SubscribeOn the 2nd January 1915, Kitchener received an appeal from the Grand Duke Nicholas for a diversion which would relieve the Turkish pressure on Russia's forces in the Caucasus. Kitchener felt unable to provide the troops and suggested a naval demonstration against the Dardanelles. Churchill's imagination seized upon the wider strategic possibilities, and he proposed, in default of military aid, to convert the demonstration into an attempt to force the passage. His naval advisers, if not enthusiastic, did bot oppose the project; and the admiral on the spot, Carden, drew up a plan. A naval force, mainly of obsolete vessels, was got together with French aid, and after a preliminary bombardment, entered the Straits on the 18th March. But a newly laid row of mines, in an unsuspected spot, caused the sinking of several ships; and the attempt was abandoned.I'm posting this because, compelling as stories of hardship by the rank-and-file on both sides are, I'm far, far more interested in the decisions that placed them there. That tends to get lost in the Anzac story.
It is a moot question whether a prompt renewal of the advance would have succeeded, for the Turkish ammunition was exhausted, and in such conditions the mine obstacle might have been overcome. But the new naval commander, Admiral de Robeck, decided against it unless military aid were forthcoming. Already, a month before, the War Council had determined on a joint attack, and begun the dispatch of a military force under Sir Ian Hamilton. But the authorities, slow in accepting the new scheme, were equally slow in releasing the necessary troops for its execution. Even when these were sent, in inadequate numbers, several more weeks' delay had to be incurred - at Alexandria - in order to redistribute the force in its transports suitable for tactical action. Worst of all, this fumbling policy had thrown away the chance of surprise. When the military bombardment too place in February, only 2 Turkish divisions were at the Straits; this was increased to 4 by the date of the naval attack; and to 6 when Hamilton was at last able to attempt his landing. For this he had only 4 British divisions and 1 French division - actually inferior in strength to the enemy in a situation where the inherent preponderance of defensive over offensive power was multiplied by the natural difficulties of the terrain. His weakness of numbers, and his restricted mission of aiding the passage of the fleet, compelled him to choose a landing on the Gallipoli peninsula in preference to one on the mainland or on the Asiatic shore.
On 25th April he made his spring, at the southern tip of the peninsula near Cape Helles and also near Gaba Tepe some fifteen miles up the Aegean coast. The French, as a diversion, made a temporary landing at Kum Kale on the Asiatic shore. But once the momentary asset of tactical surprise had passed, and the Turks were able to bring up their reserves, the invaders could not expand their two precarious footholds.
Ultimately, in July, the British Government decided to send a further 5 divisions to reinforce the 7 now on the peninsula. But by the time they arrived the Turkish strength in the region had also risen, to 15 divisions. Hamilton decided on a double stroke - a reinforced blow from Gaba Tepe and a new landing at Suvla Bay, a few miles north - to sever the middle of the peninsula and secure the heights commanding the Narrows. If this thrust appears more direct than a landing at Bulair or on the Asiatic shore, its justification is that it was on a line not expected by the enemy command, whose reserves were concentrated at the other points. Only 1 1/2 Turkish battalions barred the way during the 36 hours before the reserves arrived. Time and opportubity were forfeited by the inexperience of the landing troops and the inertia of the commanders on the spot. The deadlock, the disappointment, and the opposition of those who had always disliked the project, soon brought about the evacuation of the peninsula.
Yet the verdict of Falkenhayn on the Dardanelles scheme was: 'If the straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea were not permanently closed to Entente traffic, all hope of a successful course of the war would be very considerably diminished. Russia would have been freed from her significant isolation ... which offered a safer guarantee than military successes that sooner or later a crippling of the forces of this Titan must take place automatically.'
The fault was not in the conception but in the execution. If the British had used at the outset even a fair proportion of the forces they ultimately expended in driblets, it is clear from the evidence of the opposing commanders that success would probably have crowned their undertaking. While the Dardanelles move was a direct approach to Turkey, it was an indirect approach to the main Turkish armies then engaged in the Caucasus, and, on a higher level, an indirect approach to the Central Powers as a whole.. Viewed against the gloomy background of the Western Front, where the density of force in relation to space offered no prospect of a decisive penetration, the Dardanelles conception appears to have fulfilled the principle of adjusting the end to the means as thoroughly as its execution violated this principle.
But I still don't understand ANZAC day. Is it a celebration of national pride? Mateship? Brotherhood? Courage? All that? If so, why should it be linked to a pointless millitary conflict we were dragged into out of some pathetic loyalty to Mother England? Is it just a respectful celebration of those who have given their lives and their health to the service of our country? That's fair enough, but why should those of us who never made that sacrifice have a right to feel proud and patriotic?But then, I went to the ANZAC day march in Adelaide this year, and saw Sudanese refugees lined up down King William St waving Australian flags. So I'm probably just a cynical wanker.
-me.
vitia: Wow. Could you post a more western-centric post? No mention of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk? No apparent consciousness of why the place might be called something other than "Gallipoli"? Enormous use of the passive voice to obscure the fact that, actually, the Turks held their own quite well, and then publicly praised and raised a monument at the battlefield to those who fell in battle against them? And used that battle as the impetus for the formation of the modern Turkish nation which still stands today as a rare example of what a secular and democratic nation might look like in the Islamic Middle East?But what about your own posts, vitia? No mention that the Gallipoli landings practically coincided with the start of the Turks' 1915–22 genocide of the Armenians? Or that Turkish nationalism—highly 'triumphalist' in its own right—rests on the back on the 1,500,000 victims of that campaign? But then again, I guess 'most educated folks' should know about that, right?
And all you've got is ANZAC triumphalism?I have to disagree with you about the triumphalism you mention. In the case of this particular battle it is more about the sense of victimisation of the young white Aussie/Kiwi males. (Don't know about Australian Aborigines, but in NZ some Maori tribes refused to participate in WWI for obvious reasons that most educated people would know about.) There is a sense of the colonials having been hard done by, by an uncaring Britain. I think this victim mentality is far more insidious than any kind of triumphalism as it gives people license to adopt some pretty atrocious attitudes towards those they see themselves as victimised by.
Wow. Could you post a more western-centric post? No mention of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk? No apparent consciousness of why the place might be called something other than "Gallipoli"?Actually there is a place in Wellington called Ataturk in commemoration of Ataturk. It was named as part of a cultural exchange of names and monuments between Australia, New Zealand and Turkey. In NZ the Turks and Australians are part of our ANZAC services and we commemorate all who died on this day, so I think you might be a little unfair there.
What other country celebrates ... a defeat?
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posted by Kattullus at 9:25 PM on September 15, 2008