing there is some fully determined British essence that causally explains why the UK left the EU, or a countervailing European essence for that matter—truth be told I would have been entirely happy not thinking about the UK at all! But it's true that it's somewhat conceivable we could have had Grexit or Nexit or Frexit instead of Brexit—there was a lot of uncertainty and fretting about the future of EU at the time. The experience of getting to see the Brexit trainwreck at a more or less safe distance from across the Channel definitely made those other *exits a lot less likely, and strengthened the EU.

At the same time, it's undeniable that the UK occupies a unique position within Europe, geographically, historically, economically, and culturally, and that the Leave campaign succeeded in part because they were able to mobilize a British sense of "difference".

Certainly, it's exceedingly arbitrary what it means to be "British". Notions of national or group identity are notoriously tenuous and frequently wholly fabricated. This is just the sometimes sordid, but always vital heart of politics: you have to persuade people that they share some interest or identity in order for them to form a coalition that can seize power and effect change. The Brexiteers were able to form that coalition because they are shifty, shameless rat-people, yes, but also because they had help from (real or perceived but in any case existing prior to Brexit) notions of Britain as distinct from "Europe".

Now of course the Intermarium isn't a ''real'' thing, either—it's an exorbitant fantasy, a veritable Hindenburg of an idea. But since "the centre of Europe is moving eastwards", after almost a century of languishing on the periphery, people are rediscovering & falling in love with all kinds of forgotten fairytales, and trying to kiss them back to life. I find that development important, because while the fairytales aren't real, it still makes a difference whether we look at the world as full of evil stepmothers & hungry wolves, or as full of princely frogs & happily ever afters, or as something in between.
posted by dmh at 2:56 PM on February 22, 2023 [4 favorites]


Stuck at home with the flu, I’ve had plenty of time to watch interviews such as this one with Timothy Snyder. I’m not sure if he touched on Brexit, but he discusses the mistakes in Obama administration’s actions (or rather, in-action) towards Putin’s Russia and how effectively Putin was using social media propaganda methods to influence events in western countries (ie election-meddling in the US and convincing the west that Russia had not actually invaded Crimea). Apparently there was no New York Times front-page headline "Russia invades Crimea", people were just clueless even though it was right in front of them. It’s nothing new to us in this discussion, but I found the way he laid it out striking anyway. In hindsight you wonder, what was the collective west thinking?

But it’s not over. Snyder’s interview makes me think of the Nordstream pipeline discussion and how the idea that "maybe it was Norway" has gently been injected into the conversion. That advertising-esque rhythmic memory trick is nearly brilliant: Nordstream was Norway. But now I’m just inventing things, right? Just as people invented the idea that those "little green men" were actually Russian soldiers. What proof do I have anyway? What were we talking about again?

Nordstream’s sole purpose was to skip over all the countries in the so-called "Intermarium" zone. I’ve said it a number of times on this forum but it’s something many journalists don’t mention when they jump into the conversation — there were plenty of pipelines to get Russian gas to Western Europe. It’s so that there’s nothing in the way of Putin slicing up central Europe for his own purposes. Putin successfully got a former German chancellor to work for him, how much of a propaganda coup is that? It’s just mind-blowing to me — back then it was barely talked about here in Germany. It’s like Bill Clinton getting a job at Al-Qaeda and everyone shrugs.

Anyway Brexit, famously, was another coup for Putin. I don’t think I need to mention more on that here, but we know he may not have been the root cause of Brexit — but he certainly did what he can to make it happen. Unfortunately, some British politicians were happy to receive the free help from a dark source and so we had Brexit.

Running xenophobic propaganda campaigns against Central Europeans (Poles, Romanians, Bulgarians) in the UK was easy — Russia has developed those stereotypes for decades and you see some of those results of that in this very thread. It doesn’t work as well in the US, which is why you don’t get as much of that there. For years, any article in Germany about Nordstream had a comment response within milliseconds including the phrase "those greedy Poles want a cut of the gas money". In the UK, you’d see the same things about greedy lazy Poles lining up for take good British healthcare for themselves. Did you know Ukrainians are mostly Nazis? That Poles were responsible for the Holocaust?

Some "Putin Facts" start with a kernel of truth. Yes, a Romanian has surely visited a doctor in the UK. Does that mean they’re healthcare tourists? Of course not. Yes, women have difficulties getting abortions in Poland and its a national tragedy. Does that mean Poland has something to do a Russian soldier raping a Ukrainian woman? No. But someone made the gross juxtaposition in the comments above.

Putin will continue to exploit our weaknesses. He’ll find reputable sources to inject stories that infect our conversations bit by bit. Wherever there’s a greedy anti-EU politician — in the UK, France, Italy or elsewhere — Russian money shows up.

Snyder mentions that Putin may have simply gotten a little too relaxed and confident about his propaganda efforts prior to the recent invasion of Ukraine and I think there’s probably a truth to this. The man has had so many successes, I’m not surprised if he let his guard down. It’s just so damned easy to fool us.
posted by UN at 2:04 AM on February 23, 2023 [6 favorites]


There's a fascinating book, Yiddish Civilisation by Paul Kriwaczek which is pretty relevant to the idea of the Intermarium as well. The author essentially makes the case for the now (essentially completely gone) world of a distinctly Yiddish civilisation which was not merely peripheral to the pre-nation-state worlds of Polishness or Ukrainianness but genuinely existed in parallel. (He also makes the interesting and on reflection almost certainly true claim that there were Jews in South Ukraine before there were Christians which I've never heard made elsewhere).

I'm not a geographical determinist but I wonder to what degree the sparsity of natural boundaries between the Urals and central Germany has created certain geopolitical realities which drove civilizational patterns. In particular, what I think of as a distinctive pattern of settlement compared to my Western European ancestors is the pattern of mosaic but unmixed villages (you might have a Polish village, a German village, and a Jewish village close to each other without long term integration ever happening nor, until very late, nation-states coalescing out of these). We don't see that at all in Western Europe where during that same time there might be strong e.g. Burgundian identity alongside other "French" identities but those people would actually be in Burgundy.
posted by atrazine at 2:21 AM on February 23, 2023 [4 favorites]


He also makes the interesting and on reflection almost certainly true claim that there were Jews in South Ukraine before there were Christians which I've never heard made elsewhere.

Off topic: AFAIW, the first evidence of Jews in Crimea is from the Late Hellenistic period (or possibly early Roman) and was discovered in the 1950s - there's been later excavations (1990s) that have uncovered more, including a synagogue.
posted by lesbiassparrow at 3:32 AM on February 23, 2023 [4 favorites]


Ah, I guess it wasn't such a novel claim after all then. It makes perfect sense, I think it's just that Western Europeans think of Crimea as "East of Poland and Germany" rather than "just North of Roman Black Sea ports" so it seemed surprising when I read it (and then immediately became obvious).
posted by atrazine at 8:45 AM on February 23, 2023


I look at a programs like the F-35 where the costs of R&D were too big for the US alone and they ended up partnering with allies. Before the war there were people pointing to Russian systems like the S-400 and Armata and SU-57 as credible examples of Russia catching up to, and perhaps beating the Patriot, the M1 Abrams and F-35. Yet the S-400 has struggled against ancient Soviet airplanes, the Russians haven’t been able to get the Armata out of the factory in any numbers and they have a handful of SU-57s and at least one has been shot down. Russia has not been able to deploy the kinds of drones and smart munitions the west has in abundance. The Ukrainians have largely been fighting with old Soviet gear and lots of 90s era US/NATO gear. We haven’t even sent them the really good stuff yet.

For Poland the problem is they are smaller in population than Germany and a long way from catching up economically in terms of GDP per capita. They can import a bunch of advanced military equipment; but those maintenance costs are going to hit quickly. And then you have to go and buy the next generation or pay for upgrades to all that stuff just to maintain your defense posture. That’s a lot of money exiting the country via the military budget.
posted by interogative mood at 11:30 AM on February 23, 2023


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